


J o u r n a l o f
ABORIGINAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Volume 7, Number 1



CANDO



Captus Press



*Journal of
Aboriginal Economic Development*

VOLUME 7, NUMBER 1



Captus Press

The Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development is the first journal devoted exclusively to issues and practices in the field of economic development and Aboriginal peoples' communities. The journal, published jointly by Captus Press and CANDO (Council for the Advancement of Native Development Officers), offers articles that are of interest to those who teach and those who work in the field.

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THE ARTIST

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Nancy Desjarlais

Nancy Desjarlais was born a Plains Cree/Metis from the Anzac First Nations in northern Alberta. Her roots have been a deep force that wind throughout her life and work.

While growing up in Edmonton, Alberta with her three sisters, Nancy learned that creativity was a great solace and the door that would lead to her fulfillment as an artist.

She entered the University of Alberta in 1989 and obtained a bachelor's degree in painting and printmaking. In 1993, she won first and third prizes in the annual Peace Hills Trust Native Art competition.

In 1995, Nancy moved to Vancouver Island, knowing she was going to a land of accessible forests and abundant waters that her spirit craved. There, she developed her style and techniques in mixed media and, inspired by the ocean and the petroglyphs close by, she painted a series of work that included those themes.

Nancy continues to explore the unlimited realm of the artist and recent work includes paintings of people, mandalas, meditative figures, tricksters and mythical beings. Some of her work can be view online at <<http://nancydesjarlais.blogspot.com>>.

Nancy was chosen as winner of the 2009 Peace Hills Trust Native Art Competition with a painting called, *Spirit Horses Running Over Rough Terrain*. It was painted with simplicity and freedom in mind. This colourful, mixed media painting shows two running horses, "symbols of our spirit", and the medicine wheel with its four directions. "The rough terrain implies that we must strive for freedom in our spirits no matter how rough our path is."

Recently, Nancy returned to Edmonton to be closer to her family.

Editors' Comments

Welcome to Volume 7, Number 1 of the *Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development*. This 13th issue of JAED marks another first for the journal. During this past year, the first eight issues of JAED were made available on-line, providing free access to readers, students, community change agents, EDOs, researchers, and writers. The on-line issues span a 10-year period from 1996 to 2005 and include many unique stories and research on Aboriginal economic development in Canada, and around the world.

The on-line issues are available through the Indigenous Studies Portal (iPortal) at the University of Saskatchewan. The Indigenous Studies Portal Research Tool, as it is also called, may be accessed through the following link: <<http://iportal.usask.ca/>>.

According to its site, the iPortal connects faculty, students, researchers, and members of the community with electronic resources: books, articles, theses, documents, photographs, archival resources, and maps. The Indigenous Studies Portal is an initiative of the University of Saskatchewan Library. As of March 2010, the iPortal had more than 21,000 records, including the "Our Legacy" archival records. This contains photos, anthropological field notes, diaries, correspondence, and other textual documents.

The iPortal website not only provides links to Indigenous programs and events at the University of Saskatchewan, it also offers specialized tools for teaching and scholarship for anyone interested in Indigenous studies in Canada. For our readers of JAED and members of CANDO, the iPortal website provides links to a vast array of resource materials related to business and community development.

The digitization of JAED, which will include additional issues over the next few years, is yet another way CANDO and Captus Press are attempting to better serve the needs of community EDOs, business leaders, government managers, researchers, and students. Of

course, this overarching task continues to be addressed in the content of our journals, in an attempt to serve all of our members. By gathering and publishing stories that are meaningful and useful to academic and pragmatic readers and members, CANDO remains mindful of the critical balance between academic knowledge and the practical day-to-day needs of practising EDOs, community leaders, and institutional managers.

In this issue we offer interviews with Indigenous leaders, a case study, an overview of training opportunities, and research on various business/social sectors. This issue concludes with the State of the Aboriginal Economy by examining the new Federal Framework on Aboriginal Economic Development (FFAED). The issue ends with the review of a recently published book on Aboriginal property rights.

On behalf of CANDO and Captus Press, and especially the editorial board, we hope you enjoy this issue of JAED, and you will consider becoming a contributor to the journal, sharing your research or stories with us in the months and years to come.

Editors' Introduction

Warren Weir and Wanda Wuttunee

This section describes the strategies and motivations of those addressing the challenges and conflicting views regarding resource development.

Meet Mark Sark, CEO of Gespe'Gewaq Mi'gmaq Resource Council, "the best natural resource and environmental organization in eastern Canada." You are invited to find out why he says this and learn about significant influences brought to bear on his work. Gaming is a growing industry and Enoch Cree Nation has been a leader that is willing to share experiences fully in their challenging journey to realize community goals. Paulette Flamond brings 15 years of entrepreneurial experience to her current position with the Aboriginal Business Service Network Society. She has a strong focus with a number of organizations and projects on Aboriginal economic development.

Many communities are facing natural resource development opportunities. They must deal with companies and contracts that will impact the futures of their ways of life. Based on research in and around Baker Lake, Nunavut, Warren Bernauer examines the consulting phase of this process in detail. He questions current consultative processes and makes recommendations for nurturing a stronger community role.

Finally, individual training needs are recognized in an article by Robert Oppenheimer, Tom O'Connell, and Warren Weir. Surveying course offerings by National Aboriginal Capital Corporations Association, Aboriginal Financial Officers Association, and Council for the Advancement of Native Development Officers provides

readers with a quick review of the array of courses in the area of economic development.

This section can be a catalyst to reaching out to the many resources that are available to economic development officers and others with an interest in this field. Several note their willingness to share their experiences, so take a step in that direction and support your growth in this field.

CANDO 2009 ECONOMIC DEVELOPER OF THE YEAR AWARD WINNERS

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Anita Boyle

CANDO EASTERN EDUCATION & RESEARCH MANAGER

RECOGNIZE! CELEBRATE! HONOUR!

Sharing our stories and celebrating our successes will ensure that economic development initiatives continue to grow. In 1995, the CANDO Economic Developer of the Year Award was created to recognize and promote recent or long-standing Aboriginal economic development initiatives throughout Canada. All winners past and present share a common desire to bring their communities forward as each pursues a vision of sustainable economic self sufficiency. Though the paths that each took have been different, all have lead to success. As a former EDO of a small First Nation community I can personally attest to the challenges faced by First Nation communities as they struggle to utilize their strengths to maximize opportunity. Navigating the business world of today with dwindling government resources makes this no easy task!

Three outstanding examples of Aboriginal economic development were awarded for their hard work over the past year. Delegates at the 2009 National Conference celebrated, recognized and honoured winners in three categories: Individual EDO, Community & Aboriginal Private Sector Business. The following are the Economic Developer Award Winners for 2009.

GESPE'GEWAQ MI'GMAQ RESOURCE COUNCIL ABORIGINAL PRIVATE SECTOR BUSINESS AWARD

Anita Boyle: Mark, can you tell us about yourself and share some of your experiences?

Mark Sark: My name is Mark Joseph Sark. I am a Mi'gmaq from the community of Gespgapegiag. However, I call all of Mi'gma'gi my home. I am 46 years old, a father of two children (Pasmay and Shaya), and a U.S. veteran having served both with the U.S. Army and the United States Marine Corps. I am also a businessman and strong advocate for Aboriginal and Inherent Treaty Rights.

I have a wide range of life experiences from being a trade's person, a hunter, fishermen, entrepreneur, gas station attendant, short order cook, stock investor, consultant, former band manager and now a CEO of the best natural resource and environmental organization in eastern Canada. I have worked for many different First Nation communities in Atlantic Canada in various capacities. All of my experiences have allowed me to actively participate in my current field of choice.

Looking back, I was lucky to be born during a time when the language and our interaction with the environment played a big role in growing up. We didn't have the distractions like kids have today. We didn't own cell phones, satellite

Mark Sark, Gespe'gewaq Mi'gmaq Resource Council
 Winner of the Aboriginal Private Sector Business Award (left) and CANDO President Alfred Loon



radio and cable television and the Internet wasn't even invented yet. Despite our lack of technology, I still think our people were much better off. Some of my favourite memories are associated with fishing and hunting and being outdoors. I remember catching my first salmon, and hunting my first moose.

Since returning home and now living and working in Listuguj, I have been able to participate in lots of neat projects and activities where my learning experience relates to life experience and my interactions with Mother Earth. My field of work is deeply intertwined with culture. I was told by an elder many years ago, "We are the land." Mi'gmaq are the original stewards of our traditional territories within Mi'gma'gi. We still have a duty and obligation to protect and use our resources responsibly, which the Creator has given us. Of course this creates differences of opinion when working with government and industry.

I suppose my passions are tangible, which one of the main reasons I love working in the field I do. The great thing about GMRC is that it allows me to further my studies and do

research on the old ways while combining new and innovative ways of doing business. I have the job of a lifetime and I am very thankful to the Creator and my people for giving me the opportunity to serve. Sometimes it's hard to believe that I get paid to do something that I enjoy so much.

Anita Boyle: Can you give us a background of your work experience and your business/community history?

Mark Sark: Perhaps one of the greatest teachings I received outside of a formal education were my enlistments in the U.S. Armed Forces. The military gave me my foundation and my start in life. I owe them big-time. Starting your own business is not easy. It's a test in patience and perseverance. Only the strong survive. There is not a day that doesn't go by where I don't use what I learned in the service to help me in some way.

My biggest accomplishment in business at least to date has been my work building GMRC. What separates GMRC from others in the business is our unique insight in how we see the

world. It is important to understand that as First Nations our culture, traditions and values differ from that of the westernized world. We see problems associated with changes to the environment, ecosystems, and habitat loss through a different lens. We believe that addressing the problems associated with environmental degradation and natural resource management will require a collaborative approach, if we are to be truly successful in bringing about a new environmental consciousness. Furthermore, we believe that we can all live in balance with Mother Earth if we are prepared to work together.

Anita Boyle: Can you provide examples of Aboriginal economic development initiatives you have been apart of and have completed?

Mark Sark: I took an Entrepreneurial training course in Sydney, Nova Scotia back in the 1980's. During that time I was hooked with the prospect of working for myself. Upon completion of the course, I was awarded \$5,000 towards opening my very first business. Having been involved with the trades as a bricklayer, I decided to open a construction business. It was a logical step for me at that time.

I wish I could say publicly that my first business was a huge success. In truth, my business failed in its second year. I realize that sometimes it's hard not to personalize our failures. Even though sometimes we fail this should never mean that we are failures. "The only time you're a failure is when you stop trying." Since my first business, I have opened several businesses; each one has been more rewarding and challenging than the previous. I even made some money at it.

Anita Boyle: Would you describe any aspects of your enterprise as innovative and groundbreaking?

Mark Sark: There is nothing as far as my business goes that I consider innovative and groundbreaking. Most of what I learned has already been done somewhere else. There are lots of great companies in Canada and the United States that concentrate their efforts in the fields of environment and natural resource management. It's a big industry driver right now and an area where more of our people should get actively involved in.

As First Nations our relationship with Mother Earth is well noted. The only thing remotely innovative or unique in what we do at GMRC is to use our heritage and culture to our advantage. Being Aboriginal can be a huge competitive advantage when working with the environment.

Anita Boyle: What are your challenges?

Mark Sark: The biggest challenge right now is to get our communities to see the big picture. Many of our communities have a mindset based solely on waiting for the government to answer all our problems. Looking to government for answers is not always the brightest thing to do in my opinion.

Communities should have their own house in order as well. If your community doesn't have strong financial health it's difficult to convince industry and banks to lend you the capital required to start various economic development undertakings.

Anita Boyle: Can you tell us how your initiatives have effected surrounding communities?

Mark Sark: The Gespe'gewaq Mi'gmaq Resource Council (GMRC) is a newly designed environmental agency whose purpose is to work on a multitude of issues within the traditional Mi'gmaq district of Gespe'gewa'gi, the seventh and largest district in the Mi'gmaq nation. Our central focus is in the area of resource and oceans management. The organization is federally incorporated under the government of Canada's "Societies Act." GMRC's head office is located in Listuguj, Quebec.

While the agency is considered an infant in terms of its operational life, it is nevertheless growing quickly. We are working hard in establishing ourselves as a leader in the field of natural resources and environmental management. GMRC is founded on the following core principles: delivery, dependability and superior client service. GMRC has ISO 9001-2008 certification. ISO is an international organization of standardization believed to be the first of its kind for a First Nation environmental organization in Canada.

Currently we have 8 full-time staff members. I am extremely proud that they are all First Nation. So the social and economic impact of

GMRC is clearly visible to those within our native communities. It gives me great personal satisfaction knowing the lives of our people and communities are being impacted positively because of GMRC.

Aside from the social and economic impact that GMRC is having in our native communities, we also get to see the positive affect we are making to the environment. Currently we do a lot of contract work for the federal government.

Anita Boyle: Describe the nature of your partnerships and the relationships formed?

Mark Sark: GMRC actively pursues partnerships. Our fundamental philosophy is based in large part on the need to work together. We face some very serious and complicated problems with our environment and just how resources are managed in this country. Old ways of doing things simply don't work well. Unless we find new solutions and new ways of doing business we can expect further damage and destruction to Mother Earth.

In building partnerships we look to other organizations, which have similar commonalities' and views regarding the importance of living in balance with nature. Organizations we decide to support must have strong core values and most respect our worldview. Good partnerships are a two-way street based on mutual goals and respect.

In order to assist us in doing our part, organizations and agencies need to come together and engage each other not just in dialog but also in action. This is what GMRC is all about. An agency created specifically to foster innovation, improve social and economic conditions in our communities, advance First Nation stewardship and protect natural and cultural resources.

Anita Boyle: Describe your contribution to the field of Aboriginal economic development and the impact on the EDO profession?

Mark Sark: My involvement in Aboriginal business started in the mid eighties. A lot has changed since then. I think the best way to promote economic development in our communities is to have real working examples in place so people can see for themselves.

Communities can take a lead role in generating and promoting economic development. We

have some good examples in Atlantic Canada where communities are moving forward their agenda. Membertou and Millbrook First Nations are a few good examples.

Anita Boyle: What advice would you provide to Aboriginal youth seeking to start a career in Aboriginal economic development?

Mark Sark: I am not a big believer in handing out advice. However, I would say to those interested in getting into business for themselves, "find something you feel passionate about and incorporate those feelings and values into a sound business idea." With some hard work, determination and a little luck the sky can be your only limit. By getting involved with something that you enjoy all those extra hours spent making your business grow will seem effortless.

Don't be afraid to read some books from some of the masters in business. Donald Trump, Warren Buffet, Jim Cramer, Jack Welch, etc. They didn't get to the top of their profession simply by accident. You can learn a great deal from them and pick up some tricks, which will help you in the future. Business, business, business....

Perhaps the most important thing is to have fun! Life is too short to be caught up in something you're not enjoying. Not everyone is cut out in getting into business because it's not your typical 9-5 gig.

But if you're anything like me being in business for yourself is one of the most rewarding things you can do in life.

ENOCH CREE NATION (ECN) ECONOMIC DEVELOPER OF THE YEAR AWARD WINNER — COMMUNITY CATEGORY

Enoch Cree Nation (ECN) has been a leader in the gaming industry of First Nations as well as in Alberta. The Enoch Cree Nation Economic Development's Department mission is to actively seek, promote and secure economic initiatives that will enhance the quality of life for a prosperous First Nation's community.

The Enoch Cree Nation (Enoch) is a Sovereign Government pursuant to Treaty 6, which was signed by Cree leaders in 1876 and 1877, and has traditionally used and occupied lands in

Enoch Cree Nation — Winner of the Community Economic Developer Award
 (Left to right) Councillors Lorne Morin, Nola Wanuch, Pearl Cardinal, Cody Hodgson,
 Chief Harry Sharphead and CANDO President Alfred Loon



and around what is known today as the Central Alberta Region.

The Enoch Government is recognized by the Federal Government of Canada under the authority given to Enoch through the Treaty, the Canadian Constitution, and the *Indian Act*. The Enoch Cree Nation today consists of 12,933.5 acres, or 20.21 square miles, located west of Edmonton. The current Enoch population includes 1,776 members, with approximately 1,400 living on the reserve and the remaining members living off (primarily in Edmonton).

Enoch functions as a unique, sovereign social democratic society, governed by the leadership of the Chief and nine councillors elected by secret ballot. Enoch has been assessing and forecasting the future civic needs of the Nation and identifying on-reserve economic opportunities that could potentially fund those civic needs.

Overall, the emphasis has been centred on economic development projects that could potentially generate meaningful job creation and opportunities for advancement of Enoch members. It was determined that economic self-

sufficiency for the Enoch Nation could only come from feasible, market-driven economic activities that attracted the attention and support of the Greater Edmonton market.

The River Cree Resort and Casino destination resort is number one in Alberta: hospitality, food and beverage recreation, entertainment and gaming. Along with the Enoch Cree Nation stores and golf course.

It took seven years to aggressively pursue the River Cree Resort and Casino project with partners — New Buffalo and Paragon Gaming — along with many high profile meetings with the City of Edmonton for Infrastructure purposes.

The project faces many challenges, including the following:

- Other casinos did not want a First Nation in the gaming business. Enoch Cree Nation had to meet with the Minister of Gaming, Ron Stevens, and had to hire political liaisons to help obtain AGLC (Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission) approval for a First Nation Casino in Enoch.

- Ongoing meetings with their partners, Paragon Gaming, to continue their support through the long negotiation process with: AGLC, City of Edmonton, Alberta Chiefs, and INAC, along with other surrounding communities.
- Securing financing and meeting AGLC's 8-step process.
- Structuring a First Nation Gaming board.
- Developing Mechet Charities.
- Preparing the community to develop business plans for meeting future expenditure, to meet our charity needs once the funds started to flow to Enoch Cree Nation.
- Assisting with the development of Host FN Charitable Handbook with AGLC.
- Developing the First Nations Development Fund (FNDF) for all non-host First Nations.

Due to ECN's initiative with First Nations Development Fund, the Alberta non-host First Nations have received in excess of \$185 million, which had contributed to their economic and social needs in their communities. ECN secured partnership with Paragon Gaming, and together sought financing needs, along with meeting many obstacles put forth to develop a successful part-

nership in gaming. ECN fought hard to have what it has today, not only for its people, but for all FN communities. They are now 5 Alberta FN in the gaming business today. ECN has been a key player in the industry and has always shared its struggles and successful business strategy with many.

PAULETTE FLAMOND INDIVIDUAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPER OF THE YEAR AWARD WINNER

Ms. Flamond is a Métis originally from North Battleford, Saskatchewan. Her family tree travels back to the Red River Settlement. Paulette is a graduate of Grant McEwen College and is currently completing her university degree in Psychology. Ms. Flamond is the Executive Director of the Northeast Aboriginal Business and Wellness Centre in Fort St. John and has many years experience as a small business owner/operator. Paulette coordinated the first Petroleum Employment Training Project for the Doig River First Nation and was Chair of *Walk in Balance* the first wellness conference in Northeastern BC in April.

Paulette Flamond, Winner of the Individual Economic Developer Award, and CANDO President Alfred Loon



Paulette currently sits on the board of the Aboriginal Business Service Network and the Fort St. John Métis Society. Since 2003, Paulette has been a driving force of Aboriginal Economic Development in the Fort St. John/Peace River region of BC she is the founding Executive Director of the Northeast Aboriginal Business & Wellness Centre (NEABWC). NEABWC was established with a mandate of providing advisory and support services such as business planning, financial forecasting, community economic development, market research, aftercare and access to business financing.

Paulette Flamond has true entrepreneurial spirit. As an experienced small business owner and operator, she has also worked over 15 years providing economic development value to her community. Paulette projects strong leadership and ethical values. Through her work, she has been successful at increasing capacity among Aboriginal communities; this has resulted in many Aboriginal individuals starting small business ventures in competitive markets. Paulette shares the vision of economic development that is modelled around community values. She has been instrumental in encouraging individual wellness and strong personal values within her community and she has presented wellness initiatives to community members as a way to maintain a balanced lifestyle.

Prior to opening of the Northeast Aboriginal Business and Wellness Centre Society in 2003 there was limited access available to Aboriginal business clients in the BC Northeast. Approximately 60,000 people live in the Northeastern region of BC; more than 7,000 are Aboriginal. Fort St. John is considered the “hub” service area of the region, which has an oil and gas industry that produces an estimated \$1.4 billion per year. Until NEABWC’s opening in 2003 there was limited assistance to help Aboriginal people to enter the local urban economy. Since opening there has been a substantial increase in economic activity for Aboriginal people. In addition to direct business start-ups or expansions, NEABWC has developed the capacity to support other organizations and individuals working in the area of economic development. NEABWC has enhanced the Aboriginal economic environment in the North East region and has increased the number of successful joint ventures and contracting arrangements between the

Aboriginal community and oil and gas companies through Paulette’s leadership and vision.

Paulette considers it a privilege to work with entrepreneurs and to share in the experience of helping them to build or grow their businesses. Her passion towards entrepreneurship is contagious. Her staff work diligently with their clients because they believe that through business development Aboriginal people will become equal partners with industry, government and the private sector.

Paulette thinks of Economic Development as a collective whole and enjoys playing her part in helping to better communities, families and Nations. “It is a necessary tool for the betterment of our people and I am happy to play my part in the “Entrepreneurial Revolution”, taking place in beautiful British Columbia. There is no work like it. I believe that my life’s work is one of service. I do the work because I love witnessing people succeed knowing that, in some way, my support has helped them to achieve their dreams.

Paulette’s work experience and contributions as an advisory resource are summarized as follows:

- Eight years experience in an Aboriginal organization assisting entrepreneurs.
- Fifteen years of management experience
- Established and managed three successful business ventures
- Produced four documentaries highlighting Aboriginal culture and entrepreneurship in the North East region of British Columbia
- Created the first ever wellness conference hosted in 2004 (Walk in Balance) as well as subsequent conferences held in 2007 & 2009 attracting over 700 Aboriginal participants.
- Appointed by Premier Gordon Campbell to the Northern Development Initiative Trust 2007.
- Currently serving 3rd term Native Economic Development Advisory Board.
- Currently serving on the Executive of the Aboriginal Business Service Network Society.

Paulette’s advice to Aboriginal youth seeking a career in Aboriginal economic development is to find their true passion. Also vital is to continue to develop your skills sets, so keep learning and most important love to help others. If you

love what you are doing it is not work but simply pure joy!

Increasing Economic development activities in our communities is challenging but offers many rewards. Successful communities have drawn on the often limited resources available to them and capitalized on the opportunities. Building and nurturing healthy partnerships with government along with joint venturing with the

private sector can often define the level of success that can be achieved. At the same time, communities must be able to sustain the growth they achieve; this is where integrated community and strategic planning are vital. Economic development that is truly successful builds capacity in communities, and puts Aboriginal people to work!

MINING, HARVESTING AND DECISION MAKING IN NUNAVUT

A Case Study of Uranium Mining in Baker Lake

.....

Warren Bernauer

DEPARTMENT OF NATIVE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

Despite a growing dependence on the capitalist economy, many Inuit communities in Nunavut continue to rely a great deal on harvesting to satisfy a variety of economic, social and cultural needs. While wage labour employment at mines and other extractive projects may provide income to purchase the equipment and supplies necessary for harvesting, they also threaten and undermine the viability of harvesting activities, primarily by damaging local ecosystems — and therefore the wildlife resources upon which harvesting is based. The coexistence of these two forms of economic activity is dependent upon the ability of Inuit, especially Elders, to participate in decisions regarding mining. The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement has created a variety of mechanisms, including Inuit Qaujimatuaqangit studies, Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreements and consultations, which enable Inuit to exert control over what type of mining activities proceed in their homeland. However, a case study of Areva Resources Canada Inc.'s proposal to mine uranium near Baker Lake reveals that the manner in which these mechanisms are utilized does not always facilitate meaningful input from entire communities. Community consultation meetings — the most prominent method of soliciting Inuit input and commentary for mining projects — suffer from barriers to participation. While this may be indicative of a need to rethink the manner in which consultations take place, an overhaul of the bureaucratic structures involved in community consultations will take time and considerable research. More immediate action is required to facilitate participation in dialogues surrounding contemporary proposals for major mining projects in Nunavut, including Areva's proposal.

This paper is based upon two months of community-based research in Baker Lake, Nunavut in early 2010. The focus of my research was contemporary Inuit perspectives of uranium mining in the region and the social, economic and political factors that are influencing these perspectives. However, the topics of Inuit control over mining projects and issues with IIBAs, *Inuit Qaujimatuaqangit* studies and community consultations arose frequently in the 25 interviews I

conducted with community members, as well as in informal conversations with many others. Additionally, I was provided with the opportunity to observe one consultation meeting between representatives from Areva Resources and a group of community members, and two community-wide consultation meetings on the topic of Areva's proposal, held by the Kivalliq Inuit Association. This paper begins with a brief discussion of the contemporary harvesting economy in

Baker Lake and mining-related controversy in the region. This is followed by an outline of the various mechanisms that facilitate Inuit participation in decisions related to mining projects on their territory and an analysis of the limitations associated with each of these mechanisms. I conclude with some recommendations to improve the ability of Inuit to partake in these discussions.

MINING AND HARVESTING IN BAKER LAKE

Subsistence wildlife harvesting, especially of caribou, fox, wolf and lake trout, plays a substantial role in the contemporary well-being of the Inuit of Baker Lake. In 2001, 53% of Inuit adults in Baker Lake reported that they had hunted in the previous year, 62% reported that they had fished in the previous year and 55% reported that they had gathered wild plants in the previous year (Statistics Canada, 2001). While harvesting provides some monetary income to Inuit harvesters through the sale of furs and arts and crafts made from animal products, this income is generally reinvested into harvesting activities in the form of hunting equipment, fuel and ammunition. Thus, the primary net economic benefit Inuit accrue from harvesting is food.

Locally harvested foods, which are generally more nutritious than imported foods sold at local stores (Sharma et al., 2010), are distributed amongst Inuit via a variety of social mechanisms (Wenzel, 1995). Most Inuit with whom I spoke reported that they shared or received food most often through extended kinship networks. These networks included individuals that mainstream western society would normally classify as relatives (children, grandchildren, parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, et cetera) as well as individuals that are related in Inuit-specific ways (through adoption, naming practices, et cetera). Many hunters described a particular need to provide food for individuals who could not provide for themselves, including widows, Elders and the disabled. Some politicians and hamlet employees spoke of a desire to retire from their jobs early so they can have more time to hunt for local Elders and widows. Most hunters I spoke to claimed that they would, in general, provide food for anyone who asked and that it was “very diffi-

cult to say no to someone.” One hunter commented, “You’ll probably never hear someone say ‘no, you don’t get some.’” In this sense, the hunting economy can be conceived as an informal, community-driven social-safety net, with the goal of ensuring that all members of the community have access to healthy food—an aspect of the local social economy (Wenzel, 1995).

The mining industry has historically been a source of contention in the community of Baker Lake, primarily because of the impacts exploration activities have had on the harvesting economy and the anticipated impacts of some extractive activities on both harvesting and community health. In 1978, the Hamlet of Baker Lake, the Baker Lake Hunters and Trappers Organization and the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (now the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami) sought litigation to halt uranium exploration activities in the area surrounding Baker Lake. They based their case on the argument that Inuit possessed unextinguished Aboriginal Title to the region, rendering existing land use permits invalid. Furthermore, they contended that exploration crews—through noise created by low flying aircraft and drilling—were scaring caribou herds away from the community and creating a situation in which subsiding off of hunting was difficult, if not impossible¹ (*Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development*, 1978).

Justice Mahoney issued a temporary, one-year injunction in 1978, and reached a final decision in 1979. Mahoney came to the conclusion that Inuit did possess Aboriginal Title to the region, but that it was insufficient to nullify federal land use permits (*Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development*, 1979: 3). Furthermore, he contended that exploratory activity was not the cause of the caribou herds’ failure to frequent the Baker Lake area during this time period (ibid.: 62).

Mining-related controversy returned to the community in the late 1980s, when Urangesellschaft (UG)—a German mining company and one of the defendants in the above-mentioned court case—submitted a proposal to mine uranium at Kiggavik, 80 kilometres west of Baker Lake. Due to the sensitive role the Kiggavik area plays in caribou life cycles,² concerns with the radioactive contamination of wildlife and moral qualms with nuclear power

and weaponry, many local residents and politicians took part in a campaign to prevent the mine from opening. Baker Lake residents Joan Scottie and Samson Jorah formed the Baker Lake Concerned Citizens Committee (BLCCC)—a local group with the aim of educating residents about the dangers associated with uranium mining and promoting local participation in the environmental assessment process (Joan Scottie, 1992). A variety of local and regional politicians formed the Northern Anti-Uranium Coalition (NAUC), which sponsored workshops on nuclear power and uranium mining (McPherson, 2003: 174). In 1990, the Hamlet of Baker Lake (which had, up to that point, officially remained neutral in the debate, despite the fact that it appeared to many residents that a number of hamlet counsellors supported the project) agreed to hold a plebiscite to determine the community's position on the project proposal. Over 90% of voters who turned out voted against UG's proposal, with 72% of eligible voters present (*Nunatsiaq News*, September 5, 2003). Levels of opposition, in conjunction with low market prices for uranium, prompted UG to shelve and eventually abandon the Kiggavik proposal.

In recent years, the community of Baker Lake has become more open to mining activity in the region. During my time in the community, I encountered very few people who were opposed to all forms of mining in the region. Agnico-Eagles Mines Ltd. began construction of the Meadowbank gold mine—located 70 kilometres north of Baker Lake—in 2007, with production commencing in early 2010. Despite some controversy around the question of Inuit access to mine roads, language in the workplace and a racially stratified workforce, many local Inuit appear to be content with the role Meadowbank is playing in the community thus far.

Even with this newfound openness to mining in the region, local support for projects is by no means unconditional. Another more recent proposal to mine uranium at Kiggavik, submitted by Areva Resources in 2007, has generated a great deal more public concern than the Meadowbank mine. While opposition to the Kiggavik mine is nowhere near as widespread as it was when UG was the proponent, many community members remain apprehensive about the project and others are actively opposing it.

Support for projects is based on whether or not the project in question will play a positive role in the community. Inuit demand that projects benefit local Inuit—both through employment and resource royalties—and that projects do not substantially harm community health or the harvesting sector. The satisfaction of the latter demand is largely contingent upon the ability of local Inuit to control the characteristics of mining projects in the region. The harvesting mode of production is complex and its success relies upon the guidance of Elders who have a nuanced understanding of local wildlife, survival in the Kivalliq's ecosystem and the social context of Inuit communities. The complexity of the knowledge required to guide and direct local harvesting activities will likely render any unilateral attempt on the part of bureaucratic institutions to manage Inuit harvesting disastrous.

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING: OPPORTUNITIES AND BARRIERS

A variety of mechanisms currently exist which facilitate Inuit input into the design and operation of mining projects, most of which have their roots in the *Nunavut Land Claims Agreement* (NLCA). The policies of some regulatory boards created by the NLCA stipulate that project proponents must undertake *Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit* (IQ) studies and incorporate these in their Environmental Impact Statements. Furthermore, the NLCA states that mining companies must negotiate Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreements (IIBAs) with Regional Inuit Organizations (in this case, the Kivalliq Inuit Association) and consult extensively with Inuit prior to the commencement of mining activities.

While these stipulations appear to provide Inuit with a great deal of control over projects, a variety of concerns exist regarding their ability to facilitate meaningful Inuit input. IQ is a concept—often likened to Inuit Traditional Knowledge or Inuit Traditional Ecological Knowledge—which was formulated by Inuit in an attempt to facilitate the incorporation of Inuit culture and values into governance when the territory of Nunavut was created in 1999. Specific definitions of the term vary, but in general they all suggest that IQ encompasses the entirety of Inuit knowl-

edge and culture, including worldviews, values, language, social relations, decision making processes, hunting skills, sewing skills, survival skills and intimate knowledge of wildlife and the environment (Oosten, Laugrand & Aupilaarjuk, 2002; Arnakak, 2002; Tester & Irniq, 2009).

A developing scholarly interest in traditional knowledge in general has resulted in numerous academic IQ studies in recent years, the majority of which concern climate change (Department of the Environment, 2005; Leduc, 2006; Thorpe et al., 2002) and wildlife management (Dowsley & Wenzel, 2008). This trend has also resulted in a requirement that mining companies utilize IQ in their environmental impact statements by the Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB) (Nunavut Impact Review Board, 2009). Accordingly, in preparation for their environmental impact assessment, Areva Resources has undertaken a baseline IQ study in which twenty local Elders who were born in the Kiggavik region were interviewed.

A great deal of controversy exists surrounding the manner in which IQ is utilized by both academia and industry. These studies often treat IQ as a source of empirical data about wildlife rather than a living body of knowledge that embodies non-western worldviews and ways of being. This can lead to the fragmentation of IQ, removing it from the values and cosmological understandings that give it meaning (Tester & Irniq, 2009). Furthermore, this treatment of IQ may render it available for corporate appropriation. Regarding this issue, Inuit politician and intellectual Jaypeeete Arnakak stated:

One of my criticisms of the treatment of indigenous knowledge and IQ is that it's a thinly veiled corporatist agenda regarding the environment. It's way too specific to corporate style resource development and management to really be considered indigenous knowledge (quoted in Leduc, 2006: 27).

The limited number of participants in IQ studies is also a source of concern for many local Inuit. This is largely related to the nature of IQ itself—a variable and individual, rather than universal and objective, body of knowledge. Each Elder possesses their own knowledge and experience, and most place a great deal of value on the different and sometimes contradictory

information and opinions provided by others (Oosten & Laugrand, 1999: 9–10). For some Inuit, the complex nature of IQ and the fact that IQ studies often only include a small number of Inuit rendered them essentially worthless.

I've heard of people collecting traditional knowledge, but often times they hand picked people who they think have traditional knowledge. And if they pick five people from anywhere, they think that's traditional knowledge. I think it should be approved by the whole community. We have so many different tribes and what traditional knowledge are they talking about? How many are they going to interview? Is ten enough or is twenty better? How is our traditional knowledge used? How does it cover all of the areas of traditional knowledge? We may have different knowledge. I don't know a whole lot, I know some, but you'd have to go to someone else to learn about different kinds of traditional knowledge. There's so many things like meat preparing and hunting and land use and wildlife habitats and fishing areas and different seasons. If I say that I hunt in one area, it's not all year long. This might be my seasonal hunting area and then I go somewhere else. And if I get caribou in the month of January it's not the same thing as if I hunt in the month of August. How I prepare and how I hunt. How do they cover all of that stuff? (Joan Scottie)

Some local Elders felt that the only way IQ could be utilized by mining companies in a meaningful fashion was consultation with *all* local Elders regarding every aspect of a mine's design and operation.

Areva's IQ study also exhibits limitations which may be specific to its particular context. The fact that the study focused on Elders who were born in the region is in some ways problematic. The land use patterns of Inuit in the Baker Lake region have shifted a great deal since the movement from scattered camps throughout the Kivalliq region to a centralized settlement in the 1950s and 1960s. Most of the Elders interviewed, as well as their families, now frequent different hunting territories, while a number of families who trace their origins to different areas use the area immediately downstream from Kiggavik for fishing and caribou,

wolf, fox and wolverine hunting. It is likely that Areva's study will do little to help protect the subsistence activities these families rely upon, due to their lack of participation in the research.

IIBAs — agreements which may include local hiring and training initiatives and preferential contracting for Inuit businesses — are also associated with a variety of problems.

IIBAs often focus solely on capitalist economic development, while paying little attention to social and health issues (Knotsch & Warda, 2009). The contents of IIBAs are also often confidential, making it impossible for most Inuit to participate in their negotiation in any meaningful way. The case of Baker Lake seems to fall in line with the trend of confidentiality, as the contents of the IIBA concluded with Agnico-Eagle Mines for the Meadowbank mine are confidential, as are the negotiations of an IIBA with Areva Resources.

Given the numerous issues associated with IQ studies and IIBAs, consultations appear to provide a much more viable avenue for Inuit to control development projects in the interests of protecting the harvesting economy. In Canada, a series of Supreme Court of Canada decisions³ provide all of Canada's Aboriginal Peoples with the right to be consulted prior to development on their traditional lands. In the case of Inuit, the *Nunavut Land Claims Agreement* has created a regulatory regime which provides opportunity for consultation with Inuit.

Proponents in Baker Lake consult with a wide-array of territorial, regional and local organizations, including Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, the Kivalliq Inuit Association, the Baker Lake Hamlet Council, the Baker Lake Hunters and Trappers Organizations and two community liaison committees created by mining companies specifically to facilitate consultations with local Inuit. However, this manner of consultation is victim to many of the problems associated with IQ studies — most notably these meetings do not involve the entire community. Also, many of these organizations are often run by people who, many local Inuit contend, are in a position to benefit from these projects a great deal more than other community members, making their interests conflict with those of many of the Inuit they represent.

In addition to meeting with local and regional organizations, proponents and regulatory

boards hold consultations with entire communities. For example, Areva Resources has held a series of open houses in Baker Lake to seek input regarding what route a road connecting Baker Lake with the proposed Kiggavik mine might take. While these types of meetings are inherently more useful to local Inuit seeking to protect the future of Inuit hunting, a variety of barriers to meaningful Inuit participation still exist. Many of these barriers are most problematic for unilingual Elders, whose meaningful input is by far the most valuable.

Most prominently in the case of consultations dealing with Areva's Kiggavik proposal, many Inuit are finding it difficult to engage mining company representatives in a meaningful discussion because they lack an understanding of the scientific concepts used to explain issues related to the nuclear industry. Concepts like radiation are extremely difficult to translate into Inuktitut, making it hard to discuss the potential dangers of a uranium mine. This should not be interpreted as a claim that Inuit Elders are unintelligent; this could not be further from the truth. The experience, knowledge and wisdom possessed by Elders can make a great deal of academic knowledge appear to hold little practical value. However, the concerns with nuclear science are relatively new to Inuit Elders, and an understanding of nuclear physics has yet to be fully incorporated into IQ.

This problem is made more severe by a variety of structural issues. Some Inuit feel that there is insufficient time available to absorb issues and discuss concerns in the context of short consultation meetings. This is often made more problematic by the fact that many consultation meetings take place without adequate information being sent to the community prior to meetings. Many feel that if more information was made available prior to meetings, allowing Inuit time to discuss and familiarize themselves with issues within the community, that the meetings would be far more productive.

Inuit participation in public consultation meetings is further constrained by difficulties associated with accessing information about potential projects. While project proposals and correspondence is made available on-line by regulatory boards, there is a notable lack of material available in Inuktitut (other than summaries of project proposals) and the proposals and cor-

respondence are organized in a manner which makes it difficult and time consuming for English-speaking academics to locate particular projects of interest. For unilingual Elders or English-speaking Inuit with little formal education,⁴ accessing this information would likely be impossible.

The difficulty Inuit experience when attempting to access information means that the primary source of information regarding mining projects (as well as radiation and the nuclear fuel cycle) for most Inuit is oral in nature. In the contemporary context of Baker Lake, this information is generally provided by mining companies. For example, representatives from Areva Resources have gone to great lengths to explain the benefits of the nuclear industry to local Inuit. Community wide open houses are held to explain the nuclear industry to residents of Baker Lake and Inuit are taken on tours of uranium mines in northern Saskatchewan, all on Areva's budget. However, many Inuit Elders feel that the information provided is biased in favour of the mining company's interests, and gives no attention to concerns and drawbacks associated with uranium mining. For some Elders, this has created a situation in which they are unable to engage in a proper dialogue.

According to the Elders ... what I'm hearing is that the mining companies are not completely up to par with their information. The Elders don't feel that the mining companies are giving them all of the information, so that they could be included and be there within the discussions while they [the companies] are looking for answers. All they're doing is making the decisions themselves without the consultation of all of the Elders. (Paul Atutuva)

There's not enough discussion in the community. No one talks to the public about the bad parts, only about the good stuff. (Anonymous)

They keep telling you these good stories of products in your own home ... as an example, TV gives off radiation or is made from some sort of radioactive material ... so is your microwave ... so is the clock ... they give out radiation all over the place. They say, if that's safe ... why shouldn't our products be safe ... is the analogy they're using ... obviously it is hard to answer back when you are told

that your TV produces radioactivity ... whether it is your watch, your clock, your fridge, your fast cooker, whatever is electrical it seems. They give you that answer ... it is hard to really talk back. As a real Inuk, you don't really know what else to say. But still, there are questions. It gets to the point where there may be issues that might come up, but given that type of answer it is difficult to try and talk back. You may have concerns, but how do you explain what your concerns might be given the type of answers you are given ... another example they give is that if a person gets cancer they use radiation therapy to correct the cancer. Hearing stuff like that, it is slowly getting harder and harder to talk back. (Anonymous)

Many feel that an appropriate response to this situation should involve sending independent scientists to Baker Lake to discuss the concerns and potential negative impacts of uranium mining to local Elders.

I think it [the presence of independent scientists] would make it fair. It would be very fair for anyone who wants to hear it from the other side as well. If they do that, it's not so much saying that Areva is wrong about uranium and we need to prove it. It's not so much that. What we're trying to say is that 'ok, you've got your scientists, you've got your public relations guys, you've got your psychologists telling us how friendly and good uranium really is. But we're not hearing it from the other side. You know, let's hear it from the other guys as well so that, you know, we can make a sound decision from there. But for now it's really one sided ... (Hugh Ikoe)

For some reason they are not allowing other independent scientists to really explain their side. If there was an open dialogue with other scientists, where they [Inuit] are given the real side, the negative side, the bad side, and have an open dialogue with the Inuit and maybe the company might open up a bit more ... maybe if that dialogue was open between all concerned including the Inuit, the mining company. It might be better if we get other, non-involved scientists to come up and explain things ... just as a regular Inuk you have no idea of where else to turn or who to believe. (Anonymous)

It should be noted that many people who, at the time of my interviews, supported the Kiggavik proposal, also agreed that having an independent expert discuss the potential negative impacts of uranium with local Elders was desirable.

This situation is, to a degree, a symptom of the lack of funding available to community groups. Joan Scottie reformed the Baker Lake Concerned Citizens Committee in response to Areva's interest in the Kiggavik ore body. However, the BLCCC has been unable to obtain any operational funding to assist them in either analyzing Areva's proposal or explaining issues related to it to the community.

Some individuals and community groups have applied to the NIRB for intervener funding, to help them take part in the Environmental Review of the Kiggavik proposal. Some of these individuals and groups (including *Nunavummiut Makitaganarningit* (NM), a new Nunavut-wide non-governmental organization with objectives that include undertaking research and educating Inuit on the dangers associated with uranium mining) have indicated that they wish to use these funds, in part, to hire independent consultants to help them review Areva's proposal. At the time of writing, the amount of intervener funding allotted for the Kiggavik review by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada was \$250,000, and is apparently to be split between ten interested parties. This is a relatively small amount of funding, especially when compared to the combined \$1,976,035 these groups requested. The small amount of funding made available has been criticized by NM, the Beverly and Qamanirjuaq Caribou Management Board and MiningWatch Canada. As a result, the NIRB has written INAC Minister Chuck Strahl, requesting that the minister reconsider the amount of funding allotted for interveners (Arragutainaq, 2009).

RECOMMENDATIONS

These concerns are not limited to consultation meetings between communities and mining companies. According to many community members, public hearings held by regulatory boards and community consultations undertaken by Inuit Organizations suffer many of the same difficulties. Perhaps the existing logic of consultations needs to be rethought in a manner which facili-

tates community participation to degrees greater than currently exist. A recent study of mining regulatory regimes in Canada's north, commissioned by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, argued that there is a need to properly define "principles, steps and standards" related to consultations (McCrank, 2009: 34). The concerns discussed in this paper lend support to this claim. However, they also indicate that any attempt to define the consultation process must involve the active participation of Inuit *at the community level*.

Attempts to address problems with the consultation processes will no doubt take a great deal of time and research. In the meantime, Inuit throughout Nunavut are faced with decisions regarding mining projects. Some, like the proposed Kiggavik mine, are a source of a great deal of community concern. Action must be taken immediately to provide Inuit communities with the resources required for full participation in decision making processes. In the context of uranium mining in Baker Lake, an appropriate strategy would involve the allocation of funding for independent experts to further discuss issues related to uranium mining with local Inuit. This would help facilitate the meaningful use of IQ in mining projects. Rather than fragmenting IQ and forcing it into the structures and values systems of western science as studies often do, it would result in the reverse—the incorporation of empirical data provided by science into the cosmological framework of Inuit culture.

NOTES

1. During this time period the Beverly and Qaminirjuaq caribou herds failed to visit the Baker Lake area in sufficiently large numbers. Biologists attributed this to a decline in caribou populations (Tester & Kulchyski, 2007), while local Elders maintain, to this day, that the caribou had simply changed their migration routes and were frequenting different areas.
2. The Kiggavik area is used by the Beverly caribou herd in the post-calving period of their life cycle. Disturbance to cows in the post-calving period is associated with an increase in calf mortality and a decrease pregnancy rates the following year (BQCMB, 2007).
3. See *Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)*, *Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia* and *Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage)*.

4. In 2006, 72.6% of Aboriginal People in Baker Lake aged 15 and over did not have any form of certificate, diploma or degree from a formal education institution, including High School diplomas. Additionally, 82.2% of Aboriginal People in Baker Lake did not have any form of certificate, diploma or degree from a post-secondary institution (Terriplan Consultants, 2008: 9–10).

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TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES IN ABORIGINAL BUSINESS, COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT *Being Offered Through Aboriginal Organizations*

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The purpose of this article is to present alternative developmental opportunities for those concerned about economic development in Aboriginal communities. It provides information about the development and availability of modules and courses available from NACCA, CANDO and AFOA.

NATIONAL ABORIGINAL CAPITAL CORPORATIONS ASSOCIATION (NACCA) TRAINING PROGRAMS

In 2004, NACCA saw a need for uniform training programs for the lending staff and Business Service Officers (BSO's) in the Aboriginal Financial Institutions (AFI's).

A total of 112 modules were created (48 in a Business Plan Assessment series, 48 in a Financial Management series and 16 in a Strategic Planning series). The modules were custom designed to be relevant for Aboriginal lending staff and BSO's working in AFI's. Each module was designed to be one and a half hours of

training with 4 modules to be a full day of training. All modules were tested with an AFI in Saskatchewan (Beaver River Community Futures) and other AFI's in Alberta and Manitoba. Participants from other parts of Saskatchewan also attended the training conducted in Saskatoon.

The pilot testing took two years to complete. Evaluations were conducted during each training session and the results were consistently in the 8 to 9+ range, on a 10-point scale.

The titles of the 112 modules are included in Exhibit 1.

In 2008 NACCA determined to provide an accredited training program that would be recognized by Universities for credit. Based in part

EXHIBIT 1
NACCA Training Modules

- A. Business Plan Assessment Modules
B. Financial Management Modules and
C. Strategic Management/Governance Modules

Business Plan Assessment

<i>Module Number</i>	<i>Title</i>
1	Introduction to Business Plan Assessment
2	Assessing the concept
3	Assessing the business model
4	Assessing the entrepreneur and team
5	Feasibility analysis
6	Research assessment
7	Niche & Mass market analysis
8	Assessing the product/service
9	Assessing the pricing model
10	Assessing the promotion plan
11	Assessing community impact
12	Concept of full accounting (true profit)
13	E-commerce
14	Franchising
15	Competitive analysis
16	Writing business plans for funding agencies
17	Assessing service businesses
18	Working with the entrepreneur on the business plan
19	Assessing place and distribution strategy
20	Assessing operations (supply side)
21	Assessing operations (key people)
22	Assessing operations (Job descriptions and specifications)
23	Buying a business (factors of evaluation)
24	Buying a business (evaluation techniques)
25	Assessing a retail business start-up
26	Assessing a retail Internet business start-up
27	Assessing a manufacturing start-up
28	Assessing the deal structure
29	Assessing the business capitalization
30	Assessing the youth business plan or project
31	Assessing the business value chain
32	Assessing the start-up cash burning phase (break-even)
33	Assessing start-up costs
34	Assessing the expansion plan
35	Assessing entrepreneurial spirit
36	Assessing the business plan implementation
37	Assessing community capacity for a new business
38	Assessing the start-up balance sheet
39	Assessing the start-up income statement
40	Assessing the start-up cash flow statement
41	Assessing an invention
42	Assessing the Research and Development capacity for the start-up
43	“Sandboxing”
44	Assessing a family business
45	Assessing supporting documentation (appendices)
46	Assessing contingency planning (intervention and re-positioning)
47	Benchmarking and ratio analysis for the business start-up
48	Aligning entrepreneurial and Native values

EXHIBIT 1 (continued)**Financial Management Modules**

<i>Module Number</i>	<i>Title</i>
1	Introduction
2	Record Retention
3	Income Statement (Gross Margin component)
4	Income Statement (Operating Expense component)
5	Balance sheet
6	Financial Forecasting
7	Inventory control
8	Ratio Analysis
9	Break-even analysis
10	Establishing a Loan policy
11	Introduction to Financial Statements
12	Credit collection
13	Business Valuation methods
14	Partnership agreements
15	Cash Flow
16	Objectives and Conditions necessary for effective incentive plans
17	Declines in inventory value
18	Assessment of collateral
19	Leading indicators of problems
20	Inventory definition and recording procedures
21	Inventory valuation methods
22	Inventory calculation and selling prices
23	Optimum inventory levels
24	Planning negotiations
25	Financial ethics
26	Commercial credit in an Aboriginal environment
27	Loan application forms and reference checking
28	Alternative types and sources of loans
29	Cash conservation and grants
30	Pro-forma financial statements
31	Limitations, principles and objectives of compensation
32	Methods of hiring and compensating employees
33	Financial analysis of Business Plans
34	Assessing loan repayment risk
35	Criteria for granting a loan
36	Determining rate of interest to charge
37	Financial Forecasting
38	Negotiation strategies
39	Sources analysis for business funding
40	Competitive negotiation model (A)
41	Negotiation strategies
42	Competitive negotiation model (B)
43	Non-financial incentives (B)
44	Alternative payback schedules
45	Types of incentive and profit sharing plans
46	Non-financial incentives (A)
47	Debt vs. Equity Financing
48	Self-financing methodologies for business

EXHIBIT 1 (continued)**Strategic Management/Governance Modules**

<i>Module Number</i>	<i>Title</i>
1	Introduction to Strategic planning
2	Strategic Innovation
3	Mentors and Guides
4	Planning Discussions and other Tools/Skills
5	Collecting (Internal and External) data
6	Testing the idea and strategic formulation
7	Strategic development
8	Strategic implementation
9	Strategic evaluation
10	Introduction to Governance
11	Governance and transparency
12	Governance and trust
13	Best practices
14	Co-ordination and monitoring of Businesses, Programs, Projects
15	Delegation and development of others
16	Coaching followers and helping them succeed

EXHIBIT 2

Accredited on-line course at University of Regina

Aboriginal New Venture Development, AD436AE — Course Description

Entrepreneurs are at the heart of economic development. They are the initiators of business opportunities that create jobs, provide spin-off business opportunities and prevent economic leakage of funds from the community or generate external inflow of funds into the community. This thirteen-week course examines the role of the entrepreneur and the actions needed to launch a successful enterprise. The roles of the lenders and Economic Development Officers and Business Service Officers are examined from the perspectives of facilitating the achievement of the entrepreneurs' goals and the community's economic development.

on the earlier module development, a course was developed that fulfilled the academic requirements for accreditation and the first delivery of this course was completed in the winter (January–April) session of 2009. It was conducted on-line and hosted by the University of Regina.

The course number and title is Aboriginal New Venture Development, AD 436AE. This course was custom designed for Aboriginal BSO's and lending staff working in AFI's. It is described in Exhibit 2.

A secondary market was entrepreneurs and business students who were interested in the

business start-up process and working with the AFI. A number of Aboriginal business students from the University of Regina took the course as an elective (for credit) in their business degree program. A total of 13 successfully completed the course (out of 22 registered) and a second delivery of the course is projected for the fall of 2010. The plan is to supplement this initial course with three to four other customized courses which will constitute a certificate in AFI management.

Another training initiative was launched in 2009. This is the development of two customized

training programs for AFI's. The first one is "Board of Directors training" and the second is "Portfolio management for loan officers". These are each to be two day training sessions to be done live with on-line accessibility. The beta testing for the first one is now in progress and is expected to be ready for delivery in fall of 2010.

The intent of NACCA, CANDO and AFOA is to look for synergistic opportunities to cooperate with training initiatives.

For further information about the NACCA training programs contact Steven Morse (COO, NACCA) at steven@nacca.net or the NACCA office in Ottawa:

75 Albert Street, Suite 605
 Ottawa, ON K1P 5E7
 Phone: (613) 688-0894
 Fax: (613) 688-0895
 e-mail: office@nacca.net

ABORIGINAL FINANCIAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF CANADA (AFOA)

AFOA focuses on providing capacity building and meeting day-to-day needs of those involved in administrative, financial and management issues in Aboriginal communities in Canada.

To facilitate the development of those involved with financial matters, AFOA has developed a designation called a Certified Aboriginal Financial Manager (CAFM). This may be

obtained by those who have been working in Aboriginal financial management for a period of over five years, upon successfully completing a CAFM exam. Also those accountants with a CGA, CMA or CA and two years of practical work experience in an Aboriginal organization may obtain a CAFM.

Others may obtain their CAFM designation by successfully completing fourteen (14) courses and a CAFM exam and having two years of practical work experience. These fourteen courses are listed in Exhibit 3. Five of these courses are available on line and ten are offered in accredited post-secondary institutions. Those who have taken financial management courses at the college or university level may obtain exemptions for certain courses.

In addition, AFOA offers eight on-line courses that run for 15 weeks. These are listed in Exhibit 4 and focus on enhancing management practices that support high performance.

For more information about the AFOA courses or the CAFM program call 1-866-722-2362 or go to their website at www.foa.ca.

COUNCIL FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF NATIVE DEVELOPMENT OFFICERS (CANDO)

CANDO was founded in 1990 and incorporated in 1991. It seeks to facilitate high standards of

EXHIBIT 3

Courses in AFOA's Certified Aboriginal Financial Management Program

AFM 1	Financial Accounting Fundamentals
AFM 2	Business Communications
AFM 3	*Business Law
AFM 4	*Strategy and Development
AFM 5	*Values and Ethics in the Aboriginal Workplace
AFM 6	*Aboriginal History and Developments
AFM 7	Managing Information Systems
AFM 8	Micro and Macro Economics
AFM 9	Financial Accounting: Assets
AFM 10	Financial Accounting: Liabilities and Equities
AFM 11	Business Quantitative Methods
AFM 12	Management Accounting Fundamentals
AFM 13	Corporate Finance Fundamentals
AFM 14	*Aboriginal Human and Fiscal Issues

* Offered on-line

EXHIBIT 4**AFOA Management Certificate Courses**

AFOA 1	Introduction to Community Economic Development
AFOA 2	Aboriginal Management Practices 1
AFOA 3	Aboriginal Program Management
AFOA 4	Aboriginal Management Practices 2
AFOA 5	Values and Ethics in the Aboriginal Workplace
AFOA 6	Performance Measurement and Reporting in First Nations: A Focus on Results
AFOA 7	An Introduction to Comprehensive Community Planning in First Nations
AFOA 8	Developing an Effective Remedial Management Plan for First Nations

EXHIBIT 5**CANDO Certification Courses**

1. The nature, structure functioning and development of economies
2. Community economic development philosophy and theory
3. Community economic development practices
4. Community and political processes
5. The nature, structure, and functioning of organizations
6. The context of Aboriginal economic development
7. Contemporary Aboriginal development approaches and issues
8. Financial accounting
9. Managerial accounting
10. Community impact analysis and assessment
11. Introductory marketing
12. New enterprise development
13. Community based research methods
14. Aboriginal business law and policies
15. Written and oral communications
16. Computer applications

economic development activities in Aboriginal communities across Canada. A key accomplishment for CANDO has been its development of a national training and professional certification process for economic development officers (EDOs) working for Aboriginal communities and organizations.

The CANDO National Training and Professional Certification Process accredits institutions which offer appropriate programs and certifies individuals who meet the professional requirements needed by Aboriginal economic development officers. CANDO has accredited a number of post-secondary institutions that provide the courses needed for those seeking certification.

In order to determine which institutions should be accredited and which courses would be

considered relevant for inclusion, CANDO working with others developed a comprehensive profile of the job of an EDO working in the Aboriginal context.

The profile ensures that the content of a particular university or college program is relevant to the field of Aboriginal economic development. It also has been used to assess the level of competency needed by individuals to obtain a professional certification in the field of economic development in Aboriginal settings.

To obtain certification a candidate must satisfy the requirements of the first or "Technician" Level of the program before proceeding to the second or "Professional" Level. The Technician Level consists of 16 core competencies. These are listed in Exhibit 5.

Candidates for certification can use one, two or three of the three methods to demonstrate competency in these 16 areas. They can complete a program consisting of the 16 courses, which are offered at the colleges or universities that CANDO has accredited. Alternatively, they can apply to have courses they have taken evaluated on a course-by-course assessment or basis. For example, the successful completion of an introductory economics course may suffice as demonstration of competency 1: The nature, structure, functioning and development of economies.

A third alternative is that they may make use of Prior Learning Assessment (PLA) standards. PLA standards may be used to demonstrate the completion of any of the Technician Level competency requirements. PLA is based on the idea that valuable learning is not limited to a formal education setting, but also occurs in many other settings. Many practising EDOs have already mastered many of the core competencies.

The requirements for completing the second level, referred to as the "Professional" Level include (i) participation in and completion of CANDO's professional development course, (ii) completion of two years of experience in Aboriginal economic development, and (iii) the completion and acceptance of a paper or case study related to Aboriginal economic development.

The professional development course — *Integrating Knowledge and Experience* — represents the capstone course of the Professional Level of the Certification Process. During the intensive 5-day course, participants are asked to integrate knowledge learned in previous sections of the Certification Process, discuss their experiences, and share ideas on three overriding themes: ethics, communication, and leadership. The course is structured to encourage participation and the open and forthright discussion of professional

standards, the CANDO Code of Ethics, and other current and pressing CED issues. By the end of the week participants develop and present outlines of their required paper or case study on Aboriginal economic development. To date the Professional Development Course (PDC) has been given twice.

For more information about the CANDO National Training and Professional Certification Process call 1-800-463-9300 or go to their website <<http://www.edo.ca>>

CONCLUSION

There are a number of alternative developmental opportunities available for those concerned with economic development within Aboriginal communities. The modules, courses and programs presented in this article have all been developed with an Aboriginal orientation.

A reasonable question might be, "which is the best one?"

A surprising answer is "each is the best for some, but not for others." What is important is for the individual, perhaps in consultation with others, to determine what he or she is seeking and what knowledge and skill base would be most beneficial to his or her community. NACCA, AFOA and CANDO all have interest in facilitating Aboriginal community, economic and business development.

All three organizations, NACCA, AFOA and CANDO, have made significant investments in creating modules, courses and programs to provide the skills and knowledge that may greatly benefit those who partake of them. The challenge and the opportunity for the individual seeking to learn and develop is to move ahead and obtain the training that is consistent with his or her objectives.

Editors' Introduction

Warren Weir and Wanda Wuttunee

In this issue, writers continue to share interesting and innovative research on a variety of topics key to better understanding Aboriginal community, economic, business, and entrepreneurial development. The four articles profiled in this section of JAED relate to Aboriginal wineries in New Zealand and Canada, job satisfaction and Indigenous labour mobility, the First Nation social economy, and accountability in the Aboriginal gaming industry.

In the first piece, Missens, Dana, and Yule compare and contrast entrepreneurial activities in Indigenous communities located in Canada and New Zealand. Highlighting the value of Aboriginal communities becoming involved in “non-traditional” activities, the authors analyze the activities of two Indigenous communities involved in the wineries industry. They conclude that, while the activities were similar in that entrepreneurship seemed to be a collective activity, there are differences in the objectives, or purposes, of the two enterprises. The authors also explore the idea of social and psychological acculturation as a factor in the success of Indigenous entrepreneurial activities. Social and psychological acculturation refers to the “psychological and behavioural changes that an individual experiences as a result of sustained contact with members of other cultural groups”. This theory suggests that as acculturation increases, associations with culture, identity, and community and family relations will decrease.

In the second article, Gayle Broad shares her reflections on the First Nation social capital derived from her involvement with a major project that took place in and with several First Nation

communities in the 1990s. Broad's article discusses the social capital, the social economy in the First Nation context, and the original project. The project, called Understanding the Strengths of Indigenous Communities (USIC), was well profiled in the communities and institutions involved, but it did not get much airplay in the larger realm of Aboriginal economic development in Canada. In her article, social capital is defined as "the networks of social relations that provide access to resources and support that exist both internally within communities and in external networks between and among different communities".

In the third article, Christopher Adams attempts to "shed a little bit more light on the topic of mobility among Aboriginal people, especially among those who are employed full-time and not residing on-reserve". He surveys why Aboriginal labour becomes mobile, by focusing on job satisfaction and job security in relation to status, gender, age, level of education, and residency.

In the fourth and final piece in this section on research, Yale Belanger examines the relationships that exist between public trust, corporate identity and reputation, consumer trust, and the economic success of Aboriginal enterprises and businesses. His analysis is based on an historical examination of activities related to the Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA) during 2000–2004. He suggests that the separation of Aboriginal politics and business is a strategy that can enhance consumer confidence and trust, leading to economic success and a positive and sustained corporate image.

INDIGENOUS ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE WINE INDUSTRY

A Comparative Study of Two Indigenous Approaches

.....

Richard Missens
FIRST NATIONS UNIVERSITY

Leo Paul Dana and Simon Yule
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY, NEW ZEALAND

This case study compares two Indigenous approaches to entrepreneurship within the wine industry: Nk'Mip Cellars (a joint venture between the Osoyoos Indian Band and Vincor Canada) in British Columbia, Canada and Tohu Wines, in Marlborough, New Zealand. The aim was to identify whether differences exist in the approach to entrepreneurship between two different Indigenous groups competing in non-traditional businesses. The results should assist Indigenous populations in their understanding of Indigenous entrepreneurship as well as help guide their people towards greater economic development. Substantial differences between the two chosen Indigenous groups were found in their method of achieving collective entrepreneurship. This study has shown that both the Indigenous New Zealand community and the Indigenous Canadian community can be successful in competing entrepreneurially in something outside their traditional competencies. Furthermore, this study suggests that in order to be successful by competing entrepreneurially in business activities typically considered outside their traditional competencies, Indigenous groups looking to develop their communities economically might want to consider the level of social or psychological acculturation with their non-Indigenous neighbours.

INTRODUCTION

Increasingly, minority Indigenous communities around the world are looking at new ways to regain control over their traditional lands and

resources (Camp, Anderson, and Giberson, 2005). There is sufficient evidence to suggest that governments have been negotiating with Indigenous groups about their claims for land by considering more liberal economic policies and

The authors thank Leeann Froese, Coletta and Associates, North Vancouver, BC, for providing information.

by transferring resources to private but collective Indigenous ownership (Sullivan and Margaritis, 2000). This is an attempt to provide a substantial economic base to build entrepreneurial businesses and ultimately reverse long suffered socio-economic disadvantages through a relatively new approach to economic development called Indigenous entrepreneurship (Peredo, Anderson, Galbraith, Honig, and Dana, 2004). The aim of this study is to conduct a comparison case study between two thriving Indigenous wineries, Nk'Mip Cellars in British Columbia, Canada, and Tohu Wines, situated in Marlborough, New Zealand. Nk'Mip Cellars and Tohu Wines are two examples of Indigenous groups successfully participating in the global wine economy, and by doing so are making considerable progress in marketing their unique traditional cultures.

Wingham, Anderson, Gibson, and Giberson (2004) suggest that the success and popularity of Nk'Mip Cellars and Tohu Wines are giving rise to increased attention being paid to other Indigenous communities worldwide, and in particular, their approaches to development on their own terms. The authors also note that this has been due, in part, to the failure of neo-liberal (market and authoritarian and bureaucratic (state) approaches to economic development. A growing number of Indigenous communities are considering using wine to achieve their goals. This suggests that Indigenous wine ventures are proving to be a popular entrepreneurial activity amongst many Indigenous populations.

However, despite the growing research on Indigenous entrepreneurship, little comparative research has been done between different Indigenous communities and their approaches to entrepreneurship in non-traditional businesses. A better understanding of the ways that different Indigenous communities take with regard to entrepreneurship and economic development, in this sense, may considerably help other Indigenous communities who are looking to rebuild their community economically, socially, and culturally. Anderson, Wingham, Gibson, and Giberson (2007) note that through developing a greater understanding of this Indigenous wine market, it has been possible to enhance knowledge of both the market for Indigenous wine products in isolation, as well as the niche that exists for Indigenous wine and Indigenous tourism enhancements to sales.

With numerous awards won for the quality of their wine, successful companies like Nk'Mip Cellars and Tohu Wines not only provide a better understanding of the Indigenous wine market, products, and tourism, but also the examples illustrated in this study will hopefully provide motivation, encouragement, and inspiration to other Indigenous communities around the world. Therefore, this study aims to extend the research on Indigenous approaches to entrepreneurship in non-traditional businesses by identifying, through comparison, the extent to which two different Indigenous approaches to wine entrepreneurship are similar or different.

This study has four main parts. First, it reviews relevant literature on Indigenous socio-economic welfare, Indigenous entrepreneurship and the Indigenous wine industry. Second, comparisons are made on the basis of organisational purposes and objectives, organisational beliefs and values. Third a comparison of the business strategy and marketing techniques between Nk'Mip Cellars and Tohu Wines, and lastly, similarities and differences between approaches are then discussed before limitations and future research areas are considered.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Indigenous People and Low Socio-economic Levels

It is relatively well known that, globally, many minority Indigenous communities have long suffered socio economic disadvantages including poverty, low education levels, poor health (Peredo et al., 2004) and this deprivation of economic development has also been a great concern for a considerable length of time (de Bruin and Mataira, 2003; Hindle and Lansdowne, 2007). Before progressing further, it is necessary to define what the notion 'Indigenous people' specifically means. Peredo et al. (2004) provide a well-rounded definition of Indigenous people, which includes being a descendant from populations inhabiting a region prior to later inhabitants, followed by geographical, political, and/or economic domination by later inhabitants or immigrants, and then finally, maintenance of some distinctive social-cultural norms and institutions (p. 5).

For many years, governments have been trying to help Indigenous communities improve the state of their overall socioeconomic situation, as well as address their poverty, health and education levels, by providing minority Indigenous communities with direct economic assistance (Peredo et al., 2004). However, Hindle and Lansdowne (2007) highlight an important point with regard to this approach by stating “whether or not the intentions of non-Indigenous governance and the aid agencies have been malicious or benign, the result of taking responsibility out of Indigenous hands has resulted in a hand-out culture” (Pearson, 1999). Therefore, this approach may not be the best way of helping to alleviate the socioeconomic disadvantages of minority Indigenous communities because essentially it is not solving the problem. In addition to the resistance to direct economic assistance and “handouts” from governments and aid agencies, Indigenous people themselves are looking to regain control over their traditional lands and resources so that they can use the land and resources in innovative ways as the foundation for their pursuit of development on their own terms (Camp et al., 2005).

Furneaux and Brown (2007) note that a key way of facilitating the Indigenous communities’ escape from depending on the welfare has been through entrepreneurship. The growing resistance by Indigenous groups against direct economic assistance from governments and aid agencies combined with the urge from Indigenous groups to become self-determined in their own creative way is encouraging Indigenous communities to become more involved in what many authors are calling ‘Indigenous entrepreneurship’.

Indigenous Entrepreneurship

Before Indigenous entrepreneurship is discussed in more detail, a clear definition of entrepreneurship is needed. Wennekers and Thurik (1999, p. 46) define entrepreneurship as the manifest ability and willingness of individuals, on their own, in teams, within and outside existing organizations, to perceive and create new economic opportunities, for example, new products, new production methods, new organizational schemes, and new product market combinations. Therefore, entrepreneurship involves the ability to introduce the entrepreneur’s ideas in the mar-

ket, in the face of uncertainty and other obstacles, by making decisions on location, form, and the use of resources and institutions. Indigenous entrepreneurship is defined by Lindsay (2005) in terms of “creating, managing and developing new ventures by Indigenous people for the benefit of Indigenous people” (p. 1). Lindsay (2005) further notes that the advantages in Indigenous entrepreneurship lie in having strong desires for self-determination, heritage preservation, entrepreneurial strategies originating in and controlled by the community, and the sanction of Indigenous culture. A more thorough definition of Indigenous entrepreneurship is provided by Hindle and Lansdowne (2007, p. 9) as

the creation, management and development of new ventures by Indigenous people for the benefit of Indigenous people. The organisations thus created can pertain to either the private, public or non profit sectors. The desired and achieved benefits of venturing can range from the narrow view of economic profit for a single individual to the broad view of multiple and social and economic advantages for entire communities. Outcomes and entitlements derived from Indigenous entrepreneurship may extend to enterprise partners and stakeholders who may be non-Indigenous.

Some authors have described the Indigenous approach to entrepreneurship as being collective in nature (Anderson, Dana, and Dana, 2006; Peredo et al., 2004).

This study aims to examine Indigenous entrepreneurship, not in a traditional sense, but rather through ‘opting into’ traditionally unfamiliar industries or business activities as a means of achieving economic development. While the more traditional Indigenous approaches to entrepreneurship might be collective in nature, it is possible that some Indigenous groups may vary in the degree of individualism or collectivism in their approach to entrepreneurship when participating in non-traditional business activities. This may be due to factors such as shifting economic forces, advancing technologies, encroaching population centres, social acculturation, and colonial expansion (Peredo et al., 2004).

The Indigenous Wine Industry

Globally, wine markets are becoming more competitive as ‘New World’ wine producers, such as

Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Latin America, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States are increasingly developing aggressive marketing policies as well as promoting products at competitive prices (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2009). A recent growing trend, within many of these New World wine regions, seems to be occurring where a number of Indigenous groups have also decided to enter the increasingly competitive, but seemingly fashionable wine industry. There are a number of Indigenous wineries throughout these New World regions to illustrate this growing trend

Murrin Bridge is an Aboriginal owned vineyard in New South Wales, Australia. The 25-hectare vineyard was planted at Murrin Bridge, on the banks of the Lachlan River in 1999 as part of a joint venture of the local Aboriginal community. Initially, the project lacked finance and wine industry expertise; however, a deal with the Bidgebong winery at Wagga Wagga led to the release of a 2004 Shiraz and a 2005 Chardonnay under the Murrin Bridge label (Murray Bridge Wines, 2005).

In 2004, a majority-owned Native American wine company called Indigenous Wines LLC was launched in San Francisco with a goal to provide strategy and financial self-sufficiency for Native Americans across the U.S. and for Indigenous people worldwide. The company's primary tools to create positive change in Indian country include investment financing, tribal energy creation, and pharmaceutical development for Native American communities (Business wire, 2004).

More recently, the Kiraya Winery in Hualien, Eastern Taiwan, has been another example of an Indigenous winery making the most of an opportunity to publicise its unique culture. The winery greets customers with a small exhibition featuring the Indigenous culture of Tawain's Sakizaya tribe, displaying some historic photos of the traditional brewing equipment used by the Sakizaya tribe. The winery has helped in marketing the Indigenous foods and drinks, which also allows visitors to experience the traditional life of the Indigenous brewers (Culture Taiwan, 2009).

Perhaps coincidentally, these different Indigenous groups are tapping into wine as a way to succeed in entrepreneurship just as many others tap into more traditional or familiar Indigenous industries such as fishing, recreational hunting,

and other forms of tourism. However, one author outlines a number of reasons that the wine industry is proving to be a popular choice of new venture by Indigenous groups. According to Wingham et al. (2004), international tourism is economically powerful and when supplemented with a growing desire for a greater understanding of the cultural roots of Indigenous people of the world, there lies great potential for Indigenous product markets. Additionally, Wingham et al. (2004) state that resources such as agriculture and land management provide a solid foundation upon which Indigenous economic development can occur in places like Canada and New Zealand.

Having quality land available not only offers a natural advantage, but the relative ease of entry makes the wine industry an already popular choice for Indigenous people. Furthermore, Wingham et al. (2004) describe wine as having a "unique quality among the harvested crops, of being transferred into a drink that is imbued with magic, and which is enhanced by consuming the product at, or around its place of origin" (p. 4). This concept is similar to place branding, and according to Hall (2004), the issue of place branding is important as the place of origin is a key aspect of wine marketing. The notion of place is also especially appealing for Indigenous people who may look to utilise their rich cultural ties with the land in order to enhance the sense of imbuelement with the wine, attract more customers and ultimately improve the performance of their venture for the benefit of their people. In their study, Wingham et al. (2004) looked at the approaches that Indigenous communities take in their attempt to make sense of the global economy. More specifically, their research aimed at identifying which elements of the global economic environment are in line with or similar to certain philosophies of Indigenous culture. Their two chosen case studies were two of the first Indigenous wineries in the world, Nk'Mip Cellars from North America, and Tohu Wines from New Zealand.

Wingham et al. (2004) describe some similarities between the Canadian and New Zealand approaches to Indigenous wine entrepreneurship, which reflect the characteristics of Indigenous economic development and philosophies being divergent from global cultures. This is in line with other research, which suggests that signifi-

cant differences exist between Indigenous and non-Indigenous entrepreneurship in the United States (Dana, 1995) and in Canada (Dana, 1996). Although Wingam et al. (2004) suggest the two non-Indigenous approaches to wine entrepreneurship used in their study are similar, their study falls short of discussing what specific similarities, or even differences, may exist in approaches to wine entrepreneurship and how these similarities or differences relate to the general literature on Indigenous entrepreneurship. Some research suggests that individual approaches to Indigenous economic development might vary across different Indigenous groups (Anderson and Giberson, 2003; Fredrick and Henry, 2003; Harmsworth, 2006).

A Suggestion of Differences between Indigenous Approaches to Entrepreneurship

Literature surrounding the topic of Indigenous entrepreneurship of Canadians and New Zealanders suggests that differences in characteristics and approaches to entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship may exist. For example, Fredrick and Henry (2003) state that Maori have always been very entrepreneurial and that they are seen to be first movers, as well as enthusiastic adopters of technology. Harmsworth (2006) also describes Maori business people as profit driven. In comparison with Indigenous people from Canada, Anderson and Giberson (2003) describe the characteristics of Indigenous entrepreneurs in Canada to have a strong tie between the process and the place and with a strong component of rebuilding their culture and heritage.

In addition, an interesting note that Anderson and Giberson (2003) make about the Canadian Indigenous approach to entrepreneurship is that it is in contrast with other instances of entrepreneurship associated with ethnic groups that have migrated to new places in order to seek economic opportunities by distinguishing their way from the non-Indigenous way. The authors mention one such distinction in the Indigenous Canadian approach, which involves forming alliances and joint ventures among themselves with non-aboriginal partners to create business that can compete profitably in the global economy (p. 144). Anderson and Giberson's comments suggest that some differences may exist in

the approaches between Indigenous Canadian entrepreneurs, and Indigenous New Zealand entrepreneurs, particularly along the individualism–collectivism spectrum. Other research suggests that differences may exist due to the affect of psychological acculturation.

Psychological acculturation is defined as the psychological and behavioural changes that an individual experiences as a result of sustained contact with members of other cultural groups (Ward and Kennedy, 1994, p. 330). Research has suggested that as acculturation increases, the strength of certain levels of collectivism or the individual's identification with his/her family decreases, and as a result, their culture may decrease in strength (Gomez, 2003). Following this logic, highly acculturated Indigenous groups looking to compete in non-traditional concepts should have greater levels of individualism and lower levels of collectivism than similar Indigenous communities with lower levels of acculturation.

METHOD

Based on published materials, we examine similarities and differences between two Indigenous groups and their respective enterprises, Nk'Mip Cellars in Canada and Tohu Wines, in New Zealand. Specifically, this research aims to compare three areas including organisational purposes, values and beliefs, and business strategy and marketing techniques.

FINDINGS

In this section below, brief backgrounds of the two Indigenous wineries are provided. In the following sections, comparisons between the approaches are put forth. Table 1 provides an overview of the key points found in the comparison between the different approaches of Nk'Mip and Tohu. The key findings will be discussed in more detail later in this article.

Background

Nk'Mip Cellars

Nk'Mip Cellars (pronounced *In-ka-meep*) is one of approximately ten profitable enterprises created by the Osoyoos Indian Band Corporation (OIBC). Nk'Mip Cellars is not a co-operative. It

TABLE 1

	<i>Organisational purpose and goals</i>	<i>Organisational beliefs and values</i>	<i>Business strategy and marketing techniques</i>
Nk'Mip Cellars	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decrease state dependency on government funding • Increased First Nation employment and self sufficiency • Life long learning for Band members • Bringing back traditional Indian concepts • Increase band member standard of living 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stakeholder perspective • Band members • First Nation employment • Heritage • Land 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wine tourism strategy • Location • Symbiotic networks and marketing relationships • Interior decor featuring works by local band artisans as well as numerous authentic native art and artefacts • Aboriginal inspired cuisine and traditional salmon feasts • Leveraging off the collective Nk'Mip Project
Tohu Wines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Profitability • Producing high quality wine • Exporting Maori culture to the world 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shareholder perspective • Tikanga Principles • Maori culture and history • Land 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wine exporting strategy • First Indigenous winery in the world • Award winning wine maker, Simon Waghorn • Board members and their divers range of skills • Self-directed approach (establishing themselves on their own terms) • Communicating the Brand through international wine shows, fairs, and to overseas restaurants, journalists, and in wine magazines and advertisements • Complementary Maori cuisine

is a corporation held 51/49 by Nk'Mip and Vincor respectively. However, it shall be shown that an organisational value is cooperation. Headed by Chief Clarence Louie, who was first elected as band chief in 1985, the Nk'Mip project was an initiative developed by the Indigenous band members of the Osoyoos Indian Band

(OIB), which was formed on November 21, 1877 (Anderson, McGillivray and Giberson, 2007) and as of 2005 had 567 members (Anderson et al., 2006). The land of Nk'Mip is on a land base of 3200 acres in Southern Okanagan Valley, British Columbia. The land on which Nk'Mip Cellars operates is on the most environmentally sensitive

in Canada and on part of Canada's only desert ecosystem. Nk'Mip Cellars is part of the general Nk'Mip project, which is centred among a group of business activities. The winery opened in September 2002 after almost 35 years of OIB's involvement in the wine industry. In 1968, the OIB provided high quality vinifera grapes to many of the wineries in the Okanagan Valley, and some further afield. The winery has a total capacity of about 15,000 cases per year (Anderson et al., 2007).

Tohu Wines

The novel idea behind Tohu Wines (pronounced *Tor-who*) first came about in 1998 and was originally conceived as a vehicle to internationalise Maori culture by placing it on the tables of some of the world's finest restaurants (Te Puni Kokiri, 2005). Tohu Wines is a limited liability company owned by three Maori-owned organisations, the Ngati Rarua Atiawa Iwi Trust (Motueka), Wakatu Incorporation (Nelson-Marlborough) and the Wi Pere Trust (based in Gisborne). Tohu's vineyards are situated in three of New Zealand's premier wine growing regions including Marlborough, Gisborne and Nelson. Marlborough is renowned for its world class Sauvignon Blanc and Pinot Noir, Gisborne for stunning chardonnay and Nelson, one of New Zealand's most exciting emerging wine regions, produces aromatic varieties such as Riesling and Pinot Gris. Tohu's Wines capacity is approximately 120,000 cases of wine per year (Marketnewzealand.com, 2007).

1. Organisational Purpose/Goals

Nk'Mip Cellars

Nk'Mip Cellars along with the various other businesses in the Nk'Mip project, have a number of organisational purposes that they hope to achieve as part of increasing Indigenous economic development through entrepreneurial enterprise. The first of these include increasing the level of education specifically within the vocational and cultural areas. Chief Louie states that although profitability is good, it is not their main purpose (Kayseas, Hindle and Anderson, 2006). Nk'Mip Cellars hopes to contribute by sharing the responsibility and to motivate life long learning for band members. This is in line with what Anderson et al. (2007) stated where in

2004, the OIB devoted 60% of the profit from its business venture to social programs (p. 53). Secondly, Nk'Mip Cellars aims to decrease the dependency on Government funding through an increased level of self-generated income, joint ventures, leasing, land, and resource development in an attempt to strive for self-sufficiency.

Bringing back traditional Indian concepts of honour, sharing, and respect, is another goal Nk'Mip hopes to achieve through creating community involvements. Other goals and objectives include reducing political influence, and increasing band member standard of living within the band. With only a capacity of 15, 000 cases of wine, the Nk'Mip winery is not large; the objective has been quality over quantity (Wingham et al., 2004). Since opening in 2002, Nk'Mip Cellars has received more than 50 international wine awards (Nk'Mip Resort, 2009).

Tohu Wines

Although many of the underlying objectives might be similar, Tohu Wines appear to have some slightly different organisational goals and purposes. Profitability is the primary purpose of Tohu, where success lies in making money and producing top quality wines and management performance is based on key indicators such as sales and budget control (Te Puni Kokiri, 2005). By producing excellent quality wines, Tohu hopes to become one of the top five wineries out of more than 400 wineries in total operating in New Zealand (Te Puni Kokiri, 2005). Whereas the Nk'Mip Cellars goal is to bring back traditional Indian concepts of honour, sharing, and respect, the objective of profitability and producing quality wines is the driving force behind Tohu Wines and their original concept of exporting Maori culture to the world. Here, Tohu are looking to exhibit Maori culture to the world, rather than to rebuild it as in Nk'Mips case. Although Tohu are looking to tell the world about their culture, it is not their sole objective, as employing more of their people is also important. According to James Wheeler (current marketing manager of Tohu Wines and has been with the company right from the start), states that offering more employment to their people will make Tohu Wines more successful (Te Puni Kokiri, 2005).

2. Organisational Beliefs and Values

Nk'Mip Cellars

The organisational goals and objectives of both Nk'Mip and Tohu underpin their beliefs and values. The OIB, in particular, has a very strong belief in supporting its Band members. Adopting a stakeholder perspective, Nk'Mip Cellars is an organisation focused on the community where it is essential, that, to be part of the Band, you must be born into it. Chief Louie of the OIB states that, to him, First Nation employment is most important. Nk'Mip Cellars and the general Nk'Mip project as a whole is the product of this belief—development on their own terms in which control over traditional lands and resources plays a key role. He states that he would rather have a company that employs First Nation people and which loses a little money, than have a company that does not employ as many First Nation people but makes more money (Kayseas, Hindle and Anderson, 2006). Evidence to support chief Louie's belief was found in the study by Anderson et al. (2007), which stated that “By 2002, the OIBDC business had created so many jobs that people from other bands and non-native workers from the reserve were needed to supplement the Indian workers from the OIB.” (p. 346). Their motto, which states “Working with business to preserve our past and strengthen our future” illustrates this well.

Kayseas et al. (2006), state that many Indigenous communities in Canada are dismayed by the threatened extinction of tradition, languages, knowledge and skills and that Indigenous people believe that heritage is of vital importance and should be protected and maintained at all costs. The idea behind Nk'Mip Cellars is one such way of ensuring Indigenous heritage is not lost or replaced with skills and knowledge of superior or even equal utility. As well as the community, another one of Nk'Mip's organisational values is their land. According to the Nk'Mip Cellars website, a newly constructed desert interpretive and heritage centre has recently opened across from the Nk'Mip Cellars site (Nk'Mip Cellars, 2009). This strategically placed desert interpretive centre adds to the whole experience of the wine tourists.

Tohu Wines

The organisational beliefs and values illustrated in Nk'Mip's approach to economic development are mirrored only to a certain extent in Tohu's approach. Although James Wheeler notes that the ability to offer employment to their people would make Tohu Wines more successful, Tohu's approach to economic development might be to ensure continued success of Tohu through good quality wine. Like Nk'Mip, Tohu believe in, and value, their tradition, which is one reason why Tohu was originally conceived to compete in an area of business previously considered outside one of their traditional competencies. This was done using wine to publicise certain aspects of Maori culture by placing it on the tables of the world's finest restaurants.

As James Wheeler notes, “Global markets are fascinated by our authentic Maori history. They are intrigued to learn about a successful Indigenous company and it makes their experience of our product unique” (Marketnewzealand.com, 2007). As a result, Tohu incorporate many of the Maori principles into their approach to business including the Tikanga principles, which are “the customs and traditions that have been handed down through the passages of time” (Maori.org.nz, 2009). Similar to Nk'Mip, Tohu values their land. It consistently achieves accreditation from Sustainable Winegrowing New Zealand for its vineyard management and wine making practices. James Wheeler says this is in line with the company's fundamental commitment to sustainability and its policy of being Kaitiaki, or guardians of the land. This too is in line with Tohu's motto of “Nga hua a te whenua (Our gift from the land where time begins)” (Tohu wines, 2008).

3. Business Strategy and Marketing Techniques

Nk'Mip Cellars

The fact that their land is located amongst the most environmentally sensitive in Canada may not be an advantage from a grape growing perspective; Nk'Mip Cellars do look to leverage this unique aspect in another ways. In particular, Nk'Mip have leveraged their location from a tourist attraction perspective, where the desert ecosystem may strengthen the experience the tourist has while visiting the winery. In this

sense, their location may be an advantage over other North American wineries. Perhaps more obviously, their specific location at the end of the Southern gateway of the wine tourism region provides Nk'Mip with a clear benefit because it is the first winery that tourists see when they enter the valley from the South, or the last stop on the trail when they leave. Although their advantages in terms of heritage and location might suggest that it is not necessarily the quality of their wine, or the fact that the winery is Indigenous that make the business popular among tourists, Nk'Mip cannot rely on their Indigenous heritage and location alone (Anderson et al., 2007).

With their unique OIB heritage, which gives them a platform to leverage from, comes a lack of business skills. Nk'Mip's answer to this was to establish a symbiotic network and marketing relationship with Vincor (the largest producer and marketer of wine and related products in Canada (Vincor International, 2009) where up to 60% of their wine is sold through Vincor's marketing channels (Anderson et al., 2007). The business partnership allows Vincor access to vineyards in some of the hottest and richest growing climates in Canada while in return the OIB get resources and expertise needed to develop their land and obtain a piece of an emerging industry (Hayes, 2002).

During the over 25-year relationship with the Band, Vincor have helped build a stunning winery building. The design was influenced by aboriginal culture and the desert locale, and the interior decor features works by local band artisans as well as numerous displays that recount the evolution of the winery and vineyards (The Okanagan Wine Guide, 2008). The restaurant is open during the summer and features aboriginal inspired cuisine. The traditional salmon feasts are held in August and known for displaying the local talent including native dancers and drummers (Nk'Mip Resort, 2009).

Tour experiences at the winery are enhanced through the architecture designed and constructed to display native art and artefacts, and to enhance the beauty and unique nature of the wild sage desert surroundings (British Columbia.com, 2009). Another marketing technique Nk'Mip Cellars employs is through the joint marketing effort of the Nk'Mip project as a whole. Many of the 10 Nk'Mip enterprises oper-

ating within the Nk'Mip project have a common purpose, which is to provide tourists with a more total cultural experience in close geographical proximity. Collectively these businesses create a powerful marketing effort, and it is this joint marketing effort, which Nk'Mip Cellars look to leverage off.

Tohu Wines

Tohu wines also has some advantages, which differ in comparison to Nk'Mip Cellars. Although Nk'Mip Cellars prides itself on being the first and only Indigenous winery in North America, Tohu Wines has gained publicity for becoming the first Indigenous winery in the world. With the winery situated in Blenheim and with vineyard land in three of New Zealand's premier wine growing regions including Marlborough, Gisborne and Nelson, Tohu Wines prides itself on having a great location. These top wine growing regions, combined with one of New Zealand's most esteemed winemakers, Simon Waghorn, contribute to the fact that Tohu Wines has won medals at international and New Zealand wine awards for virtually every wine it has produced.

Tohu's board comprises six members who bring a diverse range of skill sets including accountancy and banking, entrepreneurialism and risk taking, and marketing (Te Puni Kokiri, 2005). Tohu acknowledges that it is these skill sets that are more important than the size of the company. The techniques Tohu uses to sell their wine start with the Maori story being told through all aspects of their business. The Maori aspect is communicated in all the company's marketing and branding—from talking about it at international wine shows, and fairs, restaurants and to journalists, to advertisements in wine magazines overseas. The Maori aspect is also communicated through Maori drawings on their boxes and on their website, including the striking Tohu label, which features a section of a painting by Maori artist Sandy Adsett (Marketingnewzealand.com, 2007). Tohu's Maori aspect is also shown in their food that complements their wine. The wine is often featured with contemporary Maori food including Kaimoana hotpot, Piri Piri lamb leg, Seafood salad as well as Seared Tuna, while using distinct flavours derived from herbs and spices from the native New Zealand bush (Maori Experiencz, 2006).

Another marketing technique used by Tohu is to establish good relationships. However, Tohu's approach to relationships is quite different to the relationship between Nk'Mip Cellars and Vincor mentioned earlier in this paper. Since Tohu exports approximately 80% of their wine offshore, James Wheeler travels up to four months of the year opening up new markets and meeting with distributors, importers, clients, and potential clients (Marketnewzealand.com, 2007). This has also resulted in Tohu purchasing a 19% stake in a United States importing company called Davies & Co Inc., which has secured an importing structure within the lucrative United States market. Another result from establishing good relationship has allowed Tohu to set up its own importing company called Tohu Wines Europe Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tohu Wines Limited. According to James Wheeler, the wine industry is one of the most competitive in the world and this means that developing good relationships with importers, distributors, retailers, chefs, restaurateurs, and sommeliers is essential. As James Wheeler notes, "The wine game is all about relationships ... a good relationship can mean good sales" (Te Puni Kokiri, 2005).

DISCUSSION

This study aimed to compare Indigenous approaches to entrepreneurship by specifically comparing the organisational purposes and goals, beliefs and values, and the business strategy and marketing techniques of two Indigenous wineries in Canada and New Zealand. The comparison highlighted a number of similarities, as well as some significant differences worth discussing.

On face value, the two Indigenous approaches to entrepreneurship both seem to have taken a collective approach. However, the results suggest that the notion of collectiveness seems stronger for the Indigenous Canadian approach. Additionally, Anderson et al. (2007) describe Nk'Mip Cellars and the OIB's involvement in the wine industry is "an excellent example of Aboriginal group successfully participating in the global economy, and by doing so, making considerable progress in rebuilding their community economically, socially and culturally." (p. 337). While this statement might be true in the case of Nk'Mip Cellars, findings suggest that it may not appear to hold entirely in the case of

Tohu Wines due to the lack of evidence suggesting Tohu are involving their communities, or at least, investing back in them.

Looking at the organisational purposes, beliefs and values, and business strategy and marketing techniques, it is clear that Nk'Mip's approach to entrepreneurship is strongly collective, where the day-to-day activities, as noted by Anderson et al. (2007), are conducted with social objectives in mind. Not only does their involvement in the combined Nk'Mip project suggest their collective nature, but also the primary objective of educating, motivating, reducing state dependency and increasing self-determination for their band members strongly emphasises collectiveness. The Osoyoos Indians value their people as much as their land and this is reflected appropriately in their employment of band members, as well as in their motto. Where Nk'Mip Cellars have lacked the business skills, they have looked to form symbiotic network relationships with larger companies such as Vincor. Their motivation to achieve self-determination through their belief in employing First Nation people underpins their purposes. While Nk'Mip's approach is to *revive* and *reignite* traditional Indian concepts, Tohu's approach is more a case of *showcasing* their Maori culture to the world.

Although still essentially collective, Tohu differs substantially in their approach to Indigenous entrepreneurship compared to Nk'Mip Cellars. For example, in contrast to Nk'Mip Cellars, Tohu Wines places a strong emphasis on profitability and producing high-end wine in order to export Maori culture to the world. Nk'Mip Cellars, on the other hand, is part of a business project including, for example, a desert and heritage centre and a golf course. This suggests that Nk'Mip Cellars has adopted a predominantly wine tourism strategy, as opposed to Tohu Wines, which could be considered primarily as an exporting strategy. While Tohu acknowledges that making money is the key to a successful Maori organisation, the Tikanga principles are valued and must be strongly tied with this approach. Rather than establishing alliances and joint ventures with outside companies, much of Tohu's business strategy and marketing techniques have been different to Nk'Mip's. Tohu have looked to include well balanced and experienced, yet diverse board members, who bring a range of skills into the business, and have gener-

ally looked to establish themselves on their own terms. Evidence of this can be seen through Tohu's stake in Davies & Co Inc, and through their decision to establish their own importing company. With this self-directed approach, the board recognises that a profitable organisation is needed to grow the business so that it can ensure longevity and that it can offer more to its people through, for example, employment. Harmsworth (2006) describes Maori Indigenous business models as composite business models involving mixed Western and cultural, or mainly Western practices. Devlin (2007) outlines a possible research framework for Maori economic development alternatives.

Our results suggest that, although Indigenous approaches to entrepreneurship are still mainly collective in nature, individual differences between Indigenous groups may exist in their approaches to achieving collective entrepreneurship. In addition, and aside from the very nature of wine as a product and the different techniques used to sell wine, there is evidence to suggest that in order to be successful by competing entrepreneurially in something outside their traditional competencies, Indigenous communities may only be able to do so by borrowing from non-Indigenous concepts. The idea of Indigenous communities borrowing from non-Indigenous concepts may have an affect on the level of collectivism that eventuates in their entrepreneurial approach. Therefore, a possible explanation for the variation in approaches to entrepreneurship between Indigenous groups could be due to the level of social acculturation with non-Indigenous groups, which maybe influenced due to a number of factors, for example, culture specific behaviour. This in turn may be accentuated by a country's physical size, population density and or the difference among the geographical proximity of Indigenous populations with non-Indigenous populations. This is in line with Collier, Brice, and Oades (2007), who highlight the significance of geographical proximity between cultures in the sharing of cultural elements.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

There are a number of limitations in this study that should be addressed. First, only two Indige-

nous approaches to entrepreneurship were compared. Secondly, this comparison was made within the relatively specific and distinctive wine industry and has neglected other industries all together. Third, a lack of primary data weakens the findings of this study. All these limitations affect the ability to generalise of the findings and therefore the reader should interpret the results with caution. Future research should look at and compare other Indigenous wineries and their approaches to entrepreneurship to confirm the findings in this study. Future studies should also consider other industries in which Indigenous communities are entering business, for example, in the area of small businesses. Future studies should focus on multiple businesses including the size and number of businesses and use primary data as the main source of data. Consumer perceptions of brand value would be another particularly interesting area of future research as this would perhaps indicate the amount that the brands are worth in terms of reputation, prestige, and market value from a consumer's point of view. Additionally, the level of differentiation between the Indigenous business and the non-Indigenous business operating in the same country is worth investigating. Findings on these previously mentioned research areas would allow for an even better understanding of Indigenous entrepreneurship and the different styles Indigenous entrepreneurs take in their approach to achieving collective entrepreneurship.

CONCLUSION

Globally, new wine ventures are increasingly being seen as popular choices among Indigenous communities. Wine lovers are seeking opportunities to taste and buy wine in unique settings, while combining an already popular commodity with a unique twist of culture, which enhances the appeal of the commodity and the tourist experience. The present study has looked at two different Indigenous groups and their innovative approach towards entrepreneurship in what appears to be an unfamiliar, non-Indigenous industry. The results found some similarities as well as a number of substantial differences between approaches. Similarities between Indigenous approaches included the mainly collective nature of the entrepreneurial activity across both groups. Differences were found in the main

objective or purposes of the organisations. For example, Nk'Mip's purpose was to educate, motivate, reduce state dependency and increase self-determination for their band members as well as revive the traditional Indian culture by using wine to revive some aspects of native cultures through, for example, food sales, tourism and cultural events. Tohu's main objective, however, was to use wine as a tool to make profit and to showcase aspects of their culture to the world. Tohu has also chosen a more self-directed approach by buying stakes in importing companies as well as establishing their own importing companies rather than relying on alliances and joint ventures (as in Nk'Mip's case with Vincor). Both Nk'Mip and Tohu value their land and their tradition. However, Tohu has voiced their value in producing high quality wine, while Nk'Mip have consistently voiced their value in employing First Nation people. Lastly, Nk'Mip's wine tourism strategy is in contrast to Tohu's exporting strategy. The differences in the approaches to entrepreneurship across Indigenous groups suggest that factors such as the level of social and psychological acculturation might affect the extent to which Indigenous populations are willing to borrow from non-Indigenous concepts. Therefore, it could be posited that social and psychological acculturation plays an important role in explaining the differences in approaches to Indigenous entrepreneurship.

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GENERATING SOCIAL CAPITAL IN FIRST NATIONS *Learnings from the USIC Project*

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Social capital has become a much-used phrase in academic literature to describe relationships of trust that evolve between partnering organizations, individuals, governments and academics. Using a case study approach this paper explores the mobilization of internal and external networks that occurred in the “Understanding the Strengths of Indigenous Communities” (USIC) project¹ to uncover some considerations for the generation of social capital within First Nations. The paper identifies some key factors to consider in the development of social capital in First Nations, including using strengths — rather than deficits. This entails respecting and including a diversity of perspectives and community members and establishing processes and protocols for relationships both within the community and with external partners and organizations. The paper concludes that building cross-cultural networks requires time, patience, perseverance, and effort, and will be constantly challenging. However, these networks may also benefit the collective interests of First Nations by encouraging community engagement and power-sharing within communities.

INTRODUCTION

As social beings, people have developed a wide variety of relationships that contribute to our ability to function and develop within society: family relationships, workplace and marketplace relationships, relationships arising from leisure, recreational, cultural and spiritual activities, all contribute to our development. More recently, there has been a growing recognition of the function that these relationships play in both our

social and economic well-being, and the term “social capital” has been coined to reflect the benefit of these relationships to society.

Abundant research has illustrated that strengthening social capital is likely to improve the health and well-being of both individuals and communities (Fukuyama, 1990; Putnam, 2001; Premier’s Council on Health Strategy, 1991) while simultaneously modern life, with its busyness and disruptions, tends to act contrary to the ongoing nurturing of social capital (Putnam, 1999).

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In recognition of this growing body of knowledge, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) funded a Policy Research Initiative (PRI) in collaboration with Statistics Canada to explore the utilization of social capital as a public policy tool. The PRI suggested that to make social capital “a useful tool” policy makers must define it and identify “policy levers for affecting the many ways it is created, accumulated and utilized” (PRI, 2004: 5).

This paper attempts to shed some light on how social capital may be “created, accumulated and utilized” within First Nation communities, through exploring the processes and techniques employed by the “Understanding the Strengths of Indigenous Communities” (USIC) research project.² As a collaborative research project involving academics, First Nations and funders, a number of new networks were developed, while other networks were renewed or enhanced through the project. This type of collaboration provides some substantial learnings for the processes of respectful, social capital development — learnings that will be crucial to the development of public policy supporting social capital in First Nations communities.

This paper draws several conclusions regarding the generation of social capital within and among First Nation communities:

1. Use strengths as a starting point for dialogue (rather than starting with the “problem”).
2. Find ways to be inclusive and involve a diversity of perspectives.
3. Clarify the terms of your working relationships early on.
4. Build in processes that respect the power relationships impacting on those you are working with.
5. Respect and work with differing world views — no one answer fits all.
6. Be flexible and persevere.
7. Find as many opportunities as possible for meeting in other First Nation communities — instead of meeting in cities, towns etc.
8. Discover how networks help in accessing resources.
9. Be prepared for longer-term involvement.

Background to the USIC Project

The USIC project extended over a period of almost 10 years, beginning with initial applications to SSHRC in the late 1990s, and culminating with the final community reports in 2007. Five First Nation communities from across Canada — Wagmatcook, Batchewana, Flying Dust, Teslin Tlingit and Saanich — stayed with the research project titled “Understanding the Strengths of Indigenous Communities” (USIC) until its conclusion. The research was unique in a number of ways:

- It focused on the strengths of the communities rather than on the problems.
- The researchers were drawn almost exclusively from their communities, then trained to use their skills to elicit community perceptions of First Nations’ own strengths.
- It approached the concept of strength holistically, accepting that any one strength cannot be understood out of context of the larger social system.
- It focused on the processes through which strengths were developed and maintained.

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the research was its focus on *process*, i.e., exploring how the strengths of relatively strong First Nations were developed and maintained over time. Rather than focusing on the actual achievement by itself, the research explored the process of each strength’s development, how it was used to assist the community in growing and persevering, and how the community utilized its strengths to build and develop itself. The end goal of the research was to provide models of development that may be adapted by other First Nations communities for their own use.

USIC: A CASE STUDY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT IN FIRST NATIONS

Social capital has been defined as “the networks of social relations that provide access to resources and support” (PRI, 2004) that exist both internally within communities, and in external networks between and among different communities. Research indicates that these networks have a number of shared characteristics:

- The network may be composed of individuals or of communities of interest or practice.
- They are composed of both strong ties (family, close friends) and weak ties (acquaintances, friend of friend, etc.) (Savory-Gordon, 2003; Granovetter, 1973).
- They are built on trust, reciprocity and shared values (Gilchrist, 2004).

These networks of social relations have proven to be of substantial benefit to both individuals and communities. For example, on an individual basis, “strong ties” such as those amongst family members or close friends, may provide support to an ill or grieving member, while weak ties may provide access to letters of reference for employment, or access to knowledge key to solving a particular problem. On a community basis, these networks increase a community’s capacity to deal with adversity, through strengthening the community’s resiliency.

The USIC project, a five year SSHRC-funded initiative led by the late Dr. Cynthia Chataway, formerly of York University, contributed to the development of social capital through a broad-based collaboration involving academics, First Nations and a wide variety of funding partners. Once the research process began, the USIC project developed networks in a variety of sites:

1. Within the Community (Bonding): Community Oversight Teams (COT), Focus groups
2. Between Indigenous Communities (Bridging): conference calls, meetings, final community celebrations
3. Between non-Indigenous Institutions and Indigenous Communities (Linking): academe, funders
4. Between non-Indigenous and Indigenous Communities: media reports on project, friendships within the project.

Two of these sites were “external” to the participating First Nations, i.e., the linkages between the non-Indigenous institutions and the communities, and between non-Indigenous and Indigenous communities, while the other two were “internal”, i.e., between Indigenous individuals/groups within the community, or between Indigenous communities.

External Networks: Linking Non-Indigenous Institutions and Indigenous Communities


In 1999, Dr. Cynthia Chataway and Larry Sault, a former Chief from his community of Mississaugas of the New Credit, and former Grand Chief of Iroquois and Allied Indians, initiated the USIC project by posing the question “What type of research would be useful to First Nation communities?” to a group of twenty individuals, drawn primarily from First Nations. This initial meeting was composed of a group with whom the two principals had both “strong” and “weak” ties — all were known to them primarily from their work, Cynthia within the academic community working with Indigenous people, and Larry through his role as a First Nation Chief and Vice President of Canadian Executive Services Organization (CESO), Indigenous Services.

This first grouping eventually evolved into the “Project Oversight Committee” (POC), a group that would actively participate in the development of the research proposal, and then provide ongoing advice to the project throughout its five years of funding. After determining the research questions, i.e., “What are the strengths of Indigenous Communities? “ And “How have these strengths been developed and maintained over time?” the POC selected a group of 53 people from across Canada to identify the First Nations which they considered to be relatively strong. Out of this group, eight First Nations were selected to be invited to join the project, with the intent to have as wide a range of cultures, strengths, and geographical locations as possible, within Canada.

This group then applied for funding to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), eventually obtaining a five-year Strategic Initiatives grant, as well as obtaining smaller but significant funding from Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC).

The USIC project also brought together a group of academics drawn from a number of non-Indigenous institutions, and again, joined these groups with funders. Each community accessed research support from a local college or university, involving large, small and medium-sized institutions. While York University provided the lead, Trent University, University of Saskatchewan, First Nations University, Yukon

FIGURE 1
National Level Networks



Notes:

SSHRC is the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
INAC is the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs.

College, Cape Breton University, Dalhousie and Algoma University all participated to a greater or lesser degree in the project. The wide network of academic support, drawn from a variety of disciplines, provided communities with an assurance that the research was both valid and valuable, contributing to their self-confidence in embarking on such a large research project.

The project also required the participation of a number of funders, and while some of these, such as Indian and Northern Affairs, had relationships with all the communities prior to the commencement of USIC, for others it was a new relationship which led to unforeseen outcomes, such as a conference on traditional forms of governance in Teslin Tlingit First Nation.

The involvement of academics and funders through USIC with the participating communities, encouraged the development of social relations in a non-threatening manner, i.e., in such a way as to allow the development of weak ties, that may eventually develop into stronger ones. Chataway (2002) has pointed out the advantages for 'outsider' facilitation of a dialogue process;

by developing links with outsider institutions, USIC may have promoted opportunities for Indigenous communities to identify outsiders with whom they could be sufficiently comfortable to eventually invite to such a process.

The external networks then can be characterized by Figure 1.

External Networks: Linking Non-Indigenous and Indigenous Communities

The USIC project also supported networks of relations between non-Indigenous and Indigenous communities, primarily through presentations of research findings, media reports on the project, and friendships developed within the project. The research findings had applicability across a wide spectrum of disciplines, thus presentations on the research findings aroused interest from numerous quarters. Presentations to groups as diverse as scientists, political scientists, health care providers and policy makers, and economic developers arose from the USIC research.³ Additionally, the project garnered local, regional and

national interest through media attention. At the beginning of each community's research, local media outlets were provided with a press release, which in at least some communities, created ongoing interest in the project. A national website, coverage in regional magazines as well as academic journals, continued to build relationships with non-Indigenous communities.

Perhaps the closest relationships however, developed through the friendships established within the USIC network. A number of the research supervisors and students working on the project were drawn from outside of Indigenous communities, and these individuals, on many occasions, formed close relationships not only with the community researchers, but also with the First Nation community with whom they were most engaged. Making presentations to Chief and Council and to the Community Oversight Team on a regular basis; completing funding applications; developing newsletters for community-wide distribution; working with the community researchers and other interested community members to complete the research all contributed to the establishment of such friendships, and in some communities, researchers from the national office resided with community members, sometimes for extended periods.

Both the local networks and the national network intersected at various points and over the life of the project meetings with a meeting of people from all of the groups on at least three occasions. Additionally, the structures interconnected through a variety of different processes. For example national funders often had connections with local research supervisors and local communities, as they funded individual pieces of the research, such as a case study. For example, Batchewana researchers and academic support from Algoma University were involved with the Department of Heritage Canada, which funded a case study on culture at Batchewana First Nation (BFN).

Internal Networks within the Participating Communities

The USIC project, as indicated above, invited a number⁴ of relatively strong First Nation communities from across Canada to participate in the research. In accordance with suggested principles for network mobilization (Chataway, 2002), the

research director approached the Chief and Council of each community first, and obtained their support in the form of a Band Council Resolution. This approach demonstrated USIC's respect for the political power-holders in the community, and encouraged community members' participation through the assurance of the leadership's endorsement. At the local level, each participating First Nation established a structure similar to that of the national project, with a local college or university providing research support, a local Community Oversight Team (COT), funders, and of course the First Nation community (see Figure 2).


In each of the participating USIC communities, at least two sites were created for network development: the Community Oversight Team (COT), and in the focus groups. Each of these provided differing levels of participation and different access points.

Each community was asked to form its own "Community Oversight Team" (COT) composed of 10–12 members of the First Nation, and reports were regularly provided to COT, Chief and Council, and members of the community. The composition of the COT varied from community to community, but in general, a group of ten to twelve community members volunteered or were appointed by Chief and Council to oversee the ongoing work of the project.

Although the COT's primary purpose was to ensure that the research accurately reflected the community's reality, the COT members played various roles in the participating communities. Often they acted as a conduit of information between the research and the community; sometimes they lobbied Chief and Council or funding agencies for additional monies to support the ongoing work or assisted the project in accessing other resources; often they encouraged the participation of community members in the research processes. Generally the COT met once per month throughout the research process, and reviewed each of the documents produced by USIC prior to its general release to the community and beyond.

In some communities, the COT provided an opportunity for the creation of a network with "crosscutting ties" (Chataway, 2004: 68), in that representatives of different social groups within the community were encouraged to participate. The COT members' participation in the various

FIGURE 2
Local USIC Structure, Using Batchewana First Nation as An Example



Notes:

HRSDC (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada) is the federal department responsible for developing human resources and skills policies and programs.

LDM is the Local Delivery Mechanism some First Nations have established to deliver programs on behalf of HRSDC.

community meetings, open houses and feasts that each community organized as part of the USIC process, also contributed to this broader network formation. Also, the training in research methods provided at the beginning of the community research process, was offered to any community member who might choose to participate, at no cost, and was usually well attended by prospective COT members.

A key site for network development which the USIC process created was contained within the research methodology, in that 12–17 focus groups were held in each participating community. The focus groups engaged approximately five to eight people in each group, discussing in a structured process, over a two to three hour period, the strengths of the participating community. The structured format ensured that each participant's opinions was heard in a safe environment, where ideas were not critiqued and consensus on relationships between strengths was required.

These structured discussions, focused around the positive theme of the communities' strengths, provided participants with a space which encouraged "... dialogue designed to improve communication and understanding" (Chataway, 2002: 72), the first step in the process of building social cohesion. Participation in the focus group discussions led to an almost universal endorsement by participants of the dialogue process (Broad, Boyer and Chataway, 2004) and the opportunity to hear differing perspectives from a wide variety of community members.

*Between Indigenous Communities
(Bridging)*

USIC also created the space for social capital development between Indigenous communities through the communities' involvement in a national research project. Researchers participated in monthly conference calls, where they were encouraged to share successes, challenges and problem-solve issues arising from the

project. This participation gradually developed a network between the communities, solidified by their meeting on a number of occasions, sometimes through training planned by the project itself, but at other times as a result of funding conditions or presentation of the findings.

The community researchers and research supervisors were most able to participate in community-to-community networking, with some opportunities for researchers to actually visit one another's First Nation. These exchanges were identified by the community researchers as some of the most valuable experiences of the USIC project (Schmidt, 2005) and provided them with an opportunity to share their knowledge and learn from each other, thereby encouraging empowerment. As the researchers shared their knowledge and improved their skills as researchers, they participated in "An empowering process [that] engages people as co-participants and designers of their own change" (Chataway, 2002: 73).

Network Evolution and Sources of Social Capital

As the sections above illustrate, the USIC project created both external and internal networks of relationships, both at the organizational or community level, as well as at the individual level. These relationships evolved over time: some, such as the relationships between research supervisors and community researchers became stronger, while other networks expanded to create larger groupings of "weak ties" such as the relations between community researchers and funders.

The major sources of social capital for the USIC project were accessed from three areas: academe, funders of social research (primarily SSHRC and government departments), and the First Nation communities themselves. Key personnel within these differing sites leveraged resources and extended the network development through a commitment to the project itself and to inclusive practices which encouraged broad-based community participation.

The project's design provided structural sources of social capital: in an effort to address power differentials within First Nation communities (Chataway, 2002) the research methodology employed numerous access points to participa-

tion, and encouraged respectful dialogue among participants. Due to the nature of a national project with limited funding, local research supervisors were required to mobilize local resources and thus engage local interest, further utilizing relations with local institutions and First Nation organizations.

BUILDING RESPECTFUL SOCIAL RELATIONS: PROCESSES AND PRINCIPLES OF USIC

Chataway (2004) emphasizes the need for outsiders respecting both the culture and the politics of First Nations in the process of developing working relationships. This theme has been explored by many others, including action researchers (Reitsma-Street and Brown, 2004).

The USIC project established a number of processes and principles to ensure that respectful relations resulted from the collaboration in two main areas: the definition of the research itself, and secondly, in the control of the research findings. USIC involved participants both in defining the research questions and the research methodology, as well as developing the protocols for the dissemination of the findings. Each of these raised however a number of challenges for the project, and resulted in self-questioning for many of the researchers and supervisors (Schmidt, 2009).

Defining the Research Parameters

As mentioned earlier, the USIC project began when Dr. Cynthia Chataway and Larry Sault convened a meeting of twenty people, composed of seventeen Indigenous and three non-Indigenous people. The question posed to the first meeting of what later became the POC, was "What kind of research would be useful to Indigenous communities?" This question offered a wide-open space for discussion and later collaboration, as community members were afforded the opportunity to define the research questions. Out of this discussion developed the two research questions which guided the USIC project: What are the strengths of Indigenous communities? And How have these strengths been developed and maintained over time?

The involvement of the POC members did not end at this point however, instead they con-

tinued to meet to further determine which communities represented relatively strong First Nations that should be invited to participate, and their participation was evident in the development of the selection process. Rather than the POC themselves nominating the communities, they brainstormed a group of 53 individuals who would be knowledgeable about First Nations from across the country, and asked them to nominate those communities which they felt would be “relatively strong” First Nations. Finally, from this group, the POC invited those communities which they felt would represent a true diversity (in terms of size, proximity to urban centres, regions, cultural diversity, etc).

Ownership of the Research Findings

Once the communities were identified, the research director approached the Chief and Council of each and obtained a Band Council Resolution supporting the project. This was an essential part of the project’s structure, as approval of Chief and Council signified the formal acceptance of the project’s presence in the community. At this point, the community was notified by way of a widely-distributed press release, also approved by Chief and Council, advising the community that the project was underway. Throughout the research community members were consistently reassured of the legitimacy of the project’s presence in the First Nation by the assurance that a BCR had indeed been obtained, as were various funders who required this stamp of approval for the project.

A number of factors contributed to ensuring that the community itself would have control over the dissemination of the research findings, following the agreement by Chief and Council for the research to be conducted within their First Nation. First, a protocol had been designed that accorded the COT the authority to deny dissemination of any materials. Once the COT and Chief and Council had approved the publication/distribution of materials, the findings were distributed throughout the community through the website, newsletters, and through a package to be distributed in the mailbox of every community member. Each First Nation member was thus accorded the opportunity to explore in detail the research findings, question the

researchers and/or research, and dispute or discuss the findings thoroughly.

Challenges for Respectful Relations

While the USIC project was founded with progressive processes and structures in the building of respectful relations, the project found a number of challenges for the development of respectful relations that required additional work.

Ermine’s (2005) proposition of the creation of “ethical space” suggests that cross-cultural collaborations require a concerted approach to relationship development that goes beyond structures and processes towards a new consciousness of cross-cultural initiatives. Ermine suggests that to date, the engagement between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples frequently leads to misunderstanding due to different worldviews, where words and descriptors have differing meanings, resulting in differing understandings of what is being agreed to, leading to misunderstandings that can be profound.

In the USIC project, academics and communities held different expectations, for example, around authorship of journal articles, research reports and presentations. For example, some of the students working on the project had need for sole authorship on certain pieces of work for the completion of academic degree requirements, while communities sometimes felt that acknowledgement of community knowledge, included acknowledgement of authorship. In other cases, communities felt that the knowledge contained in a case study or focus group report, for example, was the community’s knowledge and as such, no one or even several authors should claim authorship as the knowledge was derived from the community. Additionally, funders also at times required/desired changes be made to reports before or after they had been approved by the community representatives, leaving the project in a dilemma as to how to respond, with deadlines that were completely unfeasible given the community approval protocol. This left research supervisors in difficult situations trying to meet the requirements of several “bosses”—the funder, the COT, Chief and Council, and the national project.

These misunderstandings resulted in individuals in all locations within the research project struggling to find that “ethical space” to which

Ermine refers, yet also finding that that space, and the processes and principles that result in the creation of respectful relations, is key to the mobilization of networks which provide due respect to each of the partners.

Role of Strong and Weak Ties in Accessing Resources

The social capital literature discusses the relative advantages of both strong and weak ties in accessing resources, and outlines that weak ties, i.e., ties that are more of an “acquaintance” nature than a friendship or family member, may actually be most advantageous in terms of leveraging or accessing resources. The literature provides the example that while family and close friends may be essential for enduring a particularly difficult emotional or physical trauma, it is more likely to be an acquaintance that provides the key to accessing a job or a bank loan.

The USIC project found that both types of ties were fruitful to the project, but that indeed, it was through the “weak ties” that some of the key resources were accessed. For example, the research supervisors were on occasion appointed or selected by Chief and Council—a strong tie to the community, but on other occasions were referred through the academic research support committees. In one case, an academic became aware of the USIC project through the website, eventually providing a link to a funder; often one potential funder who might be unable to assist themselves, would provide a referral to another funder who was able to assist.

The process of accessing resources through weak ties leads to a number of challenges for First Nations communities. First, the USIC project found that this type of access required substantial time investments, and a highly motivated and skilled individual(s) who could negotiate with tact and diplomacy. The language of funders varies according to the particular government department or ministry, or foundational focus; and required the project to be highly sophisticated in both its approach and presentation. Many of these resources also required the use of academic or technical language which would preclude any First Nation community which did not have ready access to that type of expertise.

First Nations may also be at a disadvantage in the initial development of “weak ties”—INAC was frequently identified to USIC as the funder responsible for all First Nations initiatives, but USIC through its academic connections was able to access substantially more funding than would have been available had INAC been the sole funding source. Linking First Nations with academics, or with other progressive organizations, may be one way to develop some additional weak ties that will advantage them in seeking other resources.

IMPLICATIONS OF LEARNINGS FROM USIC FOR SOCIAL CAPITAL GENERATION IN FIRST NATIONS

According to Chataway (2004) for development in First Nations communities to be deemed successful would require two outcomes: first, that the project contributes to sharing power more broadly within First Nation communities; and second, that the project support Indigenous culture through the advancement of collective community interests over individual benefits. An analysis of the USIC project indicates a number of learnings on both of these fronts, as well as on the process of developing social capital in First Nation communities, findings which may be of high value to those interested in economic development.

Strengths as the Starting Point of Dialogue

A key learning from the USIC project is the importance of using community strengths—not deficits—as the starting point for community dialogue. This focus provided a rich site for discussion, embracing diverse opinions and perspectives and giving community members an opportunity to take pride in their community. Often, one participant would identify a ‘strength’ that others had never considered, or had no knowledge of or no experience with, which most discussions also demonstrated a number of areas where community members shared common values and beliefs (e.g., ‘elders’, ‘youth’, or the natural resources of the community).

Discussing strengths for two or three hours left participants feeling good about the experience, and often willing to participate further in

the project itself. Often people regretted having to leave early or before they had a chance to say all they wanted to. It was not uncommon for participants to state at the conclusion of a session “we’ve barely scratched the surface” of strengths. At the conclusion of Batchewana’s project in 2005, over 100 people came to the closing feast, a demonstration of the enthusiasm for the project and in Flying Dust First Nation, a similar event attracted an even larger group.

Using focus groups as method, encouraged a diversity of community members to be involved—for example, a group might be composed of young mothers, or elders, or students—reducing anxiety about ‘not having anything to say’. By targeting different groupings within the community, the focus groups also provided an opportunity to include groups who might not often be heard, such as persons with disabilities, or youth.

The opportunities which USIC community based researchers had to visit one another’s communities emerged as a strength of the project itself. For many, it was a unique experience, in that many researchers indicated they had not visited other First Nations before, and the strong desire to meet more frequently with other communities and community members was expressed many times throughout the project. Creating the space for exchanges between First Nations, so that community members can share their knowledge and experience, is clearly an important step in generating social capital within First Nations, and strengths-based dialogue could provide a facilitating focus.

Power-sharing in the USIC Project

The structures and processes of the USIC project led to a broader power sharing than what occurs in most research, both internally within each of the participating First Nations, and externally between First Nations, academics and funders.

Internally, power was shared by the Chief and Council, COT members, and research participants by approval protocols that ensured that no one group or individual could control the outcome. By reporting back to the full community, USIC ensured the integrity of the research findings while the COT and Chief and Council were able to determine how broadly these findings were disseminated. The regular reporting gave

assurances to everyone involved that there would be no major surprises in the final reports of the project.

Externally, the roles of the participating communities, academics and funders were all clearly defined in the materials developed and shared throughout the project, avoiding (for the most part) major misunderstandings. The free flow of information also ensured a level of power-sharing, as each of the COT members had access to the same information as the POC with regard to the funding processes, the resources of the project, the research methodology—in short, the full outline of the project. Some of the challenges of the project revolved not around the lack of access to information, but rather the processing of large quantities of information.

As identified earlier, there are still some areas where power-sharing between academics and First Nations have not been fully resolved within the USIC project, where there is still a need for the creation of an “ethical space” wherein this can be negotiated. The learnings from USIC would indicate that this is an area that needs to be addressed before further progress on protocol development can be made.

Finally, power-sharing between funders, academics and First Nations has still not been fully realized within the USIC project, although a number of funders did demonstrate a new willingness and understanding of how essential this is. Research that respects community processes and community knowledge is going to take longer, and old accountability mechanisms that do not reflect the community’s culture or the respect for community protocols can only serve to undermine power-sharing. USIC, due to the size and scope of the project, was forced to rely on a wide variety of funders (and of course, funders like to include various partners in larger ventures such as this) but some of the requirements of the funders made almost impossible demands on project personnel. Researchers and academics selected for their skills and knowledge of research methodology and community practices, were also obliged to become project managers, adept at budgeting, managing personnel, deadlines and bank statements, and reporting to a variety of masters. For several of the participating communities, these demands proved exceedingly onerous and contributed to personnel stress and turnover.

Collective vs. Individual Benefits

Chataway (2004) points out that frequently development in First Nations benefits individuals at the cost of the collective interests of the community, and Navarro (2002) suggests that this is one of the risks of policies supporting the creation and accumulation of social capital. The USIC project was designed with the intent to benefit the collective interests of First Nations by disseminating knowledge to communities about how relatively strong First Nations have developed and maintained their strengths.

There is no doubt that the USIC project has benefited some individuals, in that those most intimately involved with the project have developed their individual skills, and have also expanded their own personal networks, giving them some advantage in future endeavours. The creation of social capital has however not been restricted to the individuals employed in, or overseeing, the project, as outlined in Section 2. The external relationships developed between First Nations, First Nations and academics and First Nations and funders, may have provided access to resources for the collective benefit of the community.

The question that remains outstanding of course, is whether these weak ties will provide the community with sufficient leverage to continue to redistribute power within its membership, and empower itself as a collective identity. There are indications that it will: the recognition that has accrued to the participating communities, as they shared their knowledge with others, likely provided them with further opportunities to leverage the relationships. It is impossible to know how extensively the knowledge resulting from the USIC project has been disseminated or how it may have influenced those communities which are less strong, but the collective benefits of this type of relationship development may have been significant.

Measuring Social Capital

The Policy Research Initiative's report on measuring social capital (June 8, 2004) suggested a variety of methods for the measurement of social capital. In exploring the creation and accumulation of social capital within the USIC project, it is evident that the measurement of social capital is a challenging exercise. People tend to forget

how they first became connected to a particular funding department, or how they first met an individual who later acted as a connecting link to another organization. Strong ties are certainly better recalled than weak ones.

The USIC research explores the *process* of development, and thus a number of the case studies suggest how one tie leads to another, much as Gladwell (2002) suggests in his book "The Tipping Point", there are some individuals, and even some organizations that act as "clearinghouses" providing information, and connecting similarly interested people or organizations with others. No doubt these connecting links—or "nodes" as they are referred to in the social capital literature—are crucial to the creation of social capital, but Ermine's work, and the USIC experience, strongly suggests that in the First Nation context, such nodes may need to be evaluated critically. Indiscriminate engagement by First Nation communities with other organizations may lead to further support for unhealthy power structures, or alternatively, contribute to further deterioration in the strengths that have ensured their current levels of perseverance and resiliency.

CONCLUSIONS

The learnings from the USIC project can provide substantial guidance on developing networks between outsiders and First Nation communities, as well as developing networks within communities themselves. Its adherence to a set of pre-established protocols for research processes, its respect for existing governance structures, and its intent to share power within the participating communities, all demonstrate a sound foundation for building healthy relationships, and its focus on strengths provides a sound starting point for discussion.

The project also raises a number of challenges for the outsider working with First Nations:

- Establishing a set of mutually agreed cultural understandings
- Identifying insiders who are able and willing to participate in a collaborative process
- Identifying outsiders who are committed to community capacity building

- Working within a community's timeframe
- Investing sufficient time and resources in the pre-research period to allow for true collaboration on the identification of research questions and research design
- Ongoing investment of both time and resources to maintain and sustain a lengthy project

For USIC, one of the greatest challenges was locating and supporting the key personnel — both insiders and outsiders — who were prepared to make a long-term commitment to a project that could not provide any ongoing stability. For the insiders, only a strong belief in the benefits to the community kept them going through funding instability and their own need for financial security. For the outsiders, where much of the work was being conducted without the signposts of traditional research, motivation to continue had to come from within. The support provided by monthly conference calls and emails helped, but not nearly so much as face-to-face meetings, and in future projects of this scope, it is recommended that semi-annual meetings be built into the planning.

Developing social relations between diverse groups such as academics, First Nations and funders, requires patience, an ongoing commitment from all parties to dialogue, the flexibility to make adjustments, and a willingness to change. Establishing policy to support the development of such relations is challenging: people often think they are flexible until they are confronted with values/realities that challenge their own worldview. A project or initiative that creates “ethical space” for a new relationship to develop, requires a profound commitment by all parties to ensuring that this engagement results in respectful relations, and may, as Ermine (2007) suggests, require that disengagement occur — perhaps more than once — so that the ethical space can be ongoing.

NOTES

1. Understanding the Strengths of Indigenous Communities (USIC) was a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) funded project, involving 8 First Nations from across Canada. The project was led by the late Dr. Cynthia Chataway of York University.

2. It should be noted that the USIC project was not intended as a project which would create ‘social capital’. Social capital creation and development was simply an unintended outcome of the project.
3. For example, conference presentations to CANDO in 2004 and 2005, Health Canada First Nations and Inuit Health Branch in 2006, etc.
4. The number of participating communities changed over time as some First Nations began the process, but later decided that they were unable to continue for a variety of reasons. Thus, while a total of eight communities were engaged in some of the processes, five communities actually completed the final research process. Not all eight communities were engaged at the same time.

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JOB SATISFACTION AND ABORIGINAL LABOUR MOBILITY AMONG NON- RESERVE POPULATIONS *An Overlooked Variable?*

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With a focus on the non-reserve Aboriginal population of Manitoba, this article examines the extent to which job satisfaction influences labour mobility. The study incorporates into the analysis a comparison of this factor to such other variables as job security, gender, age, education, as well as Aboriginal identity (i.e., First Nations, Métis, etc.). The author concludes that among those who are employed in the non-reserve population, two variables stand out as being statistically significant in association to mobility: age and job satisfaction. At the same time, many other variables in this population of employed individuals do not stand out as being statistically significant, most notably gender and education. It is hoped that this paper will further discussions among policy makers and program strategists regarding the “whys” behind population mobility rather than simply the “who” when addressing issues involving labour mobility. This study therefore pertains directly to the topics of demography, human resources, and social policy as they together apply to Métis, non-status Indians, and First Nations people residing off-reserve. The results for this study are based on a random and representative sample of 1,019 self-identified Aboriginal respondents, of which 362 were employed full-time at the time of the interview and were residing in a non-reserve community in Manitoba.

INTRODUCTION

Three aspects of the labour market as it applies to Aboriginal people have received extensive attention in recent years. These are population

growth, education, and mobility. Based on census and labour force data, Statistics Canada in 2007 reported that by “the end of 2017, Aboriginal people of working age (15 and older) will number close to a million [which is] about 3.4%

I wish to thank Scott MacKay, President of Probe Research, and Harvey Bostrom, Deputy Minister of Aboriginal and Northern Affairs Manitoba, for providing permission to use the syndicated data results that are used for this paper. Thanks also are due to my friend and colleague, Kevin McDougald, for his editing work, and for all the respondents who agreed to be interviewed.

of the working age population” (Luffman and Sussman, 2007). Studies regarding this population growth are numerous and include those done by Andrew Siggner (2003), Jerry White and Paul Maxim (2003), Stewart Clatworthy (2007), Stewart Clatworthy, et al. (2007), and Doug Norris (2008). An important aspect of this growth is the extent to which these individuals have the education and skills to fully participate in the workforce. As such, attention is paid to the impact of teaching, curriculum development and high school completions (Richards and Vining, 2003; Morin, 2004; White et al., 2009), recruitment and retention studies pertaining to post-secondary education (Mendelson, 2006; Canadian Millennium Foundation, c2008), and post-secondary training coupled with employment outcomes (Hull, 2004; Maxim and White, 2006; Hull, 2009). Found alongside these examinations are a large number of reports regarding mobility, both in regard to First Nations on-reserve to off-reserve shifts in population as well as within the currently existing non-reserve population (see, for example, Norris and Clatworthy, 2003 and 2007; Norris, et al., 2003; Adams, et al., 2008; Norris, 2008). In these studies, and for the purposes of this journal article, being “mobile” is defined as having moved out of one community to another, that is, to one’s current place of residence from another Census Sub-Division.¹


Why is the study of mobility, and the specific issue of labour mobility, important? Major population shifts will usually precipitate major economic, social and cultural changes for the societies in which these occur, with the most notable example being the shift from “country” to “city” in Europe as the industrial age unfolded (Polanyi, 1957; Moore, 1967). With regard to Aboriginal people in Canada, high levels of labour mobility has consequences in such areas as: personal identity and being connected or not connected to one’s location, the character of social and family networks, the composition of the communities from which the population is drawn and to which the population is pulled, labour market skill surpluses and shortages, and social needs as they relate to health, education, and other government services.

In Manitoba, which will be the focus of this research article, the extent to which Aboriginal people are found to be highly mobile is revealed by 2006 Census data which show that 42% of

self-identified Aboriginal people (of all ages) changed their place of residence in the previous five years, compared to 36% of those who are non-Aboriginal. When this population is examined more closely, 62 percent of those who are classified as “North American Indian” who were living off-reserve and aged five or over had moved between 2001 and 2006, while 47 percent of Métis had moved during the same time period (Census data cited by Norris, 2008). Close to one-quarter (24%) of off-reserve First Nations people, and sixteen percent of Métis, had moved from one Census Sub-Division to another.

What causes mobility among Aboriginal people? There are many factors that have been identified, including poverty, child-rearing and community safety-related issues, especially among woman, many of whom are single parents (RCAP, 1996; Cooke, 1999; Probe Research, 2005), the need to pursue education and training (Hull, 2004; Maxim and White, 2006; Stonechild, 2008; Hull, 2009), and job seeking and employment-related activities (Stanbury, 1975; Clatworthy, 1980; Clatworthy and Gunn, 1981; Norris, et al., 2003; Adams et al., 2008). Perhaps due to the ready availability of reliable population-related data, most notably the Census and the Aboriginal Peoples Surveys (APS), which together reach into First Nations communities and other segments of the Aboriginal population (Statistics Canada; 2008), and the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which now includes a question regarding Aboriginal identity in its western Canadian surveys (Luffman and Susman, 2007), most of the published studies regarding labour market trends and mobility as they pertain to Aboriginal people focus on social demography. As such, it can be argued that this literature while empirically strong, uses what can be termed a “sociological prism” in which mobility is studied with a focus on life circumstances and group belonging; this includes Aboriginal or First Nations identity, whether one lives on- or off-reserve, well-being and health-related conditions, as well as gender, age and education.

There is a sense, however, that something might be missing here. That is, the current literature shows how being born into an Aboriginal community affects the likelihood of a person being raised by a single parent, and becoming a single parent, facing unsafe living conditions, poverty, and having an incomplete high school



education. All these elements are said to feed into employment outcomes and mobility. However, might there also be a social psychological aspect of mobility? In order to see if this might be the case, this article examines the extent to which those with full-time employment among the non-reserve Aboriginal population in Manitoba² are satisfied with the work they do, and the extent to which job satisfaction serves as a better predictor of mobility within this population when compared to such socio-demographic variables as gender, age, and education. In other words, this takes the research a little further along the road by moving from the “who” to a further exploration into the “why” of labour mobility, at least among those who currently hold full-time employment.

JOB SATISFACTION

It should be of no surprise to the reader to hear that employee retention is inextricably linked to how employees feel about their jobs (Rust, et al., 1996). That is, being happy with where you work should signal a reluctance to change jobs.

This is verified by numerous studies regarding numerous occupations including social work (Vinokur-Kaplan, 1994), healthcare (Cowin, 2002; Ingersoll, et al., 2002), and information technology (Nelson and Todd, 2004). In the case of Manitoba, major employers such as Manitoba Hydro go to great lengths to demonstrate to prospective job applicants who are Aboriginal that they are important to the company and therefore are offering “well-paid, skilled jobs opportunities” (Manitoba Hydro, 2009). The North West Company, another major employer in Manitoba which is headquartered in Winnipeg and operates a large number of stores across Manitoba and elsewhere, including Northern Stores, Northmarts, and the Giant Tiger retail chain in western Canada,³ seeks to reduce employee turnover among its Aboriginal workforce through the provision of workplace training programs, which have been linked to improved worker motivation, job satisfaction, and worker retention (Campbell, 2002).

Clearly employee satisfaction should tie into the study of labour mobility, yet to date there is a dearth of published studies pertaining to this topic as it applies to Aboriginal people. Perhaps

this deficiency in the existing literature is rooted in the reality that measuring “satisfaction” usually requires asking people attitudinal questions, something not typically provided by the Census, labour force surveys or other large scale databases produced by Statistics Canada. In other words, while it is possible to *infer* job satisfaction through employee behaviours (especially when it involves career changes or job resignations), human resource directors generally accept the principal that people should be *asked* whether or not they are satisfied with their job before drawing conclusions that relate to job retention. This is a major reason why the Manitoba Liquor Control Commission, a provincial Crown corporation that regulates and operates the alcohol retail system in Manitoba, pays a great deal of attention on this topic by conducting employee satisfaction surveys (Yerema, 2009), as too do many other Crown corporations, organizations, and private sector companies in Manitoba.

For this study, survey data will be used in order to answer the following questions as they apply to the non-reserve Aboriginal population of Manitoba:

- To what extent are non-reserve Aboriginal people (mostly consisting of Métis and off-reserve First Nations) who are employed in full-time positions satisfied with their jobs?
- Does job satisfaction differ when comparing the non-reserve employed Aboriginal population in Manitoba with other members of the employed population in Manitoba?
- Does employee satisfaction among non-reserve Aboriginal people who hold full-time employment vary according to gender, age, education, and whether or not one resides in a city?
- Among those with full-time employment, are there links to be found between different socio-demographic variables, especially gender, age, and education and the likelihood of moving?
- Finally, to what extent does job satisfaction correlate with labour mobility among the non-reserve Aboriginal population? And, does this variable serve as a strong predictor of being likely to move compared with many of those socio-demographic characteristics that are studied by others when seeking to understand labour mobility?

THE ABORIGINAL PEOPLES OF MANITOBA

Aboriginal people in Manitoba mostly fall into two very large groups: First Nations and Métis.⁴ Within the province the First Nations include: Cree, Ojibway, Oji-Cree, Dakota, and Dene peoples (McMillan, 1995; Brownlie, 2007). Provided in Table 1 is an overview based on the 2006 Census of the province’s Aboriginal populations for both Winnipeg and Manitoba. The First Nations population is roughly split in half between those who usually live on-reserve (51,965) and the other half residing off-reserve (49,850). Another large population group in Manitoba is the Métis people who are of mixed ancestry with many having ancestors who resided within, or near, the Red River Settlement and who had some involvement in the region’s fur trade economy (Jantzen, 2004; Brownlie, 2007).⁵ As of 2006, a total of 71,810 Manitobans identified themselves as Métis, of which close to 41,000 were residing in the City of Winnipeg. By removing the on-reserve First Nations population, and combining together all off-reserve First Nations, Métis, Inuit and those who report other identities in this population, a total of 126,710 can be categorized as “non-reserve” Aboriginal people, making up close to one-tenth of the total population of Manitoba.⁶ Due to the high levels of unemployment within many First Nations reservations, the difference in conditions between many First Nations reserve communities and other parts of Manitoba, and the simple fact that this population is very hard to reach through random telephone sampling,⁷ this study’s focus is on the non-reserve portion of the Aboriginal population.

METHODOLOGY

The survey results used in this paper are based on two datasets. The first consists of survey interviews conducted with Aboriginal people based on a sample drawn from 12,000 randomly conducted telephone interviews with the general Manitoban population that were conducted by Probe Research between March 2005 and December 2008. During each interview respondents were asked whether or not they identify themselves as Aboriginal and, if so, if they considered themselves a “Status Indian” (and if they

TABLE 1
Manitoba Aboriginal Population — Based on Self-Identification

	<i>Winnipeg</i>	<i>Manitoba</i>
North American Indian	25,900	101,815
On-Reserve	—	51,965
Off-Reserve	—	49,850
Métis	40,980	71,810
Inuit	350	560
Other/Multiple Identity	1,150	2,375
Total Non-Reserve Aboriginal Population	42,480	126,710
Total Provincial Population	694,668	1,148,401

Source: Aboriginal Population, 2006 Census, Statistics Canada.

resided off- or on-reserve), “Métis”, or something else. Out of a total of 1,019 respondents who reported being Aboriginal, 688 stated that their principal place of residence was in a non-reserve location. Of these, 442 identified themselves as being Métis, 154 said they were “Status Indians” who reside off-reserve, 61 reported being a “non-Status Indian,” 28 said they were of no particular category, and three reported being Inuit. In order to provide comparisons with the general population, a second dataset consisting of 1,000 randomly conducted telephone interviews that were conducted by Probe Research in March 2009 with the general adult population was also used.

EMPLOYMENT AND JOB SATISFACTION

To what extent are non-reserve Aboriginal people who are employed full-time satisfied with their jobs? In order to answer this question, the research population within the survey database needed to be narrowed down. Of the 688 non-reserve respondents who were interviewed, 368 reported being employed full-time. All others were excluded: 96 who reported having only part-time employment, 222 who reported not being employed, and two who did not respond to the question. Because part-time employment varies greatly in terms of the level of commitment that is required of employees, most notably the number of hours required per week, these indi-

viduals, along with those who reported not being employed, were removed from the analyses. This facilitated the production of Table 2 which provides a picture of job satisfaction among those who are employed full-time in the non-reserve Aboriginal population with a total sample of 286 respondents. Provided also are the results as they apply to Métis (of which 203 were full-time employees and responded to the question), off-reserve First Nations (60 being employed full-time), as well as the non-Aboriginal population (of which 521 were employed full-time and responded to the question).⁸ When comparing each of these Aboriginal populations (Table 2), there appears to be little or no variation when comparing satisfaction levels among Métis and off-reserve First Nations employees, and only a small difference when compared to non-Aboriginal full-time employees in Manitoba (with the bottom row showing that the small differences are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level ($p < .05$)).

VARIATIONS IN JOB SATISFACTION WITHIN THE NON-RESERVE POPULATION

While little variation occurs with regard to job satisfaction among those who have full-time employment when comparing Métis, off-reserve First Nations people, and the non-Aboriginal population, Table 3 provides a picture of how job satisfaction varies across each of the major

TABLE 2
Full-time Employment and Job Satisfaction

<i>Job Satisfaction</i>	<i>Total Non-Reserve FT Employed (286) %</i>	<i>Métis (203) %</i>	<i>Off-Reserve First Nations (46) %</i>	<i>Non-Aboriginal Population FT Employed (N=521) %</i>
Satisfied	89	89	89	92
Not Satisfied	11	11	11	8
Chi Sq. Sig. P<0.05			n.s.	

TABLE 3
Job Satisfaction and Demographic Groups

<i>Job Satisfaction</i>	<i>Total Non-Reserve FT Employed (286) %</i>	<i>Gender (286) %</i>		<i>Age (279) %</i>			<i>Education (205) %</i>			<i>Residence (286) %</i>	
		Men	Women	18-34	35-54	55+	<HS	HS	PSE	Wpg	Non-Wpg
Satisfied	89	90	88	87	90	84	90	87	91	89	88
Not Satisfied	11	10	13	13	10	16	9	13	9	11	12
Chi Sq Sig. P<0.05		n.s.		n.s.			n.s.			n.s.	

socio-demographic groups, including gender, age, education, and whether or not one resides in Winnipeg or elsewhere in the province. Only slight variations are found between employed men and women, between each of the different age groups, and between different levels of educational attainment; and, as shown in the bottom row, such differences are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level ($p < .05$).

VARIATIONS IN MOBILITY AMONG DIFFERENT GROUPS IN THE NON-RESERVE POPULATION

When studying factors underlying mobility, it is both useful to examine past behaviour, as is the case when examining Census data with regard to the previous five years (as shown earlier in Figure 1), and to also examine the beliefs or intentions of individuals as they pertain to the future. Here we examine this latter form of reported mobility, that is, the extent to which individuals who reside outside a reserve community believe that they are likely to move in the future, what is termed here as “expected mobility.” Respon-

dents were asked the following question: “Thinking about the next twelve months, how likely is it that you will be moving to a different neighbourhood or community?” Examined first is how expectations of mobility among full-time workers might be connected to which major non-reserve Aboriginal group one belongs.

Table 4 shows that of those with full-time employment, close to one-out-of-five (19%) non-reserve respondents reported being likely to move.⁹ With differences that are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level ($p < .05$), full-time workers who identify themselves as being a First Nations person and not residing on a reserve are much more likely to say they are likely to be mobile in the coming twelve months (29%) compared to full-time workers who are Métis (18%) or those who belong to the other population category (10%). Unfortunately, expected mobility among the non-Aboriginal population in Manitoba has yet to be measured, and must be left for another time.¹⁰

When the results are broken out by gender, age, education and whether or not one resides in Winnipeg (Table 5), two of the four variables

TABLE 4
Non-Reserve Population Identity and Expected Mobility

	<i>Total Non-Reserve FT Employed (362) %</i>	<i>Métis (255) %</i>	<i>Off-Reserve First Nations (59) %</i>	<i>All Other Aboriginal (N=48) %</i>
Likely to Move	19	18	29	10
Not Likely to Move	82	82	71	90
Chi Sq. Sig. P<0.05			0.042	

TABLE 5
Expected Mobility and Demographic Groups

	<i>Total Non-Reserve FT Employed (362) %</i>	<i>Gender (362) %</i>		<i>Age (356) %</i>			<i>Education (N=258) %</i>			<i>Residence (362) %</i>	
		Men	Women	18-34	35-54	55+	<HS	HS	PSE	Wpg	Non-Wpg
Likely to Move	19	21	16	35	12	7	18	19	16	23	13
Not Likely to Move	82	79	84	65	88	94	82	81	84	78	87
Chi Sq. Sig. P<0.05		n.s.		0.000			n.s.			.019	

exhibit statistically significant results among the full-time working population, while two do not. The key findings from Table 5 can be summarised as follows:

- Not surprisingly, younger Aboriginal adults (35% of those aged 18 to 34) who are employed full-time are much more likely to say they are moving compared to middle aged (12% of those aged 35 to 54) and older aged (7% of those aged 55 or over) non-reserve Aboriginal adults.
- Residents of Winnipeg who are Aboriginal and have full-time employment are more likely to say they will be moving than are those workers who are Aboriginal and residing in other parts of the province. However, this statistically significant finding is likely due to the fact that some urban respondents plan to move from one Winnipeg neighbourhood to another Winnipeg neighbourhood, thereby artificially inflating the incidence of expected mobility for this group.
- Males with full-time employment are slightly more likely than their female counterparts to report a likelihood of moving (21% compared

to 16%); however, these differences are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and therefore may not be valid.

- Surprisingly, there appears to be almost no variation in expected mobility when comparing individuals of different levels of educational attainment. Sixteen percent of those who have completed a program of study at either a college or university say they are likely to move, compared to 18% of those with less than a high school degree and 19% of those with a completed high school degree. In other words, educational attainment among those with full-time employment does not appear to be associated with expectations of mobility.

JOB SATISFACTION AND MOBILITY

At this point the discussion shifts from focusing on socio-economic groupings and expected mobility to how attitudes about one's job might be connected to mobility. Compared to many of the socio-demographic variables already considered, might there be a stronger link between job

satisfaction and mobility among those who are employed full-time? Of course, what is expected and what actually occurs in a person's life may be different. It is possible that individuals who are more vulnerable than others may be less capable of predicting whether or not they will be moving, this might include individuals who unexpectedly find themselves in a lone parent situation, become unemployed, need to flee an unsafe community, or lose their place of residence. Unfortunately a full exploration of this aspect of the research as it applies to full-time workers is beyond the capacity of the data that were acquired for this study, and therefore needs to be pursued through other avenues at a later date.

What is possible to examine using the data, however, is to look at the extent to which concerns about losing one's job¹¹ may be linked to job satisfaction, and therefore expected mobility. Table 6 below shows that there is a statistically significant link between having a concern about losing one's job and its link to job satisfaction. More than 9 out of 10 respondents (92%) who are *not* concerned about job loss are satisfied with their jobs, while only 78% of those who

have concerns about job loss are satisfied with their jobs. At the other end of the scale, more than one out of five (22%) who are concerned about job loss, are also dissatisfied with their jobs, compared to only 8% of those who are not concerned about job loss. Therefore, expectations regarding losing one's job appear to feed into job dissatisfaction.

Table 7 allows us to explore the extent to which job satisfaction might serve as a stronger predictor of mobility compared to many of the socio-demographic variables examined earlier. Among those with full-time employment there is a much higher incidence of expected mobility for those who are not satisfied with their current job (31%) compared to those who say they are satisfied (17%), with the differences between these two groups on the cusp of statistical significance at the 95% confidence level (.051). The table also shows that there is a slightly higher tendency of expected mobility among those who are concerned about losing employment (28%) compared to those who are not concerned (16%).

TABLE 6
Concern about Job Loss and Job Satisfaction

	<i>Total Non-Reserve FT Employed</i> (286) %	<i>Not Concerned</i> (222) %	<i>Concerned</i> (63) %
Satisfied	89	92	78
Not Satisfied	11	8	22
Chi Sq. Sig. P<0.05		0.003	

TABLE 7
Job Satisfaction, Job Security, and Expected Mobility

	<i>Job Satisfaction (283)</i>		<i>Job Security (361)</i>	
	<i>Satisfied</i> (252) %	<i>Not Satisfied</i> (31) %	<i>Not Concerned</i> (278) %	<i>Concerned</i> (83) %
Likely to Move	17	31	16	28
Not Likely to Move	83	69	84	72
Chi Sq. Sig. P<0.05	0.051		0.013	

TABLE 8
Job Security, Satisfaction and Expected Mobility

	<i>Not Concerned (221)</i>		<i>Concerned (61)</i>	
	<i>Satisfied %</i>	<i>Not Satisfied %</i>	<i>Satisfied %</i>	<i>Not Satisfied %</i>
Likely to Move	16	22	23	43
Mobility Gap (Those Not Satisfied minus Satisfied)		+6		+20
Chi Sq. Sig. P<0.05		n.s.		n.s.

TABLE 9
Correlations with Expectations of Mobility

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Job Satisfaction</i>	<i>Expected Job Loss</i>	<i>Expected Mobility</i>
Gender (Female 0, Male 1)	n.s.	-0.150 0.004	n.s.
Age	n.s.	n.s.	-0.312 0.000
Education	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Job Satisfaction	—	-0.186 0.002	-0.115 0.054
Job Loss Concerns	-0.186 0.002	—	0.129 0.014

As a second step, a three-way table (Table 8) helps to show the links between job satisfaction and expected mobility and how these might be intertwined with job security. Among those who feel secure about their jobs *and* at the same time are satisfied with their current employment, only 16% reported that they expect to be moving in the coming twelve months, while 23% of those who feel insecure but satisfied with their jobs expect to be moving. Among those who report being both insecure in their employment *and* at the same time not satisfied with their job, more than four out of ten (43%) expected to be moving. While the results for this three way table as they apply to job satisfaction do not pass a test of significance at the 95% confidence level, they do indicate that further research into how these three variables interact together is certainly warranted.¹²

CORRELATIONS WITH EXPECTED MOBILITY

Provided here in Table 9 are the survey results as they pertain to those with full-time employment according to gender, age, education, job satisfaction, and job security and how they correlate¹³ with expectations of mobility (which is treated as a binary variable with 0 being “unlikely to move” and 1 being “likely to move”). Age remains the strongest of the variables with a negative direction (-.312) which signifies that as one gets older, expectations of moving decline. Two other variables stand out as well: job satisfaction is negatively associated with mobility (-.115 with the results being very close to the 95% confidence level) and concerns about job loss (.129), meaning that as one becomes concerned about unemployment so too is there an expectation of being likely to move. At the

same time, gender and education appear unrelated to such expectations among those who hold full-time employment.

BUILDING A MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL FOR EXPECTED MOBILITY

This section takes the data analysis one final step forward by studying expected labour mobility through the use of multiple regression. Here the results are provided in Table 10 using most of the variables discussed previously, including specific Aboriginal group identity, gender, age, education, Winnipeg residence, and job satisfaction. This model produces an adjusted r^2 of .147 (for those who are unfamiliar with regression

analysis, an adjusted r^2 result of 1.0 would signify that all changes in the dependent variables are explained by all the variables in the left-hand column¹⁴). Because there are many variables that are not at, or even near, statistical significance at the 95% confidence level ($p < .05$ — as shown in the right hand column), including specific group identity, gender, and educational attainment, these need to be removed from the model.

Table 11 shows the multiple regression results after having the statistically insignificant variables removed from the model (i.e., being “trimmed”). The adjusted r^2 is .134 with all statistically significant variables included. This signifies that together, these variables have a small yet statistically significant predictive effect on expected mobility. An examination of the middle column containing the standardized coefficients,

TABLE 10
Multiple Regressions on Expected Mobility (Untrimmed)

	<i>Unstandardized Coefficients</i>		<i>Standardized Coefficients</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>		
(Constant)	1.274	0.155		8.225	0.000
Being Métis	-0.110	0.072	-0.128	-1.520	0.130
Being Status Off-Reserve	-0.135	0.091	-0.125	-1.486	0.139
Being Male	-0.076	0.050	-0.097	-1.529	0.128
Age	0.112	0.020	0.350	5.523	0.000
Level of Education	0.022	0.021	0.066	1.053	0.294
Resident of Winnipeg	0.093	0.050	0.118	1.880	0.062
Job Satisfaction	0.145	0.077	0.117	1.875	0.062

Dependent Variable: Expected Mobility

TABLE 11
Multiple Regressions on Expected Mobility (Trimmed)

	<i>Unstandardized Coefficients</i>		<i>Standardized Coefficients</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>		
(Constant)	0.613	0.091		6.764	0.000
Age	-0.112	0.019	-0.338	-6.031	0.000
Job Satisfaction	-0.141	0.069	-0.115	-2.051	0.041
Resident of Winnipeg	0.109	0.044	0.138	2.458	0.015

Dependent Variable: Expected Mobility

which provides figures showing the proportionate force of each variable as part of the whole, age is the strongest variable with a contribution of 34%, followed by residing in Winnipeg (14% of the model) and job satisfaction serving as the third strongest driver (12%). This informs us that individuals who are employed full-time in the non-reserve Aboriginal population are less mobile as they get older and more satisfied in the type of jobs they do, but are more mobile if living in the City of Winnipeg. The reader might recall that this final factor, being a resident of Winnipeg, is probably affected by intra-urban mobility rather than moves into and outside the city.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this article has been to shed a little bit more light on the topic of mobility among Aboriginal people, especially among those who are employed full-time and not residing on a reserve. Using survey results derived from interviews with non-reserve Aboriginal people in Manitoba, it is clear that social researchers need to continue pushing beyond demographically oriented discussions regarding employment outcomes, the labour market, and mobility. That is, they must move from the “who” as it relates to mobility, into developing more questions regarding the “whys.” It is clearly important to examine how individuals *feel* about their current situation, including job satisfaction and job security. By doing this, those involved in policy-making and program design might be able to design better strategies to address mobility-related issues. Other areas of interest should include how individuals view and evaluate their local economy, community conditions, personal and family safety, and the future of youth.

The survey results examined in this article demonstrate that when those who hold full-time employment are studied with regard to their expectations about mobility, the variables of age and job satisfaction both stand out as being statistically significant. The survey data also reveal that (i) job security and (ii) factors of mobility as they specifically pertain to the urban labour market need to be studied further in order to better understand labour mobility and Aboriginal people. Overall, it is the author’s hope that this

research article will help to inform further research and discussions among those who are involved in developing labour market strategies relating to Aboriginal people and the communities in which they reside, and to underline the fact that attitudes and perceptions are important aspects when seeking to design policies and programs relating to labour mobility.

NOTES

1. This would be having moved from a different city, town, village, township, municipality, or Indian reserve in Canada, or a community outside Canada.
2. Because the incidence of full-time employment is much lower among the on-reserve population, with sample sizes in the data being too small to warrant analysis, and because community conditions are much different compared to those of other communities (Adams, 2009), this population is excluded from this particular study. The reader is referred to the discussion on methodology found later in this document.
3. Giant Tiger is separately owned in central and eastern Canada.
4. This discussion of the Aboriginal population in Manitoba is largely drawn from Christopher Adams (2009). The term “First Nations” and that used by Statistics Canada and other government entities, “Status Indian”, are treated in this paper as pertaining to the same population.
5. There are many ways by which Métis can be defined. As discussed in the next section, the simplest approach is used here: self-identification.
6. The author recognizes that there would be a small number of non-First Nations people living on a reserve either due to family connections or employment.
7. However, it should be noted that alternative representative sampling approaches can be used for incorporating the on-reserve population into a cross-provincial study. See Christopher Adams (2009).
8. Those who report being employed full-time and categorize themselves as non-status (N=33), Inuit (N=1), or of no particular category (N=14) are included in the total column but do not have their own specific column in this or in the other tables provided in this study. Of the general population, 58 were self-identified Aboriginal people with full-time employment. These were removed in order to provide the non-Aboriginal population results. The reader should note that the job satisfaction question was not included in one wave of the surveys conducted. N-sizes will vary depending

on the questions that are examined for each table.

9. Worth noting is that this is a lower incidence than that found among the total adult Aboriginal population of Manitoba which reported a 25% incidence level of expected mobility (Adams, 2009).
10. At the time of writing (September, 2009), Probe Research has been surveying a representative sample of 1,000 Manitobans regarding their expectations of moving in the next twelve months. The results from this survey will be available for any future versions of this research article.
11. It should be noted that the question pertains to whether or not the respondent is concerned "that someone in your household" will undergo an unwanted reduction of hours or job loss. Because it is only those with full-time employment that are studied here, it is expected that most respondents would be thinking of their own personal employment situation when responding to the question. The category of those who reported "being concerned" includes those who responded "yes" plus those who stated "maybe".
12. The reader should note that interviews continue to be conducted for this project by Probe Research, and a future study on this topic is anticipated based on a larger dataset for the year 2011.
13. Pearson's r is used here, in which a perfect positive association between the two variables would produce a +1.0 score, and a perfect negative association would produce a -1.0 score.
14. For a clear description of the use of multiple regression models, see Chapter 19 in Alvin Bush and Ronald Bush, *Marketing Research: Sixth Edition* (2009).

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THE SASKATCHEWAN INDIAN GAMING AUTHORITY'S APPROACH TO SECURING PUBLIC TRUST, 2000–2004

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INTRODUCTION

Formed in 1996, the Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA) has ranked consistently as one of the top fifty most profitable companies in Saskatchewan, citing twenty-seven consecutive quarters of growth and rising revenues as of 2008. It won the Saskatchewan Business Magazine Business of the Year award in 2007 and consistently generates annual gambling revenue in the neighbourhood of \$120 million. At its six casinos SIGA employs more than 2,100 people, nearly 65% of which are of Aboriginal descent. Acknowledging the need to promote social responsibility, the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN), the political body that established SIGA, channels 5 percent of net gambling revenues into the First Nations Addictions Rehabilitation Foundation (FNARF) “to ensure that effective and accessible education, prevention and treatment programs about problem gambling are available to First Nation people.” SIGA revenues remain a source of funding for the provincial treasury, the province’s First Nations communities, and the Community Development Corporations, non-profit distribution bodies that provide funding for projects benefiting

First Nations. This success was threatened in 2000 after SIGA chief executive officer (CEO) Dutch Lerat was reputed to have misappropriated more than \$360,000. Enhanced provincial scrutiny of all gaming operations followed, as did a forensic audit. To make matters worse, the entire episode received significant print media attention and was played out provincially and nationally in the court of public opinion. The final auditor’s report was critical of the province and SIGA’s operations; however, most of the issues identified were remediable. Nevertheless, SIGA’s administrators anticipated a potential public crisis of faith and recognized the need to secure the public’s trust to ensure continued economic growth.

The effects of the SIGA scandal, or the “Dutch Lerat Affair,” as it was branded, led many to publicly question SIGA’s accountability, which potentially undermined its corporate image. Since a corporation’s image is the link between corporate reality and public perception, how people view a company is vital to that company’s success. As SIGA depended appreciably on non-Native patrons, and were cognizant of their Aboriginal patrons potential concerns,

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SIGA's management team and board of directors were forced to regroup in 2000 to fashion a policy to counter this negative publicity. Within months, it unveiled a new corporate governance model intended to bolster its reputation as an accountable corporation. While several of these reforms worked toward rebuilding public trust, the FSIN's attempts to downplay the situation nearly undermined these alterations. Particularly troublesome was the FSIN's use of an Aboriginal rights/self-government rhetoric to challenge outside demands for accountability, and blaming the media for exaggerating the situation. This paper examines the steps taken to improve corporate accountability. First, I will provide a brief history of provincial reserve casinos, followed by an overview of the Dutch Lerat Affair. The second section will discuss the importance of corporate identity and corporate reputation to secure the public's trust and guarantee continued economic success. The third section will develop a thematic analysis drawn from 367 print media articles (2000–2004) to ascertain and evaluate SIGA's and the FSIN's response to the Dutch Lerat Affair.

REALIZING FIRST NATIONS GAMING IN SASKATCHEWAN: THE SETTING

On March 1, 1996, the Gold Eagle Casino opened in North Battleford, Saskatchewan. Less than a week later, the Northern Lights Casino opened in Prince Albert, followed by the Bear Claw Casino on the White Bear Reserve in November and the Painted Hand Casino in Yorkton one month later. FSIN-owned and regulated by SIGA, the FSIN's charitable corporation, these were Canada's first First Nations-owned casinos. From 1996 to 2007, these four casinos grossed over \$900 million in gambling revenues, producing \$281 million net profits. Nearly two-thirds of this amount (\$185,328,953) was generated in the last five fiscal years (Belanger 2010, p. 24). Two more casinos have since opened, giving SIGA six operations: the Dakota Dunes Casino, located at the Whitecap Reserve (twenty kilometres south of Saskatoon), opened August 10, 2007, followed by the Living Sky Casino in Swift Current on February 14, 2009.

In 1993, the FSIN approached Premier Roy Romanow (NDP) to discuss reserve casino con-

struction. Since taking the reins in 1991, Premier Romanow had been considered pro-business and compassionate towards First Nations issues, leading Chief Roland Crowe to comment, "This historical relationship meant that the Native leadership felt comfortable initiating a discussion regarding a Native casino gambling policy with the NDP government, which demonstrated an impressive level of trust in the Romanow government" (Skea, 1997, p. 103). Following more than a decade's research and years of FSIN lobbying for the overhaul of provincial gaming policies to permit casinos and high-stakes gambling, Romanow was nevertheless reluctant to yield to these demands. From the premier's perspective, the FSIN's inability to speak on behalf of many of the province's First Nations, tribal councils, and individual band councils appeared to render the organization less than effective. Seeking to establish a working relationship with the province that would lead to new gaming policies benefiting its member communities, the FSIN cited a corresponding desire to stimulate economic development.

Working behind the scenes with First Nations leaders helped satisfy Romanow's concerns about organizational stability, as did market research confirming the positive role gaming could play in helping to expand the province's hospitality and tourism industry (Skea, 1997, p. 110). In February 1993, the NDP government published an internal document promoting the expansion of provincial gaming policies. The document made specific mention of First Nations people and their involvement in a proposed "joint-venture framework" with the provincial government (Saskatchewan Government, 1993). Preliminary discussions with the chiefs of several tribal councils occurred on the topic of their potential involvement in casino projects. The measured pace of negotiations was attributed to the increasingly confrontational approach toward First Nations leaders adopted by the minister in charge of gaming, Janice MacKinnon. Following her removal in March 1993, a government negotiating team was created consisting of Dave Innes, vice president of the Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority; Victor Taylor, assistant deputy minister of the Saskatchewan Indian and Métis Affairs Secretariat; and Andrew Thomson, chief of staff to the minister of the Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority. Negotiations were

initially held with the chiefs of Prince Albert, the Battlefords, Saskatoon, the Touchwood File Hills, Qu-Appelle, Meadow Lake, and Yorkton, along with the Agency Chiefs (representing Big River, Pelican Lake, and Witchekean Lake) (Skea, 1997, p. 14).

Setting to work, First Nations leaders and Premier Romanow's people developed the base principles leading to two agreements signed in 1995: the Gaming Framework Agreement (hereinafter Framework Agreement), and the Casino Operating Agreement (hereinafter Operating Agreement). At the heart of the Framework Agreement was the revenue-sharing formula, including a set of guidelines delineating how the revenues were to be spent by recipient First Nations. Specifically, 37.5 percent of net revenues would go to the provincial government, 37.5 percent to the First Nations Trust, and the residual 25 percent would be allocated to four provincial Community Development Corporations (CDCs). Each CDC was established to aid in distributing one-quarter of the net profit share pursuant to the Framework Agreement in an effort to (i) stimulate First Nations economic development; (ii) fund reserve justice and health initiatives; (iii) finance reserve education and cultural development; (iv) improve community infrastructure; and (v) develop senior and youth programs and other charitable purposes. Each CDC was recognized as a corporate body with a board of directors (Nilson, 2004, pp. 49-50). During the first full year of operations (1997-98), the SIGA casinos generated \$57.6 million, realizing a total profit of \$20.3 million (Wenger & Mckechnie, 1999, p. 22). On the surface it appeared as though the needed checks and balances were in place to ensure smooth operations, and during the first three years everything seemed to be proceeding smoothly. Towards the end of 1999, however, whispers of financial impropriety began to circulate the provincial legislature. By the spring of 2000, the public's perception of and trust in SIGA and the provincial First Nations gaming industry were being significantly challenged.

In May 2000, the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix broke the story concerning potential mismanagement of SIGA funds, specifically the FSIN's failure to comply with provincial demands for full disclosure of financial statements related to the distribution of casino revenues. Driven by vari-

ous complaints about SIGA's and the FSIN's spending, the Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority (SLGA) intervened (Warick, 2000a, p. A1). The provincial minister responsible for gaming, Doreen Hamilton, singled out SIGA administration for what she claimed was its inability to control spending. This scrutiny centred on SIGA CEO and board of directors (board) chairman Dutch Lerat, in particular for his receipt of an estimated \$360,000 in unauthorized debit and credit card purchases. Lerat's gaming registration was suspended and an interim CEO was appointed in June. In addition to publicly questioning SIGA's effectiveness, Minister Hamilton threatened to fire the association's primary officers. She also stated that any FSIN resistance to her demands would force the shutdown of all casinos.

Provincial auditor Fred Wendel reviewed SIGA's books and indicated that his "audit found improper and questionable use of public money. The problems are serious and the government needs to correct the problems quickly" (Mandryk, 2000, p. A14). Wendel initially concluded that Lerat had taken \$360,000 in unauthorized debit and credit card advances above his \$150,000 salary. He owed SIGA \$811,906 for unsupported expense claims and a number of suspect business trips. Critical of SIGA, Wendel was also distressed at the limited research conducted prior to SIGA's initiating a \$12 million advertising campaign. An additional \$1.7 million originally destined for Saskatchewan's First Nations Fund, Métis organizations, and the province was also unaccounted for. Finally, SIGA had paid \$875,000 to Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Licensing (SIGL), a body that had no authority to grant licenses (Mandryk, 2000, p. A14). Wendel took careful aim at the Saskatchewan government's role, given their wilful disregard of a 1999 provincial auditor report that recommended the SLGA work with SIGA "to establish proper conflict of interest guidelines; ensure inspections and audits are completed as planned or document why the plan was changed; receive an external auditor's report within 90 days of the adequacy of SIGA's internal controls and receive and approve SIGA's budget on a timely basis, with procedures in place for approaching changes to the budget." Wendel concluded that improper spending would have been prevented had the SLGA "fully acted on the recommendations we

made in our 1999 spring report to the Legislative Assembly” (Mandryk, 2000b, p. A14). The quickly negotiated Framework Agreement was cited as the basis of the difficulties: it was ill suited to offer checks and balances in the face of unbridled spending.

CORPORATE IMAGE AND CONSUMER TRUST

The Dutch Lerat Affair preceded a period of larger corporate disgrace epitomized by the Enron accounting scandal of 2001. SIGA administrators presented the issue as inadequate accounting of irregular spending easily resolved once identified. Having originally depicted Dutch Lerat as a spendthrift, the print media quickly reversed course, labelling Lerat and SIGA corrupt and incapable of properly managing a multi-million-dollar corporation. This blow to SIGA’s corporate image and reputation signalled to the provincial gaming industry that SIGA was on the cusp of a crippling monetary setback, which would have grave ramifications for the provincial gaming industry.

Corporate image is public reality; it is the general impression that a society of people has of an organization. For SIGA, which was and remains largely dependent on non-Native patrons for its financial success, creating a favourable corporate image is necessary to advance positive attitudes (political and societal) about the organization (Dowling, 1993; Van Riel & Balmer, 1997). These attitudes often reflect an individual’s direct experience with an organization, specifically its ability to provide a valued service to its customers (Fombrun & Van Riel, 1997; Wartick, 1992). The print media play an influential role in framing public opinion, which suggests that multiple forces inform public attitudes about corporations. Over time, these interactions provide the public with the subjective data from which a corporate reputation develops (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000). Whereas “an image reflects a set of associations linked to a brand or company name that summarizes a brand or firm’s identity,” reputation “reflects an overall judgment regarding the extent to which a firm is held in light esteem or regard, not the specific identity it has” (Weiss, Anderson, & Macinnis, 1999, p. 75). According to this philosophy, a

company with a poor reputation will generate less attention, and ultimately fewer customers, than a firm with a good reputation. The link between a positive corporate image and company performance is generally accepted (Simoes, Dibb, & Fisk, 2005).

Keeping one’s reputation strong requires effective management of the corporate image, because that image influences “stakeholders’ perceptions and preferences of companies as employment and investment opportunities, as community members, and as suppliers of products and/or services” (Pucheva, 2008, p. 272). Strong corporate governance can effectively enhance the integrity of the financial reporting process, which aids managers in securing consumer trust (Cohen & Hanno, 2000). Two theoretical frameworks inform our understanding of corporate governance. The first is drawn from agency theory and postulates that managers will act according to their own self-interests, even if it is detrimental to the shareholders. As a result, diverse mechanisms are adopted to observe managerial performance, including independent scrutineers (members of the board) who monitor management (Bathala & Rao, 1995; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2002). The second framework considers governance as an agent of regulatory requirements and largely symbolic; it provides limited oversight and generally endorses management’s decisions (Kosnick, 1987). In both cases, overseers are put in place to ensure adherence to financial reporting criteria and accountability. Multiple definitions of this last term abound, but in the main, accountability is “not essentially concerned with discretionary or voluntary disclosure, but rather with the institutionalization of legal rights for stakeholders to information concerning corporate behaviour” (Swift, 2001, p. 18). Strong corporate governance, then, is concerned with establishing the tools needed to counter the anticipated risks associated with individual advancement in an endeavour to advance a strong reputation.

A trustworthy CEO plays an important role in maintaining customer confidence should questions arise regarding unorthodox management styles or board of director efficiency. For First Nations casino operators, this is critical for several reasons. First, the casinos are largely dependent on non-Native patrons for their financial success. As an example, the Opaskwayak

Cree Nation's Aseneskak Casino near the Pas, Manitoba, has consistently suffered from low patronage since opening in 2002. A minimally successful venture based on modest annual profits, it has, as a result, never attained the level of patronage casino advocates and managers desired (Belanger, 2006). Second, public opinion indicates that only 1 percent of Canadians believe First Nations should operate gaming establishments (Azmiar, 2000). Thus First Nations casino operators need to combat an already-existing negative feeling. Finally, the public trust is challenged by regular media reports detailing reserve corruption and political futility.

Unlike public corporations that are responsible for reporting to one set of shareholders, First Nations businesses are unique: they are often accountable to key stakeholders (the communities) and band councils (the governments). In this regard, First Nations businesses are indeed answerable to a minimum of two and oftentimes multiple stakeholders, each with its own demands and expectations. SIGA faced similar tensions: as the FSIN's charitable arm and gaming regulator, its board of directors was inherently bound to the FSIN as well as to the communities and to various other political agents, such as the province's ten tribal councils. This resulted in intersecting political and economic agendas, and nominal delineation between leadership decisions related to political advancement and those related to corporate surety. Two scholars have written of this and similar models, concluding that "members of tribal council get to make the decisions, hand out the goodies, and reward supporters, but the nation as a whole suffers as its power—its capacity to achieve its goals—is crippled by an environment that serves the individual interests of office-holders but not the interests of the community as a whole. Equally crippling is a community attitude ... that sees government not as a mechanism for rebuilding the future but simply as a set of resources that one faction or another can control" (Cornell & Kalt, 2006, p. 17). The resulting conflict is often an insurmountable and common phenomenon in North American indigenous communities, according to the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development. Intended to improve our collective understanding about why some communities flourished economically where others failed, the Harvard Project has identified the policy of

legitimate self-rule exercised by Indian tribes to the exclusion of the United States as the central process of nation building. Among various issues the Harvard Project discovered is that successful tribes are able to separate politics from day-to-day business decisions.

According to the Harvard Project, First Nations seeking business opportunities often find themselves trapped in non-responsive colonial bureaucracies. In Canada, this is attributable to the Indian Act's restrictive provisions regulating reserve economic and political development. The resulting lack of strategic direction can be detrimental for Native leaders directing economic development. A lack of competent bureaucracy often complicates ambitious development programs, making difficult governing and administrative tasks more financially and administratively complex. Those First Nations that choose to not separate political and business interests would be well-advised to attract, develop, and retain skilled personnel, establish effective civil-service systems that protect employees from politics, install robust employee grievance systems, and establish regularized bureaucratic practices so that decisions are implemented and recorded effectively and reliably (Cornell & Kalt, 2006; Cornell, Jorgensen, Kalt, & Spilde, 2005).

This brief discussion highlights the key components of strong corporate governance and how it can be employed to ensure a positive corporate image, leading to an enhanced public reputation. One researcher laments, however, "Given the importance of the relation between the quality of governance mechanisms and the credibility of the financial reporting system, it is surprising that we know so little about the nature and extend of this relation" (Farber, 2005, p. 540). This could be said to apply directly to SIGA. Bound by the Framework Agreement and the Operating Agreement, both of which were negotiated with the provincial government, it seemed the proper mechanisms existed to ensure accountable financial reporting. Within three years of opening, however, it was clear that SIGA officials often disregarded an already weak accountability framework, thereby threatening the First Nations gaming industry. As has been suggested by one study, most "fraud firms' governance structures are initially weak" (Farber, 2005, p. 540). Detecting the fraud is important, but it is also vital to assess how fraud firms

respond (e.g., through corporate restructuring) and to determine how new governing models were expected to circumvent what previous governing structures were unable to accomplish.

METHOD

The following analysis is based on newspaper articles, editorials, and op-ed pieces obtained from Canadian newspapers. Most of the stories originated in Saskatchewan, and in most cases were published in the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix or the Regina Leader-Post. On several occasions stories appeared in other regional newspapers (e.g., the Kitchener-Waterloo Record) with additional information not cited by the Saskatchewan-based newspapers. These are occasionally referred to, albeit utilized more for context. The articles used in this study make reference to the Dutch Lerat Affair and SIGA's response to outside challenges to its legitimacy over a four-and-a-half year period: June 2000 to December 2004. A preliminary search of articles for the acronym SIGA turned up 1,588 documents on the Canadian Newsstand database; for Dutch Lerat, 523 documents. A combined search generated 367 hits, all of which were used for the following analysis. The research's final phase consisted of a thematic analysis, based on these articles, of subject matter related to both SIGA's response to the fraud and how it countered these actions (Daly, Kellehear, & Gliksman, 1997). The coding process involved identifying a principal theme or proposition prior to proceeding with data interpretation (Boyatzis, 1998). This enabled data to be organized and categorized, and from there for central themes to be identified and developed (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). A comparative overview of newspaper coverage was not conducted, nor was a distinction made between newspaper discourse and the comments of the primary actors. The chapter is concerned with outlining the various ways SIGA attempted to bolster its tarnished corporate image to secure the public's trust.

ANALYSIS

SIGA responded in two ways to buffer criticism in its attempts to secure the public's trust and move forward: (i) by developing an independent corporate response; and (ii) by citing Aboriginal

rights/inherent right to self-government. Each response involved a variety of actions dealing with the affair (as listed below):

1. The independent corporate response involved
 - (a) drafting new internal accountability criteria and calling for audit
 - (b) firing Dutch Lerat
 - (c) altering SIGA's board of directors selection criteria
 - (d) working with the province to rebuild business relationship
 - (e) drawing from tradition to guide contemporary corporate development.
2. The Aboriginal rights/inherent right to self-government response involved
 - (a) downplaying the extent of mismanagement
 - (b) challenging provincial jurisdiction over reserve casinos
 - (c) citing the province's imposed changes as a missed opportunity to learn from mistakes
 - (d) blaming the print media for undermining the FSIN's ability to self-regulate.

INDEPENDENT CORPORATE RESPONSE

SIGA quickly became the focus of unprecedented print media attention highlighting what initially appeared to be financial mismanagement. This soon spiralled into talk of misappropriation of funds and fraudulent activities. All newspapers in the sample contain information and quotes from major players about the need to secure public trust by responding to outside charges in an appropriate manner.

DRAFTING NEW INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY CRITERIA AND CALLING FOR AUDIT

The first action taken by FSIN president Perry Bellegarde was to announce a new SIGA policy for submitting travel expenses on June 16, 2000. Proper documentation was now required to track spending, including in particular all receipts cataloguing expenses. No maximum spending limit was imposed, although the board would review

expenditures on a monthly basis (Warick, 2000b). "As far as we're concerned," claimed Bellegarde, "we have every trust in the system that's there." The issue was simple: a "grey area for [SIGA] financial controls" existed. As part of its self-imposed changes, SIGA adopted the crown corporation schedule for per diems and remuneration (Silverthorn, 2000). With new monitoring of all spending criteria in place, Bellegarde expressed his confidence that a corporate review and an internal FSIN audit would find no evidence of wrongdoing. This was apparently intended to assuage government fears while impressing upon gaming officials that SIGA employees were exercising due diligence within an imperfect system. Operations were restructured to improve accountability and to reassure the public and government officials, thus reinforcing the public trust.

FIRING DUTCH LERAT

The following day, June 17, 2000, the provincial minister in charge of gaming (Hamilton) suspended Lerat's gaming registration and ordered the immediate cancellation of his credit and debit cards. Bellegarde was bombarded with questions concerning his continued support of Lerat and how the missing money was spent. Newspaper columns added further fuel to the fire, arguing that "accountability only sure bet," and that SIGA was "setting a new standard in deception." Bellegarde held out for six days before finally terminating Lerat (Parker). Lerat's termination suggests that Bellegarde was aware that SIGA's corporate image was taking a hit, thus impugning its reputation. He insisted that Lerat would be forced to pay back the entire amount while occasionally suggesting that he could potentially remain on the payroll, citing Lerat's exemplary work — outside of some minor mismanagement issues.

ALTERING SIGA'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS SELECTION CRITERIA

The day the story broke, Bellegarde admitted the need to realign SIGA's corporate structure. He further acknowledged that having Lerat serve as both CEO and board chair was a conflict of interest. After being asked to resign as the board

chair, Lerat did so willingly and immediately. It became evident during this period that the existing SIGA board model was inefficient. Prior to 2000, the ten provincial tribal councils had each elected one representative to the eleven-member board. Tribal councils could change their member without notice, and the operating rules were not clear (Burton, 2000). Conflict of interest guidelines were also nonexistent. Meadow Lake tribal council representatives in July "indicated that the whole board should be replaced and Dutch [Lerat] should not be the only one to take the fall. The director of finance for SIGA should be fired as well. He's got a certain amount of responsibility and should have said something" (Zakreski, 2000a). The FSIN responded a few months later by introducing new accountability guidelines, including seventeen internal controls to monitor spending. The tribal councils were also asked to reconsider their appointments to the eleven-person board. During the FSIN election campaign, the need to separate politics and business was broached by Morley Watson, who was seeking to replace Bellegarde. He argued, "Our businesspeople must make the business decisions and our political leaders have to fight the political battles." He added that the board members should be First Nations businesspeople rather than tribal council members or FSIN chiefs (Parker, 2000b). As of the end of the October 2000, five of the eleven SIGA board members had been replaced (Parker, 2000c).

WORKING WITH THE PROVINCE TO REBUILD BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP

Returning to the negotiating table to revamp the original Framework Agreement was the first step taken to rebuild the damaged province-FSIN relationship. Of particular concern were: (i) reporting and communication criteria; and (ii) criteria outlining SIGA's overall performance objectives. The report demonstrated that both SIGA and the SLGA had failed to properly adhere to provisions detailing auditing and reporting procedures. Cited as the source of the difficulties, the Framework Agreement was loosely configured, making it open to interpretation. It was overhauled and a new framework developed. Signed

in 2002, the new agreement created a 25-year partnership that would be reviewed every five years, with the understanding that each party had the authority “to raise any matter for discussion and negotiation during the Review Period by providing the other party with reasonable notice in writing of its intention to do so” (Gaming Framework Agreement, 2002, p. 23). The revenue-sharing formula was revamped to assign the First Nations Trust half of net revenues, with the remainder to be divided equally between the province’s general revenue fund and the newly reconstituted Community Development Corporations.

The four CDCs ‘board of directors’ structure was jettisoned for a new model, according to which a simple majority representing the host tribal council would make up the board of directors, along with two other representatives drawn from other tribal councils. A standing committee was also struck to “facilitate and coordinate communication between the Community Development Corporations and the Government concerning the operation of the Community Development Corporations and the distribution of gaming funds to the organizations” (Gaming Framework Agreement, 2002, p. 17). To ensure greater accountability, the CDCs were required to hire an auditor to determine whether “the monies received by the Corporation have been fully accounted for and properly disposed of and that the proper rules, policies and procedures are applied” (Gaming Framework Agreement, 2002, p. 23). The government retained responsibility for determining SIGA’s net profits at the end of each fiscal year, and for distributing those monies according to the revenue-sharing formula. The new Framework Agreement’s accountability and management provisions were more rigorous, assuring greater accountability when handling revenues.

DRAWING FROM TRADITION TO GUIDE CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT

Upon ensuring the public that it had indeed turned over a new leaf, SIGA’s 2003–04 Annual Report outlined a list of five principles it had adopted to guide employee relations and ensure the maintenance of public trust. Drawn from key

principles Cree leaders employed during Treaty 6 negotiations with the British Crown in 1876, these ideas reflected a new approach to corporate governance. As the annual report describes, “SIGA will strengthen the lives of Saskatchewan and First Nations people through employment, economic growth and community relations. This will be accomplished through the provision of a distinctive First Nations gaming experience that reflects the traditional aspects of our First Nations culture and hospitality. As a First Nations organization employing First Nations people, SIGA has adopted five principles to encourage balance while incorporating traditional aspects of First Nations culture. While our five guiding principles are presented here in Cree, there are parallel expressions in the Saulteaux, Dene, Lakota, Dakota and Nakota languages.” The principles are as follows:

Tâpwêwin (Speaking with precision and accuracy): The principle of Tâpwêwin advocates speaking with precision and accuracy. For SIGA, from a business perspective, it means we are accountable and conduct our business with integrity, honour and discipline.

Pimâcihowin (Making a living): Pimâcihowin stresses the importance of making a living and is today’s realization of our First Nations treaty relationship. The financial and operational success of SIGA provides the means to integrate a holistic approach to improve the quality of life for our people and for all people in the province of Saskatchewan.

Miyo-wîcêhtowin (Establishing good relations and getting along with others): The value of getting along with others is represented by the word Miyo-wîcêhtowin. By conducting our business in a manner that reflects our First Nations hospitality, traditions and customs, we are able to foster good relations with our customers. Guest satisfaction is crucial to our success.

Miskâsowin (Finding one’s sense of origin and belonging): Miskâsowin represents the value of finding one’s sense of origin and belonging. A fundamental goal of SIGA is to bring about a positive sense of origin and belonging in a predominantly First Nations employee base. This will lead to confident, productive and fulfilled employees.

Witaskêwin (Living together on the land): Living together on the land is the fundamental value conveyed by the word Witaskêwin. SIGA's vision statement "Sharing Success" speaks to the concept of sharing the land or, in today's terms, sharing resources. This value inspires us to give back to the communities where we live and work (Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority [SIGA], 2004, pp. 12-13).

As discussed above, the FSIN and SIGA responded in what could be described as a responsible manner. Each step appears to have been taken with the intention of countering the poor publicity the Dutch Lerat Affair was generating and ensuring a quick containment of negative publicity. Importantly, it must be noted that these responses could best be described as being informed by economic concerns as opposed to political concerns. Reflecting on the Harvard Project's unease with political and economic amalgamation, the aforementioned responses, while developed by the FSIN's political arm, better reflect the organization's response to a potential economic hit borne of poor publicity and lagging public trust. The following section details the political response.

ABORIGINAL RIGHTS/INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

On the surface it appeared as though SIGA and the FSIN had taken several positive steps forward through a corporate restructuring process that embraced enhanced accountability. Despite these varied responses, the FSIN concomitantly embraced an Aboriginal rights/self-government discourse that at times appeared to be counter-intuitive to the proposed structural and ideological changes that SIGA seemed to be on the verge of implementing.

DOWNPLAYING THE EXTENT OF MISMANAGEMENT

In the same June 2000 meeting in which Lerat stepped down as CEO, the SIGA board announced new controls on expense accounts. It also promised that the misspent monies would be paid back (Warick, 2000c). A SIGA press release

initially reported \$260,000 was misspent, when in fact the total was \$360,000. The reason for the difference: the SIGA board (of which Lerat was the chair) agreed to an unbudgeted annual \$50,000 salary increase for Lerat retroactive two years, in keeping with industry standards, followed by a three-year contract reflecting these changes. This raised his annual salary to \$500,000 to offset the amount of Lerat's indebtedness to SIGA. This occurred a little more than one month before the original story broke (Parker, a). Bellegarde publicly supported Lerat, claiming his CEO spent appropriately on gifts, contributions to powwows, and travel expenses for himself and others. The province intervened and ordered both the rescission of the pay raise and the cancellation of Lerat's credit cards, while also bringing to a close negotiations between the province and SIGA regarding two new casinos. (Negotiations remained closed until 2002.)

The internal SIGA audit was submitted September 14, 2000, two months before the provincial audit authored by Fred Wendel. It contended that the print media was exaggerating the extent of its perceived overspending. Acknowledging Lerat's unauthorized expenditures, the FSIN admitted that the board's spending was "out of step with our fiscal reality. Despite rising revenues our profit margin is falling" (Silverthorn, 2000, p. A1). The SIGA audit concluded that the board misspent an approximate \$835,000 (Parker, 2000b). This amounted to an average of \$47,000 annually for each board member for travel expenses, per diems, and remuneration. The Manitoba Lottery Corporation spent \$45,000 total during the same period; likewise, the Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation incurred \$87,798 in board expenses (Parker, 2000e). The provincial auditor's report was released two months later, and it identified that total misspending was closer to \$1.7 million, a number that grew to \$2.3 million by mid-2001 (Silverthorn, 2002). SIGA openly disagreed with these conclusions, although it was later revealed that despite having made \$7.5 million more than the previous year, the Gaming Authority experienced a \$3.3 million drop in profit (Parker, 2001a).

Additional research uncovered that several board members were hired as SIGA consultants and that Lerat was not interviewed for the CEO position, against an FSIN consultant's advice.

Wendel's report indicated that Lerat did not submit a resume and that the SLGA did not conduct a background check, since the applicant was an FSIN vice chief (Mandryk, 2000a). Regarding board members hired as SIGA consultants, the key example cited was the \$6,000/month contract given to former FSIN chief and board member Roland Crowe. Crowe was hired in 2000 on a seven-month contract; it was reported that upon that contract's expiration it would be renewed until July 2001, and then extended again for another three years. Crowe claimed the contract was to become permanent. Furthermore, the contract was for Crowe and his partner Mick Ryan to develop the Moose Jaw casino proposal and to negotiate management contracts with three Manitoba First Nations interested in operating casinos (Parker, 2001b). The negotiation of contracts with Manitoba First Nations would be beyond the scope of the 1995 Framework Agreement. Crowe insisted, however, that no conflict of interest existed due to widespread knowledge of the contract.

Wendel's subsequent two reports cited continuing discrepancies while suggesting that SIGA failed to implement the changes needed to secure the public's trust. In December 2001, SIGA's failures to develop a business plan and hire a chief financial officer were identified. Wendel also cited room for additional fraud at SIGA, including ease of access to blank cheques and automated systems lacking password protection that allowed "unauthorized persons [to] make changes to the systems to conceal frauds and errors" (Silverthorn, 2001, p. A1). The review unearthed additional fraud, including an employee who made improper payments worth \$30,000 and a former employee who, with a partner, defrauded SIGA of \$66,000 by falsifying account entries (Parker, 2001c). An update in December 2002 indicated that SIGA "continues to make payments beyond its authority and without due care. Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority (SLGA) is responsible for the supervision of SIGA. While (SLGA) has good practices in other areas, its supervision of SIGA remains deficient." In this regard, Wendel noted that the SLGA authorized SIGA to pay \$400,000 to the FSIN for legal fees in connection with negotiating the new twenty-five-year gaming agreement and \$150,000 to the SIGL without proper authority. As of December 2002, SIGA had imple-

mented only seven of the original nineteen recommendations. Ignored critical suggestions included establishing adequate policies to "ensure its books and records reflect its business operations" and "compliance with the casino operating agreement" (Mandryk, 2002, p. A18).

In December 2003, a fourth consecutive report critical of SIGA's spending was published identifying a \$446,000 unauthorized expenditure promoting the creation of a Saskatoon casino, well above the \$100,000 approved payment. Most of the expense was recorded in other categories on the balance sheet (Parker, 2003). In December 2004, Wendel again reported questionable spending practices. This time, SIGA had spent \$480,000 on disputed marketing and promotional items (Burton, 2004).

CHALLENGING PROVINCIAL JURISDICTION OVER RESERVE CASINOS

In June 2000, renowned Star-Phoenix columnist Doug Cuthand promptly identified the FSIN's reliance on jurisdiction claims to deflect outside criticism: "The jurisdictional argument was a non-starter and clearly dealt with in the agreement. The FSIN wisely backed away from that argument and saved the issue of provincial jurisdiction in First Nations affairs for another day." He also astutely concluded, "This whole incident has the potential to haunt self-government if the First Nations leaders don't take decisive action and get SIGA under control and gain back its credibility" (Cuthand, 2000a, p. A13).

Cuthand was, however, somewhat optimistic in proclaiming that the FSIN had backed away from this discourse. Rather, the FSIN continued to aggressively challenge provincial jurisdiction over reserve casinos. Despite several Supreme Court of Canada cases concluding that gaming jurisdiction rested with the province (e.g., Pamajewon, 1996), Bellegarde insisted provincial officials were "overreaching their bounds as far as we're concerned. Is it their jurisdiction to say, 'You can't do this?' No." He later added, "We've ultimately been working towards First Nations jurisdiction and control over management and operations of our gaming industry here in Saskatchewan. Unfortunately, the 1995 gaming agreement does give the power, authority and

control to Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming right now” (Warick, 2000c, p. A1). This argument was later altered in late 2000 to reflect on the nature of First Nations jurisdiction on reserves as opposed to gaming in general (Parker, 2000f). Bellegarde cited provincial jealousy as the motivating factor driving what he claimed many in the First Nations community would characterize as a witch-hunt: “Is it because they’re [the SLGA are] upset with the success of our operations? That’s something you’ve got to speculate about because [the government-owned] Casino Regina was going into Moose Jaw. One of our other tribal councils was going to go into Moose Jaw. So we had competing interests” (Zakreski, 2000c). He added, “There’s some other political agenda [government officials] aren’t coming clean with” (Warick, 2000d).

Former Assembly of First Nations (AFN) grand chief David Ahenakew in December 2000 answered the claims that the FSIN had given up jurisdiction by insisting that Saskatchewan’s First Nations were taking jurisdiction back or “we close all casinos. The ultimate bottom line is to close all casinos; not just the Indian casinos but all the casinos. There will be no gambling in this province.” Willing to throw all provincial casino employees under the bus to regain jurisdiction, including an estimated 900 First Nations workers, Ahenakew demanded provincial officials “back off and allow us our money, our jurisdiction, get the hell out of there, then everything would be fine.” He also implicitly suggested if the FSIN were not granted jurisdiction, SIGA’s continued role as corporate sponsor would be compromised, as would its charitable work (“Ahenakew Urges Indian to Control Casinos,” 2000).

This response was multifaceted. Take SIGA’s two-pronged response to the auditor’s 19 recommendations, for example. Publicly Bellegarde admitted that they were logical responses to the situation and that they would be implemented. However, as of December 2002, Wendel highlighted SIGA’s unwillingness to implement change: “SIGA has no clear plan to improve its spending practices” (Mandryk, 2002). For instance, it was some time before the positions of CEO and board chair were officially separated, and SIGA resisted recommendations to overhaul the board structure. The FSIN

attempted to placate the print media and therefore the public by making aesthetic changes to the board structure. The new rules that were instituted for appointing trustees included stipulations that criminal background checks be conducted; all candidates be bondable; trustees be provided training in due diligence; and that the provincial government make the appointments (Adam, 2001). Acknowledging this resistance, the SLGA unilaterally fired the board members and instituted its seven-member model in its place.

In another instance, the FSIN attempted on three separate occasions to re-hire Lerat, despite his being the subject of a very public RCMP investigation. Within two weeks of the mismanagement story breaking, in June 2000, the FSIN tried to secretly re-hire Lerat. The rationale: Lerat was “still a First Nations citizen member, he will always be a Cowessess band member. So people thought he’s got a lot of experience in gaming, there are financial obligations from the individual to SIGA” (Zakreski, 2000a, p. A10). The Saskatchewan Indian Institute of Technologies (SIIT) later provided Lerat with a six-month, \$30,000 contract. SIGA also refused to furnish the SIGL (SIGA’s regulatory authority) with financial statements, and the SIGL was blamed for doing a poor job of monitoring the gaming authority (Zakreski, 2000d). First Nations Trust Fund financials were withheld in 1997, defying a provincial auditor’s request to review the records, as were board minutes (Zakreski, 2000d). This despite the FSIN’s justice and economic development commissions demanding their release (Parker, 2002b). SIGA begrudgingly relented and delivered the minutes to Ernst and Young—in effect bypassing Wendel on the basis of proprietary interest. The review reported that the board ran informally; multiple people attended and influenced the outcome of meetings; it was difficult to ascertain who was supposed to be in attendance or what the rules were leading to vital corporate decisions (Parker, 2002d, p. A1).

It is interesting to note that as the inherent right to self-government and the corresponding right to regulate reserve casinos was being cited, FSIN leaders consistently referred to the SLGA’s failure to monitor and regulate SIGA spending. Ahenakew opined, “All of us are to blame for allowing the province to do what it’s doing to

us” (Adam, 2000, p. A6). Bellegarde claimed that the SLGA was partly responsible: “Every year they had the authority and responsibility. They vetted SIGA’s operating expenses and budgets. They knew what was going on” (Parker, 2000f, p. A3). Interim chair of the board Gerry Merasty also questioned the province’s competency: “They were made aware of the situation in 1998 and they approve all budgets and audits and they were aware—why did they choose to raise it [this issue] at the end of 2000?” (Silverthorn, 2000, p. A1). Bellegarde blamed neo-colonial attitudes for his and SIGA’s difficulties: “Every year they [SLGA] had the authority and responsibility. They vetted SIGA’s operating expenses and budgets. People don’t talk about that” (Parker, 2000f, p. A3). Bellegarde’s parting comments were provocative: “Every time First Nations people try to do something for their people in a good way, there’s still oppression.” He added, “There’s that control. There’s still that colonialism that exists” (Mandryk, 2000c, p. A1).

Bellegarde potentially undid any good will when he asserted that jurisdiction over reserve gaming was “the jewel in our crown ... and that if it is our sovereign territory, we should be able to do what we want, when we want, in our land” (“Reveal Intent of SIGA Deal,” 2002, p. A12). Then, in June 2003, the FSIN vice chief responsible for economic development, Guy Lonechild, announced that Lerat had once again been hired, this time to expose the province’s influence in the SIGA scandal. Attempting to deflect blame, Lonechild informed the print media, “The province was regulating SIGA and they approved all the expenses. The province regulated all the operations and they were licensing all the casinos and the people who managed them. So the province was responsible.” He added, “We’re going to expose those, like they did to us. From the First Nations’ point of view, its time for us to tell the truth about the province. And that’s what I’m going to do” (Parker 2003, p. A1). As a Star-Phoenix editorial later suggested, “It’s as pathetic as it’s galling to see Lonechild trying to play the victim card in suggesting that intelligent and competent Native persons responsible for the profitable casinos were powerless to act ethically” (“Hiring Lerat Absurd Move,” 2003, p. A14).

CITING THE PROVINCE’S IMPOSED CHANGES AS A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN FROM MISTAKES

SIGA responded slowly to the nineteen recommendations to improve government and accountability, although on November 16, 2000, the entire SIGA board of directors was fired. A seven-member board was established in its place with the following criteria: members must demonstrate proper educational qualifications and business experience, with three positions designated for government appointees. SIGA hired an internal auditor, limited credit card availability, and introduced new conflict-of-interest guidelines. Bellegarde’s demeanour at times suggested a willingness to meet with government officials to resolve the situation, with him claiming, “We’ve got to sit down and work this out” (Warick, 2000c, p. A1). On other occasions, he claimed that the scandal was simply reflective of the growing pains associated with self-government (“Hiring Lerat Absurd Move,” 2003). In what was described by the Harvard Project as practical sovereignty, those communities and their leaders will benefit directly from good decisions while suffering the consequences of bad decisions: “Once decisions move into Indians’ hands, then the decision-makers themselves have to face the consequences of their decisions.” This, the authors argue, provides a learning curve resulting in “the quality of their decisions” improving (Cornell & Kalt, 2006, p. 14). It seems that the province agreed with this general assessment: in April 2002, a new twenty-five-year agreement was signed that permitted SIGA to install an additional 125 machines, bringing its total to 625. It then allowed for the installation of 250 more at the proposed casino in Moose Jaw (Parker, 2002a).

BLAMING THE PRINT MEDIA FOR UNDERMINING THE FSIN’S ABILITY TO SELF-REGULATE

The print media made convenient targets for an FSIN leadership frustrated with having their every action in the spotlight. Although this tactic played out minimally in the print media, it was, all the same, an aspect of an overall response whereby the FSIN blamed others for its inability

to self-regulate. This unusual situation was arguably the result of many FSIN leaders' unfamiliarity with the internal workings of the print media and their minimal experience working with non-government agents seeking out corruption. Frustration boiled to the surface on October 18, 2000, following the publication of the FSIN's internal audit of SIGA, acquired by a Star-Phoenix reporter. The SIGL chief executive asked the reporter to refrain from publishing from the report, arguing that it was destined for internal [read "FSIN and affiliated agents"] consumption (Parker, 2002b). As Star-Phoenix columnist Murray Mandryk, who closely followed the scandal, wrote, "The FSIN chiefs and their overpaid spin doctors were busy playing the race card Wednesday, desperately trying to make this issue about something that it is not. The issue is the print media, they charged" (Mandryk, 2000b, p. A11). Doug Cuthand identified that during the FSIN chiefs' assembly the print media came under attack and were accused of muckraking and meddling. However, as he noted, "What they failed to mention is that the document was leaked to the media by someone within the First Nations community. The report came from within the offices of the Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Licensing Commission" (Cuthand, 2000b, p. A17).

FINAL THOUGHTS

The Dutch Lerat Affair had the potential to compromise the public's trust in SIGA, and to a lesser extent in the FSIN, resulting in diminished gambling revenues. First Nations officials responded immediately to a torrent of negative publicity, highlighting financial impropriety with two identifiable strategies: (1) establish a dialogue that would shape its official corporate response to perceived wrong-doing; and (2) cite the inherent right to self-government as a justification for First Nations mistakes made in pursuit of self-determination. These responses reflect the economic and political dimensions First Nations communities contend with daily, and how contradictory the responses can become when informed exclusively by political agendas. The failure to separate politics and economics in this case led to the misappropriation of funding, but more importantly it hindered the FSIN's public response. The Harvard Project's findings anticipated this result: SIGA's corporate structure

means that it is a branch of the FSIN, informed by and answerable to politicians. Even if SIGA's gross revenues had not taken a significant hit, suggesting that the public's trust had not been compromised, the central issues identified in this case study resonate with the Harvard Project's long-standing contention that First Nations must separate politics and economics. As of 2010–11, SIGA is successfully operating six casinos and the Dutch Lerat Affair is largely forgotten — notwithstanding a poor corporate response to a troublesome episode that could have turned out unfortunately for all involved.

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Editors' Introduction

Warren Weir and Wanda Wuttunee

In this section, we continue to profile the current views on the evolving state of the Aboriginal economy. To this end, Weir and Oppenheimer explore the policy context of the new Federal Framework for Aboriginal Economic Development (FFAED) in Canada. They end the piece by asking additional questions about FFAED — questions they hope readers will help to answer.

THE NEW FEDERAL FRAMEWORK FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Base Upon Which Future Canadian Government Policies and Programs Are Being Built

.....

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The Government of Canada has introduced a new Federal Framework for Aboriginal Economic Development (FFAED or Framework). The Framework provides the foundation upon which future Canadian policies and programs are being built. This paper examines the significance of this Framework and six related policies.

In his introductory message to the Government of Canada's *Federal Framework for Aboriginal Economic Development*, the Honourable Chuck Strahl, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Government of Canada, 2009) states that:

The approach that we are pursuing under the Framework recognizes the federal government cannot act alone, that we have to focus on priorities, and that money is only part of the solution. The Framework will focus the federal government's action on priority areas to unblock the full economic potential of Aboriginal Canadians, their communities, and their businesses by taking realistic steps to have a measurable impact on the lives of Aboriginal people. (p. 1)

Embedded in his message, Minister Strahl also provides insight into the context and policy connections to the Framework:

The new *Federal Framework for Aboriginal Economic Development* builds on a number of recent federal actions to improve the participation of First Nations, Inuit and Métis people in the Canadian economy. These include an investment of \$200 million through *Canada's Economic Action Plan* for Aboriginal skills and training to improve labour market outcomes for Aboriginal peoples, amendments to the *Indian Oil and Gas Act*, investments to benefit all Canadians living in the North, including Aboriginal Canadians, and a commitment to establish a new regional economic development agency for the North ... acknowledging that members of the National Aboriginal Economic Development Board, and the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples whose 2007 Report, *Sharing Canada's Prosperity — a Hand Up, Not a Handout*, set the stage. (p. 1)

This paper reviews the five documents specified in Strahl's remarks (above), in addition to the one that is discussed in the body of the Framework—*Advantage Canada: Building a Strong Economy for Canadians. The six areas to be covered are as follows:*

1. *Advantage Canada* (2006)
2. *Sharing Canada's Prosperity—a Hand Up, Not a Handout* (2007)
3. *Canada's Economic Action Plan* (2009)
4. Amendments to the *Indian Oil and Gas Act*
5. The establishment of a new regional economic development agency for the North
6. The National Aboriginal Economic Development Board

We begin by providing an overview of the previous policy framework on Aboriginal economic development, namely the Canadian Aboriginal Economic Development Strategy (CAEDS). Then, after discussing the six policy connections listed above, we end with some observations on how the ideas evident in FFAED and its associated policies are also being replicated in other areas of Aboriginal economic development. Specifically we focus on the realm of Aboriginal human resources development, looking at the changes occurring with the Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy, originally the Aboriginal Human Resources Development Strategy, which expired March, 2010.

This update on the Framework follows our introduction of the FFAED in last year's Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development (JAED), Volume 6, Issue 2 (Fall 2009). As CANDO and the editors of JAED are interested in learning about your experience with the new Framework, we end with some open-ended questions about the potential and actual impacts of the FFAED. We hope that you, our readers, will respond with ideas and articles that we can share in the next JAED (7.2), scheduled to be published in the Fall of 2011.

CANADIAN ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (CAEDS)

When discussing the new Framework, the federal government acknowledges its genesis in previous

programs established under the 1989 CAEDS. By doing this they advance the idea that new policy efforts signify “that time, the conditions, needs opportunities and relationships associated with Aboriginal Canadians and economic development have changed significantly ... It is time to introduce a new federal framework for Aboriginal economic development that is targeted at opportunities, is responsive to new and changing conditions, leverages partnerships and is focused on results” (p. 2).

According to a Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) report (1998),

CAEDS started ... as a joint responsibility of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), Employment and Immigration (EI) and Industry Science and Technology (IST). Its purpose was “to address economic disparities between Aboriginal peoples and other Canadians.” ... DIAND took the lead for community economic and resource development; EIC focused on skills development; and IST concentrated on business development. Outcomes expected from CAEDS programs included increased employment for Aboriginal people, a wider business base, enhanced entrepreneurial skills, decreased dependency on social welfare, and increased capacity for Aboriginal communities to manage their own affairs. (p. 42)

The report ends its section on CAEDS with a brief evaluation of the results of this strategy:

One result from CAEDS is that the Industry Canada component appears to have been relatively more successful than the other initiatives. The focus on business development and the financing of new ventures seems to have had important benefits for selected Aboriginal communities. However, this apparent success may be the result of a few communities effectively using the business-development programming. The objectives for the DIAND and HRDC components of CAEDS are longer-term, more diffuse, and do not show relatively quick returns. (p. 45)

This evaluation suggests that perhaps the strategy failed, and the CAEDS was ultimately replaced by FFAED due to a lack of concrete and measurable outcomes in relation to the

forementioned list of expectations. The strategy's lack of ability to measure its own impacts is alluded to earlier in the HRDC report:

Evaluations of CAEDS noted a range of structural improvements such as increased involvement by Aboriginal organizations and increases in their capacity to deliver programs. However, data deficiencies precluded measuring impacts on employability, actual employment impacts or social-welfare dependency. (p. 43)

These, and other, deficiencies were previously reflected in the findings of The 1993 Report of the Auditor General of Canada (Chapter 11):

11.3 Visible leadership for implementing the Strategy as a whole needs to be better established.

11.4 The three departments responsible for implementing the CAED Strategy could not demonstrate that the variety of funding methods and amounts provided under the Strategy were appropriate in the circumstances. In addition, despite some positive examples of aboriginal economic development, they could not demonstrate that, after spending at least \$900 million from the beginning of its implementation in 1989 to early 1993, they were meeting the Strategy's objectives.

11.5 The lack of appropriate performance and evaluation information impedes the necessary accountability within the aboriginal communities and between the government and Parliament.

In a 1995 November Report of the Auditor General of Canada, an assessment of the previous 1993 concerns was tabled. Many of the concerns outlined in 11.3 through 11.5 (above) were judged to be not adequately addressed, in the judgment of the Auditor General's office (1995). These concerns were reviewed via consultation with First Nations and a number of CAEDS evaluation reports were reviewed. The implication was that change to the Government of Canada's approach to Aboriginal economic development was on the horizon.

It appears that, although there were concerns about the strategy at this point in time, it took another 14 years to see the move from CAEDS to FFAED. This was despite the con-

cerns about the limited results and the difficulty in evaluating the outcomes of CAEDS. It is probably the new Conservative government's desire to apply its "approach" to Aboriginal programming, emphasizing results, accountability and market driven initiatives that caused the demise of CAEDS.

ADVANTAGE CANADA (2006)

The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) began to plan a new strategy for Aboriginal economic development in Canada. This movement corresponded to a change in Government, when the Conservative Party, under Stephen Harper, assumed power in 2004. From this point onward, Prime Minister Harper has been in the process of developing a clear stance on Canada's economic strategy. This began in earnest with the 2006 release of the Government of Canada's *Advantage Canada: Building a Strong Economy for Canadians* (under the cover page heading — "Canada's New Government").

According to the FFAED, Advantage Canada is "a strategic, long-term economic plan designed to improve Canada's economic prosperity today and in the future". It continues, stating that "Advantage Canada is focused on helping people and business strive for excellence, and recognizes that the Government has an important role to play in creating the right conditions for Canadians — and Canadian businesses and organizations — to thrive" (p. 2). Here we see a focus on business, and the facilitation of prosperity through Government policy. This is reflected in the new Framework.

The new Framework aligns with the Conservative government's stance on strategic and long-term economic planning designed to improve Canada's current and future economic prosperity, which was outlined in the government's 2006 report *Advantage Canada: Building a Strong Economy for Canadians*. The FFAED is consistent with Advantage Canada in the following ways:

- *roles and responsibilities are aligned* to maximize economic outcomes for Aboriginal Canadians;

- supporting *skills and training* that will create new opportunities and choices for Aboriginal peoples;
- *leveraging investment and promoting partnerships* with the private sector to produce sustainable growth for Aboriginal peoples; and
- acting to *free businesses to grow and succeed* by removing barriers to Aboriginal entrepreneurship and leveraging access to commercial capital. (p. 2, italics in original)

In relation to Advantage Canada, the expected outcomes of the FFAED—to ensure that Aboriginal Canadians enjoy the same opportunities for employment, income and wealth creation as other Canadians—are threefold:

- **Opportunity-ready Aboriginal communities** that have stable, efficient and predictable investment climates attractive to business and investors
- **Viable Aboriginal businesses** that can compete in today's marketplace, and
- **A skilled Aboriginal workforce** that is able to take advantage of employment opportunities across the economy (p. 20, bold in original)

Advantage Canada (Department of Finance Canada: 2006) focuses on five Canadian advantages:

- **Tax Advantage:** Canada's *Tax Advantage* will reduce taxes for all Canadians and establish the lowest tax rate on new business investment in the G7.
- **Fiscal Advantage:** Canada's *Fiscal Advantage* will eliminate Canada's total government net debt in less than a generation, creating a strong foundation on which to build sustainable prosperity.
- **Entrepreneurial Advantage:** Canada's *Entrepreneurial Advantage* will reduce unnecessary regulation and red tape and lower taxes to unlock business investment. By building a more competitive business environment, consumers will get goods at lower prices and Canadian businesses will be better equipped for global success.
- **Knowledge Advantage:** Canada's *Knowledge Advantage* will create the best-educated, most-skilled and most flexible workforce in the world.

- **Infrastructure Advantage:** Canada's *Infrastructure Advantage* will create modern, world-class infrastructure to ensure the seamless flow of people, goods and services across our roads and bridges, through our ports and gateways, and via our public transit. (pp. 10–11)

As well, *Advantage Canada* is based on four core principles:

- **Focusing government.** Government will be focused on what it does best. It will be responsible in its spending, efficient in its operations, effective in its results and accountable to taxpayers.
- **Creating new opportunities and choices for people.** Government will create incentives for people to excel-right here at home. We will reduce taxes and invest in education, training and transition to work opportunities so Canadians can achieve their potential and have the choices they want.
- **Investing for sustainable growth.** Government will invest and seek partnerships with the provinces and the private sector in strategic areas that contribute to strong economies—including primary scientific research, a clean environment and modern infrastructure.
- **Freeing businesses to grow and succeed.** Government will create the right economic conditions to encourage firms to invest and flourish. (pp. 11–12) For the purpose of our discussion, it is important to note that *Advantage Canada* (Department of Finance Canada: 2006) describes itself as “optimistic, but realistic. It is visionary, but pragmatic and *results-oriented*. It is ambitious, but grounded in the realities of world markets, and of Canada's existing economic and social realities” (p. 9, bold italics added).

**SHARING CANADA'S PROSPERITY—
A HAND UP, NOT A HANDOUT:
THE STANDING SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ABORIGINAL
PEOPLES REPORT (2007)**

According to its website, the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples was first created in December 1989, and has a mandate to examine legislation and matters relating to the

Aboriginal Peoples of Canada. One of its major accomplishments was the publication of its 2007 report, *Sharing Canada's Prosperity — a Hand Up, Not a Handout*. According to the preface, the report is based on research and consultations that started three years prior to its publication.

In November 2004, the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples agreed to undertake a study examining issues concerning Aboriginal economic development. In particular, the Committee sought to understand what accounts for the economic success of some Aboriginal communities, while others have not achieved success despite advantages of resources and location ... Over the two-year course of the study, the Committee held 31 meetings and heard from 155 witnesses (p. viii).

Although the report was not addressed in the main text of the Framework, it is apparent that the report, and the recommendations made by the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, was instrumental in the finalization of the Framework. In the Indian and Northern Affairs Background (2009), it is stated that the Framework “benefited from the advice” of the committee and their report. It is important to note that the Senate report is a valuable and intriguing reference, and should be read by those interested in a broader understanding of Aboriginal economic development, including those who would like to know more about the range of options open to the redress of Aboriginal conditions in Canada.

CANADA'S ECONOMIC ACTION PLAN (2009)

Following in the footsteps of *Advantage Canada*, and taking into account the Standing Senate Committee report, the Conservative Government committed to the development of a new federal framework for Aboriginal economic development that would be opportunity driven, results focused and partnership-based (FFAED: p. 8). After certain measures and stakeholder consultations were put in place, the Framework came into being in 2009.

Around the same time, the Canadian Government (Department of Finance Canada: 2009)

announced Canada's Economic Action Plan in its 2009 Federal Budget. Generally, the Plan focuses on four, key, and targeted activities, including (i) Further reducing the tax burden on Canadian individuals, families and businesses, (ii) Engaging in smart stimulus spending that creates jobs, (iii) Helping Canadians who are hardest hit by the recession, and (iv) Strengthening the financial system and improving access to credit.

The Government of Canada (2009) through its Department of Finance Canada, supported Aboriginal economic development, and by extension the new Framework, by investing \$200 million for Aboriginal skills and training to improve labour market outcomes for Aboriginal peoples (pp. 104–105).

AMENDMENTS TO THE INDIAN OIL AND GAS ACT

According to the INAC website,

The Indian Oil and Gas Act is the legislative tool for the federal government to manage and administer the exploration and production of oil and gas resources on reserve lands ... The proposed changes provide solutions to two specific problem areas. First, they respond to immediate needs related to the day-to-day management of First Nation oil and gas resources by modernizing the current regime. Second, enhancements to Governor-in-Council regulation-making powers would facilitate the continuous improvement of the regime in response to industry and technology advances. The core areas for change addressed in the proposed amendments to the Act are regulation-making powers, audit powers, limitation period for actions to collect amounts owing, determination of royalty payments, a comprehensive enforcement system comprised of fines and penalties, a remedy for trespass, environmental protection, and authority to issue replacement leases for lands added to reserve. (see <<http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ai/mr/nr/s-d2008/bk000000138-eng.asp>>)

The site concludes by stating that “a key policy objective for the Government of Canada is to modernize the legislative frameworks that support First Nations programs, services and governance.”

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AGENCY FOR THE NORTH

Canada continued its advance of its claims to Northern sovereignty by provided funding to its newly developed Northern Strategy: an attempt to help the North realize its true potential as a healthy, prosperous and secure region within a strong and sovereign Canada (see <http://www.northernstrategy.ca/index-eng.asp>). To broaden the strategy, a number of initiatives and activities were earmarked for funding in its 2009 Economic Action Plan.

Through the 2009 budget, the government promised to invest \$50 million per year for five years (2009–2014) to create and sustain the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency, or CanNor:

The Agency's primary focus is the provision of integrated business services north of 60. In particular, CanNor will:

- oversee the \$90 million Strategic Investments in Northern Development Program;
- manage the \$11.8 million in annual funding supporting economic development in Northern Aboriginal communities and Aboriginal businesses and entrepreneurs in the North;
- manage investments made in the North through the Municipal-Rural Infrastructure Fund, the Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund and Recreational Infrastructure Canada; and
- oversee the \$33 million allotment for the territories contained in the Community Adjustment Fund—the new, two-year program that helps Northern communities create job opportunities and adjust to changing economic and market conditions. (see <http://www.north.gc.ca/fcs-eng.asp>)

THE NATIONAL ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BOARD

Finally, the FFAED is provided advisory assistance from a group of Aboriginal leaders and business people, on the National Aboriginal Economic Development Board. The board was established in 1990.

The National Aboriginal Economic Development Board is an advisory body to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. It provides advice to government on strategic approaches and programs aimed at promoting greater economic development for Canada's Aboriginal people whether of First Nations, Inuit or Métis heritage.

The Board was established through Order in Council in 1990 and is comprised of up to 20 members including a Chair and up to three Vice-Chairs. All members are appointed by the Governor in Council.

ABORIGINAL SKILLS AND EMPLOYMENT TRAINING STRATEGY (ASETS): AN EXAMPLE OF THE EXTENSION OF THE FFAED

In January (2010), Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) presented their Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy (ASETS), *Strategic Business Planning Process for Recipients*. In the report, HRSDC announced the replacement of the previous Aboriginal Human Resources Development Strategy (AHRDS) labour market strategy with the ASETS. Exhibit 1 summarizes the key changes.

On closer examination, this larger policy approach promoted by Prime Minister Stephen Harper and the Federal Conservative Government of Canada is reflected in other programs and policies being established and re-established across the country, in Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities and organizations funded and supported by federal monies.

The policy statements in FFAED relate directly and are relevant to changes that are occurring to local/regional Aboriginal Human Resources Development Agreements (AHRDA) directing training and labour-force development via ASETS. For example, there are four strategic priorities listed in the FFAED, including (i) strengthening Aboriginal entrepreneurship, (ii) developing Aboriginal human capital, (iii) enhancing the value of Aboriginal assets, and (iv) forging new and effective partnerships (p. 12). In terms of human capital development, the FFAED report states that the Government of Canada is committed to the following actions:

EXHIBIT 1	
Key Changes Proposed for the Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy (ASETS)	
<i>From AHRDS</i>	<i>To ASETS</i>
Training was individual-focused in nature	→ Demand-driven approaches, linked to employers and reinforced through rigorous business plan and incentive investments
Training delivery approach individualistic and short-term	→ More systematic, strategic partnering (with business, PTs, OGDs, and other Aboriginal service providers), reinforced through business plans and incentives
Overlap and duplication in some areas	→ Realization of efficiencies and economies of scale among service providers, respecting capacity needs and cultural imperatives of client base
Limited employer service capacity	→ Invest in capacity building; providing incentives for more outreach and initiative, and adjust service delivery networks
Inconsistent reporting and performance information	→ Annual performance reports and improved reporting using realistic performance indicators
Accountability through sub-agreements not standardized	→ Regular monitoring of Aboriginal Human Resources Development Agreements/sub-agreements/points of service
HRSDC role focused primarily on management and oversight	→ More expansive HRSDC role, focused on brokering, stewardship, capacity building, and promotion of best practices

- Support labour market programming that increases skills development and employability to help Aboriginal people secure long-term jobs
- Foster linkages across initiatives supporting labour market participation, skills development, apprenticeship and training, as well as education and income assistance (and)
- Collaborate with industry, educators and the voluntary sector to better match learning and training with job opportunities in the labour market. (p. 14)

To build on the policy directives introduced and described in the *Advantage Canada* and FFAED documents, it is worthwhile addressing some of the points listed and discussed in the recent Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy (ASETS) document, *Strategic Busi-*

ness Planning Process for Recipients. This is important as it is clear that this ASETS approach “**is complementary to the proposed new framework on Aboriginal economic development, [and that related] organizations will also be expected to make links to federal economic development programming**” (p. 7, bold added for emphasis).

The transition from AHRDS to ASETS is based on three strategic priorities: (i) demand driven skills development, (ii) partnership with the private sector and across the whole-of-government; and (iii) accountability for improved results (p. 4). These are a reflection of the other policy statements and documents presented by the federal government via *Advantage Canada* and the new *Federal Framework for Aboriginal Economic Development*. Market demand will determine programming needs, and it will

require everyone working together to attempt to meet these needs. If a labour market demand need is tackled, the approach will need to be backed by long-term business plans and short-term operational plans that can be monitored, evaluated and assessed.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Framework for Aboriginal Economic Development and the related documents discussed in this article describes the Canadian Government's policies and future direction. It is the base upon which forthcoming programs will be built. It is seeking to focus on market-driven, results-oriented strategies.

The questions for which we are seeking your answers to relate to what your experiences are regarding the policies and programs resulting from the Framework and how you are addressing these issues.

- Since skill development in the ASETS will be demand-driven and linked with employers,
 - ✧ if you are seeking support for skill development, how will you identify the "demand" for the skills you are seeking to acquire?
 - ✧ if you are seeking opportunities, how will you identify partners to work with in the private sector or throughout the government?
- How will you measure the results?
- How will you determine who will be held accountable for achieving what results?
- What does it mean to you to be held accountable; what are the rewards or consequences of such accountability?

The questions that were raised in the initial discussion of the Framework in the 2009 JAED article still warrant consideration:

- What are the implications of moving from "untargeted" to "economic opportunities for Aboriginal resources"?
- Funding for economic opportunities in the new Framework is proposal-based while the current Community Economic Development Program (CEDP) is a core funding process allowing decision making at the community level. The proposal based programs appear to

be subject to a decision making process controlled by the government, away from the Aboriginal authorities.

- What are the funding implications for the employment of economic development staff under community-based institutions?
- How will a community be able to implement this?
- What happens with communities that have limited access to economic opportunities because of their small population, remoteness or limited access to the resources which the mainstream economy is looking for?
- What kind of structure does INAC need to deliver services and programs?
- What kind of economic development structures are needed for Aboriginal economic development at the local, regional and national levels?
- What are the potential costs and benefits of the inclusion of all Aboriginal people's eligibility to funding, notwithstanding their place of residence whether on reserve or elsewhere? This may double the potential Aboriginal clientele.
- What are the implications of this on the actual financial resources available for economic development?

There and other questions that may be raised are those for which answers will be needed. Our objective is to identify issues that should be considered and for which strategies for addressing them should be shared. Ultimately, we are seeking your inputs, your experience and your solutions for utilizing the policies and programs that build upon the Federal Framework for Aboriginal Economic Development. Submissions may be forwarded to the Editor of the *Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development*, c/o Svitlana Konoval, Council for the Advancement of Native Development Officers at the following address:

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Your input may be profiled in next issue of the CANDO Journal (7.2). Submissions by e-mail are preferred.

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Beyond the Indian Act: Restoring Aboriginal Property Right
by Tom Flanagan, Christopher Alcantara, and Andre Le
Dressay

BOOK REVIEW

Beyond the Indian Act: Restoring Aboriginal Property Rights
Tom Flanagan, Christopher Alcantara, and Andre Le Dressay

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.....

David Newhouse

NATIVE STUDIES, TRENT UNIVERSITY

Beyond the Indian Act is an interesting, provocative and easily readable book. Using cases drawn from contemporary First Nation development, the authors argue that the restoration of property rights to Indian lands is the key to economic prosperity for First Nations peoples. They argue without full property rights, First Nations communities cannot use their lands effectively in creating economic wealth. Their proposal is that First Nations individuals ought to be able own their own land in fee simple as other Canadians are able to. Reversionary or underlying title would rest with First Nations. In the case of sales of lands to non-First Nation individuals or entities or defaults on lands First Nations Councils continue to have jurisdiction over the land. It is not removed from their authority. In this sense, it is similar to the sale of lands in other parts of Canada. If land in Saskatchewan is sold to a person from Ontario, the Saskatchewan land is not transferred to Ontario. Saskatchewan laws remain in effect and the owners are expected to respect Saskatchewan law, not Ontario law.

This short 200 page book consists of three parts: The first, Peoples and Property, is a historical examination of property rights in general as well as a discussion, using anthropological evidence, of property rights in traditional Aboriginal societies. This section ends with a review and analysis of the attempt to create individual

property rights in the United States of America through the Dawes Act in the 1930s. For those interested in history, it is an informative read. The second section, Limited Property Rights under the Indian Act, focuses on Canada and property rights under the Indian Act. It discusses custom land rights, certificates of possession and leases and ends with a discussion of the recently enacted First Nations Land Management Act. Again, this historical information is an easy read. The final section, Beyond the Indian Act contains the proposal for the restoration of First Nations property rights. It starts with a discussion of markets and why they don't work on Indian reserves, using developments at Kamloops and Squamish to illustrate the difficulties of making markets work, moves to a discussion of the ways in which First Nations communities have attempted to use comprehensive land claims and amendments to the Indian Act to enable First Nations land to be used for development. The proposal for a First Nations Property Ownership Act is contained in the final chapter.

THE FIRST NATIONS PROPERTY OWNERSHIP ACT

Since the Royal Proclamation of 1763, Indian lands have been set aside from the main eco-

conomic space of Canada and have had a restricted set of property rights. Fee simple title, necessary to unlock the capital within, is not one of the property rights enjoyed by First Nations individuals or Bands. Since 1969, with a growing emphasis on economic development and resolution of land claims, there have been several proposals which attempt to do this and at the same time respecting the desire for protection of the land in the case of default or sale. The authors argue that the way forward is to find a way to bring Indian lands into the market in a way that can be used to wealth. They recommend the creation of a system of property rights that provides a fee simple title to land for individuals and a reversionary right to Indian Bands. They propose the passage of a First Nations Property Ownership Act as a way of enacting this system in Canada. This would provide, on a voluntary basis, a fee simple title for individuals for Indian land and a reversionary title to Indian Bands in the event of sale or default by individuals or others.

Flanagan et al. recommend that the new Act encompass the following principles:

1. First Nations must gain fee simple ownership title over their current lands.
2. Individual First Nations must have underlying title in their land, so that when there is an issue where individual title is lost or removed by someone else, the title to land reverts back to the First Nation. This involves all of the accompanying responsibility of taxation and management.
3. There should be a Torrens style land title system to manage and record transactions.
4. All accompanying legislation should seek to harmonize provincial and First Nations jurisdictional gaps to provide for investment certainty.
5. It should be an optional piece of federal legislation that releases communities from the land governance parts of the Indian Act.

THE TORRENS SYSTEM

Flanagan et al. recommend the use of a Torrens land-title system rather than a deeds system. The fundamental difference between the Torrens system and other land registry systems is that only

the act of registration can change ownership of land, not a private agreement between sellers. The determination of validity of title is undertaken by the registrar at the time of application rather than by the purchaser at the time of purchase. This system is based on elements that generate secure title such as registration, certainty of title in the registry, a system of priorities for ranking competing interest, and assurance that the registered owner is the true owner of the title. This is much different than the current land registry system under the Indian Act that is considered to be a deeds system. In this system, the registrar files the records but does not determine their legality nor does the registrar have any involvement in the effect of these documents. The risk lies mostly with the parties to the transaction.

FOUNDATION IN HERNANDO DE SOTO ECONOMIC THEORIES

In general, the Flanagan proposal represents one of the latest proposals for converting “Lands reserved for Indians” into lands where Indian individuals and Bands enjoy full property rights. The underlying premise of the text is based on the work of respected Latin American economist Hernando de Soto’s *The Other Path* (1986) and *The Mystery of Capital* (2000). De Soto argues that one of the reasons why urban slum dwellers in the third world are so poor is that they suffer from a deficient system of property rights that prevents them from using their small parcels of land or houses as collateral in loans and hence they are unable to “unlock” the capital contained within them. The establishment of property rights that are “secure, easily defined, enforced and traded” (2010: 171) is the foundation of modern Aboriginal economies. Flanagan/Jules sees Indian reserve lands as representing “unlocked capital” as a result of the restrictive property right provisions of the Indian Act. Unlocking them requires the development of a new regulatory environment for Indian lands. Unlocking them in enables “ownership of underlying title by First Nations Governments and secure individual property ownership affirmed by guaranteed title.” (2010: 169)

NEED FOR MORE DISCUSSION

In the context of the evolving and complex arena of Aboriginal property rights, Aboriginal and treaty rights, self-government and treaty negotiations and as an expression of a way of moving forward in a modern capital economy, the ideas contained within the Flanagan proposal are worth further consideration and discussion. Defined, secured and enforceable property rights are foundational to participation in modern market economies. It is important to understand that Aboriginal political objectives are broader than economic development. Protection and enhance-

ment of cultural property, equitable distribution of wealth, enhancement of individual choice, development of accountable and effective First Nations governments are also important goals that need to be examined as well when considering such fundamental issues of land reform. Balancing First Nations cultural values and customs with contemporary individual rights is also an important aspect to be explored in some depth. The wholesale adoption of a new system of property rights, however attractive, ought to occur with informed public discussion and debate.

Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development

Call for Papers Volume 7, Issue 2

Published jointly by the Council for the Advancement of Native Development Officers (CANDO) and Captus Press, the *Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development* (JAED) features academic articles, examples from economic practitioners, book reviews and “The State of the Aboriginal Economy” section. Published yearly, the Journal is a unique resource for anyone interested in Aboriginal community economic development.

Volume 7, Issue 2 of JAED will be published in September 2011 in preparation for the CANDO 18th Annual National Conference & AGM.

Papers should relate to one of the following areas:

- Aboriginal Community Economic and Enterprise Development
- Aboriginal Small Business and Entrepreneurship
- The Analysis of the Aboriginal Economy
- Evaluating Aboriginal Economic Activity
- Aboriginal Corporate Responsibility, Social Auditing, and the Triple Bottom Line
- Economic Partnerships
- Indigenous Knowledge and Economic Development
- Indigenous Land Management and Economic Development
- Aboriginal Organizations and Management
- International Aboriginal Trade and the Global Economy
- Aboriginal Community Development: The Role of Women and Youth
- Change: Traditional and Modern Aboriginal Economies

We invite papers and case studies from academics and practitioners that address these issues. Academic papers will be subject to the usual double-blind peer-review process. Please note that we are not just looking for academic papers; we are also looking for interviews, case studies, and other practitioner views and perspectives. Submissions from practitioners will be reviewed by members of the editorial board. We believe such submissions will be particularly valuable, and it is our objective to publish as many as possible, if not in this issue then in subsequent issues of the JAED and/or in CANDO N-Side News. We want to know what people are doing, what is working, what is not working, and why.

Academic and Practitioner papers (double spaced, 12 point font, and 1 inch margins) should not exceed 25 pages in length, including appendices. Length can vary—1 to 25 pages. The preferred format style is APA.

SUBMISSIONS MAY BE FORWARDED TO

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Submissions by e-mail are welcomed, in fact preferred. Send the paper as an attachment to the e-mail address above. The deadline for receipt of submissions for Volume 7, Issue 2 is **April 15, 2011**. If your paper does not make the cut for this issue, or needs extra work, it will be considered for publication in Volume 8, Issue 1.

Should you require further information please contact Svitlana Konoval, CANDO Executive & Administrative Services Coordinator at 1-800-463-9300 or skonoval@edo.ca.

It is important that the content in the Journal hold meaning for practitioners in the field of Aboriginal community economic development. Beginning with this issue of JAED, we will ensure that all publications include content that is understandable, accessible, and useful for practising EDOs. For example, interviews and case studies in the “Lessons from Experience” section could provide practical tips on the advancement of Aboriginal economic development on a day-to-day basis. Articles in the “Lessons from Research” section might profile best practices and ways to implement the author’s findings and recommendations. The “Book Review” section could highlight innovative ways to promote economic change and growth in Aboriginal communities, organizations, or businesses. Finally, the content in the recently introduced “The State of the Aboriginal Economy” section requires reflections, evaluations, and the critical analyses of the topics presented in the final section of Volume 6, Number 2 — specifically *the New Federal Framework for Aboriginal Economic Development*, and *The Struggle to Make Aboriginal Poverty History*.

Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development

Submission Guidelines

The Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development (JAED) is a peer-reviewed journal for practitioners and scholars working and researching in areas relevant to Aboriginal economic development. Its intent is to explore ideas and build knowledge in the field of Aboriginal economic development theory and practice. The journal prefers a broad interpretation of research and knowledge and encourages a wide variety of forms of contributions in this area.

JAED typically features three sections: **Learning from Experience**, **Lessons from Research**, and **Reviews of Current Books and Literature**. For the next set of issues, we will be highlighting an additional section, **The State of the Aboriginal Economy**. Please send three copies of your manuscript. Contributions may vary in length, depending upon the section they are written for. We are looking for submissions in the range of 15–20 pages, or about 4,000 words for research papers, book reviews of about 1,000 words, and experience sections of about 2,000–3,000 words. Manuscripts submitted should be single spaced with 1.5 inch margins all around and page numbers at the bottom middle. The title page should indicate the section for which you are submitting. All identifying information should be restricted to this one page. Review for publication will take approximately 8–12 weeks from time of receipt.

Manuscripts should be sent to: JAED (skonoval@edo.ca), CANDO, 9635 — 45 Ave., Edmonton, Alberta, T6E 5Z8. A copy of the final revised manuscript, in Microsoft Word® format, saved on an IBM-compatible disk should be included with the final revised paper copy. Research submissions should conform, where practical, to the *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association* (4th edition); however, the Journal is flexible in its format and encourages creativity and innovation.

Submission of a manuscript implies commitment to publish in the Journal. Submission to JAED implies that the manuscript has not been published elsewhere, nor is it under consideration by another journal. Authors who are in doubt about what constitutes prior publication should consult the editor.

Learning from Experience from practitioners, academics, consultants and executives include interpreted case studies, evaluation and commentary on popular and current approaches and tools of Aboriginal economic development, advocacy of particular approaches and solutions, successful or failed efforts, and the identification of important economic development problems that are in need of solutions.

Lessons from Research from academics features scholarly inquiry, debate and commentary on how we frame, perceive, interpret, research and contribute to the field of Aboriginal economic development.

The State of the Aboriginal Economic Development will feature current views on the evolving state of the Aboriginal economy and responses to the newly proposed Federal Framework on Aboriginal Economic Development.

Reviews of Current Books and Literature features recent literature exploring aspects of economic development relevant to Aboriginal peoples.


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