# Journal of ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Volume 4, Number 2


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# Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development

Volume 4, Number 2

SPECIAL EDITION

## The State of the Aboriginal Economy: 10 years after RCAP

CANDO

**Captus Press**

*The Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development* is the first journal devoted exclusively to issues and practices in the field of economic development and Aboriginal peoples' communities. The journal, published jointly by CANDO (Council for the Advancement of Native Development Officers) and Captus Press, offers articles that are of interest to those who teach and those who work in the field.

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# David B. Williams

David B. Williams is a self-taught artist of Ojibway ancestry. In 1977 he moved from his home on the Garden River Reserve, Ontario to Vancouver to find work as a writer and photographer. Later, his career path changes and he successfully focused on a career in art.

Mr. Williams has developed an original style, combining graphic lines with abstract, realism, stark geometry and bold vivid colours. In each of his pictures he depicts the life cycles of nature by encircling various elements with fine graphic lines.

Mr. Williams's artwork is a representation of the closeness and devotion he has with his family. He represents his children through symbols of the sun found in the framing of each picture. The three red suns represent Mr. Williams's three boys and the yellow sun represents his daughter.

Since 1978 Mr. Williams work has been displayed through Canada, the United States and England. Mr. Williams has been residing in Winnipeg, Manitoba and continues to delight his many fans with his works.

# Editors' Comments

This Special Edition focuses on *The State of the Aboriginal Economy* that has been in the works for a number of years. Following the release of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) final report in 1996 which spoke about burgeoning Aboriginal economies that were at the same time both self-contained and working effectively within the larger Canadian and provincial economies, the journal editorial board determined that it is time to try and offer some useful insights into the heart of economic activity that is flourishing at every level within First Nations, Métis, and Inuit communities.

We wanted to offer a glimpse into Aboriginal economic activity that is, for all intents and purposes, ill-understood if at all recognized by the vast majority of Canadians. In this journal, our work, and in our classes, we (including our colleagues and students) are documenting history in the making in an age where many Indigenous communities are moving forward to fiscal freedom in their own terms. While this often involves reconciling the rhythms of the Canadian economic system with community-based initiatives, many Aboriginal business leaders perceive this action to be valid and the only way that people with the freedom to choose can do. The reconciliation includes establishing home-based businesses, entrepreneurial endeavors, developing products and selling services to communities that rely on band-owned businesses and co-operatives. Many of the same philosophies have also been successfully utilized by communities seeking to tap into global technology markets and developing culturally appropriate, sustainable businesses. In a word, Aboriginal communities are doing what makes sense and taking on projects that are manageable.

All of our journal issues to date have expanded upon these trends and this sense of movement, and this one is no different. We recognize the importance of history, offer some of the personal insights of our Economic Development winners and then give the

academic insight into a variety of topics to peak interest and stimulate debate.

In our opinion, there is no one way to engage this dynamic and constantly changing topic. Rather, we must approach The State of the Aboriginal Economy from different vantage points in order to begin to make sense of the new and evolving ideas and processes currently emerging; and each one is more exciting than the next. It takes courage to make a difference when all around are saying "it can't be done" and "you aren't doing it right". The voices here can now be stilled.

# Editors' Introduction

From the perspective of the 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), the most extensive and expensive commission in Canadian history and the most comprehensive and credible account of Aboriginal peoples in Canada, there is an urgent need to support self-government and community-based initiatives that help the rebuilding of Aboriginal economies:

> Self-government without a significant economic base would be an exercise in illusion and futility.... What measures need to be taken to rebuild Aboriginal economies that have been severely disrupted over time, marginalized, and largely stripped of their land and natural resource base? ... Under current conditions and approaches to economic development, we could see little prospect for a better future.... [A]chieving a more self-reliant economic base for Aboriginal communities and nations will require significant, even radical departures from business as usual.[1]

In this section, we find that not only are significant and radical departures occurring from business as usual in Aboriginal communities across Canada, but that the trend was taking place well before the Royal Commission made its recommendations in 1996.

In the first piece, Wendy Featherstone documents the value of Aboriginal partnerships in her overview of Northern Resource Trucking (NRT) and the Northern Resource Trucking Limited Partnership (NRTLP). The NRTLP was signed in 1994, but was initially a partnership that involved Kitsaki (the economic development arm of the Lac La Ronge Indian Band) and Trimac Transportation. Northern Resource Trucking, which is now 71% Aboriginal and Northern Saskatchewan community-owned, focuses on training and employing Aboriginal peoples in northern Saskatchewan. The success of NRT, Featherstone argues, is based on its competitive approach to business and the importance of realizing profits. NRT's approach, in turn, fuels training and employment and contributes to

community development in meaningful and beneficial ways. The NRTLP is a partnership model other industries located in or near Aboriginal communities should consider.

Following the NRT piece, Gaye Hanson shares an interview she did with her father, Bill Hanson. In the interview, Mr. Hanson — an honoured "leader and trailblazer of Cree ancestry" — provides his insight, ideas and vision on Aboriginal economic development he gained over decades of work in the field, including 30 years in a leadership position with the Inter-Provincial Association of Native Employment (IANE). Bill is particularly interested in understanding better the differences between members of the Aboriginal community who want to maintain a traditional lifestyle and individuals and organizations that have opted for acculturation into 'modern-day' society.

As is the tradition in previous issues of JAED, this section then honours the winners of CANDO's nationally recognized Economic Developer of the Year awards. In the two back-to-back articles that build on interesting and intimate interviews with the award winners, three authors profile the 2003 and 2004 recipients. In the first piece, Cheryl Cardinal highlights the 2003 winners, including the Membertou Corporate Division, owned by the Membertou First Nation, Nova Scotia (Business Category), and Mark Wedge (Individual Category), a visionary leader who was presented with the Individual Award for the work he did in the Yukon and across Canada as a member of the Carcross/Tagish First Nation, Yukon Territories. The Membertou Corporate Division interview was conducted with organizational representative Bernd Christmas. The 2004 winners, profiled by Teresa Callihoo and Sara Cardinal, include Piikuni Wind Power (Business Category). based out of the Piikuni First Nation, Alberta, and Chief Lawrence Paul (Individual Category) of the Millbrook First Nation, Nova Scotia.

The articles in this section show in no uncertain terms that the leaders and community businesses and organizations profiled are involved in anything but 'business as usual'. While business must be run in effective and profitable ways, and leaders must manage the affairs of their institutions and organizations in a professional and responsible manner, it is clear that innovation and creativity is an important key to the success of Aboriginal partnerships and community ventures that impact the communities and people involved in meaningful ways. Furthermore, the stories reinforce the feeling for many of us involved in Aboriginal economic development that consistency and commitment are necessary requirements if we hope to impact change for the communities in ways that are meaningful, beneficial, and successful.

If you have any stories you would like to share with us about your organization, or a leader, manager or community change agent that is making a significant — even radical — difference in the field of Aboriginal community and economic development, we would like to hear from you!

**Note**

1. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), *Final Report*. Vol. 2. Part 2. *Restructuring the Relationship* (Ottawa: Minister of Supplies and Services, 1996), p. 775.

# NORTHERN RESOURCE TRUCKING

Wendy Featherstone

Northern Resource Trucking (NRT) is a true partnership that developed in response to the need for the uranium mines to provide benefit to the people of northern Saskatchewan where they mined. Originally, it started with Trimac Transportation and the Lac La Ronge Indian Band through its economic development branch, Kitsaki. The Chief and Council of the Band recognized an opportunity to provide transportation to the mine sites, but they lacked the experience and capital to provide the level of service and safety that the mines required. Trimac Transportation knew that they could provide the trucking services, but being a Southern company, would not be in the running for the contracts available.

Kitsaki bought in with 51% ownership, and Trimac had 49%. The partnership proved successful. Trimac provided the experience in trucking and Kitsaki provided the knowledge and ownership of the North. A training program was established to provide the training and experience from Trimac to the members of the band, and NRT began.

The competitive nature of the trucking industry made it difficult for NRT to meet the goal of training and developing northerners while providing the lowest price for transportation to the mines. Since Cameco, the uranium mining company NRT originally hauled for, had an interest in delivering benefits to the north, NRT's proposal to broaden its base of ownership, in return for a longer-term contract was accepted. In 1994 Northern Resource Trucking Limited Partnership (NRTLP) was formed when Kitsaki and Trimac sold 41% of NRT to other northern Aboriginal and Metis communities. NRTLP's ownership now consists of:

- Lac La Ronge Indian Band . . . . . 30%
- Trimac Transportation Systems. . . . . 29%
- First Nations of Black Lake, Hatchet Lake and Fond Du Lac . . . . 20%
- Clearwater Dene Nation . . . . . 3%
- English River First Nation . . . . . 3%
- Community of Buffalo Narrows . . . . . 3%
- Community of Ile a la Crosse. . . . . 3%
- Montreal Lake Cree Nation . . . . . 3%
- Peter Ballantyne First Nation . . . . . 3%
- Community of Cumberland House . . . 3%

Because NRTLP has 71% northern ownership dividends from the company's profitable operation flow directly to northern communities. The initial cost of the investment was set up as a loan to for each of the respective development corporations, and has been paid back directly through the profits of the company. This process enabled northern groups with little or no money to make a major investment that would give them access to jobs and dividends.

In addition to their return on investment, northern communities have access to well paying jobs that allow people to remain, if they choose, in their home communities. Since 1994 NRTLP has paid over $34,000,000 in wages, salaries and leased operators payments to residents of Saskatchewan's North. These wages tend to be spent in their home communities. This allows further economic development at the community

Wendy Featherstone, Executive Assistant, Northern Resource Trucking Limited Partnership, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.

level because there is more money available for service sector businesses to start up. This is a very important aspect of community development and NRTLP has been proud to contribute to the process.

Another benefit to the north is that NRTLP purchases fuel, meals and hotel rooms in northern communities. This in itself will not be enough to start new businesses but it certainly gives existing businesses a boost.

Positive examples of Aboriginal people succeeding are valuable. In NRTLP we have First Nations and Metis communities partnering with North America's largest bulk transportation company to do business with the world's largest publicly traded uranium mining corporation. The prestige of being involved in NRTLP gives northern aboriginal groups role models for their people and allows them better access to financing for other ventures. If an Aboriginal group can show its banker a successful business venture, with a partner like Trimac, doing work for a customer like Cameco, it enhances their profile and gives them credibility. NRTLP is the type of partnership that will allow further participation in the economy for northern Aboriginal people. This is of tremendous benefit in a province like Saskatchewan, where the growing Aboriginal population has to be integrated into the economy or we will face dire economic consequences.

Another direct benefit of participating in NRTLP is our training program. Since 1994 NRTLP has trained over 90 northerners and spent over $1.4 million in this process. Our training program takes people who have no qualifications other than a desire to be a truck driver and gives them the training necessary to achieve their goal. The process takes over one year, starting with a 7 week course to attain a Class 1A license. Then there is a 10 month, in cab, training period where the trainees drive with leased operators or company drivers and learn to handle the various commodities that NRTLP hauls. After achieving proficiency the trainees become Junior Drivers. They then have to drive by themselves for another 6 months or until they achieve the desired level of proficiency. Once the final certification is achieved the successful Junior Driver becomes a certified driver and is eligible to become a leased operator, company driver or leased operator driver.

Our focus on trainee retention has changed over the years as opportunities for the people of our communities have grown. We are hard pressed to compete with the wages in the mining and petroleum sectors, however we have provided a solid base of knowledge and experience that our trainees can use to move ahead. Many other companies, including those in the mining sector, the Department of Highways and the RCMP, have recognized the value of our training program. NRT trainees have become a sought after commodity, which in itself is of value to our partnership. Even if trainees didn't stick with NRT, the training they received was valuable and they are earning a wage and contributing to the economy. Putting people into the marketplace with a new skill is a victory for our partners and a direct benefit to the north.

The formation of NRTLP heralded a new era of cooperation between northern communities and the mining industry. NRTLP has given northern communities a chance to benefit from the mining development going on around them and has given them a vested interest in that development. It has allowed mining development to proceed without some of the blockades that affected the forestry industry.

The reason that the mining industry was allowed to develop free from some of the problems that beset the forestry industry is because most of the communities in the north received a direct benefit from the uranium mining industry. Through community ownership, NRTLP has been able to deliver direct benefits to northern communities.

The reason behind NRT's success is that is run as a trucking company. It is privately owned, and profitable. Without profit, NRT fails. Nobody would get trained, no benefits would go to the partners, and it would cease to be a trucking company. NRT cannot provide work that is not sustainable, or training that is not viable, and it must operate under the same basic principles of any other trucking company. While it is a community owned company, the expertise that has been developed has been in trucking, not in community or economic development. The economic development lessons have been learned by our partners, and have been expanded and honed in even more limited partnership ventures.

# INTERVIEW WITH BILL HANSON JULY 16, 2005

Gaye Hanson

**Bill Hanson** is a leader and trail blazer of Cree ancestry who has worked in the field of Aboriginal economic development for many years. He is the author of *Dual Realities — Dual Strategies: The Future Paths of Aboriginal Peoples' Development* and has held workshops and delivered lectures throughout Canada. Bill is a teacher and advocate for providing options for development that take advantage of all of the benefits of mainstream society while providing effective alternatives for those Aboriginal people who choose a more traditional path.

**Gaye Hanson** is Bill's daughter, the second of four daughters. She is a management consultant who works in many areas of Aboriginal health, social and economic development. With degrees in nursing and public administration and a background in senior positions in the public sector, her most important learning has been from her parents who have taught her how to live and think creatively and independently.

**GH:** Please tell me about your background in Aboriginal Economic Development?

**BH:** I have always being concerned with employment, economic development and the total development of the Aboriginal people. By total development of Aboriginal people, I am referring to the efforts to regain their legitimacy and their own sense of where they fit in society. I worked for many years in Aboriginal employment and see the overlap with economic development. From economic development, comes the possibility of employment opportunities which also provides the means to improve the quality of life for everyone within the community. I worked at that for many years, and it wasn't actually until I retired from government and the institutionalized approach to Aboriginal peoples' development that I suddenly realized that the lack of recognition of the duality of Aboriginal lifestyle is our main obstacle to effective development. It never really came together until, actually until six months after I left the public service. Then I realized that this duality of lifestyles has confused us and continues to confuse us today. We'd like to put everything into little packages ..... housing, community development, education and we are experts in every one of these fields but we don't have the expertise to put them all together. That really undermines the total impact of what we are doing. It affects the quality of life, because you are going to a community as a government representative and saying "okay I want to talk about employment". I fly in there to talk about employment and I want to talk employment. The community representatives say "no, no, no, what we want to talk about is health". I say "well that is not my expertise". They say "well, why can't you, you are government, why can't you do it?" As a result, the relationship of

Gaye Hanson, President, Hanson and Associates, Whitehorse, Yukon.

trust and the credibility of the people is compromised. We have to develop the capacity to respond to where the community is and what their issues are and see how it all links into the total development of the community.

**GH:** From the perspective of looking back fifty years, what have we done right in Aboriginal economic development? Can you think of some bright spots that we could build from?

**BH:** There's no doubt that progress has been made. I mean, if we accept the fact there is over two million Aboriginal people, you know, with some degree of Aboriginality, certainly there are examples of success in practically all regions of Canada. A review of Aboriginal Business Development Webpages and other sources clearly indicates progress. But you have to look at what contributed to the success — the price of success. We have rewarded the winners who have internalized the norms of the Euro-Canadian market-oriented society. In addition to opportunities that flow from economic or business ventures, these individuals also have greater opportunities in higher education, access to technical training and employment in the private and public sectors. Provided they've got the expertise and the connections, they can make it. As a society, we continue to invest several million dollars in economic development annually across the country with little evidence that the symptoms of social, economic and psychological distress obvious in most First Nation/Aboriginal communities have been alleviated. At the same time, not recognizing these people that are taking advantage of these opportunities are not the people that are being incarcerated or spending their lives on and off social assistance. These are not the people that are suffering from of distress of all kinds and who are passing the problems on to their children. There are lots of Aboriginal people who are making it in the white man's world, or the industrial marketplace and we need to applaud that success. So, in a sense, on paper it looks good. Strategies, programs and services that are required to support people coming into the mainstream society are there. Many Aboriginal people are trained and motivated. They are drawn to urban centres and mainstream opportunities in the search for power, prestige and position. Every program possible is available at the moment, and they are all working. No question about it. We don't need to preach any more about that.

**GH:** Where have we fallen short of your dreams for advancement?

**BH:** The problem is that the success we have had only addresses part of the overall problem. The difficulty is that we're putting on a "band-aid" but it is not stopping the bleeding in the other parts of the system. So, we have to now have to shift our focus to those Aboriginal people choosing a different path and that are not responding to current programming. Don't try and apply those strategies and programs and services that are working for the culture of the Aboriginal person over to solve some of the more traditional people in the traditional communities. Right away, you will confront their goals, challenge their aspirations and make impossible demands on their capabilities. We have no right to do that. On the other side, when we have to interface with the more traditional people, probably Granny or people like that, that speak their own language. And we have to start with, okay, where are you going? Again, that is why it is important to understand the difference in the lifestyle characteristics between the change oriented and more traditional people. You go down to see Granny as she is the expert. In other words, she sees all of this coming together, housing, the health, the nutrition and other things. She can tell you how to work with the people. She is the only expert that can do that. If you don't talk to Granny, if you come in from outside and disturb the community dynamics; the traditional people pull back. They won't tell you anything except what you want to hear. They will not get involved. They just defend themselves against all outsiders. Outsiders to their lifestyle and way of seeing the world include the Aboriginal people from university that try to go back and help their people.

**GH:** So you are saying that there is a whole group of Aboriginal people not served by the current programs and services. Can you tell me more about that?

**BH:** Yes, that's right. What we are saying to traditional people both in the city and in rural and remote areas is "you will get no programs and or access development opportunities that are

well suited to you — the only option is welfare." And we are telling the families and their children every day that "you will not qualify for programs and services until you meet the norms of the modern day society." Little wonder that they say back to us "to hell with that" and they walk away because they feel that they can't do it — they cannot pay the price of giving up ties to the socio-cultural past. The traditional people are a collective, which differs from the notion of individual success. To choose acculturation, they have to break out of that, they have to cut the ties, and the thinking that goes with that, and walk away. Not everyone can do that. As a result, there are no viable options available to them. There are no options available at the more traditional end of the spectrum. Mainstream society holds back the access to any forms of rewards offered by society and release is conditional on acculturation. No acculturation — no access.

**GH:** And we somehow have to provide opportunities with them while they are not having to be forced into a process of acculturation. How can they stay connected to traditional values and lifestyles, and still have opportunities?

**BH:** On one hand, make sure that we do not dismantle programs and services for those choosing acculturation. We need to help them on the journey to where they are going — into banking, the professions — all those things we have to continue to do. On the other hand, we need to invest the same degree of resources doing new things differently. Where are these traditional people? They are caught up in the cycles of life. There is a time and a place for everything. There is spirituality, connection to the land and the authority of the collective. In the traditional values system, an individual person cannot come in and tell me what to do, not even the Chief. That is why the democracy in the mainstream sense, falls apart. We have to accept a different way of thinking, a different lifestyle and a different way of making decisions. The challenge is to develop programs and services that are effective on the traditional end of the spectrum. We have to start where they are.

**GH:** If the problem is not having enough food in the cupboard, then that is where you start.

**BH:** Yes. But there is resistance to alternative forms of programming. The general public is asking the question of "why are Aboriginal people different?" They are different. They are beginning their journey and where they are today is different. We have problems seeing the unique characteristics of the traditional Aboriginal person. We get preoccupied with this European, Euro-Canadian concept. People say "we are immigrants — my father came from middle Europe and lived with the cattle in the house and pretty soon his kids were doctors and lawyers." The immigrant ethnic groups left their history, their roots and their basic culture over in some foreign land. They covered over their roots and packed what they wanted to bring of their history and dropped their suitcase over here in Canada. What they brought was a mere distillation of their past ethnic identity. With that they were able to carve out a very positive image to give their children, their next generation. These children, often born in Canada don't know the history of the blood, sweat and tears experienced by their ancestors. For Aboriginal people, it is all right here. All of the history, the roots, the culture with both the good and the bad is all here in Canada.

**GH:** What was one of the most successful Aboriginal development projects that you were involved in and what made it successful?

**BH:** In one community, we used the Dual Realities — Dual Strategies concept to plan housing development. Traditional people do not think of housing in a form of a subdivision and prestige values of the size of the house. What the traditional person says is "I want my house put over there. I want it over there by that meadow over there." And the housing staff member says "okay, who should live in the other houses around you?" The traditional person says "my granny's house should be over there, and my older sister's house over there." In other words, they put up their own housing arrangements in a flexible social configuration. Okay, who is the most important in this little mini band housing setup? Well, there's granny's house. Older daughter lives right there. What happens is that the whole collection of ten or twelve houses, or whatever, becomes their "home." Everything and everyone in the extended family is all connected — like a ball of made up of pieces of wool, where it is all tied

together. The connections cannot be disrupted without destroying the whole.

**GH:** Your concept of Dual Realities — Dual Strategies has been used to guide economic development in many places in Canada. How would you see it being used from this time forward?

**BH:** The concept is used like a compass in your mind — it affects what you see when you look at things. You don't practice it so much as it envelops your whole body and soul and makes a difference in how you look at the world. The community dynamics that can be understood by using the concept exist wherever in the world a market oriented society imposed itself and its structured institutions on an indigenous way of life, their tribal homeland and ways of doing things. We have the same problems in Saskatchewan that are being experienced throughout the world. Right now in Iraq, the leaders have similar complex problems. They have a bunch of change oriented Iraqi people planning to set up a government and a democracy. They think in similar terms to acculturated people throughout the world. It is people who are at the next level that are living lives based on subsistence, agriculture or horticulture that are saying "no way, I'm not going to change. I'm going to fight you and I'm going to kill you if it takes a hundred years. We will, and we will win." There is no question they will win. Whenever one society of part of a society pushes out a tentacle of the market oriented society including the industrial orientation and ethnic control rural and remote regions like reserves, some people will accept it and the others will curse the colonizer. Those selling the market driven changes say "we're coming in to create jobs." I ask — "who gets the jobs?" And they say "well, get an education, get a Grade 12 and then you might get a job." You can look at statistics, the majority of Aboriginal, First Nation people don't have Grade 12. Why isn't the current education level sufficient to prepare people for a more acculturated life. It is because the education they are receiving is inferior. Most of the teachers have very little math, science, or physics background. Other than the Aboriginal teachers, many teachers are only in the rural and remote communities because they have to gain some experience. Traditional people also use dropping out of school as a way of resisting acculturating forces.

**GH:** Why do some economic development ventures fail to meet the expectations of government officials and local economic development staff?

**BH:** What happens is that government officials, again outsiders, want to bring change to the traditional people and to bring them across the spectrum of acculturation in order to satisfy the objectives of their program. They want to prove success of the program. For example, the officials work with the community level officials to buy a grocery store and they turn the store over to a local manager. Who is the local manager? Usually, it is somebody associated or aligned with those in power. As soon as that decision is made about the local manager, it is likely that one part of the community will not agree with the appointment as reflecting who they might trust. The half a million dollar market that you were serving before, now becomes much smaller. One third of the community residents may be traditional and they may react to the appointment by those in power by saying "no way, I'm not going to deal with that store anymore because that person belongs to "them" and does not reflect "us". The communities have what I call three mini bands. The traditional, marginal and change-oriented are all controlled by different groups of people. They have different life styles and value systems and due to historical differences are unlikely to support each other's business ventures. This dynamic can seriously affect the success of locally owned or operated businesses.

**GH:** You have been involved in leadership with the Inter-provincial Association of Native Employment (IANE) for the past thirty years or so. Please share your thoughts about the link between Aboriginal Economic Development and labour force development or employment.

**BH:** I know that everybody says "Bill, can't you look at this in a more simple way." There is no simple way because it is tied up in the minds, the hearts and souls of Aboriginal people. All of the time I was working in employment with the federal government in Northern Manitoba, employers would hire based on my advice and my personal credibility. I talked to people like INCO (mining company). They would say "Bill, we believe what you are saying about hiring Aboriginal people. I can see where what you are

talking about could save us a lot of money on turnover because we have the labour force here and they want the jobs. Many of them have proved to us they are qualified and they are motivated, steady and all that. So what can we do?" I recommended that they move families in groups of three or four so that they could set up support systems for each other, like the immigrants did. The result was good — the family might be living in Thompson but the report I got back was that Joe and Mary felt more comfortable and were more likely to stay in Thompson because they could look out their window and across the alley and see the light on in her sister's kitchen.

**GH:** What motivated you and others to launch IANE?

**BH:** It was the mid seventies and the labour shortage was being managed with plans to increase the immigration of foreign workers. So we said let's try and talk. Let's get together. We do not want money and we don't want to get government involved here as sole sponsors. We want to work with concerned people, industry, business, union, government agencies that are closely tied to the problem and create a process where they can sit down and talk with Aboriginal communities. I said, "okay let's talk across the table. What are the jobs that are coming down the tube? What qualifications do they need? On the other side, how many people do you have that can do this?" That is how the dialogue and the organization got started. We said to business that "we like the approach you are taking — we will all take a business-like approach." We are talking about qualified Aboriginal people that are going to enhance your work place and that are going to contribute to the bottom line. We committed to the recruitment of Aboriginal people that have the values, skills and abilities to work in harmony with the other acculturated people across the country. The purpose was to employ more Aboriginal people that were a good fit for the industrial workplace, not to set more traditional people up for failure. That's where the economic development went through a sort of secondary, back door way of saying, if we can put these people to work, it is going to benefit all of the communities. Every venture we've got out there, whether it is housing or economic development, or community development process can benefit the whole community if we develop the appropriate strategy.

**GH:** Are there any other kind of unique characteristics or considerations for economic development in an urban environment?

**BH:** Well I think that we are seeing a lot of problems and limited effective programming. One idea that I have proposed is that of Granny' Credit Union. I was doing a workshop for the police academy in Regina. They were telling me, "you have to understand the people we are talking about." I said "here's a question — how do you reduce crime rates in the core area of our urban centres? Drop it 30, 40, 50% in the matter of a couple of days?" I had all kinds of responses. I said "what are their needs? There needs are daily, their goals are daily, their responsibilities include care and security for the extended family." Then I said "what would happen if we could slow down the pace and allow these people to draw one-thirtieth of their disposable part of their income every day through Granny." Right now, if you look at crime, crime on payday is highest. Family violence, assaults, alcohol related problems goes on early and then, over the last half of the month, drops off. For four or five days after a monthly cheque, there is mayhem down there related to too much money. Towards the end of the month, petty theft and prostitution goes sky high." And everybody says, "that's right, that's exactly what is happening down there and flowing money differently could make a big difference and provide opportunities for small scale business development."

**GH:** What would suggest for a reserve based community that want to develop something for the traditional neighbourhood?

**BH:** We need to start by sitting down with the people. Don't bring in any outsiders. Just have an easy going unassuming facilitator sitting down to talk to people. Suggestions will come up. Someone might say "What if we brought some plywood in here, brought some tools in here, say for example, twelve little basic tool boxes, and give them to Grandpa over there to take care of. What you guys do is when you want to fix your houses, the plywood is under lock and key and is available to you by talking to Grandpa. So you guys decide which one of you twelve will

look after the tool boxes tomorrow, if that is when you decide to start." The facilitator may also say to them "Then what will happen is at the end of the day, you'll get paid ten bucks an hour. If you work eight hours, it is eighty bucks at the end of the day. But no commitment for work tomorrow. Each morning, the first 12 people to show up will get the boxes and the work for the day." All of a sudden what happens to the community then is when you go back a week later people are saying "how come your house doesn't leak any more?" They say, "Granny fixed it. Granny went up there tarred it up with the help of another person." They have never seen that before in their neighbourhood. Again, at their own pace, and a self selecting group, gets paid every day. Pretty soon they are making windows and doors. Pretty soon you say, okay, how about furniture? Immediately there is a change in the neighbourhood at very little cost and they are getting involved. So, now, at the same time, you are getting this money starting to circulate a little bit more. Aunt Harriet, as well, is sharing in the economic benefit by opening a part time hamburger stand in the back room of her house. Someone else is cutting hair and the money is soaked up daily in the community.

**GH:** So rather than going with the grand plan, and a big business plan and everything, you are looking to these little sort of nubs of ideas and helping them to grow.

**BH:** Yes. What is needed really in support of small scale community economic development is a person who would sit on an old stump and keep his thoughts to himself. His job is to be a facilitator for problem solving. When they say "how are you going to do that?" He says "well, that is your problem. I'm just here to help with the arrangements, just to help find the kind of the boards you need, and get the nails you need, and make sure the tool kits are put back over there with the elder under lock and key and the money is paid to you at 5 o'clock. I know how to fix the roof, but I'm not going to do it, you're going to do it because your kids want you to do it." What is the benefit? You have got some economic activity but most importantly, the community is building pride. For the first time in the life of that neighbourhood, people are saying "I did not know John could do that!" So he takes on a useful role in the whole social, cultural configuration. Then the rest of the reserve is watching him.

**GH:** Self selection is a basic principle in your approach to economic development and employment. How does self selection operate and why is it so fundamental to success?

**BH:** I describe it by saying "if you are going out hunting, who would you take with you?" A person will respond by saying "I would take a person I can trust. A person that I know something about. I know their skills. I know how they are connected to the community — the social, cultural relationships, the networking, all that." By respecting the power of social networks and asking people to use their knowledge to self select compatible groups of people, the employer can build on the strength of existing relationships and help groups to expand their social and cultural world to include a new location and employment. In other words, does a new employee's wife know a brother, sister or other people that are going the same path. Bring them in and talk to them. If you hire according to their advice, you have two and soon you have five of them. These five employees and their families are self selected. In other words, they all support one another. Soon there is a very strong collective that, it works. It just takes off.

**GH:** Your Cree name means "pathfinder", what has been your experience of being a trail blazer?

**BH:** Again, I suppose that is where the whole complicated process of perceiving something and learning to act on your instincts. When I quit government, I said "that's it, no more". I was frustrated with the lack of long term vision. A very small number of us had the concept of how all the pieces come together over the long term. To be able to look at a child and see its lifetime unfolding. To see how education and health affects employment and economic development. We failed in so many ways because we could not see the immensity, the complexity, the diversity within the challenges related to Aboriginal peoples' development. And I speak of, you know, being a pathfinder. I try to clear the path for both side of the duality. The best example of the two extremes is this story. You go to the industrial market, modern day elder, and say

"how much money do you want for the land?" They say "fifty million dollars, because all that land is worth fifty million dollars." Go down to the other end, to the reserve, and talk maybe to Granny, who speaks her own language and ask the same questions. She might say "Why would we sell Mother Earth? I'll tell you what, I'll talk to all the fish, all the birds, all the animals here, even the little beetle that is under that leaf over there. When they tell me the price to charge you, I'll let you know." I have had many challenges and my commitment remains to make sure the voices of the traditional people are heard. They are saying "we can't climb your concrete mountain ..... we can't take our extended family away from the land on such a journey ..... we can't take our elders up that way ..... so we'll walk around your mountain and when we meet on the other side we are both better people."

*Miskum Maskanow*
*'Pathfinder'*

You cannot lead until you have found your direction, purpose and commitment to forge a path for others. The Cree definition of this quality is *Miskum Maskanow* (Pathfinder).

The elements of forging a path for others embraces commitment to serve a belief in collaboration, the ability to be a spokesperson and an effective organizer — one who generates a democratic participatory environment and an atmosphere of collegiality. But perhaps above all these attributes, one must have a clear sense of vision.

*Miskum Maskanow* had a vision of aboriginal people having the same opportunities for employment as other Canadians. Of their right to self determination that would lead to creating self sufficiency and therefore strengthening community life.

*Miskum Maskanow*'s vision was and is to educate employers on the availability of a human resource pool that was ignored far too long. Conversely, he played a pivotal role in getting us to empower each other and ourselves to send a message to employers about our availability for the employment market. Miskum Maskanow may have been the one to coin the phrase "Organizations begin to change only when individuals begin to change". He also may have been the one to realize that "life is like a dog sled team — if you aren't the lead dog, the scenery never changes".

Bill and Rose Hanson, it has been a singular honour that you have passed through our lives' journey. On behalf of all IANE members, we thank you and ask the Creator to walk close to both of you with the mantle of good health, quiet peace and happiness.

C. Willy Hodgson
May 2001
Regina Saskatchewan
Presentation to Bill Hanson

# CANDO ECONOMIC DEVELOPER OF THE YEAR AWARDS 2003
# Utilizing Traditional Knowledge to Strive towards Unity

Cheryl Cardinal

## Introduction

Each year at the CANDO Conference, the Economic Developer of the Year is awarded to those individuals who exemplify what most Aboriginal Communities should be striving for. In some cases, the approach that is taken by each individual, business, or community is different but it seems to work well within the structures that they have in their communities across the country. No one approach is better than another but how each community makes it work is really what makes these awards special. You get the chance to see the approach that communities across Canada are doing to improve the status for their citizens.

In 2003, the Economic Developer of the Year Awards was presented in Whitehorse at the 10th Annual CANDO National Conference & AGM. The Business Category Award was accepted by Bernd Christmas on behalf of the Membertou Corporate in Nova Scotia. The recognition award winner was Air North Charter & Training Ltd & Vuntut Development Corp. Mark Wallace Wedge a member of the Carcross/Tagish First Nation in the Yukon Territories accepted the Individual Award. The recognition award winner was Richard Alfred Dickson.

The interviews below offer a glimpse of each award winner's strategies concerning Economic Development.

## Membertou Corporate Division[†] 2003 Business/Community Economic Developer of the Year

The Membertou Corporate Division, owned by the Membertou First Nation in Nova Scotia, have many accomplishments that can be examined. Under the leadership of Chief Terrance Paul and his Council, they were able to take a vision of where they want their community to be and make it a reality. The Membertou Corporate Division has improved accountability issues within First Nations communities and is also the first Aboriginal community to get ISO registration. These high standards set by the Membertou Corporate Division have helped this community move from destitution to a commu-

Cheryl Cardinal, Education and Research Coordinator at Council for the Advancement of Native Development Officers.

[†] Interview conducted by Cheryl Cardinal and Kelly Manyguns on September 25, 2003.

nity that is held in high regard by its members, the Aboriginal community, the various levels of government and the global market. This progressive organization has created a community based on the pillars of sustainability, conservation, innovation and success. This interview was conducted with Bernd Christmas, Chief Executive Officer with the Membertou Corporate Division.

**KM:** You talk about government funding essentially. Could you talk about that and Membertou's plan to get off of government funding?

**Bernd Christmas (BC):** Well I see, back again in 1995 a conscious decision was made by the band that had to get rid of dependency on government funding because the government funding is basically tied to agreements, financial services agreements, or financial transfer arrangements, most of these lay out what an Indian band is basically going to do. They tie the social programs, health programs, and all their developments to these agreements. I don't think it takes rocket science, if you get rid of the purse that is basically feeding you and telling you what to do and you get rid of that then low and behold you are free! So that is basically the idea we are going to break away from government funding reliance.

Right now we rely to the tune of seven million dollars on a forty-four and a half million dollar operating budget. We want to get rid of that and live those phrases that I said "self determination" and "self governance". I can honestly tell you what can that government do after that. Other than the usual, you have to follow the law. But from a First Nation government perspective, this is going to allow you to honestly achieve the goals that you want to do as a community.

**CC:** Who were the main motivators in persuading the community to become self reliant? How did the leadership persuade the community to strive for self reliance?

**BC:** It goes back to the Chief and Council. Our Chief has been elected twenty straight years and he had that vision for many, many years now. But has always been in the situation where he couldn't get the right people in place to help him with that. He and the Council work extremely well together. It's a democracy. Just because he is the Chief he can't do everything on his own. He has to listen to what the Council says too. I think that this just shows the maturity of where they are and most of those men and women on our Council have themselves been re-elected ten years on average straight as Councillors so you have this Corporate memory of what it was like way back: how destitute everyone was, no jobs, it was the community against the Council, the community against the administration, the Council against the administration. It was a just terrible situation and nothing was being done.

So, I would really credit Chief Terrance Paul and his Council for taking that bold step. It was a hard political decision to make. To basically say, "No we are not going to do this any more", "no don't come to us for the ball team funding or hockey team funding", we have to start moving our community forward.

**KM:** Can you talk about global business and where it's at right now?

**BC:** On global business opportunities, Membertou is involved in quite a few different sectors. Aerospace sector we have partnered with Lockheed Martin to build twenty-eight helicopters to hopefully be supplied to the Canadian military. Their partners along with us include two French companies, one called Talus and another called NH Industries. You saw their corporate structure. They are involved with companies such as Daimler Chrysler, France's Airbus and the list goes on and on. That opportunity is but a six billion dollar contract that we are looking at between Membertou and Lockheed Martin. And it allows us to branch into other things which include the joint straight fighter program in particular its in the trillions of dollars and on the Canadian military side, you are looking at eighteen billion dollars worth of defense contracts that are coming up in the next number of years for various things which goes from retrofitting ships to radar systems and goes on and on and on. Lockheed Martin will have us busy with that.

On the oil and gas sector, we are involved with companies like ATCO, the ATCO Group, Logistics, ATCO Midstream, ATCO Pipeline to explore options on the ground, in the Maritimes, on shore, off shore, Gas development. The Sodex'ho Canada, the world's largest food service company, providing catering services to oil and gas rigs that are located off the shores

of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and been involved in drilling vessels catering to those types of ships; Universities, Acadia, St. Francis Xavier; and whole host of different hospitals that we are looking at doing business with them.

Then on the fishing side, Membertou has partnered with a company called Clearwater whereby we provide and market our food products around the world market under our name.

And, lastly, what we call the financial services with Grant Thorton, we have developed a unique model to try to market our know-how and experiences that we have learned over the last five-six years to go from that terrible situation to where we are now and still growing.

And then that also leads into something else which we have personally developed with our own in house staff is the ISO 9001 2000 registration where we are now actually starting to help other First Nations right across the country to become ISO registered. So there are sort of four sectors that we are involved with.

**CC:** A lot of the First Nations organizations that I have seen out there are trying to separate band politics from business. You mentioned earlier that your Chief had a role to play in taking the first initial steps to becoming self reliant. Does your Chief have role in the organization and if so, what role does he have?

**BC:** What we have done is by placing structure which includes the ISO process and management systems and by putting in business structures that normal global companies utilize on a daily basis, we have been able to combine that and increase the education capacity of the government of Membertou, the Chief and Council, so they fully understand how it all works. So they almost take a role where they become the Board of Governors. They are first and foremost "a Band Government" but have adopted Board of Governors type techniques. So the Chief, he plays a major role in ensuring that both on the social side and business side everything is taken care of but he does not venture into social programs, program and services delivery or the business of the band and start micromanaging things.

We have come to understand, and he has come to understand, as the lead political person that there is a whole array of things happening all at once at the band level. By him coming in and potentially creating favouritism for one person, he is going to have a negative effect on the whole system. So, he has to figure out how to engage within the parameters set out; the parameters of budgeting, the parameters of business plans, the parameters of strategies developed for the delivery of services and programs to the community. So that is his role. And the Council again, they get involved in it as well. So our structure is the Chief and Council look over at we'll call it the "30,000 foot level" and the administration, the people that they have hired, such as myself as the CEO, I report directly to them and all of the staff, they all report to me. So it's a typical model that you have seen run everyday in the business world.

**CC:** ISO Registration. You have indicated that you were helping First Nations achieve ISO certification "free of charge". How many First Nations communities have you helped and has there been an outpouring of communities that have wanted to pursue the ISO registration or have seen the successes of your community and wanted to contact you? Are these communities regional, national or international?

**BC:** Yeah, it's national right now. Right across the country, from British Columbia, to Saskatchewan, Ontario and the Atlantic provinces have all engaged us somehow. And started to talk to us about that. I think when they talk about free is we will do the initial presentation and all this. We have a business that deals with ISO registration its something that we could never do on a free basis. It doesn't make sense. What I think they meant by that, it's that if people call us up we will give them a presentation on how ISO works generally right and then maybe if they want we'll point them in a certain direction to seek more information. Communities have wanted to engage us and get our templates for ISO Registration. We have very unique templates that are unique to the band and the uniqueness of band governance that are different than business templates that are normally ISO.

**CC:** And those templates incorporate indigenous values, beliefs, and traditions?

**BC:** Yes that is what they do. That is why we are in an amazing position because we have been able to figure out and have worked all the scams that go on in First Nations governance. We know them all. So we have been able to

adopt them and most importantly try to figure out how to. We had a serious problem where our language was almost virtually wiped out because of a move by the government to remove our kids in 1964 to off-reserve schools. And we had a school there. And then in 1999–2000, we built a school, brought in our language, now we have a new generation of speakers and you can see the big gap of Mi'kmaw speakers in the younger generation. You incorporate that into the ISO management systems that culture, the language, the history is important and that is not used I can assure you that is not the type of stuff that you will see in the regular ISO templates that are provided or are used to get a business or another government register.

**KM:** Our last question is a two part question. First, being nominated for this award of Economic Developer of the Year — what does that mean to you? And the second part, what do you think about the CANDO Conference and its focus on economic development?

**BC:** To be nominated we are obviously very excited about that. It is recognition by our peers for the most part of the work that we have done over the last year, I guess to some extent over the last five — six years, so we are obviously excited about that and our political leadership is happy about that and obviously our team of employees are happy that everything that they have done has basically started to shine through and being recognized by other people. We were never in a position to be at this level before and now it's nice to start to reap the benefits of all that work that is gone.

On the CANDO Conference itself, you have a proactive business approach, a mindset to engaging the global market place and that means also in dealing with governments, domestic governments, like Canada, provincial governments, and almost just as important in engaging other First Nations. We would love other First Nations to start wanting to do business with us, we encourage that and forums like CANDO allow us to let them hear what we are involved in and if they are interested, we would like to do business with them.

## Mark Wedge‡
## 2003 Individual Economic Developer of the Year

Mark Wallace Wedge is a member of the Carcross/Tagish First Nation in Yukon. Wedge's formal entry into the realm of economic development occurred in 1984. His focus towards improving his nation utilizing his traditional and cultural values has led him towards the ultimate goal — happiness. Wedge utilizes his traditional values to help his community out of its turmoil into a self-governing nation with a constitution that embodies their traditional values, beliefs and customs and most importantly is supported by the members of his community. Wedge is a Board Member for the Four Mountains Resort project, located in the Carcross/Tagish traditional territory. Wedge also has an upcoming book he co-wrote titled, *Peacemaking Circles: from Crime to Community*. Wedge utilizes his traditional values and beliefs to assist in moving his community from violence into prosperity.

**NH:** What does De-she-than mean?

**Mark Wedge (MW):** The De-she-than is our clan and it means the End-of-the-trail-people. Before we were from Angoon. We are Da Ka Tlinget in the Yukon. The Da ka Tlinget intermarried with the Tagish people. That clan De-she-ton came inland with the intermarriage that occurred. Before that it came from Angoon, before that it came from Basket Bay. When they started moving to Angoon. Another name originated. An-goosh-skew is named after that migration — Angoon is the Tlinget capital of the world. When they were moving to Angoon another name originated, named after that migration: Angashoo (Ang=Nation) (Goosh-OO=a large group moving together, like a migration). Angashoo is the name originated when the De-she-than moved from Basket Bay to Angoon — and that was the end of the trail. That name Angashoo as carried through because what we do is our names are carried with the clans, they are clan names. They belong to a clan pool. Mathew Fred who just passed away a couple of years ago but he was at a Potlatch

‡ Interview conducted by Nicole Hetu on September 25, 2003.

over here and that is when he gave me that name and that was one of his names — he wanted that name to be inland also. So Angashoo is one of my names. That is where the De-she-than and the end-of-the trail a person that is how that name came there.

**NH:** What other clans are there?

**MW:** There is a whole number of clans. When you look at the Tlinget clans that are on the coastal area, the Tlinget go from quite far down south and far up north — when the Tlinget moved inland and intermarried with the Tagish people they became Da ka Tlinget. Da ka means people who came up and looked over the mountain and then moved over there. There are a number of communities: Atlin, Teslin, Carcross that form part of this Da ka nation. In our community of Carcross there are six clans. De-she-than is one of them Duckloa…. (Mark listed all of them in their traditional language) which are divided into the wolf and crow inland and eagle and raven on the coast. It is the male and the female. It is the opposites that need each other to survive.

**NH:** You have animal clans as well?

**MW:** Each of the clans has crests — those crests are animals that belong to the crests. The de-she-than primarily owns the Beaver. There is a story in that with our national anthem cause our national anthem is also about that. There are crest songs. There is a totem or an icon that is often associated with these animals. We have what we refer to as the "ke do keh ka," the man behind the damn. There is a great teaching around that. It's like the Medicine Wheel, in different aspects, there is a huge teaching around it. There is a life long teaching behind it. Same with that the "split tailed beaver" is our crest and using it here.

**NH:** Is your clan system part of your governance structure?

**MW:** Governance — What is governance? CANDO is about governance. That is exactly what governance is about: trust. Is it not? According to our clans, this document talks about this. There are three key players. It is called "The prosperity of humankind", presented in Oslo — the Bahai International Community presented this paper. There are three protagonists; there is the individual, there is the community (or the collective) and institutions ... Transformation is key and critical. It is what CANDO is about. It is about acquiring knowledge and using spirituality and values. There is an innate sense of right and wrong within every individual that has to be nurtured. That is the transformation that needs to be based on our cultural traditional values, which are the essence of our spirituality. It is that foundation that starts a movement with the individual. If you get a number of individuals that format the community, what tends to happen is you get into conflicts and dispute. In most of our traditions and cultures talks about how to resolve conflict and dispute, justice when taken to the communal level. The purpose of justice is to create unity. Unity, which is critical to the well being of the community — creates the cohesion, starts creating prosperity and well being. What is important then in order to govern — the community puts its collective trust into institutions or groups of people. So when we talk about our clan, there is a system and a process that the trust of the individuals express as a collective clan and it is put into leadership.

One of the questions that you asked was, "What is an Executive Council member?" what we did when we started our self-government, although we don't have a final agreement we are implementing self-government. That is expressed through our constitution. What we recognize is that the way the Department of Indian Affairs — the Indian Act set up the First Nation's governance structure was not combatable — it did not reflect our culture values our clan values. What we did as a community (we talked about this) we need to begin to use our traditional values and our traditional governance systems in our modern day governance. Each of those clans asks somebody to hold the clans trust. Whether it is Executive Council, it is like a Chief and Council system.

It is like a chief but we don't use that word. The word that we use is (in traditional language) Ke-sha-ka dene; literally it means "head-man-standing-up." Traditionally those roles were male. Now those are problems we are experiencing with contemporary human rights issues with these roles. We know that many other communities are experiencing this. It is important to understand the reciprocity of the role between the female and the male — in

these governance models. We have clan matriarchs that hold a very sacred responsibility as well as an administrative one, it is the ying and yang, the wolf and crow, it is the reciprocity that needs to be held. What happens is men often sit on these as representative for the administrative part of it. The clan mothers are the backbone.

There is a book that my aunt wrote — Angela Sydney with the anthropologist Julia Cruikshank — "My stories are my wealth." Because she was asked [his aunt] in today's cultures people will leave their acquisitions to their children — which their accumulated wealth is left to their children. Part of the things that we started DNV is that we recognized that there was not acquired wealth in the Aboriginal community that could be passed on. Acquired wealth that would be transferred on — as a family wealth. As an Aboriginal community we did not have that acquired wealth. Aboriginal Business Canada provided the wealth so that Aboriginal People could access to put Aboriginal people on more of a level playing field. My aunt was asked about this — what would she pass on to her children? She did not have any cash any equity! What will you leave your children? She thought about this and she responded by saying that, "I don't have a lot of things but my stories are my wealth that is what I will leave them." Inherent in the stories is a value system again engrained that leads to well being which is prosperity.

**NH:** How about this new book?

**MW:** How about it? (laughs). It's all based on everything. The question about just because it's spiritual? That is what they did. What they did is they recognized that there were people that influence a whole community perspective that created this huge conflict. And they drew them in and some of them didn't come but they drew them in. Some of those groups that they put together wouldn't be in the same room together. Then what they did, they started a training process that talked about how we were going to work together. We did this training, dispute resolution, this is some of the stuff that we do in dispute resolution. But, we couldn't call it training. They didn't necessarily want to do training. What was interesting was we actually did it with the school and it was really interesting. We held the training in the school, we had the little chairs and everyone had to sit in the little chairs in the school. There were elders, children, and their substitutes they were sitting there all together. It was not as if you could train somebody. It was broad training. But what happened from those people, it began a process for people to start working together. That's about unity. It's quite impressive.

When they started working with a group, it doesn't change over night, people would actually get into fights, a couple of times one of them would leave. It's called a caucus. The caucus would talk about it and say, "oh well we better go and get them back". So somebody would have to go down and say, "We need you" and brought the person back. And that's the interesting stuff. When you actually see this stuff being applied, it's easy to talk about it but harder to do. So when you actually get in the middle of it, it's hard. It's not exclusivity and that is the stuff that creates unity.

So, things that we are talking about — this project and the Four Mountain Project that is happening — could not happen if working together didn't happen. Sure we could do the consultant work to do all of the stuff, but the community process that created unity. Even before we started the whole Four Mountain project, the first thing that we did was we got the whole community together, citizens and everybody, we invited them to a Circle, we passed a feather around to sit. We had already run it through our Elders Council who were supportive of the project. They all sat there, "why did you ask us," and we told them that it involves you. They asked whether we had the money and we told them that the money is the easy part to get. We can get the money to start a project but if you are not in support with us or working with us here, it will end down the road. So we actually started the community process and that is part of the process of negotiations; this is the process on how you create unity. Without that, you don't have anything.

We started in our clan structure and our Constitution about fifteen years ago cause our community was literally torn apart. There was violence. That is what people said under the clan system, things like this didn't happen. So we said, let's go back to our clan system. And we started asking for it to be prepared with our Constitution. Within a year, the way it happened was that not everyone wanted it, so we said, if it not, then we have to bring something in that will bring us unity.

**NH:** So how did you get those people to want it?

**MW:** We kept talking about it and working with it so it was time to bring it up. Some people would say let's use the clan system. Some people kept wanting to go back to their culture and their roots. Trying to realize that, have this dialogue about what the clan system means this and it was actually an on-going consultation on this is what the clan system means. It took about six years to implement the constitution.

**NH:** I understand things according to the Indian Act. In the Yukon, there are not bands but communities. What was the relationship with DIAND before — how did you go from DIAND to this?

**MW:** We are an Indian Act Band just like all the others. We still are but we are different. They opened up the Indian Act; they amended it, to say that you can not only have the Indian Act band but a Custom Election and a Constitution. So we moved from a custom election to a Constitution as part of an Indian Act band. We are still an Indian Act band, it's not until we get a final agreement. We are self governing. We will be self-governing, although we have always maintained that we are self-governing anyways.

**NH:** So as self governing people, an autonomous nation, what does that mean? If you mean, self governing as an autonomous sovereign nation, how do you see that mindset or understanding fitting into a self government agreement that works within the framework?

**MW:** Our self-government agreement is actually built around the constitution. We have negotiated that backbone of that constitution, is this involvement of the community process of getting the clans. So what we have is an Executive Council that have been asked to represent the De-she tan clan. This is what the six members of the Executive Council do.

The elders appoint of those six council members, a Chief of the Ke-sha-ka dene. Anyone of those Council members can act as the Deputy Chief — they are all deputy chiefs. The Ke-sha-ka dene is the spokesperson for the First Nation — the Chief. Our constitution is actually taking the clan system and adjusting it trying to accommodate things that we talked about like human rights — to try to make sure we fit in the acceptable perceptions of human rights according to Canada. Canada is signatory to those United Nations covenants. We are negotiating; it's our legal agreements within Canada, the recognized legal agreements, that is why we have had to negotiate in such a manner that was acceptable to our people and acceptable to Canada. That becomes part of the basis of self government.

Self government — these are the types of powers and laws that we have. Moves along similar types of things, it talks about whether the individual laws, law of the individual; these are the land based laws, what are the elected based laws, who has the responsibility, so our constitution basis itself is something like that is a given. Those are all based on traditional values. Our vision statement for the community is our Constitution and we see it as six major areas. Our vision is how we are going to look after the land — we see ourselves as guardians of the land not owners of it.

**NH:** So you don't have an agreement yet? So what type of relationship would you like to see with the territory and then, the Government of Canada?

**MW:** Well, I think the first thing is to get to back to where we were talking about prosperity is really where it's at. It's to be a sense of well being in the community, its healing; it's all of these things that we need to feel good about ourselves, just to be happier, that is what ultimately the whole purpose of this thing is to be happy. It's not about money. It's not about dissidence. But we know that in order to be happy to work with other governments, we need a relationship so what we have done is we have changed the way that we conduct things.

Instead of saying, can you give us this money or this type of thing even in our negotiations we have tried to change our approach where we get to the point of we educate and work with governments, and other organizations and individuals to say let's work together. And what they do that because nobody can adamantly expresses anybody's interest unless they feel that they want to or they are part of it.

So that is our strategy, is not to ask for stuff but to create the willingness and desire for other governments to work with us. And it will be their interest and our interest that where we

talk about resort where can there be conflict. Other business organizations were going to follow them in an inclusive manner that will benefit everyone. We know that we don't have enough citizens to fill employment requirements for this resort so we work with other First Nations to say what we want to done is have First Nations to have first opportunity to employ and do that work. We have started resource training. It's the plan.

## Summary

Each of the Award Winners has utilized their traditional values to move their community into prosperity. In Membertou, a community vision fostered by Chief Terrance Paul and his Council who wanted to move out of destitution into a thriving community resulted in success. Having his community remain in debt and community members living in destitution is not what the Chief envisioned for the future generations. The leadership wanted more for their people, for their community and with this drive pushed them into one the leading authorities of change. They have revived their culture and their language so that many generations beyond this leadership will know who the Miqmaw people were and are. This vision will carry into the future.

In the second case, Mark Wedge was part of a greater picture. The vision of something better than violence in their community and disparity was a main driving force for happiness and unity. Wedge utilized their cultural and traditional values to strive for community unity that allowed the community to become the driving force guiding community development. In this instance, this is characterized by the community creating a constitution and their proactive work toward establishing self government. Common goals included "working together," and as a community the people created the vision and expressed the drive to work through individual differences so the community could work as one. Mark Wedge exemplifies that working together does not happen over night but when his community worked together, they worked towards unity and happiness.

The approach that each community has taken is different. We have to recognize that each of the Economic Developer of the Year Award Winners have different communities in different parts of the country. But the magic they found was always there—it resided within the communities. The focus of the community and direction given by leadership has led these two Award winners to be recognized by their peers at the 10th Annual CANDO National Conference & AGM in Whitehorse, Yukon.

# CANDO ECONOMIC DEVELOPER OF THE YEAR AWARDS 2004

Teresa Callihoo and Sara Cardinal

## Introduction

The 2004 Economic Developer of the Year Awards were presented in Fredericton at the 11th Annual CANDO National Conference & AGM. Both award recipients demonstrated the importance on capitalizing on resources found within the community. The Business/Community Category Award was accepted by William Big Bull on behalf of Piikuni Wind Power. Chief Lawrence Paul of Millbrook First Nation in Nova Scotia accepted the Individual Award.

## Business Category Winner[†]
## William Big Bull, Piikuni Wind Power

The Weather Dancer I is the culmination of many years of research, hard work and determination. It is also a tribute to the Piikuni Nations' ability to utilize their natural resources, in this case wind power. The Weather Dancer I, which officially opened in October 2001, is a single 900 KW turbine producing 2,960 megawatt hours of electricity each year, with the ability to meet the electrical needs of 450 households. This environmentally conscious project has built on the capacity of the Nations Utilities Corporation, balancing their desire for economic growth with traditional concerns for nature. William Big Bull, Energy Manager, discusses the development.

**TC:** The Weather Dancer I was built in partnership with Epcor. Can you explain why you decided to partner with Epcor? How was this partnership formed?

**William Big Bull (WBB):** When we started there weren't a lot of people in the wind power industry. We had spoken with some main people but we got a lukewarm response, they didn't seem interested in working with us. When we spoke with Epcor they were the most receptive to our ideas and to the project, which made them the best fit. They were also interested in a green power contract, as they needed to extend their services to include green power. We were able to negotiate with them and ended up with a joint venture.

**TC:** The turbine seems to be an excellent example of balancing the use of natural resources with sustainability, how important is that?

**WBB:** The focus was to establish a change in our way of thinking. We wanted to utilize traditional and technical knowledge while maintaining the least amount of impact on the land. We are not a resource rich nation, but we do have a lot of wind. Therefore, we could tap into a resource that was readily available to us, using the wind seemed like a natural fit.

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[†] Interview conducted on June 22, 2005 by Teresa Callihoo, Education and Research Advisor at Council for the Advancement of Native Development Officers.

**TC:** Can you explain the cultural significance of the name Weather Dancer?

**WBB:** The name comes from our Sundance ceremony. On the last day of the ceremony, the medicine people break fast after four days and build a lodge. Because it is a part of ceremony, it represents our traditional and spiritual ways. The centre pole of the lodge is like the turbine, looking to the natural elements for support, guidance and prosperity.

**TC:** What were some of the key components in this development?

**WBB:** There were three main components. The first is capacity to use the land base by creating less imposing developments. The turbine itself doesn't take a very big footprint to stand on and creates a lot of use for a very small piece of land. Secondly, we were able to use technical land instruments to create access to the land, through section 28.2 [of the Indian Act]. And lastly, the strongest feature is that it is a renewable energy generator. We already have our own Rural Electrification Association (REA) called Peigan REA. The Weather Dancer added generation to our system; it increased the value of our system and improved the profile of our company. It gives us the capacity to deliver energy to our customers.

**TC:** What was the biggest lesson learned in this development?

**WBB:** The strongest lesson learned was that these things can work but there is a proper way to go about development. It has taken us ten years to appreciate the complexities of this project. I would recommend that people do their homework and know all the facts. The project does not just develop on its own, so you have to be prepared for the long haul.

**TC:** What are the future development plans?

**WBB:** We are currently discussing a 300-mega watt project.

**TC:** What does being a CANDO Economic Developer of the Year Award Winner mean to you?

**WBB:** It means that people are listening and that we've done a good job. I was really humbled by it, for our office it proves that as First Nations we can step out front and use something from the natural world. It shows our people that there is opportunity. It was a very good feeling to be recognized.

**TC:** Do you have any other comments?

**WBB:** A lot of First Nations want to get into the business but we need organization and advocacy to help them, to empower communities when projects come and to show that there is support in government, in communities and in leadership to let projects move ahead away from political institutions. I would encourage anyone working on a renewable energy project to have strength and perseverance.

## Individual Category Winner‡ Chief Lawrence Paul, Chief of the Millbrook First Nation

Chief Lawrence Paul has been the leader of his community for almost 22 years. During his tenure as the leader of the Millbrook First Nation, he has assisted in the growth of the community economically. The community is prospering with future plans for economic development. Chief Paul discusses how the community has changed over the years and tried to work towards the eventual goal of economic self-sufficiency. Chief Paul discusses these developments, the necessity of them and the future plans of the Millbrook First Nation.

**SC:** Ok, what made you decide to get into politics and economic development?

**Chief Lawrence Paul (LP):** Before that I used to work for the Federal Government, I was a Band Councillor from 1969 to 1973. I worked for the Department of Indian Affairs starting in 1975 and I was in economic development. But, I saw a lot of problems with the whole program

‡ Interview conducted on June 28, 2005 by Sara Cardinal, Education and Research Advisor at Council for the Advancement of Native Development Officers.

at that time. There wasn't the follow up that was required, or feasibility studies. So when I was done, I worked for the Union of Nova Scotia Indians for five years in the field of economic development and pretty well had the same problems there with assisting Native business people in Nova Scotia to get started on a business. There was a lot of information that was lacking, for the kind of business they wanted to go into. I used to tell them that, you have to have the location, you have to have a population, and you have to have so much competition of the sort of business you're going into. There are many, many pieces of the puzzle you got to put together when you go into business. You have to have feasibility studies. A lot of that was lacking.

So, in 1984, I decided to go after Chief of the Millbrook First Nation because we were stagnating. You see, in the Atlantic here, First Nations weren't going anywhere, and I decided at that time that I would start working towards putting things in place for starting the development of the highway. We had a lot of work to do and feasibility studies were done, we asked other people in different parts of the country how they did it and then we put together our economic development committee, there were four councillors on that, an accountant and our lawyer. So we used to do the negotiating for our prospective tenants. But we had to designate land for lease. Millbrook was the first band in the Atlantic to make land for lease. Then of course, we had to go through the education process with our prospective clients, to tell them that the land that we had for lease on the Millbrook First Nation and the lease you signed with us was just as binding legally as if you signed it with anybody from Toronto, Montreal, Calgary, Vancouver, downtown Halifax or with any non-Indian. Our leases are just as binding; you have to do the education process on that so that they have nothing to worry about putting their money into businesses on First Nations. So it was a long process.

**SC:** Yes, it sounds like it. How close are you to accomplishing the dream of having an economically self-sufficient community?

**LP:** I'd say we're quite a few years down the road yet. We just got the small toll road now. The band ourselves, we have probably invested about 8 million dollars in projects on the Millbrook First Nation, and our satellite First Nation in Cole Harbour. Of course we invested a lot of money and what I find; it is very difficult for our prospective clients to build their own buildings. Usually, they want the band to build the building and they sign a long term lease with us. But, we get lease money for our land and rent for our building and our tax breaks. It's a good investment for the future. But it strings you out kind of thin. It is part of the financial concern when you have to build the buildings. I don't know how other First Nations fair out in other parts of Canada but I know down here in the Atlantic, it seems to me that they want the First Nations to build the buildings. The leases they enter into are 40-year leases, 50-year leases up to 99 years. But, it gets your planning kind of thin when you have to build building after building.

Of course, we're in partnership with General Dynamics on the helicopter projects, in 2006 we're going to build a seven or eight million dollar building down in our satellite First Nation in Cole Harbour which is at the Halifax municipality and that is another thing we have to build, then we lease the building and the land to General Dynamics Sikorsky. So it's a good venture for the future, but it's hard, it takes quite a bit of your money to finance these buildings. You know as I said it is a good investment for the future after everything is paid for. All the money is cream of the crop.

**SC:** Okay, how many economic initiatives are ongoing in your community at this time?

**LP:** How many economic ventures? Right now we are building an interpretive centre there down there, with a museum we want to have a gift shop, mini theatre and tracing the history back of the Mi'kmaq Nation back to time immemorial. We are going to have a forty-foot statue of our legend Glooscap out in to power centre site with a flaming torch in his hand and we will have the illusion being fire coming out of the torch. And we feel that would be a major tourist draw, not only for the Millbrook First Nation but the Tourist Association. In our partnership with them, they're going to manage the buildings for us, the interpretive centre because they're experts at it. So we will have a mini theatre there and we're going to the government to promote all the tourist attractions in the province of Nova Scotia, including the other twelve First

Nations what they have to offer. So we think it's going to be a major draw for tourism because we're located along one of the busiest highways, I think it's the busiest highway in Nova Scotia. All the tourists are going to pass our site, and they'll be able to come in and see all the tourist attractions as they pass through Nova Scotia. The gift shop is not only going to sell Native handcrafts, it will sell all handcrafts from all segments of society in Nova Scotia. One of the main ones is the Bluenose. It is not just going to be just native crafts; it is going to be all handicrafts that are native to Nova Scotia.

**SC:** What have been the keys to success for your communities' ability to establish viable businesses?

**LP:** Well the keys to our success are our Economic Development Committee, my band council and most important of all, the support of my people, of what we're doing. They realize what we're trying to do, we're trying to plan for the future of our people. But the problem was, over the years a lot of First Nations never did that and they never planned for the future of their people but the non-Indians did. They planned for what things to leave to their children, their grandchildren, things like this. But we as Native people never did that and we were stagnating by a certain time. We entered into economic development, free enterprise and going for the almighty dollar, same as everybody else. We get a little flack from the municipality governments because they feel that we're taking clientele away from them and billions of dollars out of their pocketbooks, municipality and municipal people. We've always said, "get used to us", we're in the field of economic development, of free enterprise, we're here to stay, we're not going to go away so get used to us, because we're going to be here.

**SC:** And, what are future development plans for the Millbrook First Nation?

**LP:** Well, the next thing we're looking at after this is a mall. We have some interested clients we have to talk to now because we need an anchor store. We have several small businesses I want to locate up there but they don't want to have stand alone buildings, they want to be in the mall. But, construction of the mall is sometime in the future. Not too distant future I hope. At first before you construct the mall, you have to have potential clients, at least a feasibility study, got to make sure your getting enough money per square footage to pay off what you borrowed and make a small profit at the same time.

**SC:** What does winning the CANDO Economic Developer of the Year Award mean to you and your community?

**LP:** I was very proud to receive the CANDO award, not only for myself, but also for the Millbrook First Nation as a whole and for the other people of the Mi'kmaq Nation. Because, for the simple reason, as it's always been said, you know you can lead by example. That Millbrook started, and then Membertou started, down there in Cape Breton. Now other bands in Cape Breton are kind of looking at what we did and their going forward and doing the same thing we did, leasing land and going in the field of economic development. So, our First Nations are flexing their muscles down here in the Atlantic looking at what Millbrook accomplished, what Membertou accomplished and what other bands in New Brunswick are starting to accomplish now, the Woodstock Band and other bands down here in Nova Scotia are looking very closely at economic development, free enterprise. I think its good, to have some successes, when you do things yourself as Native people. Before we always were told what to do and this is how to do it. And usually most of these projects went belly up. When we're doing it our self now, we're having success, as long as we don't leave any stones overturned before we sign the agreements. Then we're going to make a profit.

**SC:** And one last question. What advice would you have for communities trying to get into economic development?

**LP:** Well, advice that I have for communities trying to get into economic development, they have to have a location, they have to have a very progressive economic development committee, they have to have legal advice, they have to have accountant advice and they usually have to have a feasibility study. They have to look at the population of the area, probably 40 or 50 mile area. The major highways are important, railroads are not so important now, because a lot

of them are shutting down but I mean locality, I think there's more things in economic development when you go forward. One is apply, the other one is market, and the other one is location and the other one is advertising. Very important components of an economic development venture. You have to have that, to promote. You have to let people know what you have.

**SC:** Well, that concludes all of my questions. Thank you Chief Paul.

*End Note:* I spoke with Chief Paul after we completed the interview, and he said something that really struck me. He told me that there is a great sense of accomplishment for those that are involved in these economic development ventures. They were proud that they could not only help their people but that they could also help society in general by creating jobs for everyone. That was what seemed to me, to be the most important aspect of the economic development, the ability to help your people, and the pride in knowing that you were apart of planning for your community's future. For First Nations to succeed in economic development, they need leaders that believe in what their doing, communities that believe in their leaders. Millbrook First Nation is a prime example of a community that believes in its leadership and a leadership that is trying to help their community and plan for its future.

## Summary

Being that the Piikuni community was not as resource rich as some First Nations, they had to try a different approach to economic development. The result was a partnership with Epcor to develop a wind power source. The community has also recently partnered with ATCO to work on a joint dam project to produce hydroelectric power along the Old Man River in Alberta.

Chief Lawrence Paul saw that there was a lot missing in their approach to economic development. When he got involved in politics and economic development it was to help his community and as well share in doing something that would have a lasting impact. The decision to lease their land to try and foster growth has allowed the community to grow and prosper and continue to work towards the goal of self-sufficiency.

Both of these winners have shown what can be achieved when partnerships are formed, the use of the resources of the community when the communities believe in their leadership and they have a strong drive to succeed. The ingenuity of harnessing the wind to generate power and profit is something that must be recognized. Economic development has always been an avenue through which First Nations people can become self-sufficient and work towards being self-reliant. The steps that have been taken by Chief Lawrence Paul and the Millbrook First Nation as well as William Big Bull of Piikuni Wind Power have started moving them towards having economically self-sufficient communities. As well, they have gained the knowledge that they are planning for their communities' future, helping their communities achieve something and as well, leaving their communities a legacy to follow.

# Editors' Introduction

When the Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development (JAED) delivered its call for papers asking for researchers to interrogate the idea of The State of the Aboriginal Economy, the guest editors were expecting a wide array of responses. Our expectations were based on a number of observations. In recent years for instance the numbers of Aboriginal entrepreneurs Canada-wide have grown. This is one aspect of economic growth within "the Aboriginal economy". Also, several Aboriginal communities in their attempts to encourage economic development have developed "Buy Aboriginal" programs promoting local support for community-based businesses, another facet of "the Aboriginal economy". But what is the Aboriginal economy? What components fuse and deviate within this process known as the Aboriginal economy? Does the Aboriginal economy stand peripheral to the Canadian macro-economy? Or is it hopelessly/sufficiently intertwined within that larger economy? These were but a few of the questions fuelling our desire to expand on the idea of Aboriginal economy — in sum the call for papers was admittedly as much a way for us to determine how researchers are currently engaging the concept of Aboriginal economy and its current condition as it was to deliver to our readers academic discussion examining its vagaries.

Frank Tough's article "From the 'Original Affluent Society' to the 'Unjust' Society'" provides an account of the literature on the economic history of Native people in Canada, and highlights some of the areas in which scholars have either neglected the roles that Native people have played in the Canadian economy or have oversimplified the economic relationships between Natives and Whites.

The thematic emphasis of this review relies on commercialization and the processes in which the market system shaped Indian/White relations. Tough's review examines a variety of data sources, empirical studies, and methods while making the case that numerical data is needed for reconstructing past economies and that it is vital for conceptual clarity.

Yale Belanger traces the economic development of the Opaskwayak Cree Nation (OCN) located nearby The Pas, Manitoba. Belanger highlights how after years of economic marginalization following the near-collapse of the Cree traditional economy resulting from hydro-electric development projects the Band Council became economically proactive at the end of the 1960s. Beginning with the Band Council accepting responsibility for a handful of devolved federal programs and establishing a small trucking business, the OCN economy has consistently grown during the last thirty-five years to include a casino, a luxury hotel, and a shopping mall, among other business, and has become one of the region's largest employers.

Isobel Findlay and John Russell consider the questions of what has been achieved in Aboriginal economic development, how success is measured, and what barriers persist. Specifically they examine the colonial history of mainstream accounting measures and assesses initiatives associated with the triple bottom line — economic, environmental, and social performance measures. Specifically, Findlay and Russell consider what triple bottom line reporting might offer Aboriginal economic development and what Aboriginal values and practices might add to thinking on the triple bottom line to make such measures more supportive of sustainable futures for all of us.

Ralph Matthews and Nathan Young turn their attention to Aboriginal community of Lax Kw'alaams, a small Aboriginal community in north-western British Columbia. A recent turnaround in its local economy has occurred resulting from innovative land and resource management practices, as well as the entrepreneurial pursuit of new tenure rights and markets for product. Juxtaposing staples and dependency theories with Lax Kw'alaams economic success, Matthews and Young challenge accepted orthodoxies about rural development.

In his essay "The Cultural Backdrop for Economic Development Activities in the Western Hudson Bay Region," Brock Junkin stresses the need to take into consideration and integrate into federal economic development policies and initiatives an understanding of the cultural characteristics of the region's Aboriginal populations. Due in part to the fact that traditional Aboriginal views on economic development do not always lend themselves to traditional western views on economic development, Junkin argues that past bad experiences resulting from these inherent differences could have

been avoided and that future development initiatives involving the Inuit and First Nations must consider Aboriginal perspectives if they are to be successful.

Christina Dowling provides a thoughtful critique of the work of Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt, co-founders of the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development. As she herself admits, "the project has become something of a benchmark for current discussion of First Nations economic development." But as her discussion illustrates, perhaps academics have been too quick to embrace Cornell and Kalt's frameworks and conclusions, which have in many instances gone uncritically accepted.

Finally, anthropologist Martin Whittles profiles the economic and political response of Inuvialuit communities, organizations, and peoples, to changes in their renewable resources (specifically Muskoxen, Caribou, and White Fox furs) and corresponding harvesting activities.

The articles in this section provide important clues to the questions posed in our call for papers. Overall, we are provided with additional information that the Aboriginal economy is indeed interesting, unique, diverse, and growing. Further, we are assured that many people, organizations, and communities involved in the Aboriginal economy are becoming very successful and are extremely competitive. The activities of those involved are intimately grounded in a larger historical reality: a political and cultural reality that has shaped and reshaped the formation and structure of this economy.

While some of the economic activities that are covered occur in isolated communities — seemingly unaffected by the global economy, other activities are obviously closely connected and dependent on larger economic and political-cultural environments and networks. And, increasingly, leaders, managers, economic development officers, and community members, among others, are strategically promoting change in local, regional, national, and global economic systems. Most important, not only are these players actively involved in the varied economic systems, they are also proactively challenging and redefining them.

# FROM THE "ORIGINAL AFFLUENT SOCIETY" TO THE "UNJUST SOCIETY" A Review Essay on Native Economic History in Canada

Frank Tough

> On the face of it, the vicious poverty that grips our people presents one of the most complex human problems that any society might face. But the very fact that the problem was man made argues that the solution does not lie beyond man.[1]
>
> Harold Cardinal, 1969

## Introduction: Defining the Problem

Sometime between the period in which Marshall Sahlins' hunters and gathers subsisted in an "original affluent society," and Harold Cardinal's account of the Indian struggles in an "Unjust Society" the economic security of Indian societies had deteriorated. Despite the potential for greater material production made available by European markets and technology, Indian economies became impoverished. What actually happened during those years has not been looked at too closely. Native American economist Ronald L. Trosper concluded that "The economic history of American Indian communities remains largely untouched by scholars, in spite of the fact that so much of the motivation behind European expansion was economic."[2] Moreover, mainstream economic history pays scant attention to the roles that Native people played in the economic history of Canada.[3] Consequently, the field of Native Studies has had little to draw upon.

Sahlins' *Stone Age Economics*, a seminal piece in economic anthropology, has strongly influenced ethnohistory.[4] He made the case for a substantivitist analysis of hunters and gathers, arguing that the ready made models of orthodox business economics (formalism) were inappropriate. His construction of a model of the domestic mode of production, in which labour power was under used, technology was not fully engaged, natural resources remained untapped, and pro-

Frank Tough, Professor, School of Native Studies, University of Alberta.

This writing project began as a contribution to a multi-authored book project on Writing Native History that was never realized, but in many respects it ensued from a dialogue during graduate-level Native Studies courses on economic history at the University of Saskatchewan. In particular, I would like to thank Rodolfo Pino and John Thornton for their views during those seminars, and I also would like to thank John Thornton for his commentary on an initial draft of this article. Assistance from Nancy Morin and Katherin McArdle, along with scanning tasks completed by Raylene Whitford and Rhys Lillo, also helped move this project along. Skip Ray's comments on an earlier draft also contributed to refining the analysis. The faults of this article are entirely my own, as are the interpretations. And finally, I would like to sincerely thank David Newhouse for encouraging the completion of this analysis.

duction was for use, not profit, became the basic substantivist approach to "hunters and gathers." He also showed that these societies were affluent, a material plenty existed, and that mobility was required to maintain production. Affluence existed because the amount of labour required to secure a livelihood was minimal. Further to his analysis, exchange (reciprocity) was a component of culture and not behaviour. If we take as a given that Indian economies at the time of contact were affluent, in which material needs were readily available and that the domestic mode of production was based on egalitarian relations, then we really must wonder what processes occurred to modify these economies.[5] However, these are not issues that typically interest ethnologists and ethnohistorians, and in fact, often amount to a not uncommon denial of economic problems.

Sahlins' economic anthropology has helped us appreciate the economy of hunters/gathers, but he did not provide a means to use a substantivist perspective to fully comprehend the integration of the labour and land of hunters with the expanding European economy. Where did this vicious poverty come from? Or were Indians merely left behind? Or is contemporary poverty culturally relative, as one anthropologist suggested to me? (In part due to different, culturally-determined consumptions priorities.) To date, there is no clear and comprehensive explanation of the economic foundations of the Unjust Society. In many respects, the more recent historical writing has tended to eschew economic concepts. This new history has focused on misguided government policies, usually in cultural or political/legal terms, to provide a description of Indian/White relations. Most sit comfortably with the cliché, that Indians were not passive victims of exploitation during the fur trade. Once the conclusion has been reached that exploitation did not exist, a leap in faith is not required to postulate that the fur trade was a mutually beneficial arrangement. (After all, neither side sought to destroy the other; presumably this is why the trade endured.) Similarly, the necessary corrective emphasis on "human agency" by many historians, can easily over compensate, such that, a kind of exculpating of colonialism results. This is particularly problematic and noticeable when economic concepts are dismissed.[6]

In "That Other Discipline: Economics and American Indian History" Trosper offered a cautious defence of the use of economics in Indian history, suggesting that objections to formalist economics have misled historians. Trosper argued that a number of problems should be considered which would help to explain why Europeans came to dominate the continent.[7] His suggestion to use the concept of price ratios to look at the changing balance of power would seem to make good sense.[8] He also stated that the situation of open access resources, an economic problem, should be examined with respect to Indian history. He pondered: "Quite possibly the vulnerability of the hunt to open-access destruction was much more important than the nature of Indian culture."[9] Trosper suggested that efforts should be directed towards answering "a major question of Indian economic history: the causes of dependence."[10] Yet he was critical of some of the proponents of dependency arguing for distinctions between "the market" and commercial capitalism, colonial commodity markets or mercantilism. Regarding the fur trade, he asked "Why did the trade between Indians and Europeans lead to economic growth for Europeans and dependency for Indians?"[11] (The expedient way to answer this question is to plead that dependency did not ensue from the fur trade.) Thus, Trosper identified a number of problems in Indian economic history that have a broad relevance to the desire to create historical understandings of contemporary situations. The other problem that is evident in the Canadian literature is a general unwillingness to employ a social science mode of thought.

For most of the span of Indian/White relations, the commercial capitalist market has been the most enduring institution. The market was ahead of any legal/administrative "frontier" which came with agricultural settlement. In fact, market impulses, like infectious diseases, visited Indian bands in advance of the traders, missionaries or treaty commissioners; and long before the police, Indian agents, teachers, farm instructors, or social workers appeared. The extent to which economic forces facilitated these agents of European expansion has not been a focus of the revisions to the old Indian history. Instead, the economic history of Native people has been a piecemeal enterprise. Apparently, we are supposed to believe that adverse changes to Indian society came as a result of the spread of White agents of assimilation, not economic havoc of a long-standing unequal integration with mercantil-

ism. This review will employ the problem of "commercialization" as a unified approach to the literature related to Native economic history. Commercialization refers to the process in which aspects of daily life increasingly fall under the influence of exchange value. More and more, needs or wants become satisfied by market-related activities. Increasingly, with the production of goods for the market, life is subjected to "commodification." In a rather provocative manner, David Newhouse has confronted directly more contemporary aspects and consequences of commercialization in "Resistance is Futile, Aboriginal Peoples Meet The Borg of Capitalism."[12] He asserted that "the idea that we can somehow participate in capitalism without being changed by it is in my own view wrongheaded" and this review will provide some of the historical contours of the relationship between capitalism and Native people.[13] (After all, historians and anthropologists continue to insinuate that historical participation in the mercantile fur trade was without significant consequence for Aboriginal peoples.) By conceptualizing the changing relationships between Aboriginal peoples and Europeans in terms of four stages (separate worlds, contact and cooperation, displacement and assimilation, and negotiation and renewal) Kelly Lendsay and Wanda Wuttunee have also indicated the relevance of economic history to development.[14]

The relevance of economic history is not so obvious to those focussed on the immediacy of community economic development. While the writing of academic economic history may not serve the short-term needs of Aboriginal communities, some of the results are relevant to today's Aboriginal and treaty rights litigation. With respect to recognition of economic rights, courts require historical evidence of subsistence and commercial practices in Aboriginal times or at the time of treaty negotiations. Beyond the interesting legal questions concerning 18th century treaties, the dispute with the *Marshall* decision concerns Indian commercial imperatives.[15] It is not always possible to predict when academic research will in fact have applied outcomes. For example, Arthur Ray's pioneering work on HBC accounting books was not initiated by some need to find evidence for a treaty rights argument, but in fact, these historical records and his analysis are valuable evidence for understanding Aboriginal and Treaty rights.[16] Both empirical and conceptual work in the area of economic history can have a relevance to contemporary concerns. This review provides a basic introduction to Canadian Native economic history.

This essay will initiate an assessment of the literature that actually seeks to explain the economic relationships between Natives and Whites. This review is not a detailed empirical study of a particular aspect of Native economic history or a demonstration of the immediate relevance of economic history. Instead, the present-day need for an accessible account, summary and analysis of the existing economic history literature and a critical evaluation of this disparate body of work will be addressed by this essay. By summarizing and reviewing this disparate literature, a rough chronology of Native economic history can trace major changes. Innovative studies using interesting data sources and methods will be highlighted. The examination of economic history before 1870 will focus on the fur trade to consider exchange relations, racial stratification, credit, and resource management problems. The period following 1870 will consider how the social overhead of the fur trade became a government responsibility. A number of empirical studies of Native participation in frontier labour markets and reserve agriculture will be summarized.[17] Out of necessity it will not be possible to review all studies that might touch on considerations of economic life.[18] Similarly, the state sponsored socio-economic studies of Aboriginal communities of the 1950s and 1960s, followed by the studies of the mixed economy in the 1970s, which have now become historical in nature, cannot be considered here.[19] Land is seen as a factor of production by economists, however, the economic dimensions of claims or use and occupancy studies are well beyond the scope of this essay.[20] This review also reflects the current literature's geographical emphasis on the fur country of Rupertsland.[21] The focus will be on studies that consider economic life as a subject of history. Finally, the aversion to using numerical data will be examined, in light of some potentially underutilized primary data and methodological confusion.

## The Fur Trade — A Racial Partnership?

In Canada, trade was the rationale for much of the Indian/White contact over several centuries. The nature and consequence of exchange

Haida women at crab canning factory at Masset, Queen Charlotte Islands LAC, PA-123909

relationships are a matter of some disagreement. For some, the fur trade merely sustained a slightly altered Aboriginal economy; those holding this viewpoint contend that until 1945 Natives remained in a contact phase.[22] A few others recognize that the early passive trade which began as a trade of European manufactures for old clothes (*castro gras*) led to a steady commodification and commercialization of Native life. In 1974, Ray's *Indians In The Fur Trade* and Bishop's *The Northern Ojibwa And The Fur Trade* encouraged a new look at the fur trade — in particular a consideration of the Indian involvement in the fur trade.[23] Ray's study reconstructed exchange relations, patterns of consumption, ecological adaptations and resource problems. Most significantly, he connected the reserve adjustments of the treaty era to the preceding two centuries of trade: "the resource bases upon which these specialized economies developed were destroyed due to over-exploitation" and thus "out of economic necessity, rather than intensive political and military pressure, the Indians agreed to settle on reserves ..."[24] Ray's early work demonstrated the shrewdness of Indian trade captains, explained the trade ceremony as a mixture of Indian reciprocity and European commercial exchange, substantiated sensible and rational Indian consumer behaviour, and documented European modifications to their manufactures in order to suit Indian needs in a northern environment.[25]

Debate on the nature of the exchange relations between traders and Indians is one of the more "hotly" contested issues in the early academic literature on the trade. E.E. Rich, who wrote the classic history of the Hudson's Bay Company, in his major statement on Indians, focused on differences between Indian and European economic behaviour. He stated that "there was no escaping the conclusion that in trade with Indians the price mechanism did not work."[26] Indians would not respond to an increase in prices by supplying more furs, rather, they would only bring down to the Hudson Bay coastal posts what they needed in order to purchase a year's supply of necessary goods along with tobacco and spirits. He noted some price variation, but argued that neither side adjusted prices "in accordance with the laws of supply and demand."[27] Rich employed market-oriented, neo-classical terminology, such as the equation of profit pursuit with economic motivation, and thus, found that there was "a persistent reluctance to accept European notions or the basic values of the European approach."[28] For Rich, a distinction needed to be a made between the European and the Indian; he judged Indian behaviour as improvident because "it meant that the Indian did not react to the ordinary European notions of property nor to the normal European economic motives."[29] Basically, the Indian did not operate as a rational economic (i.e., profit maximizing) man; simply put, Indians did not make the appropriate responses to the forces of supply and demand in what should have been a market economy. It is fashionable to dismiss the wording of Rich's argument as Eurocenteric, but in fact, his use of economics greatly oversimplified what was going on in the trade.[30]

The view that Indian integration with the fur trade cannot be explained by mainstream economics suggests that other motivations had to be found to account for the nature of Indian participation. Rotstein used an institutional analysis of trade and politics based on selected published primary sources to argue a rather peculiar theory of Indian involvement in the industry. His argument presupposed a severe pre-contact hostility between tribes, the notion that Indians were extremely territorial and that tribal alliances constituted political institutions; all of which recast European market trade into a non-market trade. To show the dominance of politics over trade, that is gift exchange over market

exchange, Rotstein provided assorted descriptions of the calumet (pipe ceremony), gift giving and trade ceremonies extracted from published primary sources which were then taken quite literally. Rotstein agreed with Rich, Europeans and Indians were very different when it came to trade; Europeans were concerned about profits, fluctuating prices, markets, and had the tendency to carry out economic transactions impersonally. As far as Indian-European relations were concerned, Rotstein claimed that the market system, lacking the political framework and stability associated with the markets in Europe, did not arrive in the Indian New World with European contact.[31] Taken together, Rich and Rotstein asserted that trade relations could be understood largely in political and cultural terms. However, given that mercantile companies thrived when they monopolized long distance trade, Indians were not really participating in idealized markets in which supply and demand provide guidance.

The notion that Indian involvement in the fur trade was essentially non-economic fits very well with the argument that very little change occurred to Indian society as a result of several hundred years of the fur trade. On the empirical level, the Rich/Rotstein thesis simply lacks support. The Hudson's Bay Company account books, along with standard historical sources combined to form evidence for Ray and Freeman's argument which refuted some of the well established academic views about the trade. Their study considered the Official Standard, Factor's Standard, Comparative Standard and Overplus (a form of profit) and uncovered the essential features of this mercantile barter form of exchange.[32] Rich had argued that the inflexible English traders used fixed standards. He had also believed that Overplus was simply derived by short measuring certain trade goods when trading with Indians.[33] *Give Us Good Measure* demonstrated convincingly that this simply was not the case. Indian economic strategies made use of competition between trading concerns. Ray and Freeman reconstructed the long-term profitability of the HBC. Accounting and trade data were presented as simple line graphs — trends over time were displayed clearly. Competition clearly reduced Company profit margins. The spatial features of the fur trader's exchange network were critical; price variability was linked to the spread of competition. Ray and Freeman were able to present a comprehensive interpretation of the fur trade by using both numerical and narrative sources and by organizing the relevant historical data in a precise spatial and temporal matrix. This study encouraged the use of HBC accounting records by a few other scholars.[34] Their interpretation demonstrated how a European mercantile company adapted to a barter situation, how Indians adjusted to a market system and how an Indian middleman system spatially extended mercantile spheres of influence.

Indian placer miners on their way to the mines near Gladwin, British Columbia, ca 1899, LAC C-066761

Although this study by Ray and Freeman is cited, it is Ray's least appreciated argument about the fur trade.[35] The inductive quality of *Give Us Good Measure* created a detailed and accurate reconstruction of exchange procedures as developed up to 1763. Clearly, the terms of reference employed by Rich do not provide adequate theoretical concepts to explore the shifting power relations in the industry, nor was Rich concerned about such matters.[36] Ray and Freeman's recognition that Indian participation in the mercantile fur trade was mediated by behaviour has important implications. Ray and Freeman's empirical results reveal the limitation of using the substantivist approach when trying to understand the interdependence of hunters and merchants. The incremental evolution of the market in the subarctic, the significance of Indian commodity production to Canadian economic history and Indian participation in the emerging world economy can only be pursued once it has been made clear that trade relations were essentially economic, or at the very least politics and culture did not consistently override economic trajectories. However, evidence of the economizing behaviour of shrewd Indians can be misleading, or can limit an economic analysis. Mainstream economics (formalism) does not capture the deeper effects of an

Blackfoot Indian coal miners report for duty after their midday meal. Gleichen, Alberta, (Detail) LAC PA-017335

unfolding commercialization. An understanding of Indian economic behaviour in terms of responses to competitive prices does not require the total acceptance of mainstream economic thinking that focuses solely on the actions of individuals attempting to maximize gain in an idealized, anonymous market.

Native economic history could gain a fuller understanding of the production of fur as a monocrop export commodity from Polanyi's insights about the general development of the market system. Polanyi made a distinction between a market economy and a market pattern. "Market economy implies a self regulating system of markets; ... it is an economy directed by market prices and nothing but market prices" and can be contrasted to "the market pattern" which "being related to a peculiar motive of its own, the motive of truck or barter, is capable of creating a specific institution, namely, the market."[37] The motive to truck or barter is indicated by the extension of the middleman trade system in the fur trade. The same Indian participation in competitive markets, in which reciprocity, political alliances, or the Company's tradition of paternalism, failed to act as a barrier to the development of market, can best be explained as a market pattern, but not as a full-fledged market economy. Markets for labour, land and money needed to exist to create the self-regulating, full-fledged market economy. In the fur trade, a pure capitalist labour market did not exist; the direct buying and selling of wage labour was muted by paternalism (in which an interdependence develops because a shortage of labour along with a monopoly of employers necessitates a more personal relationship and the employer bears the direct costs of maintaining labour.) A market for land did not exist before Indian treaties.[38] During the fur trade, both monopolistic and competitive exchange practices fit the concept of a market pattern. The mercantile fur trade should not be conceived exclusively, in either substantivist or formalist terms, but instead as a "mercantile market pattern." The political and cultural aspects of the trade, along with the incomplete nature of the price system, can be accommodated by Polanyi's concept of a market pattern.[39]

When market relations dominated Indian/White relations, commercialization fostered economic specialization. A division of labour — suited to the needs of the fur companies — was one result. The concept of class has been readily used in social history, but in Native history, even the mere existence of classes is scarcely acknowledged. In order to export fur, the transport and post system created a rather complicated economy with specialized roles, in contrast to Watkins' pronouncements. Wage employment was an important aspect of this economy, and over time, an increasing proportion of the workers were Native. Carol Judd's research, too often overlooked, gave original consideration of ethnic, racial and class dynamics of the economic history of Rupertsland. She demonstrated that the HBC used ethnic competition to control the labour force and explained how economic circumstances affected the recruitment of labour for the fur trade.[40] In "Native labor and social stratification in the Hudson's Bay Company's Northern Department 1770–1870," Judd related the conditions of Native labour to the structure of the industry. With the restructuring that took place after the monopoly in 1821, Natives, "Halfbreeds" in particular, were trapped in the lower ranks of the Company's hierarchy. Judd concluded: "For the first time in the history of the fur trade ethnic derivations, 'class,' and status were intertwined."[41] Her archival research generated a number of interesting observations; for example, Natives tended to settle near larger posts to work at seasonal wage labour, especially boat work, rather than trap. Judd also demonstrated that "Racial stereotyping that eventually doomed most natives to the lowest rungs of fur-trade society became fully developed only after 1821."[42] The Native sons of HBC officers were blocked by rigid racial stratification. The peculiarities of the fur trade labour meant that Judd found it difficult to apply the usual socio-economic definitions; the dominant character of the HBC hierarchy meant that class "would con-

form more closely to social stratification by employment."[43] We should know that economic roles corresponded to race: generally Indians produced fur in the bush and did some seasonal wage labour; the Metis were commercial hunters, petty traders and wage labourers; and Whites held contracts for general and skilled labour, were managers, and of course, stockholders.[44] Judd's research concerning racial stratification identified the HBC as an institution that initiated racism across vast areas of the country. From the beginning until the mid-20th century, the Company's policy tried to keep a cheap labour force largely confined to the bush. The existence of racial stratification is counterfactual evidence for the theory that the fur trade was a mutually beneficial partnership between merchants and Natives. Ron Bougeault used a deterministic structuralist argument to state that: "Native peoples' modern history has as its basis class exploitation and oppression."[45] And not unexpectedly, labour struggles occurred in the fur trade. Glen Makahonuk discussed forms of labour protest in the fur trade, however, he did not specify the role of Native labour in this resistance.[46] Given the level of detail in the archival records, good prospects exist for developing Native economic history by considering a Native labour history.[47]

In terms of understanding economic history, the system of credit used by fur companies has to be seen as a key feature of the commercial interface between hunting and exchange. Very few studies have specifically examined this topic, yet it was a common practice in the trade. Morantz looked at credit in the James Bay region and found that the Cree were not "a coerced or controlled labour force, with debt being the agent of this control."[48] Indeed, the Company often wished that it could do away with the credit system; Morantz thus assumed that Indian trappers exerted enough muscle to maintain the credit system, and therefore it must have been to their real advantage. The problem with this conclusion is evident when the entire system of exchange relations is examined. Ray found that "The standards [prices] of trade that it [HBC] used to value goods and furs allowed for a very considerable gross profit margin. Indeed, it could be argued that the standards not only served to underwrite the credit/gratuity system, but that they increasingly made it necessary."[49] Significantly, Morantz indicated a similarity between European ideas of debt and

Interior of a salmon cannery, Skeena River, British Columbia, ca. 1890, LAC PA-118162.

Indian customs of reciprocity: "As a system of obligation it also conformed perfectly with the Cree expectations of sharing and looking out for one another."[50] Morantz concluded: "On the whole, the company was never able to establish a true relationship of indebtedness: the Cree could and did take their furs to other posts."[51] Be that as it may, Ray showed that: "Under normal conditions there were several advantages that native peoples and the Hudson's Bay Company derived from this arrangement. Indians counted on receiving the equipment and tools that they needed to hunt and trap regardless of their current economic or health circumstances. In this sense credit provided an economic safety net for native and trader alike since both of them depended on regular returns. In addition, company traders used the debt to establish a claim on some or all of an Indian's future returns."[52] As with other primary industries based on small producers, credit served to maintain production. The use of credit in the fur trade, is not unlike the means by which pre-capitalist, paternalistic economies extracted, on a sustained basis, a surplus. In fact, when the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation government attempted to establish a fur marketing board in northern Saskatchewan, its plans failed to provide credit to trappers, thereby generating opposition from Native producers.[53]

A more sophisticated approach to the fur trade developed when Ray made use of Pentland's concept of "personal labour relations" (a

scarcity of both labourers and employers) or paternalism as a means for understanding economic changes in the subarctic. The incomplete nature of the price system, the seasonal nature of work and the personalized relations are elements of a paternalistic economy. The debt system was part of the social overhead of the fur trade, and with the emergence of competitive fur prices and treaty money, the personal labour relations began to break down. Thus Ray's examination of the economics of the credit/debt system identified the situation that created the seemingly drastic upheavals of the early 20th century. He concluded: "As Pentland had noted in his analyses of other areas of Canada, the personal labour relations system born of the pre-industrial age did not work once competitive labour markets developed. In the north, however, the situation was very complex. Until the government provided the economic aid that native people sorely needed, the Hudson's Bay Company had to continue to carry some of the social costs of the trade."[54] Nonetheless, a general reluctance to consider Native integration with commercial markets means that economic concepts required to re-interpret Native history are very undeveloped. The need for seasonal credit in order to produce did not cease with the end of the HBC monopoly. In *The Unjust Society*, Harold Cardinal recounted a typical story of an Indian trapper waiting all day to meet with the Indian Agent because "Now the time for trapping has come again, and he would be working and off relief for a few months if his traps were favoured and the fur prices were good. But he needs a loan, some money for traps. All the Indians know that the agent is empowered to disburse funds for traps, but all the Indians also know that this is a discretionary power."[55] Finally, the trapper was told he will get a voucher: "He knows that the agent kept him waiting just to show him who was boss, but he knows there was no other way he could get the traps he needed to go to work again."[56] The assumption of the social overhead of the fur industry (i.e., outfitting producers) by the state was not without political consequences for Native producers. Clearly Morantz and Cardinal are interpreting the consequences of credit relationships very differently.

Many of the particular problems of fur trade economics have been worked out conceptually in Ray's "Periodic Shortages, Native Welfare and the Hudson's Bay Company 1670–1930."[57] He argued that the flexibility, mobility and reciprocity of pre-fur trade aboriginal economies that allowed Indians to deal with periodic shortages, were undermined. Moreover, the trade increased the risk of food shortages and resource problems which European traders responded to by storing food surpluses at posts. The spatial mobility of Native people was reduced as trade was fixed at a post; credit also necessitated reduced mobility. Trapping favoured specialization, and the flexibility of the Aboriginal economy was eroded. Credit and commercialization affected reciprocity. Resource management problems were created by commercialization associated with the market. When scarcity directed more effort towards hunting and fishing and away from trapping, the HBC provided flour to producers at well below cost.[58] Ray noted that the Company's conservation schemes after 1821 emphasized a more individual approach to land tenure.[59] The appeal of this argument is not simply because attention was drawn to some of the economic problems that Native people faced in the fur trade, but because Ray outlined a historical process — the modern welfare society of the north is not entirely a recent development — paternalism was rooted in the fur trade. Paternalism was required because "one of the most far-reaching aspects of European expansion into the north involved overturning basic aboriginal ecological strategies."[60] The conditions that were required for sustaining fur production necessitated the creation of a paternalistic economy — cancelling bad debts, gratuities, food assistance, aid to the sick and destitute were a means to deal with scarcity. Ray concluded that paternalism or the

Frontier Resource capitalism at Black River, Lake Winnipeg, Manitoba. Note ice houses for fish, wooden fish boxes, and gill net racks, sailboats and cord wood for steamboats, ca. 1929, Archives of Manitoba

Company's welfare system "was a necessary by-product of several processes: economic specialization by native peoples, a concomitant decreasing spatial mobility, European control of food surpluses and the depletion of resources. Reinforcing these were the labour policies, wage schedules, and standards of trade that assured the Hudson's Bay Company large gross profit margins in good years under near monopoly conditions."[61] Consequently, the use of the term "independent production" to describe Indian involvement in fur trade confuses the nature of the relationship between Native trappers and merchant traders.[62] These producers were not, even at the local level, independent of mercantile credit arrangements and their production was one contribution to numerous commodity flows that made up a world system which was dominated by European interests. Similarly, the pronouncement that the fur trade was simply a weak capitalist penetration obscures or denies the manifestation of the resource and income problems identified by Ray. The use of Pentland's concept of paternalism demonstrates that historical studies of the fur trade can insightfully employ theory.[63] Future research should consider the concept of a paternalistic economy as a means to examine the empirical data in the archives.

With respect to the importance of the fur trade, Patricia McCormack posited a conceptual approach that considered the fundamental issues related to commercialization (the articulation of use-oriented and exchange-oriented economies) in a study of the fur trade at Fort Chipewyan.[64] McCormack employed the concept of domestic mode of production (DMP) to show that changes in lifestyles transformed the mode of production. The Cree and Chipewyan "abandoned their aboriginal total economies and became parts of the new, complex, social configuration that was the fur trade society of the Fort Chipewyan region."[65] She sensed a central problem which has alluded other social scientists: the original domestic mode of production was structurally opposite to the fur trade, but merchant capitalism did not require direct control over the labour process in order to appropriate the surplus.[66] Serious investigation into changes of productive relations is not possible with an adherence to the Rich/Rotstein/Watkins perspective that simply defines the fur industry as a politically motivated trade. The concept of articulation was used to explain the intermeshing of these two systems: "The points of articulation between DMP and merchant capitalism in the boreal forest at contact were the willingness of Indians to produce furs and provisions for their exchange value as well as to work for the traders more directly on an occasional basis, and the willingness of Europeans to enter into a range of social relations or transactions with the Indians including marital alliances, which transcended the purely economic aspect of exchange."[67] McCormack pointed to the passing of the control of production from traditional leaders to traders, the need for Indians to reorganize material reproduction in order to supply furs and provisions, and the tendency of wage labour and credit to individualize production, especially when production was for exchange purposes rather than communal needs. Individualized relations were part of the fur trade mode of production and this was reflected in resource exploitation patterns and juridical changes in access and control over certain resources. McCormack successfully conceptualized changes in the fur trade by employing a domestic mode of production perspective and by considering the articulation, through exchange, with mercantilism. In many respects, Ray and McCormack reached similar conclusions about the historical processes, although the conceptual terminology and data differ. This is considerably more sophisticated than simply postulating that commercial credit can be classified as reciprocity or that mercantile capital was essentially benign.

While considerable primary research on Indians and the fur trade has occurred in the last thirty years, very little re-thinking of specific research problems in Native economic history has resulted. Empirical reconstructions of post economies, transport systems, and inter-regional resources flows reveal that the fur trade was a rather complicated economy and not "primitive." Certainly by 1821, the fur trade was an industry, and the narrow use of the term "trade" is misleading.[68] Patterns existed just the same: exchange relations fostered a commercialization of resources and resource management problems necessitated closer integration. A paternalistic economy evolved — the domestic mode of production articulated with European markets, subsistence activities and commercial pursuits combined to create what is now referred to as a traditional livelihood. Clearly, identifying the commercial impulses in the fur trade is not a matter of esoteric, academic debate. The inter-

connections and concomitant changes to other social, political and economic spheres of Native life that came with progressively greater commitments to commodity production cannot be understood unless this relationship is recognized. If the effects of producing and trading commodities are ignored, then it will be difficult to discern Indian perceptions of their economic circumstances with the onset of treaties. Claims about the perseverance of culture deflect from vital issues of income distribution, racial stratification and exploitation. Because of racial identity and legal status, there is a marked tendency by academic historians to see all aspects of Native life as unique. However, many of the basic economic problems that Native people had to contend with are similar to the situations of other primary producers in Canada's staple industries (e.g., restructuring, substituting labour with capital). It may be readily apparent that the intrusive assimilationist policies of the state and mission dramatically affected Aboriginal communities, but it does not follow that the preceding fur trade was unobtrusive.

## Economic Change Following Confederation: An Era of Irrelevance?

In general, the post-1870 era marks a shift in Indian/White relations, from economic (trade) relations, to a more political relationship that was inherent in the treaties and the *Indian Act*. In this sense, the external interest shifted from labour derived through exchange, to the future value of the land and resources. Nonetheless, not all Native people became economically irrelevant following the era of fur trade dominance, and many participated in markets created by frontier resource capitalism. In 1870, the surrender of the Hudson's Bay Company's Royal Charter of 1670 paved the way for major political and economic changes throughout the west and north.[69] With the surrender of its Charter and the Transfer of Rupertsland, the Company argued that it was no longer responsible for the Native population. The economic problem of the social overhead of the fur trade, which existed because of the commercialization of the domestic mode of production, became a political concern following the transfer of Rupertsland. More recent research on the post-1870 economy concerns the transfer of the social overhead of the fur trade from the HBC to the Dominion government. I have argued that: "Land surrender treaties were the main mechanism for shifting the social costs of the fur trade from the HBC to the Canadian government."[70] In fact, the value of annuities was equivalent to the cost of outfitting an Indian trapper for the winter. According to Ray, the HBC wanted to get "the state to underwrite the social costs of the trade without losing any of its influence over the native peoples."[71] One of the most important economic histories of the post-1870 era is Arthur Ray's *The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age*. He provided: an analysis of the changing structure of the industry, argued for an economic context for treaties, outlined the problem that the state faced with spiralling relief costs, and noted the hardship that came with the imposition of game laws. For the period after 1920, Ray documented that Native incomes declined, purchasing power of annuities decreased and the cost of trapping increased. Moreover, the expenses associated with the social overhead of trapping were exacerbated by reckless over-exploitation carried on by White trappers. In the non-treaty areas, Ray documented an unemployed "surplus" population at Moose Factory in the 1890s.[72] This need for economic assistance aggravated tension between government and the HBC. In this study, Ray reconstructed the negotiations between the HBC and the Canadian government over the manner of paying the social overhead and the proportions shared between the state and trading interests. Ray concluded "... the older paternalistic fur trade, a hybrid of European mercantilism and native reciprocal exchange traditions, was crumbling by 1945, and the groundwork for the modern welfare system so prevalent in the north today was laid."[73] Clearly a political economy approach is called for if we are to understand more fully government policies towards Indians, which is in my view preferable to efforts to explain Indian policy simply from biographic data and an analysis of the individual shortcomings of key civil servants.[74]

The focus on the "Spirit and Intent" of the treaties has meant that the compensation Indians received for their title has not been considered in economic terms. Research has more recently recognized that Chiefs approached treaty talks with an economic agenda.[75] Despite Indian desires for a new economy, treaty rights were also a means for sustaining a population in the bush which was producing fur for the Hudson's Bay Company. Evidently, the compensation

was not based on any sort of market valuation of Indian lands or ongoing compensation for displacement of their mode of life (livelihood). This is in sharp contrast to the arrangement made with the HBC for its claim to Rupertsland; the Company received very significant financial benefits. With fur prices remaining low until 1900, the social overhead of the fur trade was a problem, for the Company and treaty supplies, annuities and relief acted as a subsidy to the fur industry. Moreover, the HBC benefited from Indian treaties because the annuities were used to make purchases in the Company's stores. Treaty money also introduced cash into the north, which required the HBC to adjust credit/debt and barter trade practices.[76] On the prairies, the rations provided to Indians served to expand the internal markets at a time when the general lack of cash income was limited.[77] Even the nature of the treaty relationship between Indian nations and the Crown can be better appreciated by examining the relationship between the HBC and Indians in the fur trade era.[78] In this sense, an empirical and conceptual reconstruction of the nature of the economic relations between traders and Natives is a vital context for understanding the meaning of Treaty and Aboriginal rights.

Native economic history after 1870 is not confined to the problem of the social overhead of the fur industry. Throughout Indian contact history, problems of resource management occurred because of the commercialization of resources, the migration of Indians to new areas or the immigration of non-Indians to tribal lands. Trosper noted that: "The spread of Europeans across the North American continent produced a succession of open-access problems for Indians and for Europeans, for several reasons. First, the frontier was an area where no government had effective control. Management of an open-access resource is much easier when governmental authority can be used. Second, the mercantile and industrial revolution in Europe provided increasingly effective weapons for hunting. Third, international trade provided the large market needed to amplify hunting intensity to levels which threatened resources."[79] However, even with the establishment of government control, the economic circumstances of Native people in western and northern Canada was very much affected by changing property relations. Little was done to use government policies to protect the Native economy from open-access exploitation.

The problem of the transition from common property to open-access to private property was described by Irene Spry in "The Tragedy of the Loss of the Commons in Western Canada."[80] She looked at the near extinction of the buffalo and encroachment upon land, hay, fish, water and wood resources. Spry outlined the breakdown of the traditional system of resource management with the opening-up of the west: "The old balance between a limited human use of the gifts of nature held as common property by each tribe and natural the regeneration of those gifts was finally destroyed when they were thrown open to all comers, including those intent on commercial exploitation. The disappearance of the buffalo was a classic instance of the "tragedy of the commons," when a common-property resource was transferred into an open-access resource."[81] Another "cataclysmic change" occurred with "the establishment of exclusive private property instead of the traditional common property of the native peoples."[82] Private property was a means to transform the west, but also "it contributed to the economic degradation of the original peoples of the plains and to a new inequality in the economic and social system."[83] The extent to which the move to the labour market by Indians was a push, due to the problem of diminished resources and restricted access to resources, and not simply the pull of cash incomes, needs to be investigated.

The early years of the freshwater commercial fishing industry clearly illustrates many of the general problems that Spry had raised, but also an interplay between government policy, markets, capital and property relations. With the development of a foreign market for sturgeon and whitefish, an externally-orientated commercialization of lake fisheries occurred, which had a differential impact on Native communities. The early fishing industry was unregulated, and so the prospects of depletion threatened Native subsistence fisheries. Some Natives participated in the commercial industry by selling fish or as wage labourers. Tension between the Fisheries Department and the Department of Indian Affairs led to an effort to create policies which would allow the commercial and domestic fisheries to co-exist, yet with the increasing capitalization of the industry, Native near-shore fisheries and spawning grounds were encroached upon. In terms of changing property relations, the right to

fish which was understood as a treaty right by Indians was not protected; an unregulated fishery was thrown open. And the increasing use of capital and the dominance of market relations had the effect, in my view, of privatizing the fisheries. The "privatization" was not so much the result of a legal system of exclusive property rights, but the economic power that came with increasing levels of capital investment and consolidation of ownership. In other words, the capacity to appropriate resources. These changes were sanctioned by the government.[84] While Indians obtained some economic benefits, as with the fur trade, the return to labour was much smaller than the return to capital.[85] Following the treaties, the natural wealth of whitefish fisheries was converted into significant commercial gains, but Natives could not obtain a sustainable share of this wealth. Legally they could not collect a rent nor could they engage in the same level of harvesting as the American financed companies. A buoyant market and weak Native property rights created a situation in which the economic future of Native communities was undermined. With the onset of export-oriented commercial fishing, Natives were not easily displaced, in fact, their protests resulted in a licensing system that provided for Native participation in the sturgeon fishery. Significantly, the value of sturgeon was very high, and consequently, the resource was over-exploited. However, as with the demise of the beaver in the competitive fur trade, over-fishing cannot be attributed exclusively to the direct actions of outsiders.[86]

The apparent absence of Indian involvement in the grain economy that emerged following the treaties has been one of the least understood problems in Indian economic history. Sarah Carter's *Lost Harvests* addressed this problem, thereby providing one of the most important studies of Indian life in the early reserve transition period.[87] The lack of a commercialization of reserve life is an issue for economic history. She critiqued the existing historiography concerning Indian reserve agriculture, and found that: "from the beginning it was the Indians that showed the greater willingness and inclination to farm and the government that displayed little serious intent to see agriculture established on the reserves."[88] In several respects, this is a model for examining Indian policy; Carter provided an analysis of the treaty negotiations, reserve selection, Indian opposition to government policies, and shifts in government assistance for agriculture. Relevant topics such as: climate and technical problems, the general situation of prairie agriculture, relations and comparisons between reserve and homestead farmers, the role of farm instructors, the plan to subdivide reserves and land surrenders are discussed with great care. With respect to the permit and pass system, Carter concluded: "Control of Indian transactions through the permit system, as well as control of their movements, placed restraints above and beyond those they shared with other farmers in the West."[89] Such restrictions had a negative impact on commercial agriculture. Carter is particularly skilful at connecting policy and ideology — illustrated by Hayter Reed's impractical aim of creating self-sufficient peasant farmers that were forbidden to use modern farm machinery.[90] The basic process that Carter identified can be summarized: Indians acquired skills and technology, the Department of Indian Affairs provided assistance, and reserve agriculture took hold, but since reserves were competing with white farmers, the Department of Indian Affairs advanced policies to divide Indian and white farmers into non-competing groups, which meant that between 1889–1897 reserves suffered from "unprecedented administrative involvement" and officials pushed allotment and peasant farming policy "both of which set extreme limits on Indian agricultural productivity" and ultimately "as the policies functioned to curtail the expansion of Indian farming, Indians did not appear to non-natives to be "productively" using their reserve land to full capacity. This perception paved the way for the alienation of much reserve land in the years after 1896."[91] Of note was her comparison of the Canadian government's practices of favouring White farmers at the expense of Indian reserve agriculture to African agriculture under colonial administration. Thus Indian farmers were excluded from the expanding commercial agriculture of the 1890s, did not regain ground, fell further behind and became isolated. While this study indicates an important means to correct the past, more numerical data should have been used and the role of off-reserve Indian farm labour is unclear. Carter did not seem to consider the prospective that the Indian Affairs' system of reserve agriculture was not entirely irrational because it provided seasonal labour for the settler (White) system of agriculture. Nonetheless, an influential explanation has been

established for "the role of Canadian government policy in restricting and undermining reserve agriculture."[92]

In the post-1870 era, Native life continued to feel the growing influence of the market. However, with the expansion of frontier resource industries, a number of new economic roles for Native people were created. In this era, and quite contrary to the field observations of the ethnologists of the time, Native labour was integrated with wage economies.[93] In the Interlake of Manitoba, Natives found work at commercial fishing (summer and winter, as well as cutting ice for freezers and cordwood for lake steamers); at sawmills and in bush camps cutting cordwood, railway ties, lumber and pulpwood; on steamboats and docks; with surveyors, and at railway construction. They also earned money by selling senaca root, berries, potatoes and handicrafts. New commercial enterprises created new markets. Some Indians left reserves and migrated to family farms to work at harvest time. These new staple industries and markets for Native products, along with reserve gardening diversified Native economies considerably. Incomes increased relative to the stagnant fur trade. In fact, a very noticeable movement out of the traditional fur trade and into new staple industries occurred. Seasonal wage income was more secure and lured Native energy away from the fur trade. The descriptions of Native participation in new industries are often supported by numerical data collected by the Department of Indian Affairs. In this era, reserves functioned as pools of more or less settled labour and Natives were very mobile and actively sought work. Many sawmills, fish stations and steamboat landings were located on or near reserves.[94] For a number of decades gainful incomes were made in the Interlake Manitoba, in contrast to the destitution on the plains.

During this era, the Indians of British Columbia (BC) had a particularly interesting economic history. Rolf Knight's research demonstrated that Indians played vital economic roles in British Columbia.[95] His pioneering work showed that Indian history in the frontier era is not simply a matter of dispossession and marginalization, and certainly not irrelevance. Our images of a dependent and passive population were challenged; Knight found that "Indian people in some regions have been more intimately and longer involved in industrial wage work than many Euro-Canadians from rural areas."[96] Through descriptive accounts, he looked at Indian economic history by highlighting their roles as loggers, farmers and farm labourers, cowboys, teamsters, commercial fishermen, cannery workers, longshoremen, freighters, construction workers for infrastructure (railroads and telegraph lines) mine labourers and coal trimmers. Indians were involved in unions and went on strike. Knight also considers the economic activity of Indian cottage industries, reserve agriculture, mission-sponsored activities and Indian entrepreneurs. Ultimately, he contended that "But the pride of most Indian people might better be served by appreciating their real history and contributions. One might remind people that Indian workers also dug the mines, worked the canneries and mills, laid miles of railway and did a hundred other jobs. They helped lay the bases of many regional economies."[97] This study described the roles that Indians played in BC primary industries (logging, fishing, sealing, farming, mining and transport). Significantly, and in contrast to what was generally accepted, Knight challenged the accepted view that Native people were historically irrelevant after the fur trade. Knight's *Indians at Work* has often been seen as inspirational in an intellectual sense, but much is attributed to it beyond any substantive, theoretical or methodological contribution; and the second edition was disappointing.[98]

Nonetheless, Knight's work is often shunned because he challenged the all too convenient cultural myth that Indians do not make good workers, and he accomplished this by writing a labour history. Like many historical studies, Knight's evidence was descriptive and anecdotal, however, numerical data seems to support his interpretation of a Native labour history. James Burrows made use of interesting numerical data in "'A Much-Needed Class of Labour': The Economy and Income of the Southern Interior Plateau Indians, 1897–1910."[99] Burrows used band-level income data from the Department of Indian Affairs to compare the amount and sources of incomes for various bands. He found that agricultural wage levels for Indians were the same as Whites and that the sources and values of income demonstrate participation in wage labour. Burrows concluded that: "The fact that they [Indians] had nonetheless been able to function at least for a period within the framework of an economy based on wage labour suggests, however, that their capacity to adapt

to new social and economic realities was not as limited as is frequently supposed."[100] Indian involvement in fishing has been seen as a mere extension of an Aboriginal activity, but Gladstone has provided a very detailed analysis of the Indian situation in the British Columbia fishing industry. He noted: "Relationships, defined increasingly by the market rather than by custom, have become more impersonal" which suggested a key difference between the Aboriginal fishery and the complex commercial fishery.[101] Much of the current research on British Columbia concerns the Indian land struggle, but a study of the interaction between the loss of land and labour markets would also be useful.[102]

Further evidence of a dynamic Native economic history was provided by John Lutz in "After the fur trade: the aboriginal labouring class of British Columbia 1849–1890."[103] Lutz's results are similar to Rolf Knight, further indicating that "... aboriginal people were not made irrelevant by the coming of settlement. In fact, they were the main labour force of the early settlement era, essential to the capitalist development of British Columbia."[104] Well after the advent of the gold rush, Aboriginal people "remained at the centre of the transformed, capitalist, economic activity."[105] Of note is his information on large seasonal Indian migrations to Victoria and the recognition of the spatial unevenness of Native participation in wage labour. And in a manner similar to Knight, Lutz described Indian involvement in gardening, coal and gold mining, sawmilling, fishing and canneries, steamboating, hop picking, and sealing and significantly, based his narrative on a diverse set of sources. His historical evidence established that Indians did not spend their wages in the same way that Whites did. Lutz also entertained the question of why Aboriginal people participated in wage labour: "It appears that the same cultural forces that drew aboriginal people into the fur trade continued to operate and draw them into the wage and industrial labour force."[106] Wages permitted the acquisition of goods, and thus more Indians, not just the chiefs, could sponsor potlatches. (And if so, implies a type of cultural shift.) Increasing incomes permitted potlatches with more participants and an increased volume of goods distributed. The ceremonial winter season did not conflict with the demands for labour. In other words, Indians on the west coast worked largely so that they could potlatch. Nonetheless, the potlatch was a ceremony that redistributed *material* goods.

If Aboriginal employment was robust with the onset of capitalism, occurring in an era of relevance, why is it evident that Aboriginal communities subsequently became economically marginal? Knight suggested that the downturn in 1929 explained the relative decline of the economic position of Aboriginal communities.[107] And Lutz noted that: "Increasingly, however, the sawmills, the railways, the steamboats and other large employers were anxious to have a year-round and stable labour force so that seasonal labour, the choice of large numbers of aboriginal people, was becoming less compatible with the demands of capitalism"[108] which implies that other sources of labour were found. Following enforcement of restrictions, the number of blankets distributed at potlatches diminished somewhat; however, indications of a continuation of the ceremony make Lutz's conclusion that: "Ironically, the very cultural imperative that had brought aboriginal people into the workforce was outlawed because, due to changing circumstances, it was no longer sufficiently compatible with the requirements of capitalism" wanting.[109] A serious research issue for post-fur trade Native economic history is to determine why is it, if Native people actively participated in new industries in various regions, that in later years they found their communities economically isolated?

One of the few efforts to provide a comprehensive and historical analysis of contemporary economic situations of a nation is Wien's *Rebuilding the Economic Base Of Indian Communities: The Micmac In Nova Scotia*. Wien contrasted the economic security of life in the Aboriginal period with the changes brought about by the fur trade, settlement, industrialization, government welfare and centralization. He argued that "... the fur trade economy was less difficult for the Indians to cope with than the settler economy that succeeded it."[110] The Micmac (Mi'kmaq) were marginalized in the settler economy. However, Wien showed that in the industrial economy (1868 to 1940), Micmac labour was important. Reserve agricultural activity increased between 1900 and 1920, as well, Micmac laboured on non-Indian farms at harvesting time, migrated to western Canada for farm work, travelled to Maine and New England to harvest blueberries and potatoes, were employed in the new manufacturing and process-

ing industries, public construction projects (canals and railroads), travelled for factory work in New England, and were self-employed. Data showed that wage labour was the most important source of income from 1905 to 1945. Wien stated: "The general impression that emerges from accounts of the period is that the Micmac struggled to earn a foothold in the prevailing economy of the time."[111] But the Micmac seemed to participate on the margin: more as general labour than skilled labour or management; mainly at short-term work and seasonal harvesting requiring migration from place to place; and their own businesses were small, self-employed crafts. He stated that "... in comparison to the settler economy, there is considerable movement away from the conditions of absolute destitution that prevailed after the collapse of the fur trade" and "... Indian people worked very hard to maintain a fair livelihood for themselves and their families."[112] Apparently, in a pattern similar to other regions, the Micmac foothold in the economy did not endure. Relief increased with the depression of the 1930s. Wien also identified a process which probably existed throughout Canada: "Beginning in the 1940s, the hallmarks of the new period are the extensive intervention of the federal government and the unparalleled use of welfare payments as the main public policy response to the difficulty the Micmac were increasingly experiencing in the labour market."[113] The research on Indians and regional labour markets demonstrates that economic change was not a unidirectional decline. Wien suggested a broader explanation for the marginalization of Aboriginal communities and his study is also relevant for those looking to interpret present circumstances with the help of theory and economic history.

More work is needed on the extent of Native participation in wage labour after 1870. Nonetheless, as this review has summarized, in Nova Scotia, Manitoba and British Columbia, Native participation in regional economies is more extensive than had generally been recognized. Despite a body of work on the important contributions that Indians made in relation to settlement and the industrial frontiers of British Columbia, old views are resilient. Robin Fisher gruffly dismissed Knight's work stating, by way of self-defence of his second edition of *Contact and Conflict*: "In fact, Knight modifies nothing because he has proven nothing."[114] And Fisher argued that Burrows' study was too "thin a slice of time and space" to provide any real support for Knight's thesis, and he compelled that: "We need the cumulative results of more local studies such as Burrows, before we can reach broad conclusions about the importance of Native people in the labour force and the significance of wage labour to the Native economy."[115] Such a cautious inductive approach is quite appealing to conventional historians. By diminishing the work of others, Fisher holds to his original thesis that Natives were economically irrelevant after the fur trade. Apparently, the cumulative results of local studies were not required to support his original generalizations in *Contact and Conflict*. He skeptically insisted upon a standard of proof for others that his own work did not meet. Justifiably, Dianna Newell in *Tangled Webs of History* pointed out that Fisher continued "... to defend his conclusion and declares that no others have successfully challenged it are to me signs of an ungenerous scholar who is out of touch with his rapidly evolving field."[116]

## The Resistance to Numeracy in Native History

Generally, Native history, and in step with its mentor, mainstream history, shuns numerical data, and many studies that concern some aspect of economics of Native life choose not to collect or examine such data. As a consequence, the ability to apply and test fundamental economic concepts are being fettered. In the absence of precise concepts, we are left with indignation about the policies of the state and claims about Native agency devoid of any recognition or criticism of structural limitations. In practice, some academics purport that the colonizer's "numbers" are inherently more ethnocentric than the colonizers "words," which turns out to be a very convenient exemption for sidestepping the tedious work required by numerical analysis. Seemingly, Sarah Carter in *Lost Harvests* casually and reluctantly appends a few bits of agricultural data. Two little line graphs plot acres under cultivation, but for some reason only about half the available data for the period 1889 and 1897 are employed.[117] With respect to reserve agriculture, the Department of Indian Affairs published data yearly on: crop production, livestock, and farm implements. If the claim that the potential of reserve agriculture was perpetually thwarted by government policies, then numerical evidence should provide some insights about this process.

In the case of Treaty Four and Treaty Six Saskatchewan bands, numerical data demonstrates that between 1897 to 1915 the amount of land under cultivation, the number of farm animals, crop production and farm implements tended to increase.[118] These trends challenge the widely accepted view that senior officials succeeded at undermining reserve agriculture.[119] The harvest was not entirely lost, nonetheless, numerical data exists that would enhance her argument.

With respect to the annual income data from the Department of Indian Affairs, Stephen High recommended: "Caution should be used in analyzing these statistics as they represent a European concept of revenue ..."[120] Later he declared: "The statistics are consequently no more than a general estimate at best, and at worst wishful thinking. Wishful thinking *may very well* have been involved because the department's self-interest acted to minimize traditional activities and to exaggerate the importance of subsistence agriculture. These methodological concerns may have, therefore, led many historians to ignore the Department of Indian Affairs statistical data."[121] In fact, High provides no support that traditional historians have ever bothered to work with these data in order to carefully determine whether or not the data provides a useful estimate of sources and values of incomes, or whether the data is merely the dubious delusions of Indian Agents intending to exaggerate the importance of subsistence agriculture. He simply rejects the data, largely because of its source. Any systematic biases in these data would be worthy subject of inquiry and would provide insights about the Department of Indian Affairs' view of things. In contrast to disclaimers about the acceptability of this source, Arthur Ray graphed this income data for the period 1922–1935 and found "the most striking picture to emerge is that the aggregate incomes ... declined over the period;" an exercise from which we gained a new understanding of the dire economic circumstances for Indians of northern Canada.[122] Moreover, studies by Beal and Burrows made good use of the Indian Affairs data, so in fact, the data has not been universally ignored, and with proper use, it has provided some regional insights which might not otherwise be possible.[123] Why Indian agents would be so prone to exaggerate "subsistence agriculture" in particular or how exaggerating this particular source of income served the interests of the department is not made clear by High, nor is it evident that the numerical data provided by agents actually has this special bias. Generally, the department's interest was to demonstrate the over-riding objective that Indians were "self-supporting" and that relief costs were not escalating unnecessarily. Becoming self-supporting could be achieved by means other than subsistence agriculture.

It is worth parsing out his argument in detail because Stephen High expressed an unquestioned sentiment among many historians and because his argument, as conventional and as acceptable as it might be to some, is seriously flawed. Moreover, such an approach will impact on the development of theory in Native Studies. In particular, High claimed that my study of Indian incomes in Manitoba suffered from "substantive methodological problems," which specifically means the use of the data was inappropriate.[124] For High, the use of Indian Affairs data is objectionable because: (1) the data was collected by non-Natives committed to the assimilation of Natives; (2) of an inability of the data to account for the monetary value for subsistence activities; and (3) Indian agents could not accurately determine the sources of incomes for thousands of "Amerindians" living on far flung reserves.[125] In essence, he claimed that Indian agents attempted to establish Eurocenteric data they did not really acquire (the unknown value of subsistence from far flung reserves). If one infers, as High implied, that "European concepts of revenue" (data tainted by Eurocenteric biases) shed no light on Native relations with the forces of capitalism or their economic life, then how subsistence was valued or the spatial unevenness of the knowledge of agents are really beside the point.

The allegation that Indian agents exaggerated or positively skewed the value of subsistence agriculture means that the values of other sources of incomes (hunting, fishing and wages) were diminished for reporting purposes. How High learned this is unknown; he provided no specific evidence or calculations for this assertion. Similarly, alternative sources of economic data were not offered in place of the Indian Affairs data. And given that agents themselves could not come to terms with the economies of far flung reserves, how High knows with certainty that the hunting and fishing incomes were miscalculated becomes a problem. While the department promoted reserve agriculture, more specifically on the prairies, officials were capable

of describing regional economies and could account for differences between desired policies and how people actually made a living. For example, Indian Agent J.O. Lewis noted that for the agriculturally well-endowed St. Peters reserve in 1907: "They do not make good farmers, but are much sought after as labourers."[126] At Berens River, Indian Agent S. Swinford was told by one Indian "that it did not pay him to stay home and bother with a garden, as he could make so much more money in other ways, and he could buy his potatoes in the fall."[127] Even for the Manitowapah Agency, a region somewhat endowed with better agricultural resources than the fur country, agriculture was not characterized as the dominant source of income until 1914.[128] Since agents reported on the *various* ways that Indians made a living, High's insinuation that they cooked the books in favour of subsistence agriculture is only a suspicion.

Nonetheless, consideration must be given to the limitations of a source. Did Indian agents and other officials have the capacity to provide reasonable estimates of Indian income? Could the average Indian agent discern the sources of incomes obtained by Indians? High's assertion about the difficulty of data collection should not be taken at face value. A number of reserves were grouped into regions known as agencies. Indian agencies did not have insurmountably huge populations as alleged by High; for example, a number of agencies existed in the Treaty Four territory: one of the larger agencies, Touchwood Hills had a population of 868 in 1900.[129] This would amount to a much fewer number of families. Estimates of individual family incomes could provide a basis for knowing the incomes of each reserve, and agency totals could be calculated from reserve totals. In treaty areas, at the minimum, an annual visit to each reserve was required to pay each Indian an annuity, and thus, agents were in contact with the Indian population. Not only did agents provide reports on each band, but Inspectors of Indian agencies, to whom individual agents reported to, also visited Indian reserves. Indian agents also kept records relating to reserve economies. Figures 1 and 2 reproduce pages from the Saddle Lake Agency Daily Journal.[130] It is evident that the operations of a gristmill, the production of a sawmill and acres of crops sown were recorded in a working document.

**FIGURE 1** Sample Economic Data (1899) in Saddle Lake Agency Journal



**FIGURE 2** Sample Economic Data (1898) in Saddle Lake Agency Journal



SOURCE: NAC, RG 10, vol. 9083, Book 7.

With respect to the Saddle Lake Band, the published annual report noted: "The chief occupations followed by these Indians are farming and stock-raising, but a number of them add considerably to their incomes by working for settlers and freighting for the department."[131] In the spring of 1899, the Saddle Lake Agency Daily Journal recorded: "Went with Inspector to see Thos Hunter and Thos Mokookis and to count their cattle returned to agency. Inspection of books rest of the day."[132] And for the next few days: "Inspection all day. I balanced ledgers ..." and "Inspection of books all day."[133] These daily journals noted that in the spring, cattle and beef returns were regularly produced. Similarly a decade later, between 21 and 23 April 1909 the Saddle Lake Indian Agent recorded the he had been "... working at Statistical Returns."[134] And by the fourth day, he could report that he had finished the Statistical Returns. These sources indicate that attention was paid to the economic circumstances of Indians and that record keeping was routine.

Along with the capacity to keep records and to make and report observations inconsistent with the "subsistence agriculture" obsession of the department, Indian agents had access to other sources of information. Indian agents were also in contact with HBC post managers and frontier capitalists. For example in 1899, Inspector McColl reported that "Captain Robinson pays annually upwards of $40,000 to the Indians in my inspectorate for lumbering, cutting cordwood, making ties, working on steamboats and at the fisheries."[135] Indian agents were also responsible for reporting an individual enumeration of Indians for the Dominion censuses. In some parts of the country, Indian reserves were far flung, and the standards to value subsistence income cannot be known today, however, the desire to establish "social control" of band populations could not be achieved by willful ignorance of the economic circumstances of Indians. Given that the need to blindly uphold the subsistence agriculture policy and the incapacity of Indian agents to know something of the economic life of Indians is easily disputed, High is left with the mere argument that data from the Department of Indian Affairs is hopelessly tainted by Eurocentricism. Such *a priori* approach to a data source is difficult to reason with.

If the source of the data (i.e., Indian agents) negates any potential value in that data, then to be logically consistent with such methodological musings, historians should stop using all published and unpublished sources from the Department of Indian Affairs, and other non-Native sources that also sought to assimilate Natives. Since High was also unable to show the extent of error, his central objection is nothing more than an *ad hominen* denunciation of numerical data. But oddly enough, Steven High used snippets of the very same Eurocenteric quantitative data from the Department of Indian Affairs in his "Robinson-Superior Ojibwa and the Capitalist Labour Economy" to show an increase in wage income between 1899 and 1912, and also, to indicate an increase in ownership of sailboats, row boats and nets and a decline in canoes.[136] A more probable methodological concern should be the cursory or *ad hoc* use of these data, such as the treatment by High and Carter. The insurmountable data collection problems (too many Indians on far flung reserves) that High alluded to would also make many non-numerical sources somewhat suspect.

These ruminations by High, and the conventional apprehension and reluctance about numbers, do not conclusively demonstrate that the Indian Affairs data is worthless government propaganda or that it is unable to provide empirical insights not found elsewhere. Significantly, Indian agents provided estimates of the value of subsistence fishing and hunting, which were crude estimates no doubt, and may have underestimated or overestimated the equivalent values.[137] It is of course a form of acceptable arrogance that today's academics can dismiss observations, or those observations that do not accord with their views, of those that may have lived for years within Indian communities (e.g., fur traders, missionaries and Indian agents), year round and often for years or decades on end. And thus, dismissing the capacity of an Indian agent to know something of what is going on appeals easily to contemporary dispositions.

The sorts of objections offered by High are really predicated on an elemental cynicism towards numerical data. More or less identical objections could be raised with most numerical data used by economic historians (i.e., how can a nation state, like Canada, count a far-flung population?). Loose speculation about insidious institutional motives to mislead the naïve can be used to reject almost any kind of numerical data; i.e., perhaps wheat yields in western Canada in the late 19th century were extremely exaggerated because the Department of the Interior wanted to promote settlement by luring unsuspecting European peasants to the prairies and that all this agricultural data is merely wishful thinking. Therefore, government numbers cannot be trusted to assist with a description of the agriculture settlement of the west. High's objections are not novel or insightful, and are often offered up by those who prefer to use more conventional and readily accessible sources, which when considered, are not free from anecdotal and impressionistic weaknesses.[138] The same sort of demurring about numerical data applies also to the descriptive sources (correspondence, memorandum, reports, etc.). In effect, these so-called methodological objections are not brilliant, but simply a form of special pleading. The standards that are used to reject a certain type of data, such as Eurocenteric notions of revenue linked with assimilation motives, are not applied so as to reject other sources of historical information. E.H. Carr reminded us about the general limitations of historical sources: "No document can tell us more than what the author of the document thought — what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even only what he himself thought he thought."[139] Descriptive records generated by correspondence, reports and memorandums, are also really just "general estimates" of what happened and are also laden with "wishful thinking."

Of course, academic historians are not about to stop using written sources from the Department of Indian Affairs and other agencies, which would be the effect of adopting the "High Test" (reject data unless it was collected by Natives). Special pleading with respect to data sources does not negate the systematic error inherent in such an approach. Moreover, High does consider how Eurocenteric notions might have some conceptual utility for understanding capitalism, which in and of itself has something of an Eurocenteric origin. If "revenue" is too Eurocenteric a view, then we should also never foist such culturally objectionable terms like constant capital, surplus value, mercantile accumulation, or relations of production on the economic interactions between Indians and Europeans. In other words say goodbye

to political economy! In reality, unsophisticated ramblings on Eurocenterism can serve to buttress the status quo; an exoneration of economic oppression can be achieved by ignoring empirical evidence and at the same time ignoring the contributions that Native labour made during the fur trade and frontier capitalism eras.[140]

Unsubstantiated musings about "methodological" concerns cannot really justify the suppression of certain categories of data and the selective preference for other types. For example, in the published annual report, Indian Agent S. Swinford provided a lengthy description of the resources and occupations of the Indians of the Manitowapah Agency (Manitoba Interlake region) in 1900:

> The principal resource for the future will, in my opinion, be cattle-raising, but this is only in its infancy as yet ...
>
> A lot of money is earned by the Indians of all the reserves at fishing during the winter, there is also a good deal earned at hunting, trapping, digging senega-root, picking berries and working as boatmen on the lakes. Many of them work for settlers during haying, harvest and threshing time; others work at the saw-mill at Winnipegosis, and in the lumber woods, and this year a number have been working at the big government canal at Fairford River. A few are still skilled at building boats and birch bark canoes, and make money at it; others are good at making snow-shoes, light sleighs (jumpers), flat sleights and such like; but there is one thing they can do the year round, so never in want for food, and that is to catch fish.[141]

Accordingly, this is a fairly diverse economy, and notwithstanding the Indian agent's hope for agriculture, he itemized a long list of "non-subsistence agriculture" income and resource opportunities. The statistical data for the same report indicated that the sources and values of the Manitowapah Agency Indians incomes totalled $25,452, which were composed of: value of farm produce including hay $6,952 (27.3%); wages earned $3,555 (13.9%); earned by fishing $4,775 (18.7%); earned by hunting $8,370 (32.8%); and earned by other industries $1,800 (7.0%).[142] These data tend to support Swinford's description of a variety of incomes, however, the contribution of hunting is more evident in the numerical data than in the agent's written description. Given that hunting and fishing combined to make-up half the income, in this case the Indian agent's dollar estimates of the value of hunting and fishing incomes were not unduly low. In fact, the effort to estimate a dollar value of subsistence hunting and fishing suggests an acknowledgement of the importance of these sources of incomes, which in subsequent decades was seldom appreciated by other observers. Both of these main types of written historical information provide insights about the economy and the combination of quantitative and qualitative data is methodologically desirable.

A rigorous understanding of what happened is achieved by working intensively with all primary sources in order to discern discrepancies. An awareness of the limitations of the descriptive/narrative sources does not mean that numerical sources as a category of data are inherently superior. In fact, the use of numerical economic data without an appreciation of the context of these economies, which is gained by qualitative sources, will surely result in distorted interpretations. High's disapproval of Indian Affairs data ignored certain aspects of the soundness of these data. Table 1 lists the data categories that were published in the annual reports of the Department of Indian Affairs under the heading "Agricultural and Industrial Statistics." Information on agricultural implements, livestock, ownership of general effects, crop production, new land brought into production, new buildings constructed, and sources of value of incomes were captured by 77 categories. For a more complete view, a sample of the data for agencies in Saskatchewan and Alberta (Treaties Four, Six and Seven) for 1906–07 is reproduced in Appendix 1. These figures display a few of the potential variables that can be derived from the published data.

In general, whether these data represent factious "wishful thinking" or "hard fact" can be further considered by checking for internal consistency and by using external sources. Indian Affairs expenditures on relief supplies should be less for those agencies with diverse and secure sources of incomes than those agencies on the economic margins. Trends in Indian fishing income should co-relate with changes in Indian ownership of fishing equipment. The data concerning the value of Indian property (accumulation) should be within the income means to accumulate or purchase such property and personal effects.[143] Similarly, external sources, such as Department of Fisheries data can be used to

**TABLE 1** Agricultural and Industrial Statistics Collected by the Department of Indian Affairs, CA. 1897–1935

***Personality of Indians***

| *Agricultural Implements, Vehicles &c.* | *Live Stock and Poultry* | *General Effects* |
|---|---|---|
| Ploughs | Horses | Sail Boats |
| Harrows | Stallions | Row Boats |
| Seed Drills | Gelding and Mares | Canoes |
| Cultivators | Foals | Rifles |
| Land Rollers | Cattle | Shot Guns |
| Mowers | Bulls | Nets |
| Reapers and Binders | Oxen, Work | Steel Traps |
| Horse Rakes | Steers | Tents |
| Fanning Mills | Cows, Milch | Value of General Effects |
| Threshing Machines | Young Stock | Value of Household Effects |
| Tool Chests | Other Stock | Value of Real and Personal Property |
| Other Implements | Lambs | |
| Wagons | Sheep | |
| Carts | Boars | |
| Sleighs Draught | Sows | |
| Sleighs Driving | Other Pigs | |
| Democrat Wagon | Poultry | |
| Buggies and Road Carts | Turkeys | |
| Value of Implements and Vehicles | Geese | |
| | Ducks | |
| | Cocks and Hens | |
| | Value of Live Stock and Poultry | |

***Agriculture Season 1906***

| *Grain, Roots and Fodder* | *New Land Improvement* |
|---|---|
| Wheat: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested | Land Cleared Acres |
| Oats: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested | Land Broken Acres |
| Barley: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested | Land Cropped for first time Acres |
| Corn: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested | Land fenced Acres |
| Pease: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested | |
| Rye: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested | |
| Buckwheat: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested | |
| Beans: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested | |
| Potatoes: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested | |
| Carrots: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested | |
| Turnips: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested | |
| Other Roosters: Sown and Bushels Harvested | |
| Hay: Tons Cultivated and Wild | |
| Other Fodder: Tons | |

***Progress During The Year 1906–7***

| |
|---|
| Buildings Erected |
| Dwellings, Stone |
| Dwellings, Brick |
| Dwellings, Frame |
| Dwellings, Log |
| Shanties |
| Barns |
| Horse Stables |
| Driving Sheds |
| Pig Sties |
| Store Houses |

**TABLE 1** (continued)

| *Source and Values of Income* | |
|---|---|
| Value of Farm Products including Hay | |
| Value of Beef Sold, also of that Used for Food | |
| Wages Earned | |
| Received from Land Rentals | |
| Earned by Fishing: | The Estimated Value of Fish and Meat Used for Food Is Included in these Columns |
| Earned by Hunting and Trapping: | |
| Earned by other Industries | |
| Total Incomes of Indians | |

SOURCE: Canada, Sessional Papers, 1908, Paper No. 27, Annual Report for the Department of Indian Affairs, 1906–07, pp. 146–156.

verify trends in income (changes in fishing incomes, as claimed by Indian Affairs should correspond to changes in fishing yields or the value of fish yields as reported by the fisheries department). For northern regions, HBC post balance sheets (1891–1931) are another source that can serve to externally interrogate Indian Affairs numbers.[144] Absolute incredulity about Indian Affairs numerical data overlooks the fact that these data were published yearly from the period of 1897 to 1935, and that the categories of data collected were consistent from year to year. Consistency and regularity means that these data have some temporal durability, and because these data are organized by agency across the country, a spatial/temporal framework for Native economic history is possible. A certain level of error does not negate the possibility to reconstruct basic trends over several decades. (If an error is systematic over time, the trend, but not the absolute value, has some utility.)

Nonetheless, as with all sources, there are bound to be errors and mistakes. As with published data from this era, misprints occur in the *Sessional Papers*. Occasionally, data for a particular agency was not published. Since on occasion individual reserves were shifted from agency to agency in the period 1897–1935, what the data described may change geographically (in effect the boundaries of the agencies changed). Converting the raw data to per capita indices is one means to control for changes in the territorial size of agencies. Hyper-inflation existed during the First World War era and thus it would be wrong to assume that the real incomes of Indians were growing rapidly in this period. Rather than reject a source *a priori*, E.P. Thompson advised us that all sources need to be "interrogated by minds trained in a discipline of attentive disbelief."[145]

Fundamentally, "serious methodological problems" will generate unreliable substantive results, and yet, Stephen High does not really seem to quarrel too much with my findings. So merely imagining what *may very well* be wrong with data does not constitute a fully developed analysis or a justification not to expend effort on these data. In effect, High merely visualized a haphazard list of potential problems, concocted a scheme about subsistence agriculture, invoked an unsophisticated counter-Eurocenteric prerogative, made no effort to determine the extent of error, admitted no possible benefits from these data, but then used the very same series of data when it suited his interpretation. In a manner consistent with Steve High's excising of Eurocenterism, Eleanor Blaine characterized HBC records: "Account books themselves are neutral, apolitical documents; they are part of a whole belief system. Their figures represent the values assigned by the accountant's culture to goods, services and time. How can these figures pretend to assign values and motives to people who do not share that culture and belief system?"[146] By claiming that the use of these records leads to a confusion of the culture and beliefs of Indians with

those of the European account-keepers, an essentialist difference purports to negate the idea that numerical data might tell us something about the nature of the economic relationships between Natives and Europeans. In other words, a record of what was traded to Indians tells nothing about their consumption priorities. However, one does not need to assign values in order to reconstruct basic consumption and production patterns. For those that perpetuate a romanticized partnership between Indians and Europeans, looking at accounting books to determine rates of exploitation or terms of trade would only be a counter-productive endeavour. The argument that numerical data is very unreliable should also bring comfort to those prosecutors litigating against the claims that historical evidence can document the practice of Aboriginal or pre-treaty commercial rights. Finally, creating a fine-textured analysis from economic history without the use of numerical data, is rather like expecting historical demographers to determine depopulation rates without any population figures. Unconvinced by Stephen High's denouncement, I contend that this is a promising source of data for what has been labelled the reserve transition era, just as Hudson's Bay Company account books provide insights about the Native economy in an earlier era.

If economic security is fundamental to the well-being of a society, then historical trends cannot be approached without recourse to an analysis of available numerical data. Additionally, if incorporation into the capitalist market is an issue, then "European concepts of revenue" are a necessary means to establish empirical base lines. When numerical data is summarily dismissed as dubious, then it is unlikely that meaningful concepts such as, comparative wage rates, price ratios, or rate of profit will be employed, and consequently, no effort can be made to understand economic trends and change. In this case, Native history will remain stuck on analyzing policy pronouncements of virtually de-contextualized political institutions and influential individuals. And thus, the special pleading that relies on qualitative sources and disparages numerical data can be reassured by the view that Native wage labour was merely a means to strengthen Native cultural ways and not a significant interface with capitalism. Central to the theory of a world system is the notion of unequal exchange, which somewhat similarly, Trosper referred to as price ratios between what Indians and Europeans sold to each other. In fact, the use of HBC accounting data by Ray and Freeman supports a discussion of terms of trade between Indian and European entities. An examination of the terms of trade will raise troubling questions about the partnership myth. However, if data is disregarded as "wishful thinking" then the concept of exploitation need not be empirically investigated. In reality, it is the exculpating of capitalism that is the wishful project. The removal of economics from the relationship between Indigenous/settler societies can only lead to a distorted history. Following High's logic, then, economic forces become irrelevant to an explanation of why the society that took shape in Canada was so different for Indians than "settlers."

If Andre Gunder Frank along with other social scientists who are re-examining the assumptions about the origins of a world system during the early modern era can draw conclusions from old data about metal (copper and silver) price ratios in China, and the consequent dynamics for the making of global economy prior to 1500, then why is it so hard for Canadian historians to derive some sense from 20th century Indian Affairs statistical data?[147] In Native history, the prevalent resistance to numeracy is problematic on a number of levels, but in the end, as Paul Strather noted: "Without statistics, economics would be little more than guesswork."[148]

## Summary and Prospect

This essay began by considering the economic problem raised by Harold Cardinal — the vicious poverty of Native communities. And while self-government and economic development are cojoined, Newhouse noted: "As Aboriginal peoples living in Canada, we inhabit a society dominated by the ideas of capitalism and the market."[149] Yet there is little in this essay which can be snapped up by economic development officers and used to transform communities. There are no formulas here to resolve the day-to-day frustrations. Moreover, the academic literature in the field of economic history is a long way off from explaining the complex problem of vicious poverty that concerned Harold Cardinal in 1969.

Some academic efforts to explain participation in a wage-based economy require that Natives behave entirely differently from other

people (who are motivated by material needs) and instead a cultural motivation takes precedence. Oddly, academics deem economic formalism irrelevant to the historic interactions between capitalism and Aboriginal societies, however today, Aboriginal communities are expected to conform to the laws of neoclassical economics in a global context. But clearly, the foundations for economic life of Native people have changed in the last few hundred years. Most contemporary historians do not see the fur trade as a system and means for creating wealth, or that the amassing of wealth by Europeans had any relevance for Native producers. For them, European objectives or purposes had very little effect on Native communities. The dominant paradigm asserts that most Indians were essentially free to make choices, the HBC could not get them to do what they did not want to do, and that Indians merely trapped to acquire a few tools in order to carry out traditional subsistence activities more efficiently. Apparently, the fur trade did not modify the "core" of Indian culture;[150] if anything, the new technology of the fur trade positively enriched "traditional" Indian life.

There is a marked tendency towards description and particularism in the fur trade literature, although some excellent empirical studies have been written in the last few decades.[151] Resistance to the use of numerical data, quantitative methods, and social science approaches makes the prospect for a new economic history of the fur trade unlikely.[152] Reluctance to use precise terminology is evident with the effort to construct an argument that the fur trade is best understood as an enduring partnership between Indians and Europeans. The terms dependency and exploitation are used derisively on occasion, but are never defined properly, and the conclusion that Indians were not exploited was never tested against the available evidence on prices, wages and profits. Fur trade studies attempt to make use of the term dependence, but do so in the same way that pro-empire historian E.E. Rich did forty-five years ago. Thus "dependence" is regarded as a situation in which the very physical existence of Indians would irrevocably be tied to trade with the company, an absolute proposition that would be hard not to disprove. Despite a denial of dependence by many historians, Trosper's desire for an understanding of dependence based on an historical interpretation informed by economics has some appreciation. The economic experience of Indians is not examined from concepts deriving from political economy; the outcome is that this research is isolated from the economic history of other non-European peoples who were incorporated with a world system through mercantilism.[153] The effects that engaging in production of fur for an external market based upon "hunters and gathers" is not readily grasped by the existing literature, in part, because economic concepts are not employed. In this respect, Sahlins' substantivist approach cannot provide an adequate theoretical foundation for understanding Aboriginal economic history following the development of the fur trade. Rather peculiar circumstances prevail: the fur trade history neither employs a radical political economy, which would seek to try and inform the present-day conditions, or mainstream formalistic economics which would provide some rigour for describing economic aspects of the fur trade. Although fur trade society was a consequence of trade, serious economics does little to inform these ethnohistorical studies.

In some respects, the debate concerning the effect of fur production for external markets on Indian society is a problem of spatial and temporal scale. From the local point of view of post journals, the evidence can be selected and interpreted to indicate either dependence or partnership. At the micro-economic level, the Indians pretty much handled the division of labour for the harvesting of fur, could insist on certain customs and rituals associated with exchange, decide upon which technology to employ, and express consumption preferences. One might easily accept that under certain conditions, leading Indians had an indirect influence on decision-making and practices associated with the post, and in the short-run, may have achieved certain objectives. The argument could possibly be made that the strikes of the HBC boatmen in the 1860s, which drove up the wage rate, were indicative of their autonomy and agency. However, such events really imply an antagonistic relationship with the managers of mercantile interests.

Even at the micro-economic scale, it is not clear that the apparent autonomy of Indian trappers really amounted to too much overt long-run economic power. Although commercial indebtedness, which has a marked affect on income distribution, may resemble reciprocity, and might even be exactly the same thing in the minds of Cree trappers, reciprocity in a communal society

and commercial indebtedness in a system of mercantile exchange have very different historical consequences. In an economy where a racial division of labour is a key means for structuring the industry, the relative proportion of income to each of the racial groups will influence their long-run social futures. The mixed economy could not absorb commercial value in a manner that would fund future growth. On this topic, research is needed on the changing pattern of income distribution in the fur trade. The inability of Native trappers to obtain more than a subsistence share of the fur industry's wealth has implications for trends in economic history. Political consequences followed.

At the larger macro-economic scale, there was no partnership; Native trappers and middlemen had no real equity in the system. Vital decisions about the accumulation of savings, investment allocations, mergers and business reorganization, long range capital strategies and control over world markets were entirely in the hands of the Europeans. Because Indians never tried to return to the original affluent society (a local economy based entirely on local resources and labour) larger economic processes affected their history. In some respects, Indian trappers were the first Canadians to feel the outcome of the staple trap.[154] Stagnant and declining fur prices on the London fur market probably did more to extend Canada's sovereignty than the trickiest treaty commissioner or meddling missionary. When the new owners of the HBC sought to divest in the fur trade operations, the political and economic future of Rupertsland was changed. Despite the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the legal rights of Aboriginal peoples, the HBC ended up with more land and money than Native people as a result of its successful claim to posses Rupertsland.[155] But pointing out these sorts of outcomes leaves one open to the accusation of prompting stereotyping and denying Native agency.

With respect to understanding the 19th century fur trade from the longer view of Native history, a number of new research questions need to be asked. From the perspective of economic history, what are long-term consequences created by the production of fur and other commodities for mercantile companies? If the fur trade was a mutually beneficial economic arrangement, did the consumption of trade goods by Indians reflect a reasonable equity stake in the industry relative to the commercial returns to the owners of the fur trading companies? And did a price/value system preclude reinvestment in activities that could keep pace with the surrounding economies? Similarly, the aversion to serious consideration of "economics" is a disconnect from efforts to seek redress through the courts for the historic "maladjustment" of resources following treaties and settlement.[156]

Apparently, we should believe that exploitation did not occur because Indians were active historical agents, not passive victims. The premise seems to be that only the inactive become passive, exploited victims. And thus because they were not passive, they were not exploited. A reassuring, and easily grasped academically sound assertion, but when examined closely, it is only a simple dichotomy. Being mindful and active about one's interests are not sufficient conditions to prevent exploitation. This new orthodoxy holds that the "Happy days" of Native history occurred during the historic fur trade and it cannot agree to investigate the proposition that political oppression was preceded by economic exploitation.[157] In other words, wealth and power are unrelated. In Canada, the problems that Trosper posed in 1988 have not been pursued actively. Exploitation, British historian E.P. Thompson explained: "... is, in fact, as I have said, a structural argument and a polemic against orthodox economic history," an orthodoxy that "... also attempts to present exploitation as a category in the mind of a biased historian and not as something that actually occurred."[158] To illustrate in the North American context, leading ethnohistorian Jennifer Brown objected to Harold Hickerson's fur trade colonialism thesis, noting his "simple stereotype of the trader as exploiter and debaucher of defenceless natives, a view that did credit to neither trader nor native nor historical complexity."[159] Exploitation is not a matter of stereotyping. While many early critical studies lacked nuance and flouted historical complexity, to reduce exploitation to a matter of a simple stereotype is a worthy illustration of what concerned Noam Chomsky: "the job of mainstream intellectuals is to serve as a kind of secular priesthood, to ensure that the doctrinal faith is maintained ... to be guardians of the sacred political truths."[160] But by denying that the fur trade put Whites and Natives on different historical trajectories, one of our nation state's

political truths have been preserved by mainstream academics.

Indian economic history after the transfer of Rupertsland certainly makes the partnership thesis suspect. When new frontier resource industries created labour markets, Natives quickly abandoned their obligations to the HBC. In a number of regions, it is clear, that Native labour was convenient for the establishment of frontier capitalism. Factors affecting Native security with their initial integration in capitalist-like labour markets are unclear. When competitive markets re-emerged, Native trappers responded to the price system and without hesitation they traded with opponents of the HBC. Revitalization of the fur trade after 1900 enabled trappers to have some very good years. However, when new markets yielded huge price increases, Natives could not appropriate the full value of this economic rent. Middlemen markups remained high. Moreover, high prices drew White trappers into the north, Native trapping areas were unprotected, and reckless exploitation by even a few itinerant White trappers meant that most benefits went to outsiders. Northern treaties did not deal with the problem of open-access and as a result Natives lost potential sources of income. The risks or costs associated with this form of resource development were incurred by Natives. After the trapping boom in the 1920s, more government relief was needed. The problem of the social overhead needs to be further investigated. Conceptual refinement is required, but this topic can generate some insights about the traditional Native economy and Native relations with the state in the 20th century. It might be found that many of the state policies of urbanization, assimilation and community development are essentially efforts to deal with a costly social overhead. Clearly, there was a "surplus" population that could no longer live adequately in the bush producing fur. An income gap between the general post-war prosperity and the Native economy was politically embarrassing.

With respect to more current interests, the final report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recognized that "... strategies for change must be rooted in an understanding of the forces that created economic marginalization in the first place."[161] This sketch of Native economic history attempts to provide some conceptual clarity as a first step to understanding the forces of marginalization. The commissioners also appreciated that economic history could address fundamental understandings: "There is some evidence, therefore, that Aboriginal people were successfully making the transition from a traditional to a 'modern' economy. These documented examples tend to be overlooked by those who conclude that Aboriginal people were unable to make the transition, that they were prevented from gaining positions in the wider economy because of racism, or that they were unwilling to venture beyond the safe haven provided by reserves."[162] However, as suggested by this essay, the exact nature of the transition is not clear. While much of Native economic history is connected to natural resource extraction, the fascinating story of Mohawk Steel Workers, beginning with working for the Dominion Bridge Company in 1886, seems to be an almost forgotten example of an integration with capitalism that is rich in both cultural and economic details.[163]

A small body of literature focusing on Native wage labour now exists, or perhaps what might be known as a labour history of Native peoples, however, the literature is essentially descriptive and has avoided engaging economic concepts or theories. Historians ponder why Indians were integrated with capitalism, but pursue answers that would not be deemed especially relevant to other peoples. Steven High, for example, boldly asserted that "a consensus has emerged among those who study native labour history" that participation in the capitalist economy was "selective" and done so "in order to strengthen their traditional way of life."[164] When Micmac farm labour is reduced because of the introduction of mechanical potato harvesters or Native boatmen employed on HBC Yorkboats are replaced by the adoption of steam power, then culture and identity have not shielded Aboriginal peoples from the tendency in capitalism to replace labour with capital. The contemporary implications of similar historical challenges have been raised by David Newhouse: "... with the emergence of a market where I can buy what I need and sell what I produce and the emergence of money as a system of exchange, requires me to think much differently about my life, what is proper behaviour in that life and the ends of that life. The emergence of the market as the dominant economic institution, replacing tradition and command as the method of provisioning means that I must begin to think about things in terms of the market, which is concerned with exchange value and

## **APPENDIX 1** Sample Annual Economic Data from the Department of Indian Affairs

Appendix1: Statistical Data from the Department of Indian Affairs 1906-1907



AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PERSONALTY OF INDIANS.

| Agency. | Agricultural Implements, Vehicles, &c. | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Ploughs. | Harrows. | Seed Drills. | Cultivators. | Land Rollers. | Mowers. | Reapers and Binders. | Horse Rakes. | Fanning Mills. | Threshing Machines. | Tool Chests. |
| **Saskatchewan.** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4 | 51 | 34 | 2 | ..... | ..... | 32 | 2 | 34 | 1 | 3 | 5 |
| Assiniboine " " 4 | 31 | 12 | 3 | 1 | ..... | 16 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 1 | ..... |
| Moose Mountain " " 4 | 23 | 5 | 3 | ..... | ..... | 16 | 3 | 10 | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Qu'Appelle " " 4 | 126 | 71 | 24 | 2 | ..... | 76 | 30 | 74 | 7 | ..... | 4 |
| Crooked Lakes " " 4 | 60 | 37 | 15 | 9 | ..... | 43 | 14 | 45 | 6 | ..... | ..... |
| Touchwood Hills " " 4 | 53 | 23 | 7 | 8 | ..... | 47 | 9 | 39 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| Battleford " " 6 | 120 | 58 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 82 | 14 | 66 | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Carlton " " 6 | 81 | 52 | 4 | ..... | ..... | 52 | 11 | 46 | 4 | ..... | 5 |
| Duck Lake " " 6 | 90 | 62 | 13 | 11 | 3 | 48 | 14 | 50 | 2 | ..... | 14 |
| Onion Lake " " 6 | 27 | 15 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 43 | ..... | 38 | ..... | ..... | 1 |
| Total | 662 | 369 | 71 | 31 | 3 | 455 | 98 | 409 | 24 | 5 | 32 |
| **Alberta.** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6 | 47 | 27 | 7 | ..... | ..... | 35 | 9 | 31 | 2 | ..... | 2 |
| Hobbema " " 6 | 98 | 45 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 44 | 4 | 33 | ..... | ..... | 3 |
| Saddle Lake " " 6 | 34 | 28 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 32 | 4 | 28 | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Stony " " 7 | 22 | 6 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 27 | ..... | 26 | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Sarcee " " 7 | 2 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | 14 | ..... | 6 | ..... | ..... | 1 |
| Blackfoot " " 7 | 55 | 19 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 73 | 1 | 64 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Blood " " 7 | 15 | 2 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 91 | ..... | 89 | ..... | ..... | 7 |
| Peigan " " 7 | 23 | 8 | 1 | ..... | ..... | 45 | 1 | 48 | 1 | ..... | ..... |
| Total | 296 | 135 | 12 | 5 | 4 | 361 | 19 | 325 | 4 | 1 | 14 |

Appendix 1 continued



AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PERSONALTY OF INDIANS—*Continued.*

27—ii—10½

| Agency. | Agricultural Implements, Vehicles, &c. | | | | | | | Value of Implements and Vehicles. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Other Implements. | Wagons. | Carts. | Sleighs, Draught. | Sleighs, Driving. | Democrat Wagons. | Buggies and Road Carts. | |
| **Saskatchewan.** | | | | | | | | $ cts. |
| Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4 | 627 | 57 | 33 | 53 | 26 | 8 | 31 | 9,025 00 |
| Assiniboine " " 4 | 48 | 30 | 7 | 22 | 14 | 3 | 12 | 8,350 00 |
| Moose Mountain " " 4 | 200 | 34 | 2 | 25 | 10 | 6 | 14 | 4,370 00 |
| Qu'Appelle " " 4 | 1,303 | 160 | 41 | 126 | 74 | 23 | 61 | 27,156 00 |
| Crooked Lakes " " 4 | 450 | 86 | 7 | 72 | 65 | 11 | 29 | 19,391 00 |
| Touchwood Hills " " 4 | 592 | 80 | 22 | 58 | 56 | 4 | 18 | 10,677 50 |
| Battleford " " 6 | 1,414 | 148 | 42 | 125 | 135 | 25 | 29 | 24,008 00 |
| Carlton " " 6 | 1,374 | 86 | 14 | 87 | 71 | 14 | 27 | 15,237 00 |
| Duck Lake " " 6 | 1,780 | 76 | 55 | 72 | 62 | 12 | 44 | 26,960 00 |
| Onion Lake " " 6 | 650 | 69 | 10 | 81 | ..... | ..... | 29 | 8,234 00 |
| Total | 8,438 | 826 | 233 | 721 | 513 | 106 | 294 | 152,408 50 |
| **Alberta.** | | | | | | | | |
| Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6 | 314 | 52 | ..... | 51 | 20 | 2 | 8 | 9,165 00 |
| Hobbema " " 6 | 505 | 105 | 38 | 91 | 54 | 1 | 13 | 12,245 00 |
| Saddle Lake " " 6 | 794 | 65 | 7 | 44 | 41 | 5 | 7 | 19,125 00 |
| Stony " " 7 | 45 | 67 | ..... | 55 | ..... | 2 | ..... | 8,000 00 |
| Sarcee " " 7 | 250 | 30 | ..... | 17 | ..... | 1 | 6 | 4,500 00 |
| Blackfoot " " 7 | 240 | 161 | ..... | 26 | 55 | 17 | 45 | 20,320 00 |
| Blood " " 7 | 2,000 | 292 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 49 | 50 | 47,525 00 |
| Peigan " " 7 | 315 | 100 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 20 | 20 | 6,600 00 |
| Total | 4,463 | 872 | 45 | 284 | 170 | 97 | 149 | 127,480 00 |

## APPENDIX 1 (continued)

Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PERSONALTY OF INDIANS—*Continued.*

| Agency. | Live Stock and Poultry. | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Horses. | | | Cattle. | | | | | Other Stock. | | |
| | Stallions. | Geldings and Mares. | Foals. | Bulls. | Oxen, Work. | Steers. | Cows, Milch. | Young Stock. | Lambs. | Sheep. | Boars. |
| **Saskatchewan.** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4 | | 165 | | 17 | 53 | 2 | 264 | 456 | | 27 | |
| Assiniboine " " 4 | | 107 | 60 | | 24 | 5 | 45 | 85 | | | |
| Moose Mountain " " 4 | | 100 | | 1 | 23 | 13 | 90 | 147 | | | |
| Qu'Appelle " " 4 | 20 | 668 | | 14 | 34 | 166 | 384 | 839 | | | |
| Crooked Lakes " " 4 | 3 | 312 | 41 | 6 | 49 | 41 | 225 | 342 | | 8 | |
| Touchwood Hills " " 4 | 12 | 264 | 44 | 13 | 32 | 129 | 453 | 533 | | | |
| Battleford " " 6 | 16 | 555 | | 24 | 112 | 32 | 290 | 995 | | 103 | |
| Carlton " " 6 | 2 | 334 | 3 | 12 | 112 | 227 | 427 | 477 | | | |
| Duck Lake " " 6 | 1 | 273 | 67 | 3 | 27 | 96 | 250 | 633 | | 23 | |
| Onion Lake " " 6 | 9 | 313 | 30 | 4 | 147 | 99 | 318 | 631 | | | |
| Total | 63 | 3,091 | 245 | 94 | 613 | 810 | 2,746 | 5,138 | | 161 | |
| **Alberta.** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6 | 1 | 352 | 19 | | 4 | 30 | 198 | 323 | | 5 | 1 |
| Hobbema " " 6 | | 423 | | | 11 | 97 | 294 | 363 | | | |
| Saddle Lake " " 6 | 3 | 244 | 34 | 1 | 58 | 113 | 217 | 491 | | 43 | |
| Stony " " 7 | | 950 | | | | 73 | 484 | 365 | | | |
| Sarcee " " 7 | | 300 | | | | 5 | 166 | 186 | | | |
| Blackfoot " " 7 | 44 | 2,500 | 125 | 38 | | 588 | 944 | 1,179 | | | |
| Blood " " 6 | 20 | 3,034 | | 140 | | 831 | 3,687 | 2,963 | | | |
| Peigan " " 7 | | 750 | 250 | | | 151 | 1,020 | 1,409 | | | |
| Total | 68 | 8,553 | 428 | 179 | 73 | 1,888 | 7,010 | 7,279 | | 48 | 1 |

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Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PERSONALTY OF INDIANS—*Continued.*

| Agency. | Live Stock and Poultry. | | | | | | Value of Live Stock and Poultry. | General Effects. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Other Stock—*Con.* | | Poultry. | | | | | | | |
| | Sows. | Other Pigs. | Turkeys. | Geese. | Ducks. | Cocks and Hens. | | Sail Boats | Row Boats. | Canoes. |
| **Saskatchewan.** | | | | | | | $ cts. | | | |
| Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4 | | | | | | 91 | 29,712 00 | | 1 | |
| Assiniboine Agency, Treaty No. 4 | | | | | | 140 | 12,435 00 | | | |
| Moose Mountain Agency, Treaty No. 4 | | | | | | 5 | 12,260 00 | | | |
| Qu'Appelle " " 4 | | | | | | 180 | 92,440 00 | | 7 | |
| Crooked Lakes " " 4 | | 41 | | | | 80 | 38,576 00 | | | |
| Touchwood Hills " " 4 | | | | | | 60 | 63,500 00 | | | |
| Battleford " " 6 | | 90 | | | | 390 | 68,128 00 | | 8 | 9 |
| Carlton " " 6 | | 1 | 3 | 1 | | 216 | 57,473 40 | | 8 | 229 |
| Duck Lake " " 6 | 10 | | 60 | | 15 | 500 | 48,216 25 | | 19 | 28 |
| Onion Lake " " 6 | | | | | | | 50,500 00 | | 2 | 58 |
| Total | 10 | 132 | 63 | 1 | 15 | 1,662 | 473,240 25 | | 45 | 324 |
| **Alberta.** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6 | | 12 | 8 | | | 125 | 29,400 00 | | | 24 |
| Hobbema " " 6 | | | | | | | 39,650 00 | | | |
| Saddle Lake " " 6 | 12 | 40 | 5 | 8 | | 250 | 32,903 00 | | 24 | 69 |
| Stony " " 7 | | | | | | | 36,180 00 | | | |
| Sarcee " " 7 | | | | | | | 15,375 00 | | | |
| Blackfoot " " 7 | | | 3 | | 6 | 40 | 118,838 00 | | 11 | |
| Blood " " 7 | | | | | | | 234,095 00 | | 1 | |
| Peigan " " 7 | | | | | | 100 | 74,060 00 | | 8 | |
| Total | 19 | 52 | 16 | 8 | 6 | 515 | 580,501 00 | | 44 | 93 |

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## APPENDIX 1 (continued)

Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PERSONALTY OF INDIANS—*Concluded.*

| Agency. | General Effects. | | | | | | Household Effects. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Rifles. | Shot Guns. | Nets. | Steel Traps. | Tents. | Value of. | Value of. | Value of Real and Personal Property. |
| | | | | | | $ cts. | $ cts. | $ cts. |
| **Saskatchewan.** | | | | | | | | |
| Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4 | 25 | 90 | ..... | 775 | 83 | 2,025 00 | 5,750 00 | 641,935 00 |
| Assiniboine Agency, Treaty No. 4 | 14 | 44 | ..... | 168 | 40 | 1,116 00 | 800 00 | 290,547 00 |
| Moose Mountain Agency, Treaty No. 4 | 10 | 33 | 4 | 110 | 52 | 1,132 00 | 750 00 | 230,022 00 |
| Qu'Appelle " " 4 | 83 | 134 | 22 | 270 | 226 | 3,350 00 | 10,800 00 | 1,932,294 50 |
| Crooked Lakes " " 4 | 16 | 42 | 12 | 97 | 98 | 1,612 00 | 2,960 00 | 686,670 00 |
| Touchwood Hills " " 4 | 27 | 79 | ..... | 1,549 | 106 | 2,369 00 | 4,200 00 | 933,748 50 |
| Battleford " " 6 | 86 | 157 | 70 | 695 | 200 | 5,626 00 | 10,800 00 | 923,276 00 |
| Carlton " " 6 | 158 | 237 | 273 | 3,195 | 239 | 8,801 50 | 5,042 00 | 615,586 90 |
| Duck Lake " " 6 | 52 | 185 | 69 | 3,617 | 179 | 8,842 00 | 13,300 00 | 736,551 25 |
| Onion Lake " " 6 | 50 | 98 | 104 | 1,385 | 188 | 5,255 00 | 3,625 00 | 731,011 00 |
| Total | 521 | 1,099 | 554 | 11,861 | 1,411 | 40,128 50 | 58,027 00 | 7,721,632 15 |
| **Alberta.** | | | | | | | | |
| Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6 | 66 | 106 | 68 | 2,300 | 123 | 3,570 00 | 2,600 00 | 538,111 00 |
| Hobbema " " 6 | 20 | 95 | 110 | 300 | 127 | 1,465 00 | 1,825 00 | 790,509 00 |
| Saddle Lake " " 6 | 28 | 123 | 118 | 1,082 | 104 | 4,196 00 | 3,880 00 | 278,957 00 |
| Stony " " 7 | 130 | 20 | 2 | 210 | 136 | 3,000 00 | 9,000 00 | 245,910 00 |
| Sarcee " " 7 | 5 | 8 | .... .. | 40 | 70 | 500 00 | 1,500 00 | 984,317 00 |
| Blackfoot " " 7 | 47 | 41 | ..... | 24 | 125 | 4,005 00 | 12,800 00 | 205,360 00 |
| Blood " " 7 | 40 | 10 | ... .. | 40 | 185 | ... ... ... | 6,000 00 | 1,392,176 42 |
| Peigan " " 7 | 20 | 35 | ... .. | ..... | 100 | 1,359 00 | 4,000 00 | 719,449 00 |
| Total | 356 | 438 | 298 | 3,996 | 970 | 18,095 00 | 41,605 00 | 5,154,789 42 |

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Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

AGRICULTURE.—SEASON 1906.

| Agency. | Grain, Roots and Fodder. | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Wheat. | | Oats. | | Barley. | | Corn. | | Pease. | |
| | Acres Sown. | Bushels Harvested. | Acres Sown. | Bushels Harvested. | Acres Sown. | Bushels Harvested. | Acres Sown. | Bushels Harvested. | Acres Sown. | Bushels Harvested. |
| **Saskatchewan.** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4 | 291½ | 8,619 | 481 | 14,115 | 8 | 260 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Assiniboine Agency, Treaty No. 4 | 442 | 4,930 | 173 | 3,940 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Moose Mountain Agency, Treaty No 4 | 255 | 4,372 | 68 | 1,554 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Qu'Appelle " " 4 | 2,484 | 60,461 | 1,102¾ | 32,186 | 6 | 248 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Crooked Lakes " " 4 | 829 | 14,908 | 277 | 8,379 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Touchwood Hills " " 4 | 56 | 1,553 | 575 | 23,502 | 16¼ | 766 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Battleford " " 6 | 579 | 5,838 | 559 | 11,329 | 7 | 115 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Carlton " " 6 | 346 | 6,794 | 492 | 15,680 | 88 | 1,877 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Duck Lake " " 6 | 295½ | 7,945 | 326¾ | 16,755 | 34 | 417 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Onion Lake " " 6 | 15 | 249 | 144 | 2,790 | 10 | 281 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Total | 5,592¾ | 115,669 | 4,198½ | 130,230 | 169¼ | 3,964 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| **Alberta.** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6 | 76 | 1,682 | 410 | 14,035 | 68 | 1,400 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Hobbema " " 6 | 123 | 2,453 | 180 | 7,743 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Saddle Lake " " 6 | 67½ | 4,911 | 349 | 13,676 | 45½ | 896 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Stony " " 7 | ..... | ..... | 146 | * | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Sarcee " " 7 | 10 | 240 | 168 | 3,360 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Blackfoot " " 7 | 4 | 35 | 50 | 1,476 | 14 | 685 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Blood " " 7 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Peigan " " 7 | 30 | 595 | 70 | 1,567 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Total | 310½ | 9,916 | 1,373 | 41,857 | 127½ | 2,981 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |

* Used for fodder.

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## APPENDIX 1 (continued)



Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

AGRICULTURE, SEASON 1906—*Continued.*

| Agency. | Grain, Roots and Fodder—*Continued.* | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Rye. | | Buckwheat. | | Beans. | | Potatoes. | | Carrots. | |
| | Acres Sown. | Bushels Harvested. | Acres Sown. | Bushels Harvested. | Acres Sown. | Bushels Harvested. | Acres Sown. | Bushels Harvested. | Acres Sown. | Bushels Harvested. |
| SASKATCHEWAN. | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4 | | | | | | | 8 | 1,575 | 1½ | 110 |
| Assiniboine Agency, Treaty No. 4 | | | | | | | 8 | 1,600 | 1 3-5 | 108 |
| Moose Mountain Agency, Treaty No. 4 | | | | | | | 2 | 225 | | 160 |
| Qu'Appelle " " 4 | | | | | | | 28 | 2,930 | 1 | 48 |
| Crooked Lakes " " 4 | | | | | | | 10¾ | 1,484 | | |
| Touchwood Hills " " 4 | | | | | | | 10½ | 1,500 | 2¾ | 73 |
| Battleford " " 6 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Carlton " " 6 | | | | | | | 16¾ | 1,370 | 1¾ | 127 |
| Duck Lake " " 6 | | | | | | | 10½ | 1,277 | 2¾ | 215 |
| Onion Lake " " 6 | | | | | | | 6½ | 707 | 4 | 34 |
| Total | | | | | | | 100¾ | 12,668 | 13½ | 815 |
| ALBERTA. | | | | | | | | | | |
| Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6 | | | | | | | 23½ | 2,300 | 10½ | 190 |
| Hobbema " " 6 | | | | | | | 11 | 1,335 | 3 | 540 |
| Saddle Lake " " 6 | | | | | | | 21½ | 1,400 | | 147 |
| Stony " " 7 | | | | | | | 3 | 75 | | |
| Sarcee " " 7 | | | | | | | 8 | 600 | 1 | 200 |
| Blackfoot " " 7 | | | | | | | 17¼ | 920 | 3¼ | 115 |
| Blood " " 7 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Peigan " " 7 | | | | | | | 10 | 1,200 | | |
| Total | | | | | | | 94¼ | 7,830 | 17¾ | 1,192 |



Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

AGRICULTURE, SEASON 1906—*Continued.*

| Agency. | Grain, Roots and Fodder—*Continued.* | | | | | | | New Land Improvements. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Turnips. | | Other Roots. | | Hay. | | Other Fodder. | | | | |
| | Acres Sown. | Bushels Harvested. | Acres Sown. | Bushels Harvested. | Cultivated. | Wild. | | Land Cleared. | Land Broken. | Land Cropped for first time. | Land fenced. |
| SASKATCHEWAN. | | | | | Tons. | Tons. | Tons. | Acres. | Acres. | Acres. | Acres. |
| Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4 | 1½ | 210 | 1½ | 110 | | 2,805 | 2,450 | | 53 | 214 | |
| Assiniboine " " 4 | 2½ | 420 | | | | 850 | 200 | | 36 | 126 | 43 |
| Moose Mountain " " 4 | | | | | | 600 | 500 | | 53 | 116½ | |
| Qu'Appelle " " 4 | 9½ | 960 | 3¾ | 310 | | 2,880 | 5,800 | | | | 100 |
| Crooked Lakes " " 4 | | | 2¼ | 307 | | 2,095 | 1,360 | | 84 | 144 | |
| Touchwood Hills " " 4 | 4½ | 349 | 2 | 177 | | 2,369 | 1,400 | | 188¼ | | 104 |
| Battleford " " 6 | | | 39 | * | 53 | 4,544 | 1,177 | | 80 | 80 | 33 |
| Carlton " " 6 | 1½ | 163 | 1 | 51¼ | | 1,991 | 495 | 132 | 205 | 134 | 112 |
| Duck Lake " " 6 | 1½ | 410 | 1¼ | 322 | | 3,916 | 769 | | 198 | 170 | 370 |
| Onion Lake " " 6 | | 97 | | 28 | | 2,446 | 220 | | 27 | 26 | 21 |
| Total | 21 | 2,609 | 50¾ | 1,305½ | 53 | 24,496 | 14,281 | 132 | 924¼ | 1,010½ | 783 |
| ALBERTA. | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6 | 5½ | 275 | | | | 2,048 | 530 | | | | |
| Hobbema " " 6 | 6 | 950 | | | | 2,802 | 610 | | 179 | | |
| Saddle Lake " " 6 | 27 | 1,420 | 7 | 88 | | 3,542 | 175 | | | | |
| Stony " " 7 | 1½ | 50 | ½ | | | 1,166 | 366 | | | | |
| Sarcee " " 7 | 1 | 200 | 8 | 100 | 39 | 900 | 160 | | | | 70 |
| Blackfoot " " 7 | 4 | 250 | | | | 2,000 | 90 | | | 12 | 350 |
| Blood " " 7 | | | | | | 3,682 | | | | | |
| Peigan " " 7 | 4 | 375 | | | 60 | 600 | | | 73 | 73 | 470 |
| Total | 49 | 3,520 | 15½ | 188 | 99 | 16,140 | 1,931 | | 252 | 85 | 890 |

* Not given.

## APPENDIX 1 (continued)

Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PROGRESS DURING THE YEAR 1906-7.

| Agency. | Buildings Erected. | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Dwellings, Stone. | Dwellings, Brick. | Dwellings, Frame. | Dwellings, Log. | Shanties. | Barns. | Horse Stables. | Driving Sheds. | Cattle Stables. | Pig Sties. | Store Houses. |
| **Saskatchewan.** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4 | | | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | |
| Assiniboine " " 4 | | | | 3 | | | | | | | |
| Moose Mountain " " 4 | | | | 3 | 9 | | | 4 | | | |
| Qu'Appelle " " 4 | | | 1 | 18 | | | | 1 | 8 | | |
| Crooked Lakes " " 4 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Touchwood Hills " " 4 | | | | 10 | 2 | | | | 3 | | 11 |
| Battleford " " 6 | | | | 4 | | | | | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Carlton " " 6 | | | | 13 | 19 | | | | 2 | | 1 |
| Duck Lake " " 6 | | | | 10 | | | | | 15 | | |
| Onion Lake " " 6 | | | | 10 | | | | | 3 | | 6 |
| Total | | | 2 | 73 | 30 | | 38 | 5 | 48 | 3 | 19 |
| **Alberta.** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6 | | | | 1 | 1 | | 2 | | | | |
| Hobbema " " 6 | | | | 6 | | | | | | | |
| Saddle Lake " " 6 | | | | 8 | | | 5 | | 5 | | 6 |
| Stony " " 7 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sarcee " " 7 | | | | 3 | | | 4 | | | | |
| Blackfoot " " 7 | | | 2 | | | | 4 | | 3 | | |
| Blood " " 7 | | | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| Peigan " " 7 | | | | 4 | | | | | | | |
| Total | | | 3 | 22 | 1 | | 15 | | 8 | | 6 |



Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PROGRESS DURING THE YEAR 1906-7.

| Agency. | Buildings Erected. | | | Increase in Value. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Root Houses. | Milk Houses. | Corn Cribs. | Value of New Land Improvements. | Value of Buildings Erected. | Total Value of New Land Improvements and Buildings. |
| **Saskatchewan.** | | | | $ cts. | $ cts. | $ cts. |
| Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4 | | | | 750 00 | 1,100 00 | 1,850 00 |
| Assiniboine " " 4 | | | | 2,699 00 | 1,200 00 | 3,899 00 |
| Moose Mountain " " 4 | | | | 265 00 | 1,490 00 | 1,755 00 |
| Qu'Appelle " " 4 | | | 11 | 100 00 | 3,780 00 | 3,880 00 |
| Crooked Lakes " " 4 | | | | 684 00 | 300 00 | 984 00 |
| Touchwood Hills " " 4 | | | | 1,150 00 | 2,000 00 | 3,150 00 |
| Battleford " " 6 | 3 | | | 362 00 | 1,690 00 | 2,052 00 |
| Carlton " " 6 | | | | 888 50 | 1,875 00 | 2,763 50 |
| Duck Lake " " 6 | | | | 2,054 00 | 2,400 00 | 4,454 00 |
| Onion Lake " " 6 | | | | 217 00 | 840 00 | 1,057 00 |
| Total | 3 | | 11 | 9,169 50 | 16,675 00 | 25,844 50 |
| **Alberta.** | | | | | | |
| Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6 | | | | | 375 00 | 375 00 |
| Hobbema " " 6 | | | | 2,148 00 | 600 00 | 2,748 00 |
| Saddle Lake " " 6 | | | | | 807 00 | 807 00 |
| Stony " " 7 | | | | | | |
| Sarcee " " 7 | | | | 50 00 | 2,000 00 | 2,050 00 |
| Blackfoot " " 7 | | | | 7,000 00 | 2,700 00 | 9,700 00 |
| Blood " " 7 | | | | | 905 42 | 905 42 |
| Peigan " " 7 | | | | 492 00 | 800 00 | 1,292 00 |
| Total | | | | 9,690 00 | 8,187 42 | 17,877 42 |

**APPENDIX 1** (continued)

Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

SOURCES AND VALUE OF INCOME.

| Agency. | Value of Farm Products, including Hay. | Value of Beef Sold, also of that Used for Food. | Wages Earned. | Received from Land Rentals. | The Estimated Value of Fish and Meat Used for Food is included in these Columns. | | Earned by other Industries. | Total Income of Indians. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | Earned by Fishing. | Earned by Hunting and Trapping. | | |
| SASKATCHEWAN. | $ cts. | $ cts. | $ cts. | $ cts. | $ cts. | $ cts. | $ cts. | $ cts. |
| Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4 | 19,453 00 | 3,840 78 | 3,400 00 | ..... | 180 00 | 6,400 00 | 4,850 00 | 38,123 78 |
| Assiniboine " " 4 | 7,133 50 | 1,014 40 | 1,465 25 | ..... | 1,650 00 | 460 25 | 2,386 00 | 14,109 40 |
| Moose Mountain " " 4 | 4,593 10 | 1,000 00 | 650 00 | ..... | 600 00 | 700 00 | 3,500 00 | 11,043 10 |
| Qu'Appelle " " 4 | 69,026 90 | 7,573 00 | 10,610 00 | ..... | 2,300 00 | 3,850 00 | 9,102 40 | 102,462 30 |
| Crooked Lakes " " 4 | 16,587 70 | 3,145 00 | 2,135 00 | ..... | 380 00 | 2,900 00 | 6,362 00 | 31,509 70 |
| Touchwood Hills " " 4 | 22,393 20 | 5,746 10 | 1,902 75 | 3,090 00 | 400 00 | 19,538 00 | 5,323 30 | 58,393 35 |
| Battleford " " 6 | 23,602 00 | 14,764 00 | 4,110 00 | 155 00 | 1,352 00 | 5,330 00 | 8,390 00 | 57,703 00 |
| Carlton " " 6 | 12,864 50 | 3,827 39 | 6,419 10 | ..... | 13,893 90 | 26,289 55 | 8,333 50 | 71,558 04 |
| Duck Lake " " 6 | 30,222 35 | 13,696 34 | 12,185 92 | ..... | 8,100 00 | 50,117 00 | 6,781 15 | 120,502 76 |
| Onion Lake " " 6 | 12,970 00 | 7,104 00 | 4,638 00 | ..... | 2,314 00 | 13,914 00 | 2,188 00 | 43,128 00 |
| Total | 218,786 25 | 61,111 01 | 47,516 02 | 3,245 00 | 31,169 90 | 129,498 80 | 57,206 45 | 548,533 43 |
| ALBERTA. | | | | | | | | |
| Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6 | 14,500 00 | 1,415 00 | 5,280 00 | ..... | 400 00 | 14,075 00 | 2,550 00 | 38,220 00 |
| Hobbema " " 6 | 12,653 05 | 3,125 00 | 1,000 00 | ..... | 2,440 00 | 2,000 00 | 2,135 00 | 23,353 05 |
| Saddle Lake " " 6 | 21,894 90 | 2,050 00 | 2,534 31 | ..... | 2,650 00 | 7,720 00 | 889 00 | 37,738 21 |
| Stony " " 7 | 2,200 00 | 2,342 63 | 2,145 00 | ..... | ..... | 3,700 00 | 9,247 50 | 19,635 13 |
| Sarcee " " 7 | 4,600 00 | 700 00 | 2,200 00 | ..... | 75 00 | 90 00 | 350 00 | 8,015 00 |
| Blackfoot " " 7 | 5,500 00 | 7,375 16 | 7,500 00 | ..... | 200 00 | 550 00 | 11,000 00 | 32,125 16 |
| Blood " " 7 | 10,517 00 | 9,289 62 | 12,268 36 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 4,308 40 | 37,373 38 |
| Peigan " " 7 | 2,360 00 | ..... | 5,000 00 | 1,500 00 | ..... | ..... | 6,580 00 | 15,380 00 |
| Total | 74,164 95 | 26,297 41 | 38,917 67 | 1,500 00 | 5,765 00 | 28,135 00 | 37,059 90 | 211,839 93 |

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SOURCE: Canada, *Sessional Papers*,1908, No. 27, Department of Indian Affairs, 1907,pp. 146-156.

begin to value them in monetary terms. I can no longer think of them in social terms. And my behaviour begins to be labelled as productive or unproductive, according to its relation to the productive apparatus of society."[165] This is a compelling argument, which also might have some antecedent expressions in the fur trade, and thus, the notion that Natives participated in wage labour markets merely to fund cultural activity is possibly incomplete or misleading. The assertion that Canadians as a whole sell their labour power in the capitalist system to strengthen their traditional ways, would be hard to dispute, but it would be inane nonetheless.

**NOTES**

1. Harold Cardinal, *The Unjust Society: The Tragedy of Canada's Indians* (Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig, 1969) p. 65.
2. Ronald L. Trosper, "That Other Discipline: Economics and American Indian History," *New Directions in American Indian History*, Colin G. Calloway, ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988) p. 199.
3. For example, Ian M. Drummond, *et al., Progress without Planning: The Economic History of Ontario from Confederation to the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Ontario Historical Series for the Government of Ontario, 1987). This study made one reference to Indians. The classic study in Canadian economic history did not pay any special attention to Indians, see W.T. Easterbrook and H.G.J. Aitken, *Canadian Economic History* (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1956). A somewhat more recent history has included the fur trade and has made use of concepts relevant to natural resource industries, see William L. Marr and Donald G. Paterson, *Canada: An Economic History* (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1980). Considerable attention to the role of Natives in the fur trade is apparent in Kenneth Norrie, Douglas Owram and J.C. Herbert Emery, *A History Of The Canadian Economy* 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Nelson Thompson Learning, 2002). Here too, the Native disappears after 1870. See K.J. Rea, *A Guide to Canadian Economic History*

(Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1991) for a very readable and comprehensive account, however, his summary of the fur trade history seems little influenced by work carried out in the last three decades. Some attention is given to the fur trade and Native peoples in John Dwyer, *Business History: Canada in the Global Community* 2nd ed. (North York: Captus Press, 2000). Although not exhaustive, serious coverage of the fur trade is found in Graham D. Taylor and Peter A. Baskerville, *A Concise History of Business In Canada* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994).

4. Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1972).
5. For an important theoretical contribution, see Michael I. Asch, "The Ecological-Evolutionary Model And The Concept Of Mode Of Production," *Challenging Anthropology: A Critical Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology*, D. Turner and G. Smith, eds. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979) pp. 81–99.
6. For example see the debate initiated with Robin Brownlie and Mary-Ellen Kelm, "Desperately Seeking Absolution: Native Agency as Colonialist Alibi," *Canadian Historical Review* vol. 75, no. 4 (1994) pp. 543–556.
7. Trosper identified a number of research problems: Indian societies failed to accumulate capital; Indian comparative advantage was the hunt which was vulnerable to open access; Indians did not have immigrants, giving Europeans the military advantage to take Indian property; the industrial revolution took place in Europe introducing modern economic growth; and Europe gained a monopoly in the trade with Indians and gained a larger share of the gain. Trosper, Economics, p. 213.
8. Price ratios concern relative prices between two commodities or sets of commodities, for example, if the goods Indians produce declined relative to the goods produced by Europeans, then Indians would have to produce more in order to maintain the same level of trade.
9. Trosper, Economics, p. 213.
10. Trosper, Economics, pp. 212–213.
11. Trosper, Economics, p. 213.
12. David R. Newhouse, "Resistance is Futile: Aboriginal Peoples Meet the Borg of Capitalism," *Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development* vol. 2, no. 1 (2001) pp. 75–82.
13. Newhouse, Resistance is Futile, p. 81.
14. Kelly J. Lendsay and Wanda Wuttunee, "Historical Economic Perspectives of Aboriginal Peoples: Cycles of Balance and Partnership, *Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development* vol. 1, no. 1 (1999) pp. 87–101. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples suggested a slightly different periodization: The pre-contact period, the fur trade, the settler period, and the period of dependence. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* vol. 2, *Restructuring The Relationship*, part 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996) pp. 780–790.
15. *R. v. Marshall*, Supreme Court of Canada [1999] 3 Supreme Court Reporter at p. 456; online: http://www/lexum.umontreal.ca/.
16. Arthur J. Ray, "The Early Hudson's Bay Company Account Books as Sources for Historical Research: An Analysis and Assessment," *Archivaria* vol. 1, no. 1 (1975–1976) pp. 3–38.
17. An assortment of published and unpublished material has been reviewed by Steven High, "Native Wage Labour and Independent Production during the 'Era of Irrelevance,'" *Labour/Le Travail*, no. 37 (1996) pp. 243–264.
18. The ethnographic literature that provides an atemporal account of economic aspects of Indian life, the debate on the character of Aboriginal land tenure, the legal dispossession of Native resources and reserve lands cannot be considered here. A good multi-authored assessment of this problem is found in "Who Owns The Beaver? Northern Algonquian Land Tenure Reconsidered," a special issue of *Anthropologia* n.s. vol. 18, nos. 1–2 (1986). Similarly, general histories, such as those that incorporate economic reality, cannot be discussed here, for example Kerry Abel, *Drum Songs: Glimpses of Dene History* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993); Peter S. Schmaltz, *The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Bruce G. Trigger, *Natives and Newcomers: Canada's 'Heroic Age' Reconsidered* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985); and Arthur J. Ray, *I have Lived Here Since the World Began: An Illustrated History of Canada's Native People* (Toronto: Lester, 1996).
19. Some examples of policy-oriented studies include: Jean H. Lagasse, *A Study of the Population of Indian Ancestry Living in Manitoba* (Winnipeg: Department of Agriculture and Conservation, 1959); H.B. Hawthorn, C.S. Belshaw and S.M. Jamieson, *The Indians of British Columbia: A Study of Contemporary Social Adjustment* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958); and H.B. Hawthorn, ed., "A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada: A Report on Economic, Political, Educational Needs and Policies," 2 vols. (Ottawa: Indian Affairs Branch, 1966).
20. An important regional history that makes use of historical economic and demographic data, see Gerhard J. Ens, *Homeland to Homeland: The Changing Worlds of the Red River Metis in the Nineteenth Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). In particular, the chapter on migration argued that the Metis exodus out of Manitoba was motivated by economic forces.

21. See Alice Littlefield and Martha C. Knack, eds. *Native Americans and Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical Perspectives* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996). For some conceptual depth that is largely lacking in the Canadian literature, see in particular their introductory essay "Native American Labor: Retrieving History, Rethinking Theory," pp. 3–44.
22. This position is clearly articulated in June Helm, Edward S. Rogers, and James G.E. Smith, "Intercultural Relations and Cultural Change in the Shield and Mackenzie Borderlands, *Subarctic* vol. 6, June Helm, vol. ed., *Handbook of North American Indians* William C. Sturtevant, gen. ed. (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1981) pp. 146–157.
23. Arthur J. Ray, *Indians In The Fur Trade: their role as hunters, trappers and middlemen in the lands southwest of Hudson Bay: 1660–1870* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974); and Charles A. Bishop, *The Northern Ojibwa And The Fur Trade: An Historical And Ecological Study* (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974).
24. Ray, *Indians In The Fur Trade*, p. 228.
25. Arthur J. Ray, "Fur Trade History as an Aspect of Native History," *One Century Later: Western Canadian Reserve Indians Since Treaty 7*, Ian A. L. Getty and Donald B. Smith, eds. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978); and Arthur J. Ray, "Indians as Consumers in the Eighteenth Century," *Old Trails and New Directions: Papers of the Third North American Fur Trade Conference*, Carol M. Judd and Arthur J. Ray, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980) pp. 255–271.
26. E.E. Rich, "Trade habits and economic motivations among the Indians of North American," *Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science* vol. 26, no. 1 (1960) p. 49.
27. Rich, Trade habits, p. 44.
28. Rich, Trade habits, p. 45.
29. Rich, Trade habits, p. 46.
30. In essence Rich was describing a backward sloping supply curve (increased prices reduced the supply of beaver belts). Several rational explanations would seem to account for this response. Indian canoes could only carry a limited amount of trade goods on the return trip, so increasing the number of pelts brought down would be pointless. Also the backward sloping supply curve response is consistent with conservation ethics. Trosper has argued that the backward sloping supply curve can be explained by the value placed on leisure. Trosper, Economics, pp. 203–205.
31. Abraham Rotstein, "Trade and politics; an institutional approach," *Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology* vol. 3, no. 1 (1972) pp. 1–28. See also A. Rotstein, "Innis: The Alchemy of Fur and Wheat," *Journal of Canadian Studies* vol. 12, no. 5 (1977) pp. 6–31; and Abraham Rotstein, "Karl Polanyi's Concept of Non-Market Trade," *Journal of Economic History* vol. 30, no. 1 (1970) pp. 117–126.
32. Arthur J. Ray and Donald B. Freeman, *"Give Us Good Measure: an economic analysis of relations between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company before 1763* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978).
33. Rich, Trade habits, p. 43.
34. In particular, see Shepard Krech III, "The Trade of the Slavey and Dogrib at Fort Simpson in the Early Nineteenth Century;" and Robert Jarvenpa and Hetty Jo Brumbach, "The Microeconomics of Southern Chipewyan Fur-Trade History," *The Subarctic Fur Trade: Native Social And Economic Adaptations*, Shepard Krech III, ed., (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984) pp. 99–146 and 147–183. However, to my knowledge, no efforts have been made to examine the fur trade by exploring concepts of surplus extraction or rate of profit with these HBC data. For a demonstration of the potential to extract political economy findings from post-HBC accounting records, see Frank Tough, "'to make a profit without much consideration for the native': The Spatial Aspects of Hudson's Bay Company Profits in Northern Manitoba, 1891–1929," *Geography Discussion Paper Series* paper no. 44 (Toronto: York University, 1994).
35. For example, see Mel Watkins' grating defence of the Rich/Rotstein thesis and rejection of the Ray/Freeman argument in his book review of *Give Us Good Measure* in *Canadian Journal of Economics*, vol. 12, no. 2 (1979) pp. 775–777. Watkins was completely dismissive: "but in fact this book is deeply flawed and in my opinion the Rich-Rotstein thesis survives with only marginal adjustments;" "unfortunate that they do not understand that they have proved rather than disproved it;" "the authors' microscopic analysis of the account books apparently yields no firm data;" "... there is really no justification for this book-length study;" and that it should have been "read as a lengthy footnote to the major contributions of Innis, Rich and Rotstein." Not surprisingly, Watkins also claimed: "What is striking is the limited adaptation and the essential survival of the Indian way," and that "fur as a staple activity was a trade, not an industry." Any familiarity with the labour and resource demands of local post economies and transport systems does permit the classification of the fur trade as something lacking the complexity of "industry."
36. By shifting power relations in the fur trade, one only has to consider the creation of a monopoly in 1821 or the Transfer of Rupertsland in 1870.
37. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press 1957, original 1944) pp. 43, 57.
38. I am referring to number treaties of northern and western Canada. Prior to Treaty One (1871),

economic growth at the Red River Settlement led to the commodification of land, but in 1817, the Selkirk treaty was signed.

39. With the emergence of competitive fur markets ca. 1900, patterns of Indian behaviour corresponding to the findings of Ray and Freeman for the pre-1763 era re-emerged. See Frank Tough, "Indian economic behaviour, exchange and profits in northern Manitoba during the decline of monopoly, 1870–1930," *Journal of Historical Geography* vol. 16, no. 4 (1990) pp. 385–401. In this sense, the Ray/Freeman findings have an historical coherence that is lacking in the Rich/Rotstein/Watkins thesis.
40. Carol M. Judd, "'Mixt Bands of Many Nations': 1821–70," *Old Trails and New Directions*, Ray and Judd, eds., pp. 127–146.
41. Carol M. Judd, "Native labour and social stratification in the Hudson's Bay Company's Northern Department 1770–1870," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* vol. 17, no. 4 (1980) p. 314. For detailed analysis of one particular group's participation as labourers in the fur trade, see Jan Grabowski and Nicole St-Onge, "Montreal Iroquois engagés in the Western Fur Trade, 1800–1821," *From Rupert's Land to Canada*, Theodore Binnema, Gerhard J. Ens and R.C. McCleod, eds. (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2001) pp. 23–58.
42. Judd, Native labour, p. 313.
43. Judd, Native labour, p. 313.
44. For an interesting case study of a Métis merchant which provides insights into economic history, see Gerhard J. Ens, "Metis Ethnicity, Personal Identity and the Development of Capitalism in the Western Interior: The Case of Johnny Grant," *From Rupert's Land to Canada*, Binnema, Ens and McCleod, eds., pp. 161–177.
45. Ron G. Bourgeault, "The Indian, the Metis and the Fur Trade: Class, Sexism and Racism in the Transition from 'Communism' to Capitalism," *Studies in Political Economy* no. 12 (1983) p. 45. His identification of a Métis national petty bourgeoisie class provided some interesting insights about the political history of the Red River settlement.
46. Glen Makahonuk, "Wage-Labour In The Northwest Fur Trade Economy, 1760–1849," *Saskatchewan History* vol. 41, no. 1 (1988) pp. 1–17. For a general labour history of the fur trade, see Edith I. Burley, *Servants of the Honourable Company: Work, Discipline, and Conflict in the Hudson's Bay Company, 1770–1870* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997). For an analysis of this argument, see Frank Tough, review, *Servants of the Honourable Company* in *Manitoba History*, no. 37 (1999) pp. 46–51.
47. For example, records were found that showed that "... the creation of a capitalistic labour market in Red River introduced a rigid class system which confirmed the status of the Metis daughters of the merchant elite even as it reduced the mobility of the great majority of the population." Brian Gallagher, "A Re-Examination of Race, Class and Society in Red River," *Native Studies Review* vol. 4, nos. 1 and 2 (1988) p. 25.
48. Toby Morantz, "'So Evil a Practice': A Look at the Debt System in the James Bay Fur Trade," *Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective*, Rosemary E. Ommer, ed. (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1990) p. 221.
49. Arthur J. Ray, "Periodic Shortages, Native Welfare, and the Hudson's Bay Company 1670–1930," *Subarctic Fur Trade*, Krech, ed., p. 11.
50. Morantz, Debt System, p. 221.
51. Morantz, Debt System, p. 222. She also argued: "In sum, the Indians expected a system whereby their supplies were advanced by the company for the ensuing winter's hunt whether in time of competition or not. They desired such a system because it enabled them to develop their own hunting priorities, trapping for exchange when, and to the extent that, they wished." Morantz, Debt System, p. 221. Given this claim, one has to wonder why the HBC bothered keeping debt accounts.
52. Arthur J. Ray, "The Decline of Paternalism in the Hudson's Bay Company Fur Trade, 1870–1945," *Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective*, Ommer, ed., p. 189.
53. F. Laurie Barron, *Walking in Indian Moccasins: The Native Policies of Tommy Douglas and the CCF* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997) p. 145. See also, Ann Harper Fender, "Public versus Private Ownership: Saskatchewan Fur Trapping and Trading Legislation in the 1940s," *New faces in the fur trade: selected papers of the Seventh North American Fur Trade Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1995* Jo-Anne Fiske, Susan Sleeper Smith and Bill Wicken, eds. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1998) pp. 223–243.
54. Ray, Decline of Paternalism, p. 201.
55. Cardinal, *Unjust Society*, p. 96.
56. Cardinal, *Unjust Society*, p. 97.
57. Ray, Periodic shortages, pp. 1–20.
58. Ray, Periodic shortages, p. 9.
59. And see, Arthur J. Ray, "Some conservation schemes of the Hudson's Bay Company, 1821–50: An examination of the problems of resource management in the fur trade," *Journal of Historical Geography* vol. 1, no. 1 (1975) pp. 49–68. On the question of depletion, see also Ann M. Carlos and Frank D. Lewis, "Indians, the Beaver, and the Bay: The Economics of Depletion in the Lands of the Hudson's Bay Company, 1700–1763," *Journal of Economic History* vol. 53, no. 3 (1993) pp. 465–494; and Ann M. Carlos and Frank D. Lewis, "Property rights, competition, and depletion in the eighteenth-century Canadian

fur trade: the role of the European market," *Canadian Journal of Economics* vol. 32, no. 3 (1999) pp. 705–728.

60. Ray, Periodic shortages, p. 9.
61. Ray, Periodic shortages, p. 16.
62. For an example of the ambiguity concerning the nature of "independent production" in a mercantile economy, see, High, Native Wage Labour, p. 256. The concept of independent production can be an important distinction from the situation of wage labour, however, it can be misleading in terms of describing the power associated with controlling production for a market.
63. Leanna Parker, "Paternalism and Identity: The Role of Personal Labour Organization in the Formation of Group Identity Among the Metis in the Rupertsland Fur Trade and the Aboriginal People in the Northern Australian Cattle Industry," (MA Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1999).
64. Patricia A. McCormack, "Becoming Trappers: The Transformation to a Fur Trade Mode of Production at Fort Chipewyan," *Rendezvous: Selected Papers of the Fourth North American Fur Trade Conference, 1981*, Thomas C. Buckley, ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: North American Fur Trade Conference, 1984) pp. 155–173.
65. McCormack, Becoming Trappers, p. 156.
66. McCormack, Becoming Trappers, p. 157.
67. McCormack, Becoming Trappers, p. 157.
68. The notion that the fur trade was merely a "trade" and not an industry ignores empirical evidence, but see Watkins, Review of *Give Us Good Measure*, p. 777. For a critical analysis of the fur trade see, Russell George Rothney, "Mercantile Capital and the Livelihood of the Residents of the Hudson Bay: A Marxist Interpretation," (MA Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1975).
69. See Frank Tough, "Aboriginal Rights Versus the Deed of Surrender: The Legal Rights of Native Peoples and Canada's Acquisition of the Hudson's Bay Company Territory," *Prairie Forum* vol. 17, no. 2 (1992) pp. 225–250.
70. Frank Tough, "Buying Out The Bay: Aboriginal Rights and the Economic Policies of the Department of Indian Affairs after 1870," *The First Ones: Readings in Indian/Native Studies*, David R. Miller, *et al.* eds. (Piapot Reserve: Saskatchewan Indian Federated College Press, 1992) p. 404.
71. Arthur J. Ray, *The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) p. 49. See also Arthur J. Ray, "Introductory essay," in Harold Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999, original 1930) pp. i–xix.
72. Ray, *The Canadian Fur Trade*, pp. 208–210.
73. Ray, *The Canadian Fur Trade*, p. 221.
74. For example: J.D. Leighton, "A Victorian Civil Servant at Work: Lawrence Vankoughnet and the Canadian Indian Department, 1874–1893," *As Long As the Sun Shines and Water Flows*, Ian A.L. Getty and Antoine S. Lussier, eds. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983) pp. 104–119; or Brian Titley, *A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983).
75. For example, see Jean Friesen, "Grant Me Wherewith to Make My Living," *Aboriginal Resource Use in Canada: Historical and Legal Aspects*, Kerry Abel and Jean Friesen, eds. (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1991) pp. 141–155. For an the initial identification of the treaty economic agenda, see Frank Tough, "Changes To The Native Economy Of Northern Manitoba In The Post-Treaty Period: 1870–1900," *Native Studies Review* vol. 1, no. 1 (1984) pp. 40–66; and Frank Tough, "Economic Aspects of Aboriginal Title in Northern Manitoba: Treaty 5 Adhesions and Metis Scrip," *Manitoba History* no. 15 (1988) pp. 3–16. For details on the economic negotiations during treaty talks, see Frank Tough *"As Their Natural Resources Fail": Native Peoples and the Economic History of Northern Manitoba, 1870–1930* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1996) pp. 75–98.
76. Ray, *The Canadian Fur Trade*, p. 40.
77. Ray, *The Canadian Fur Trade*, pp. 39, 42–43.
78. See Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller and Frank J. Tough, *Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan Treaties* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000) pp. 3–20.
79. Trosper, Economics, p. 209.
80. Irene M. Spry, "The Tragedy of the Loss of the Commons in Western Canada," *As Long As the Sun Shines and Water Flows*, Getty and Lussier, eds., pp. 203–228.
81. Spry, Tragedy, p. 212.
82. Spry, Tragedy, p. 218.
83. Spry, Tragedy, p. 224.
84. Some excellent studies of the history of Native freshwater fisheries have raised the problem of access, over-exploitation and treaty rights: Victor P. Lytwyn, "Ojibwa and Ottawa Fisheries around Manitoulin Island: Historical and Geographical Perspectives on Aboriginal and Treaty Fishing Rights," *Native Studies Review* vol. 6, no. 1 (1990) pp. 1–30; John J. Van West, "Ojibwa Fisheries, Commercial Fisheries Development and Fisheries Administration, 1873–1915: An examination of Conflicting Interest and the Collapse of the Sturgeon Fisheries of the Lake of Woods," *Native Studies Review* vol. 6, no. 1 (1990) pp. 31–65; Anthony G. Gulig, "Sizing Up The Catch: Native-Newcomer Resource Competition and the Early Years of Saskatchewan's Northern Commercial Fishery," *Saskatchewan History* vol. 47,

no. 2 (1995) pp. 3–11; and J. Michael Thoms, "An Ojibwa Community, American Sportsmen, and the Ontario Government in the Early Management of the Nipigon River Fishery," *Fishing Places, Fishing People: Traditions and Issues In Canadian Small-Scale Fisheries*, Dianne Newell and Rosemary E. Ommer, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), pp. 170–192.

85. Frank Tough, "The Establishment Of A Commercial Fishing Industry And The Demise Of Native Fisheries In Northern Manitoba," *Canadian Journal of Native Studies* vol. 4, no. 2 (1984) pp. 303–319; Frank Tough, "The Establishment and Consolidation of a Commercial Fishing Industry in Manitoba, 1880–1910," *The Politics of Work in the West: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* Harley D. Dickinson and Bob Russell, eds. (Saskatoon: Social Research Unit, Department of Sociology, University of Saskatchewan, 1985) pp. 70–97; and Frank Tough, "Fisheries Economics and the Tragedy of the Commons: The Case of Manitoba's Inland Commercial Fisheries," *Department of Geography Discussion Paper Series* (Toronto: Department of Geography, York University, 1987). The Indian experience with the commercialization of west coast salmon fisheries corresponds to the history of the freshwater fisheries; see, Daniel L. Boxberger, "In and Out of the Labor Force: The Lummi Indians and the Development of the Commercial Salmon Fishery of North Puget Sound, 1880–1900," *Ethnohistory* vol. 35, no. 2 (1988) pp. 161–190.
86. For an appreciation of the particular situation of sturgeon fisheries and evidence that cultural values do not necessarily constrain the wanton impulses of the market, see Frank J. Tough, "Depletion by the market: Commercialization and Resource Management of Manitoba's Lake Sturgeon (*Acipenser fulvescens*), 1885–1935," *Fishing Places, Fishing People*, Newell and Ommer, eds. pp. 97–120.
87. Sarah Carter, *Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990). See also, Sarah Carter, "Two Acres and a Cow: 'Peasant' Farming for the Indians of the Northwest, 1889–97," *Canadian Historical Review* vol. 70, no. 1 (1989) pp. 27–52; Sarah Carter, "Agriculture and Agitation on the Oak River Dakota Reserve, 1875–1895," *Manitoba History* no. 6 (1983) pp. 2–9; and Sarah Carter, "'We Must Farm To Enable Us To Live': The Plains Cree and Agriculture to 1900," *Native Peoples: The Canadian Experience* 2nd ed., R. Bruce Morrison and C. Roderick Wilson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995) pp. 444–470.
88. Carter, *Lost Harvest*s, p. 50.
89. Carter, *Lost Harvests*, p. 158.
90. However, the significance of Hayter Reed's ideas might be overstated, see Rob Innes, Brenda Macdougall and Frank Tough, "Band Economies, 1897–1915," *Atlas of Saskatchewan*, Ka-iu Fung, ed. (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 1999) pp. 59–60. With respect to the mixed economies of this era, see Peter Douglas Elias, *The Dakota of the Canadian Northwest: Lessons for Survival* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1988); and Carl Beal, "Money, Markets and Economic Development in Saskatchewan Indian Reserve Communities, 1870–1930," Unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1994).
91. Carter, *Lost Harvests*, p. 193.
92. Carter, *Lost Harvests*, p. 258.
93. A good example in which wage labour has been erased from ethnography and history is Hallowell's studies on the Lake Winnipeg Ojibwa carried out in the mid-1930s; however, even more contemporary versions of ethnography have not seen fit to acknowledge Ojibwa involvement in frontier capitalism. See A. Irving Hallowell, *The Ojibwa of Berens River, Manitoba: Ethnography Into History*, edited with Preface and Afterward by Jennifer S.H. Brown (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publisher, 1992). Knack and Littlefield explained the ignoring of Native American Indian participation in wage labour by ethnographers and ethnohistorians: "Anthropological fascinations with the 'traditional,' or compulsions to salvage the 'aboriginal' before it became hopelessly contaminated by the 'modern,' may account for part of the silence;" and "... the habit of studying the Indian community as separate from the non-Indian, have all too often led to constructions that treat Native life as an isolate." Knack and Littlefield, "Native American Labor: Retrieving History, Rethinking Theory," *Native Americans And Wage Labor*, Littlefield and Knack, eds., p. 3.
94. Tough, "Changes To The Native Economy", pp. 47–48; and Tough, *As Their Natural Resources Fail*. However, Steven High is skeptical about the existence of a more diversified economy and wage labour of the post-1870 fur trade era or that it offers any advantages over the "independent" production of what was in reality a stagnating fur trade. To classify Native participation in fur trade as independent production is clearly an inadequate concept in light of mercantile domination. High, Native Wage Labour, p. 256. Declining fur prices demonstrate that the fur trade was stagnating and that new resources industries held certain advantages. Consequently, many Natives from the York Factory and Oxford House areas migrated to Lake Winnipeg because of a buoyant fishing industry.

95. Rolf Knight, *Indians At Work: An Informal History Of Native Indian Labour In British Columbia 1858–1930* (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1978). For the revised edition see, Rolf Knight, *Indians At Work: An Informal History of Native Labour in British Columbia, 1848–1930* (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1996).
96. Knight, *Indians At Work*, p. 7.
97. Knight, *Indians At Work*, p. 23.
98. Douglas Harris has reviewed the second edition of *Indian At Work* in *Native Studies Review*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1996) pp. 147–151. Harris challenged Knight's "exclusive reliance on a class-based analysis," and among other issues, Harris takes exception with Knight's view of land claims.
99. James K. Burrows, "'A Much-Needed Class of Labour': The Economy and Income of the Interior Southern Plateau Indians, 1897–1910," *BC Studies* no. 71 (1986) pp. 27–46. In preference for descriptive sources, many historians have chosen to ignore the income and economic data from the tabular statements of the annual reports of the Department of Indian Affairs.
100. Burrows, Economy and Income, p. 46.
101. Percy Gladstone, "Native Indians and the Fishing Industry of British Columbia," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* vol. 19, no. 1 (1953) p. 20. This is an excellent and rare example of an early interest in Indian economic history that not only provided a description of the industry but also considered: contrasts between the modern industry and the traditional fishery, the affects of conservation regulations, and racial divisions within the industry.
102. A recent study on the Indian lands in British Columbia see Cole Harris, *Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002).
103. John Lutz, "After the fur trade: the aboriginal labouring class of British Columbia 1849–1890," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* vol. 3 (1992) pp. 69–93.
104. Lutz, After the fur trade, p. 70.
105. Lutz, After the fur trade, p. 81.
106. Lutz, After the fur trade, p. 87.
107. Knight, *Indians at Work*, p. 196.
108. Lutz, After the fur trade, p. 91.
109. Lutz, After the fur trade, p. 91.
110. Fred Wien, *Rebuilding the Economic Base of Indian Communities: The Micmac in Nova Scotia* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1986) p. 12. For details on Micmac labour history see Harald E.L. Prins, "Tribal Network and Migrant Labor: Mi'kmaq Indians as Seasonal Workers in Aroostook's Potato Fields, 1870–1980," *Native Americans And Wage Labor*, Littlefield and Knack, eds., pp. 45–65.
111. Wien, *Rebuilding the Economic Base*, p. 27.
112. Wien, *Rebuilding the Economic Base*, p. 28.
113. Wien, *Rebuilding the Economic Base*, p. 30.
114. Robin Fisher, *Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774–1890* 2nd ed. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992) p. xix.
115. Fisher, *Contact and Conflict*, p. xix. In this respect, the historical and contemporary involvement in forestry by the Tsimshian is outlined in Charles R. Menzies and Caroline Butler, "Working in the Woods: Tsimshian Resource Workers and the Forestry Industry of British Columbia," *American Indian Quarterly* vol. 25, no. 3 (2001) pp. 409–430.
116. Dianne Newell, *Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1993) p. 25.
117. Carter, *Lost Harvest*, pp. 234–235. Clearly, the inclusion of these data was an affectation and not an effort to test the main findings. Not only was a trend constructed by ignoring data for every second year, but also a line graph was used, which provides a misleading impression by suggesting continuous data over a compact time period. Such flawed treatment of simple numbers may be a good reason for traditional historians avoiding these sources of data.
118. Innes, Macdougall and Tough, Band Economies, pp. 59–60.
119. See also Helen Buckley, *From Wooden Ploughs to Welfare: Why Indian Policy Failed in the Prairie Provinces* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992).
120. Steven High, "Responding to White Encroachment: The Robinson-Superior Ojibwa and the Capitalist Labour Economy, 1880–1914," *Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society Papers and Records* vol. 22 (1994) p. 34.
121. High's use of "many" implies a quantity, when in fact no numbers are revealed. The names of historians that had rejected these data after investigation were not provided nor was any literature cited in support of this claim. High, Native Wage Labour, p. 262 [emphasis added].
122. Ray, *Canadian Fur Trade*, pp. 202–209.
123. Beal, "Money, Markets and Economic Development;" and Burrows, "Economy and Income."
124. High, Native Wage Labour, p. 262.
125. High, Native Wage Labour, p. 262.
126. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1908, Annual Report for the Department of Indian Affairs, 1907, Paper No. 27, p. 75 (hereafter CSP, 1908, Indian Affairs, 1907, No. 27).
127. CSP, 1905, Indian Affairs, 1904, No. 27, p. 118. Similarly, when asked by the Indian agent why he did not grow potatoes, a Hollow Water band member elucidated: "he and the family were nearly always away during the growing season and he could buy potatoes cheaper than he could raise them." CSP, 1905, Indian Affairs, 1904, No. 27, p. 114. It is evident that there were better ways to secure incomes than to adhere to the

priorities of the Department of Indian Affairs, and evidently some Indian agents did not allow policy, or what we claim to be policy today, to blind them from reality.

128. Frank Tough, "Regional Analysis of Indian Aggregate Income, Northern Manitoba: 1896–1935," *Canadian Journal of Native Studies* vol. 12, no. 1 (1992) p. 144.
129. CSP, 1901, Indian Affairs, 1900, No. 27, p. 159.
130. National Archives of Canada, public records of the Department of Indian Affairs, Record Group 10, vol. 9803, Saddle Lake Agency Daily Journal, 1899, no. 7 (hereafter NAC, RG 10). This journal has been incorrectly catalogued as belonging to the Meadow Lake Agency.
131. CSP, 1910, Indian Affairs, 1909, No. 27, p. 188.
132. NAC, RG 10, vol. 9083, Daily Journal 1909, no. 13.
133. NAC, RG 10, vol. 9083, Daily Journal 1909, no. 13.
134. NAC, RG 10, vol. 9083, Daily Journal 1909, no. 13.
135. CSP, 1900, Indian Affairs, 1899, No. 14, p. 106.
136. High, The Robinson-Superior Ojibwa and the Capitalist Labour Economy, pp. 34–35. In this instance, High was not troubled by the inability of Indian agents to count accurately the canoes belonging to the far-flung Amerindians. With respect to the sources and value of incomes, High did not standardize these data in terms of per capita income, and he selected only five years from a fifteen year period. Nonetheless, the data was adequate to provide a description of the Ojibwa participation in the capitalist labour economy.
137. Even in more recent times getting a handle on the subsistence activities is not without controversy, see Peter J. Usher and George Wenzel, "Native Harvest Surveys and Statistics: A Critique of Their Construction and Use," *Arctic* vol. 40, no. 2 (1987) pp. 145–160. A very thorough account of documenting the Native economy can be found in Terry N. Tobias and James J. Kay, "The Bush Harvest in Pinehouse, Saskatchewan, Canada," *Arctic* vol. 47, no. 3 (1993) pp. 207–221.
138. With respect to fur trade social history, a very tempered critique of anecdotal sources and a case for using employment and accounting records is found in Arthur J. Ray, "Reflections on Fur Trade Social History and Métis History in Canada," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* vol. 6, no. 2 (1982) pp. 91–107.
139. E.H. Carr, *What is History?* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961) p. 16.
140. For an insightful discussion of Eurocenterism and economic history, see Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998) pp. 1–51.
141. CSP, 1901, Indian Affairs, 1900, No. 27, p. 88.
142. CSP, 1901, Indian Affairs, 1900, No. 27, Part 2, Tabular Statements, pp. 240–241. With respect to fishing and hunting values it was noted: "The Estimated Value of Fish and Meat used for Food is included in these columns."
143. With respect to these Indian Affairs data, I discuss in some detail the logical relationship between income and accumulation of personal effects. For example, if certain Indian assets appreciated or were valued higher than the initial value, then accumulated wealth might have exceeded the income required to make such investments. See Tough, Regional Analysis of Indian Aggregate Income, p. 107.
144. Archives of Manitoba, Hudson's Bay Company Archives, A.74/1-46, District and Post Balances.
145. E.P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978) pp. 28–29.
146. Eleanor M. Blain, "Dependency: Charles Bishop and Northern Ojibwa," *Aboriginal Resource Use in Canada*, Abel and Friesen, eds., p. 103.
147. Frank, *ReOrient*, pp. 134–135.
148. Paul Strathern, *Dr. Strangelove's Game: A Brief History of Economic Genius* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2001) p. 33.
149. David Newhouse, "Aboriginal Economic Development in the Shadow of the Borg," *Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development* vol. 3, no. 1 (2002) p. 109.
150. For a discussion of an enduring stability in the core of Cree culture and the basic irrelevance of the fur trade to economic change, see Paul C. Thistle, *Indian-European Trade Relations in the Lower Saskatchewan River Region to 1840* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1986) p. 34.
151. See Jarvenpa and Brumback, Microeconomics of Southern Chipewyan Fur-Trade History, *The Subarctic Fur Trade* pp. 147–183.
152. A useful discussion of this problem is found in Melisa L. Meyer and Russell Thorton,"Indians and the Numbers Game: Quantitative Methods in Native American History," *New Directions In American Indian History*, Calloway, ed., pp. 5–29.
153. This argument about connections between peoples was made very forcibly by Eric R. Wolf, *Europe And The People Without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
154. See M.H. Watkins, "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth," *Approaches To Canadian Economic History*, W.T. Easterbrook and M.H. Watkins, eds. (Toronto: Macmillan Company, 1978, original 1967) pp. 49–73.
155. Tough, Aboriginal Rights, p. 245.
156. In the academic literature, economic arguments have been used to negate Aboriginal claims, for examples, see: Gerhard Ens, "Dispossession or Adaptation? Migration and Persistence of the Red River Metis, 1835–1890," *Canadian Historical*

*Association Papers* (1988) pp. 120–144; Thomas Flanagan, "The Market for Métis Lands in Manitoba: An Exploratory Study," *Prairie Forum* vol. 16, no. 1 (1991) pp. 1–20; and Thomas Flanagan and Gerhard Ens, "Metis Land Grants in Manitoba: A Statistical Study," *Histoire Sociale/Social History* vol. 27, no. 53 (1994) pp. 65–87.

157. Throughout *A History of the Canadian Economy*, Norrie, Owram and Emery asserted that the fur trade was not dominated by European merchant capitalists. One curious proof of their position (page 126) claimed that: "The failure of a European currency system to penetrate the country indicates the degree to which the indigenous population retained economic development in the region." This is an extremely problematic assertion, and somewhat ahistorical, in that it is not clear that any serious or sustained attempt was ever made to introduce European currency into the fur trade, and thus, no actual failure ever occurred. Furthermore, the Made Beaver system of exchange was convertible to English Sterling, thus commercialization of the economy occurred on terms that by and large suited mercantilism. There was, in fact, no need by Europeans or Indians to make use of European currency. Those familiar with the fur trade will know that European currency was not necessary for mercantilism to extract profits. In later years, the HBC did what it could to slow down the introduction of cash, in opposition to the desire of Native trappers. In fact, European currency would have tended to undermine monopoly power since it would have given producers the opportunity to disconnect production and consumption, however such a realization is not possible for those that conceive of monopolies as an economic aberration. Furthermore, their notion that indigenous economic development occurred during the fur trade is more of an ideological position than historical fact, and as an ideological assertion it requires ignoring the capital accumulation by European merchants over several centuries. Since no reason existed and no effort was made to introduce European currency into the fur country, Norrie, Owram and Emery have derived a conclusion about Native economic development out of thin air.
158. Henry Abelove, *et al*., eds, "Interview with E.P. Thompson," *Visions of History* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) p. 20.
159. Jennifer S.H. Brown, "Northern Algonquians from Lake Superior and Hudson Bay to Manitoba in the Historic Period," *Native Peoples: The Canadian Experience*, R. Bruce Morrison and C. Roderick Wilson, eds., (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986) p. 229. For the original stereotyping of exploitation, see Harold Hickerson, "Fur Trade Colonialism and the North American Indians," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* vol. 1, no. 2 (1973) pp. 15–44. Discussions of exploitation need not be one-dimensional, as E.P. Thompson noted "The making of the working class is a fact of political and cultural, as much as of economic, history," *The Making of the English Working Class* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986, original 1963) p. 213.
160. Peter R. Mitchell and John Schoeffel, eds., *Understanding Power: The Indispensable Chomsky* (New York: New Press, 2002) p. 207.
161. RCAP, *Report*, Vol. 2, *Restructuring The Relationship*, part 2, p. 776.
162. RCAP *Report*, Vol. 2, *Restructuring The Relationship*, part 2, p. 788.
163. The various dimensions to the involvement of Caughnawaga Mohawk in large construction projects was first brought to light by Joseph Mitchell, "The Mohawks in High Steel," published in Edmund Wilson, *Apologies to the Iroquois* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959) pp. 3–36. Mitchell's chapter on Mohawks in High Steel was first published in *The New Yorker* (1949). See also, Bruce Katzer, "The Caughnawaga Mohawks: The Other Side of Ironwork," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* vol. 15, no. 4 (1988) pp. 39–55. A somewhat vagarious account is given by Arthur Einhorn, "Warriors of the Sky: The Iroquois Iron Workers," *European Review of Native American Studies* vol. 13, no. 1 (1999) pp. 25–34.
164. High, Native Wage Labour, p. 263. It is difficult to appreciate High's finding on this point also. Apart from Lutz's explicit claim on the Potlatch motivation, there is no validity to High's pronouncement that such a consensus exists. Several of his characterizations of the literature indicate a lack of credibility. For example, the obvious contradictions between the underpinnings of Rolf Knight's *Indians at Work* and Hugh Brody's, *Maps and Dream: Indians and the British Columbia Frontier* (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1981) have eluded High. His views can also be fanciful, in his perfunctory review of the literature he stated that "... only Menno Boldt has systematically applied the dependency/world systems model to native history." High, Native Wage Labour, p. 249. For several reasons, this declaration by High is completely false: (1) Boldt is not a historian; (2) others have, in fact, employed world system or dependency theory to Canadian Native history; and (3) Boldt did not make any use of world system theory (let alone systematic application), at least not a version of it recognizable by the works of Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Ander Gunder Frank, or Immanuel Wallerstein. An examination of Menno Boldt's *Surviving as Indians: The Challenge of Self-Government* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) reveals no references to the literature on world system theory or dependency theory, to authors such as Wallerstein or Frank.

Boldt simply uses the term "dependence" to describe the need for government funding by band councils and for social assistance for individuals. This usage can hardly be equated to the political economy concepts of world systems theory. In fact, Menno Boldt's *Surviving as Indians* is a pretty mainstream, atheoretical approach, which is not a criticism of this important study, but illustrates High's confusion. There is no justification for claiming that world systems theory is part of Boldt's analysis.

165. Newhouse, Resistance is Futile, pp. 79–80.

# BUILDING THE OPASKWAYAK CREE NATION ECONOMY
## A Case Study in Resilience

Yale D. Belanger

### Overview

On 15 February 2002, the Aseneskak Casino operated in conjunction with the Opaskwayak Cree Nation (OCN) nearby The Pas, Manitoba officially opened its doors to an eager public.[1] For one fleeting moment it appeared as though all eyes were fixed on the OCN, for not only was this the first provincial First Nations casino to open, it also represented a significant gamble on the part of both the OCN and its holding company, the Paskwayak Business Development Corporation.[2] Beginning in the late 1960s, the OCN had steadily taken over responsibility for a number of devolved federal programs while simultaneously growing its business portfolio to where the band today is recognized as one of region's largest employers. The casino was considered a means of further enhancing the OCN's economic strength and overall socio-economic potential. The community acknowledged that recovering the losses of a failed casino enterprise could significantly impair the bulk of the OCN's businesses, the majority of which were established in the 1990s. Notwithstanding the potential outcomes, the OCN and its economic development initiatives of the past three decades are in need of closer examination.

### History

The Pas region has been home to various Aboriginal groups for thousands of years. Located along the Saskatchewan River, the area was utilized by the Cree while also regularly visited by the Anishinaabe and Nakota.[3] The Cree of the region had an established economy predicated on seasonal rounds tracking moose, elk, deer, and other large animals, some gardening combined with fishing in the region's myriad of lakes and rivers. The Pas region was a habitual stop and became a regular meeting place where various First Nations would gather to trade and renew political and military alliances.[4] Beginning in the late seventeenth century, French and British explorers entered the region and by 1684 the first permanent Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) trading post was established at York Factory. The Cree and other First Nations began to utilize the vast river systems to hunt and trap for furs to trade with HBC employees in an effort to augment their economies. Henry Kelsey's arrival in this region in 1690 ushered in a wave of British and French explorers and traders, and by 1743, in addition to York Factory and several smaller HBC posts, two French trading posts, Fort Bourbon and Fort Paskoyac,

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were raised on the bank of the Saskatchewan River nearby The Pas.[5]

The HBC established a permanent post at The Pas in 1821 followed by the construction of a Church Missionary Society (CMS) station in 1840. The resulting permanent settler interaction with local Cree populations became the regional norm. Additional work opportunities also resulted in the Cree gradually working as wage labourers in the burgeoning commercial fishing and lumber industries. Hunting, trapping, and fishing still comprised the Cree economy, although some individuals tried their hand farming during this period. Few took to it and most maintained seasonal rounds, however, leaving the mission site each fall to settle in productive hunting and fishing sites upwards of 250 kilometres away. In 1860, the Hind Expedition responsible for surveying the region travelled through The Pas, where expedition member John Fleming noted that the CMS mission located on the south bank of the Saskatchewan River contained Indian homes that "seemed to be uninhabited and in a dilapidated condition; the Indians for whom they were erected, disliking a settled life devoted solely to the pursuit of agriculture, and preferring the wandering and precarious life of the hunter in their native wilds."[6] Stony and swampy fields made up of glacial deposits with poor drainage located within a moderately adverse climate were not conducive to agriculture.[7] An inadequate subsistence base led more than three-quarters of the population away from the mission for the hinterlands in winter.[8]

The Pas region was a stronghold of natural resources that included timber, fish, and subterranean minerals, and pressure to open the region to exploration led the federal government to commence treaty negotiations with the Cree and Anishinaabe in 1875. Treaty Commissioner Alexander Morris visited The Pas in October 1876 seeking the Cree's adherence to Treaty Five signed the previous year with several nations located to the south and southeast of The Pas. Morris noted upon his arrival that "the banks were covered with Indians with their canoes.[9] Fifteen years had passed since the Hind Expedition's visit to the region and little had changed at the Devon Mission. Morris noted, however, that the population at the station had grown and that more Cree appeared to have settled nearby the mission, for "there are also a large number of houses belonging to the Indians of the place; and on the other bank the firm of Kew, Stobart & Co., have erected for trading purposes. There are also several dwelling-houses on the north bank."[10] Morris finalized the terms of Treaty Five with the Cree the day after his arrival, which included provisions for a 160-acre land grant to each family of five, even though Morris himself admitted that "at the Pas all the land obtainable is now cultivated, and consists of a vegetable garden and one field attached to the mission, and a few patches of potatoes here and there."[11] He claimed that "a short distance from the river the marsh begins, and extends to the south for miles; and the same thing occurs to the north. In fact, on both banks of the river at this point, and from the Che-ma-wa-win up to it, one hundred and fifty acres of land fit for cultivation cannot be found."[12]

The Pas Indians were not listed in the text of Treaty 5 as being owed the land allocation Morris promised Cree leaders. Prescribed treaty annuities such as hoes, spades, axes, ploughs, carpenter's tools, seed to plant wheat, barley, and oats as well as oxen, bulls, and cows were withheld at various times due to the region's poor agricultural environment. During much of the next thee decades the Cree maintained their seasonal rounds while requesting government assistance in difficult times. The period following the Cree adhering to Treaty 5 was characterized by Pettipas as one of over-exploiting hunting and fishing resources resulting in bouts of starvation at the Mission.[13] In 1889, for instance, the Cree required additional relief supplies when the regional muskrat and fisheries failed.[14] The Cree were still beyond the influence of wage labour and according to Native Studies scholar Frank Tough, "the lack of alternative activities made The Pas agency Indians (with the exception of Grand Rapids) dependent upon the muskrat swamps."[15] This led to the continued reliance on seasonal rounds. In 1900, the Reverend J. Hines wrote that the Cree left the mission in October to fish at Clearwater Lake "and to take up their winter quarters along the lakes and rivers, forming hamlets of two to three families."[16] It is estimated that the population "was divided in 15 to 20 hamlets, scattered over a radius of 150 miles" from the mission and reserve.[17]

By 1903, officials of the Canadian Northern Railway (CNOR) were interested in establishing The Pas as a base for a proposed railway to Hudson Bay. Homesteaders occupying the lands

between the South and North Saskatchewan rivers resulted in increased agricultural production and it was posited that a railway leading to the grain outlets to be constructed at Churchill on Hudson Bay would ultimately expand federal economic frontiers. The financial boon would also improve prairie farmer's prosperity while simultaneously promoting the benefits of western settlement. Federal officials faced increasing political pressure to open a line from The Pas to Churchill.[18] Few understood however that such a move would require the evacuation of the Cree from their reserve, one of the region's few sites not made up primarily of muskeg and swamp. In 1905, the Department of Indian Affairs nevertheless authorized the CNOR to run a line across the reserve and set up station grounds. S. R. Marlatt of the Lake Manitoba Inspectorate proposed a town site surrender of 500 acres to permit railway construction in September followed by Indian Agent for The Pas Agency, Joseph Courtney, striking up informal negotiations with Cree leaders. A little more than one year later, Marlatt informed Indian Commissioner David Laird on 21 August 1906 that he had secured surrender of the town site from the Cree.[19]

As part of the surrender Cree leaders accepted that the band would vacate the reserve prior to 1 August 1907. However, within days of the surrender Laird received a letter from Chief Constant and Councillors Norman Lathlin and David Cook describing "irregularities of the Inspector" indicating that perhaps the surrender was not valid.[20] This letter was not acted upon and on 5 November 1906, the Order in Council accepting the surrender was passed. Railway construction proceeded slowly as did the sale of town lots initiated in 1908. As of 1910, the Cree were still living on surrendered land, something that annoyed the non-Native residents. Additional resident complaints focused on the Cree practice of drying fish and smoking moose and elk meat upwind, which they claimed made living nearby the 'Indians' impracticable. The Cree also had complaints albeit directly related to the surrender's final terms. Community leaders argued that they simply granted access to their land for use by interested homesteaders and railway officials. During the summer of 1910, following protracted and unsuccessful negotiations with non-Native residents eager to incorporate The Pas into a town, long-time OCN member Ernie Constant stated that the residents participated in a gun-point removal of 500 Cree to the north side of the Saskatchewan River.[21] Town officials claimed that the Dominion government was responsible for the relocation that resulted in all but thirty-seven Cree being effectively displaced to what is today the home of the OCN.[22]

Following the Cree removal, the town site was formally divided and placed on the market for sale. Sales once again were slow until Herman Finger of Port Arthur, Ontario arrived and purchased a number of lots. By the time The Pas was incorporated in 1912, the Finger Lumber Company employed upwards of 500 throughout the region.[23] The town slowly grew from twenty-five in 1910 to 500 in 1912 reaching 2,000 by 1914. Renewed interest in railway construction followed and by the end of May 1913, eighty-miles had been laid and a steel bridge connecting the north and south banks of the Saskatchewan River completed. Regional development during the next two decades resulted in the 1916 opening of the Mandy copper mine located seventy miles north of The Pas followed by a diamond mine opening in Flin Flon in 1927. Construction of a power plant installed at Island Falls on the Churchill River fifty-six miles northwest of Flin Flon led to a marked increase in the demand for lumber, resulting in fifty million board feet produced by the Finger lumber mill in 1926 alone. As the economist Harold Innis accurately predicted, mineral exploration combined with the completion of the Hudson Bay railway in 1929 resulted in the regional fishing industry's growth that prior to the 1930s had an estimated annual value of approximately $100,000.[24]

The expansion of regional industries led to increased opportunities for the Cree. Tough demonstrated by using income data collected by the Department of Indian Affairs that the period 1896–1935 was one wherein the Cree "regional economy remained dependent upon hunting and trapping, and that both major sources of income, hunting and wage labour were influenced by the depression."[25] In addition to more Cree farming and harvesting swamp grasses, the per capita tons of hay harvested by the Cree increased after 1917 as did the per capita number of cattle. In general, the Cree obtained more livestock during the study period that was characterized by increasing incomes up until the onset of the Depression. The data also revealed that a bush way of life remained an

important component of the Cree regional economy vis-à-vis the ownership of tents and canoes, both of which increased in overall numbers. The general growth in per capita value of total property and the post-1917 trend towards an increase in the per capita value of buildings led Tough to conclude that this represented reserve development.[26] The Cree during this period also lobbied for and received permission to finance improvements upon a portion of the surrendered town land. This in turn allowed the Cree to realize a profit of $30,000 upon sale of the subdivided lots.[27] The Pas town council soon thereafter began to pressure Cree leaders to surrender the remaining Indian land surrounding the town site. Recognizing that they possessed limited federal and provincial government support, Cree leaders once again succumbed to this pressure. Community leaders never acquiesced in total to these demands; in fact, during negotiations many of their counter demands were met, such as insisting that Cree men be hired for road clearing work after an agreement had been worked out permitting a right-of-way through the reserve.[28]

Little development occurred on the reserve after the 1930s, a trend that would last until the early 1970s. The Cree also found few people in The Pas willing to trade with beyond hostile HBC employees seeking to protect their economic position. Exacerbating financial difficulties further was the transfer of natural resources from the Dominion of Canada to the province of Manitoba in 1930 vis-à-vis the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA). The result: Indian hunters and fishermen were now subject to provincial laws related to hunting and fishing.[29] With provincial game wardens now exercising augmented jurisdiction over and control of Indian hunting practices, the Cree found themselves with limited access to the region's natural resources such as game and fur bearing animals and fish stocks. This resulted in the Cree's increased reliance upon government handouts and restricted Indian welfare programs. In their brief to the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee established in 1946 to examine the continued validity of the Indian Act, Cree leaders from The Pas stated "Our hunting rights should be extended, and trapping grounds more favourable. Indian people complain that too many white men are being put to trap on the muskrat area."[30] At nearby Chemawawin, the people complained in their brief that they had been threatened by the Indian agent with the revocation of their trapping licenses, adding cryptically that if "our licenses are taken away from us when we leave the reserve we will not be able to sell the rats we get from our reserve."[31]

As sociologist Hugh Shewell has established, most First Nations in Canada were by this period integrated into the federal welfare system due to failing economies.[32] Supporting Shewell's analysis is the work of Arthur Ray, who demonstrated that "the older paternalistic fur trade, a hybrid of European mercantilism and native reciprocal exchange traditions, was crumbling by 1945, and the groundwork for the modern welfare system so prevalent in the north today was laid."[33] For the Cree at The Pas things were no different. Unknowing to Manitoba officials, provincial programs designed to promote northern settlement also hurt Cree economic interests. Following the end of World War II, for instance, Manitoba "faced the post-war period with a well conceived land settlement policy."[34] The goal was to promote settlement of unoccupied tracts of Crown land "in an orderly, rational way, thus to increased the likelihood of success and to ease the task of local and provincial administration."[35] One aspect of the policy was the establishment of the Pasquia Project, a land reclamation venture located southwest of The Pas that was initiated in 1939. The project's intent was to see constructed flood control mechanisms to aid reclaiming 50,000 acres of potentially valuable farmland to open up to settlement.[36] The project met with limited success due to among other things years of excessive rainfall that limited construction. The resulting construction and chaos affected regional game patterns, impacting the Cree directly, as did the influx of settlers to the region seeking work and intent on establishing homesteads.[37]

Undaunted the Cree still maintained seasonal rounds while supplementing these resources with wage labour employment. According to reports commissioned by the Manitoba government in the 1950s in anticipation of construction of the Grand Rapids Dam project that would result in 7,000 acres of Cree land being flooded, the Cree regional economy was still viable. For example, the *US Fish and Wildlife Report* noted in 1961 that "fur animals, water fowl and moose of the reservoir site are estimated to have an average annual value of $593,000 over a 50 year period without this pro-

ject."[38] A 1955 *Provincial Report on the Project* indicated that over two million muskrat pelts with a cumulative $4 million value had been trapped since 1940.[39] It was also reported that "the commercial fishery harvest from Cedar, Moose and Cross Lakes and the Saskatchewan River delta between Cedar Lake and The Pas have averaged about $692,000 per year over the last several years."[40] The aforementioned report also estimated that "the average harvest could be at least doubled over a 50 year period."[41]

That the Cree regional economy was maintaining itself did not deter provincial politicians from continuing to promote their hydroelectric development agenda along the Winnipeg, Saskatchewan, Nelson, and Churchill Rivers. In 1964, the Grand Rapids Dam was completed on the Saskatchewan River near the community of Grand Rapids. This was according to Manitoba officials needed to provide cheaper electrical power and to help offset the overexploitation of fish stocks that led the federal government to shut down the regional sturgeon fishery for nearly a decade beginning in the early 1960s.[42] The dam project affected the Native communities located at Grand Rapids, Moose Lake, Chemawawin, and The Pas to varying degrees. According to sociologist James Waldram, following construction "many bands began to investigate the circumstances surrounding the construction of the dams and began to hire lawyers and initiate legal action for compensation."[43] It was nearly three decades later before the OCN signed a $4.56 million settlement with Manitoba Hydro in 1991 for damages sustained from the construction project.[44] At the time, however, the limited government response to the Cree political demands demonstrated to Native leaders that they were not politically powerful enough to effect change. This in part led The Pas Indian Band Chief and Council to aggressively pursue local political autonomy in the late 1960s. The question of how to improve their political and economic standing was nevertheless difficult to answer.

By the 1960s, a vehicle and foot bridge had been constructed connecting The Pas Indian Band to The Pas, although relations between the townspeople and the Cree failed to improve. In addition to the collapse of the sturgeon fishery, the forestry industry that had dominated the regional economy since 1912 collapsed in 1957 when the local lumber plant closed. Unemployment rates soared and government services replaced forestry jobs which negatively affected housing starts. While the people in The Pas were dealing with their economic woes, with the exception of hunting, fishing, trapping, and sporadic wage labour, the Cree regional economy languished. The Pas Indian Band claimed no significant businesses and its economy was fuelled by federal transfer payments in the form of Indian welfare programs. However, forestry once again became an important industry when in 1968, Churchill Forest Industries (CFI) was established in The Pas. Within a few short years, the company employed approximately 2,000 regionally.[45] The forestry industry remains an important economic venture in The Pas employing one in ten people. The pulp mill's current operator, Tolko, employs 750 at the mill site and an additional 350 under contract in woodland operations with a total annual payroll exceeding $50 million.[46] Statistics are currently unavailable to the public to determine how many OCN members are employed by Tolko in The Pas.[47]

The lessons learned from the regional economic decline of the 1960s led Cree leaders to consider political and economic stability as synonymous. Consequently, a community development strategy was established to help strengthen the reserve economy in an attempt to improve its member's overall quality of life. This strategy involved: (1) development of administration and program delivery; (2) strengthening local government authority; and, (3) developing local enterprises.[48] OCN administration was established in 1968 following the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development's (DIAND) partial devolution of financial and administration services to the band. By the spring of 1969, The Pas Indian Band had established its own Social Assistance Department, thereby establishing the band's first welfare administration. Throughout the early 1970s, the band slowly began to assume responsibility for a number of federal programs, including but not limited to reserve economic development and aspects of public works and reserve lands.[49] As reported by journalist Heather Robertson in 1970, "The Pas reserve is organized and has few problems, with 65 per cent of the men employed and welfare the lowest of any reserve in Manitoba."[50] The last of the strategy's key components, the development of local, band-owned enterprises, began in the late 1960s with the creation of a gravel

hauling company, which eventually expanded into a general trucking enterprise.[51]

A few years after Robertson's glowing report, few band members had found lasting work despite a period of regional economic growth in the mid-1970s. This was largely due to the specialize nature of most jobs that attracted outside skilled workers to the region. This in turn resulted in a large pool of both Native and non-Native locals with no skills and limited work experience seeking permanent employment.[52] It was at this point that band members Gordon Lathlin, Joe Ross, Malcolm McGillivary, and Henry Wilson proposed the construction of an on-reserve shopping mall in the early 1970s. The four men recognized that even though The Pas was home to the majority of the lumber conglomerate's workforce, the town housed a limited number of businesses required to serve the local community, translate to read that The Pas had no major outlet mall. Economic leakage was also a concern for the people from The Pas Indian Band who were forced to travel into The Pas to do their shopping due to the lack of comparable on reserve services. In 1973, the Ontineka Development Corporation was created with the intent of developing a community grocery store. This was a significant gamble on the band's part considering that the two communities were at an impasse resulting from the 1971 murder of Cree nursing student, Helen Betty Osborne. It would be December 1987 before Dwayne Johnston, one of four young, non-Native men directly involved in the crime, was convicted of the murder.[53] Whether the four entrepreneurs intended that their small grocery store serve only The Pas Indian Band community is not known; however, they must have realized that support from a portion of The Pas community would be required for the endeavour to truly prosper.


What the four proponents hoped for but did not count on was the support the proposal received from local Native communities also experiencing considerable leakage of reserve dollars into The Pas. Plans were expanded to develop an $8-million, large-scale shopping centre. Construction of the Otineka Mall was completed in 1975, and, according to Glen Ross, President and CEO of Paskwayak Business Development Corporation (PBDC), the opening "scared the pants off the guys."[54] The complex encompassed 225,000 square feet located on close to thirteen acres of commercially designated reserve land. An indoor shopping centre, recreation, and business offices comprised the complex, which today acts as the region's major retail and business centre. However, during the first months of operations money went missing and beset with complaints of poor customer service, the mall managers discovered that they understood little of what was involved in leasing space, finding tenants, order stock, or managing employees.[55] By the early 1980s, a number of young, university-educated community members returned who understood the issues their elders were struggling with and the band's fortunes began to change. Regional road construction also made the previously out-of-the-way mall now accessible to communities such as Grand Rapids, Easterville, and Moose Lake. Members of surrounding communities soon began flocking to the complex, creating a market centre that was ingeniously and successfully promoted as a tax-free zone for status Indians.[56]

The mall's success was inspiring. The Pas Indian Band's Chief and council announced in 1987 the establishment of the PBDC to encourage regional economic development. Wholly owned by the OCN, current PBDC ventures gross annual revenues of between $15 and $16 million.[57] The PBDC was responsible to foster commercial and investment initiatives, guide the development of the OCN business portfolio that grew to include retail outlets, property management, and a gravel operation. The PBDC was also mandated to assist those band members

who aspired to open their own businesses while supporting current owners in their attempts to grow their ventures through various capacity building strategies. This involved reviewing and helping to build effective operational structures, implementing educational initiatives to support staff development, as well as conducting training and planning programs.

The local economy became more diversified during the next several years. The OCN development corporation controls a gravel and sand operation (est. 1990) that operates seasonally from May to October. This company provides a variety of raw or crushed aggregate products for commercial and residential projects.[58] The $8.2-million, sixty-room Kikiwak Inn officially opened 1 July 1996. The hotel has meeting facilities, a swimming pool and hot tub, an exercise room, as well as a full service restaurant, lounge, and VLT area, and currently employs sixty people.[59] The Pas Food Town, located off reserve within The Pas Township


limits, opened 3 December 1997 where the 5,000 square foot store employs ten people.[60] The OCN Shell Gas Bar opened 1 November 1998, has eight pumps and a 1,800 square foot building that houses a convenience store while employing twenty people.[61] In addition to a Dollar Store that currently employs ten people, the OCN has since added a Timberland Trailer Court and Chimo Building Centre to its business portfolio.[62]

## The Aseneskak Casino

In 1984, the OCN became the only First Nation in Canada to establish federally acknowledged by-laws regulating gaming on reserve lands by, in this case, operating a lottery with the community's support. Over the next two years there were few complaints as the lottery continued. However, in May 1986, the RCMP entered the OCN and without warning proceeded to seize tickets, cash, and all records from band office relating to their lottery operations.[63] Although no charges were filed in relation to the raid, it was assumed that notwithstanding federal authorization to conduct the lottery scheme that the RCMP was on a fishing expedition in an attempt to determine whether the OCN lottery was an illegal gambling activity in violation of Criminal Code statutes. According to Justice Murray Sinclair, the band objected to the RCMP actions based on the fact that they had agreed to co-operate in an RCMP investigation even though they had in place federally-acknowledged band by-laws to regulate their lotteries.[64] The raid nevertheless "proved the catalyst for the province, under Howard Pawley's NDP government to enter into negotiations with five organizations representing all the First Nations in Manitoba."[65]

First Nations casinos were a hot topic in the 1990s, and by 1995 the Manitoba Lottery Policy Review Committee made a series of recommendations with respect to provincial gambling activities. It acknowledged that all matters related to on-reserve gaming fell beyond its pur-

view. Accordingly, the committee recommended a separate First Nations gaming review take place. The committee's recommendation established the notion that matters related to on-reserve gaming activities were to be viewed independently of other gaming policy issues, although it was decided in 1996 to proceed with First Nations gaming. The First Nations Gaming Policy Review (Bostrom Report) followed and recommended that the Province of Manitoba support First Nations' community economic development by helping to establish upwards of five on-reserve casino operations. The following year, the First Nations Casino Project (FNCP) was initiated, followed two years later by the creation of a formal Selection Committee consisting of representatives of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (AMC) and the province. It was mandated to review and recommend potential casino proposals. Following its review of twelve eligible proposals, in June 2000 the committee recommended that five proposals should advance to the casino development stage.

Prior to submitting a casino proposal, a six-member partnership was established by the OCN, Chemawawin, Grand Rapids, Wuskwi Sipihk, Mosakahiken, and Marcel Colomb First Nations. The partners all agreed that the OCN should be the casino site. A $6-million application was developed proposing that the casino be housed in a refurbished bingo hall. The Pas Mayor, Gary Hopper, publicly announced that the community was fully supportive of the proposed casino and the anticipated 150 jobs. He also made inquiries about The Pas becoming a full partner in the project, a request that was turned down because the consortium of six bands was considered to be large enough.[66] The proposal included a revenue-sharing quotient that would allocate seventy per cent of the profits to the six partners, which the province stated must go toward economic development projects. The remaining profits would be divided between a trust fund set up to benefit all provincial First Nations (27.5 per cent) and a First Nations addiction foundation.[67] Following one year of negotiations with Manitoba officials, the OCN proposal was accepted and an agreement between the province and the Aseneskak Casino Limited Partnership reached on 7 September 2001. Approval soon followed permitting construction to begin on the $4.6-million, 20,000 square foot facility.

With the acceptance of the OCN casino proposal, provincial officials in turn established a number of strict regulatory measures. For one, the agreement permitted the government to conduct unscheduled audits and it also forced the casino to be up and running and fulfilling the partnership's proposals within two years (by 2002).[68] The Manitoba Lotteries Commission (MLC) was given responsibility for security and surveillance, to control gaming proceeds and set policies, while setting the mix and number of games.[69] As construction began, the Manitoba government sponsored a $66,000 special training program to prepare OCN members to assume skilled jobs ranging from security, surveillance, slot attendants, cashiers, dealers, accountants, clerical and management positions once the casino opened.[70] The Aseneskak Casino opened 15 February 2002. One year later, the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (AMC) posted an article written by Bill Redekop on their news brief website encapsulating the previous year's highlights. The article stressed that the casino generated 180 jobs, eighty-two per cent of which were held by Native people. The tenor of the article was nevertheless dour with Redekop quoting casino manager John Gauthier as saying, "We're hoping for no loss, but there may be a little."[71] Seven months later, the CBC ran a story claiming that the Aseneskak Casino lost nearly $900,000 in its first year of operations. Chemawawin First Nations' Chief Clarence Easter was quoted as saying, "The province should sit down and give us a fair deal. Instead of a one-way deal, it should be a two-way deal, where they benefit and we benefit as well."[72] The casino fared better during its second year of operations, rebounding with a $400,000 profit.[73]

The main problem was geography and the resulting lack of tourist traffic. Originally it was anticipated that tourists would account for eighty per cent of casino revenues. By year's end it was evident that local residents were contributing eighty per cent of all revenues. Gauthier indicated clearly that this "casino cannot support itself on just local traffic."[74] According to Statistics Canada, the Manitoba population is 1,119,585 of which 671,274 reside in Winnipeg alone, a five-hour drive from The Pas.[75] Brandon (41,037) and Portage la Prairie (20,617) are more than four-hours driving distance away. These three centres combined make up sixty-five per cent of the provincial population. More-

over the highest levels of disposable income are found in the southern region of the province.

Recent events suggest that the Aseneskak Casino and several reserve businesses, in particular restaurants, will benefit from the October 2004 provincial smoking ban in public places. The smoking ban in question does not apply to reserve-based businesses since provinces do not have jurisdiction on reserves. Manitoba Gaming Minister Tim Sale recently stated, "We do in fact have the right to regulate gambling under the Criminal Code of Canada. That is very clear."[76] However, the provincial government did not "have the right to regulate behaviours of a variety of kinds in First Nations communities. That is the chiefs' and councils' responsibility. That is smoking, Mr. Speaker ..."[77] Federal Indian Affairs Minister Andy Scott publicly stated that in relation to casino operations he would refuse to block a First Nations bylaw permitting smoking in casinos.[78] The day after the smoking ban went into effect, the Aseneskak Casino reported that it was busier than normal.[79]

## Additional Ventures

Although the media coverage could lead readers to conclude that the Aseneskak Casino is the OCN's main revenue source, the band council and the PBDC have in recent years expanded the focus of their economic initiatives. Many of these projects are new and have yet to become fully operational while others have been functional for upwards of a decade to little or no fanfare. While it is impossible to highlight each and every initiative, this section will focus on and provide a brief overview of a number of the more high-profile projects.

### *OCN's Human Resource Development Strategy*

Started in 1994, the close to $2-million annual program has developed very successful funding partnerships and linkages both within and outside the OCN. The goal is to assist in developing individuals to care for not only themselves but their families and community by providing developmental opportunities. Job placements, college funding budgets, and employment and training programs are in place to not only foster enhanced educational opportunities, but to help ensure the OCN's continued economic success.[80]

### *Fiscal Accountability*

The OCN and the federal government in 2000 signed a five-year block funding agreement that transferred $16 million annually to the OCN to aid in the delivery of programs and services including land management, elementary and post-secondary education, maintenance of community infrastructure, home care and on-reserve housing, to name a few. According to Chief Frank John Whitehead at the time, "The agreement is about greater control of day-to-day decision making" that represented "another step toward self-management and self-government of our people."[81]

### *Control of Land and Resources*

On 9 August 2002, the OCN ratified the First Nations Land Management Act (FNLMA), effectively assuming control over their lands and resources. Community ratification confirmed the transfer of jurisdiction of land management for the OCN from the Indian Act to the FNLMA.[82]

### *Natural Resource Management*

Hunting, fishing and to a lesser degree trapping still play an important role in the OCN regional economy. Increased resource exploitation led the OCN to ban moose hunting in the 1980s when the regional moose population dropped to less than 500. As recently as 5 March 2003, the OCN Chief and Council and the OCN Resource Council asked its members to suspend moose hunting until after spring calving due to over hunting which threatens local population numbers.[83]

### *Policing Agreement*

On 3 December 2004, the OCN, the Province of Manitoba, and the Canadian Government announced $6.1-million in funding for the OCN Community Tri-Partite Agreement. This five-year agreement will provide police services for the OCN that will be shared between the Canadian government and Manitoba, fifty-two and forty-eight per cent respectively. In addition to enabling the continuation of funding for two band constables under the Band Constable Program, the agreement ensured the OCN had continued funding for seven RCMP officers.[84]

### *Housing Program*

Facing upwards of 400 annual requests for new homes and having built only 288 new

homes between 1960 and the late '80s, the OCN established a new housing program that promotes individual down payments and monthly payments for homes. Current requests are taxing the existing INAC-funded system, whereby $300,000 is annually allocated for the construction of ten homes. The new program also strongly encourages individuals to buy or build their own homes. The process is expected to increase the OCN housing budget thereby freeing more money for home construction for those in need within the community.[85]

*Aboriginal Healing Foundation*

Accepting that community health and healing was required to maintain a strong socio-economic standing, the OCN leadership applied to the Aboriginal Healing Foundation and was awarded a $246,264 grant to help address alcoholism and violence in the community. The money will also be used to assist community members in their healing journey by providing counselling and out patient care and to address the legacy of physical and sexual abuse through provision of awareness workshops.[86]

## Final Thoughts

This brief essay's intent was to generally outline the economic initiatives undertaken by the OCN during the last thirty-five years while focusing on the historical events that led community leaders to become more economically proactive. Developing a stronger regional economic foothold was considered requisite if the Chief and Council were to wrest control over local affairs from federal government control. The OCN leadership still considers a strong economy the key to augmenting its political autonomy. The economic growth described above has also become the key to lowering unemployment among community members, enhancing community pride built on improved individual self-esteem, and creating healthier community schools admired by many of the non-Native parents living across the river in The Pas.

Continued economic growth is the key to the OCN's future socio-economic success. The Aboriginal population is notably younger than the non-Aboriginal population and will remain so into the foreseeable future. Whereas the average age for Canadians is 37.7 years, the average age of the provincial Aboriginal population is under twenty-three years of age.[87] Current trends suggest that this group will remain relatively young in comparison to the Canadian non-Aboriginal population. In all, fifty-seven per cent of the urban Aboriginal population is under the age of twenty-four, suggesting that Aboriginal youth are quickly becoming an important demographic group. Further, the northern First Nations population from 1991–1996 grew more than thirty-four per cent whereas the OCN population during the same period grew by twenty-three per cent. Today, the OCN registered population is 4,751.[88]

When the first gravel hauling business was established at the OCN in the late 1960s, the reserve claimed no significant businesses. In fact, considerable leakage of reserve dollars into The Pas economy was occurring as a result of most OCN citizens being forced to travel into town to conduct the majority of their business ranging from shopping, banking, going out for a meal, or filling their vehicles with gasoline. During this period the local Cree economy was an amalgam of trapping, hunting, and fishing combined with government welfare payments. Today, close to thirty years after the first business opened at the OCN, the community now boasts a work force of 800 during the summer season and an approximate 550 full-time workers year-round.[89] It also houses the largest northern shopping centre which has become an important commercial centre for both Native and non-Native interests.

**NOTES**

1. The Pas Indian Band changed its name to the Opaskwayak Cree Nation (OCN) in 1989.
2. The term Native and Aboriginal will be used interchangeably throughout this paper. The term Indian is used in legislation or policy and hence in discussions concerning such legislation or policy; and in its historical context whereby Native and Aboriginal people were described within the popular and academic literature as Indians; and in such cases where it is used in quotations from other sources. First Nations is used to signify an organized Aboriginal group or community, specifically a band officially recognized by the Canadian government; or when discussing specific policies; or when referring to specific endeavours such as First Nations gaming.
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11. Ibid., 163.
12. Ibid.
13. Pettipas, "An Ethnohistory of The Pas Area", 214.
14. Frank Tough, *As Their Natural Resources Fail: Native Peoples and the Economic History of Northern Manitoba, 1870–1930* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996), 211.
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17. Pettipas, "An Ethnohistory of The Pas Area", 221.
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20. Ibid.
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23. Ibid., 14
24. Information for this paragraph was gleaned from Harold A. Innis, "The Hudson Bay Railway", *The Geographical Review* 20, no. 1 (January 1930). The $100,000 annual catch estimate can be found in Board of Trade of The Pas, *The Pas and Northern Manitoba* (The Pas: Issued by the Board of Trade of The Pas, 1929), 19.
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34. Burke G. Vanderhill, "Post-war Agricultural Settlement in Manitoba", *Economic Geography* 35, no. 3 (July 1959), 260.
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50. Heather Robertson, *Reservations are for Indians* (Toronto: J. Lews & Samuel, 1970), 158
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52. Spearman, *Comparison of Social Welfare Needs With Service Network in Two Northern Aboriginal Communities*, 30
53. See Lisa Priest, *Conspiracy of Silence* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1989), and "The Justice System and Aboriginal People." In *Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, Vol. I*. (Winnipeg: 1991). The three other men involved were James Houghton, Lee Colgan, and Norman Manger.
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# ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE
## *Toward a Sustainable Future?*

Isobel M. Findlay and John D. Russell

> [Economic] development is much more than individuals striving to maximize incomes and prestige, as many economists and sociologists are inclined to describe it. It is about maintaining and developing culture and identity; supporting self-governing institutions; and sustaining traditional ways of making a living. It is about giving people choice in their lives and maintaining appropriate forms of relationship with their own and with other societies. — Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, *Final Report*, Vol. 2, p. 780.

**ABSTRACT**

*Almost a decade after the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP, 1996) — an international decade dedicated by the United Nations to Indigenous People — it is timely to reflect on the state of the Aboriginal economy, on what has been achieved in Aboriginal economic development, how success is measured, and what barriers persist. Although the current wave of globalization has done much to undermine traditional livelihoods and destabilize communities by valuing market relations over social and other relations, it has also been the impetus for renewed interest in sustainability, alternative (or alternatives to) development strategies, discourses, and performance indicators that put community values at the centre of things. Within the broader domain of Aboriginal economic development, this essay considers the colonial history of mainstream accounting measures and assesses initiatives associated with the triple bottom line — economic, environmental, and social performance measures. In particular, this essay discusses (a) what triple bottom line reporting might offer Aboriginal economic development and (b) what Aboriginal values and practices might add to thinking on the triple bottom line to make such measures more supportive of sustainable futures for all of us.*

### Introduction

In the face of globalization and resource depletion and degradation, Aboriginal economic development is subject to many pressures from the state, the market, and the media, from national and transnational institutions, from

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international bodies and local communities, as well as the environment itself. Caught up in complex negotiations and renegotiations of realities and relationships, traditional and modern models, powerful discourses and material conditions, those involved in Aboriginal economic development are challenged to evaluate options, to assess the opportunities and challenges of globalizing processes, and make decisions that meet multiple needs and aspirations while serving the long-term social, environmental, and economic health of communities.

If Aboriginal economic development projects often proceed faster than treaty and land claims negotiations, it remains difficult to define those projects according to Aboriginal values and criteria without succumbing to the economic rationality of mainstream business discourse. Squamish Nation Chief Gibby Jacob, for instance, talks of his band's efforts "to be proactive in creating their own economy" and to become "economically autonomous within a generation." Though not "out to gouge anyone," they are concerned to "receive a fair share of the dividend from any project we are involved in. Business people understand business dialogue.... We stand on our own rights and talk on business terms" (Matas, 2005, p. E7).

As the epigraph suggests, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) links economic development to choices and values, to cultural survival, self-government, and sustainability. But RCAP is equally clear that economic development will not fulfill its promise without urgent and significant change: "Under current conditions and approaches to economic development, we could see little prospect for a better future. That achieving a more self-reliant economic base for Aboriginal communities and nations will require significant, even radical departures from business as usual" (RCAP, 1996, p. 775). The cost of doing business as usual — in 1996 estimated to be $7.5 billion — has been projected to reach $11 billion by 2016 if nothing changes (Wien, 1999). Were RCAP recommendations heeded and the economic gap between Aboriginal people and the Canadian mainstream reduced by 50 per cent, however, the result would be that Aboriginal peoples would actually contribute $375 million annually to the Canadian economy (RCAP, 1996). Meantime, Cornell and Kalt (1998) and the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development lead efforts to explain disparities not only between the mainstream and Aboriginal communities but also among Aboriginal communities, some of whom prosper while others do not despite advantages of resources and education. In the process, researchers and practitioners alike aim to model the conditions that will make for sustained, self-determined success in social, environmental, and economic terms.

Almost a decade after RCAP — an international decade dedicated by the United Nations to Indigenous People — it is timely to reflect on the state of the Aboriginal economy, on what has been achieved in Aboriginal economic development, how success is measured, and what barriers persist. Such "radical departures" (as RCAP invites) responding to local, national, and global trends are underway in a number of organizational, governance, financial, performance measurement, and other initiatives that go beyond mainstream discourses or interests in control, legal accountability, shareholder interests, and outcome maximization. Although the current wave of globalization has done much to undermine traditional livelihoods and destabilize communities by valuing market relations over social and other relations (Bauman, 1998; Bourdieu & Coleman, 1991), it has also been the impetus for renewed interest in alternative (even alternatives to) development strategies, discourses, and performance indicators that put community values at the centre of things (Blaser, Feit & McRae, 2004). Newhouse (2004), for example, promotes critical challenges to the "Borg of development" — that old story of the inevitabilities of "progress" — while Wuttunee (2004) urges us to replace the scientific "measuring tools" that have set "the standards for 'success'" (p. 3) and make room for measures that are meaningful, holistic, and respectful of "All our relations." Building on the work of First Nations Development Institute in Virginia, Wuttunee (2004) promotes balance typified by the medicine wheel coordinates: physical, spiritual, emotional, and mental.

Within the broader domain of Aboriginal economic development, then, this essay considers the history of mainstream accounting measures and assesses the value of initiatives associated with the triple bottom line: economic, environmental, and social performance measures popularized by Elkington (1998). Although mainstream accounting is typically associated with objectivity and independence (Everett, Green & Neu, 2005), it is a "social technology" (Boyce,

2000, p. 27) that has powerfully shaped people's understandings of opportunities and choices, successes and failures, but that has communicated some stories while overlooking or obscuring others. In other words, accounting is always partial — both incomplete and biased (Chew & Greer, 1997; Gibson, 2000; Collison, 2003) — and a potent site and source of mainstream views about human identity and society and about the meaning of success and happiness. Despite its empiricist commitment to quantification, to verified, standardized measures with predictive force, mainstream accounting conceals as much as it reveals: most conspicuously the social, cultural, and environmental impacts of business activity (Boyce, 2000).

In fact, accounting has been a powerful tool of colonialism whose weight continues to be felt disproportionately by Aboriginal communities and organizations. It remains a potent means of maintaining the status quo and assimilating Aboriginal economic development to mainstream standards precisely because it is a power that remains hidden to most — even to accountants whose narrow professional education leads them not to reflect on such "soft" subjects as ethics, stakeholder relationships, rights and responsibilities, and respect for diversity (Waddock, 2005) but to think of themselves as "technical people." Accounting works so seductively precisely because it does not question "what is" or how inequalities have been produced and reproduced (Hines, 1988, p. 257–59). Because that power seems so benign — few things seem so natural and neutral as numbers — it is "a power that in the end may rival even tanks and heavy artillery" (Neu & Therrien, 2003, p. 31). In the light of accounting's colonial history this essay discusses (a) what triple bottom line reporting might offer Aboriginal economic development and (b) what Aboriginal values and practices might add to thinking on the triple bottom line to make such measures more supportive of sustainable futures for all of us.

## Sustainable Livelihoods

If fences — visible and invisible, physical and virtual — have been a key part of the colonial practices of capitalist modernity that have unbalanced, encircling private property and cutting people off from public resources of land and water, food security and accessible health and housing, education and political participation, those fences are coming down "on the streets and in [people's] minds" (Klein, 2002), p. 1). In northern Saskatchewan, First Nations are making their feelings known about jurisdictional disputes that perpetuate poverty, about the disappearance of traditional ways of life, the crippling costs of living in the north, and about the mere "trickle-down benefit" from the resources industries that so conspicuously profit in their territory (Wood, 2005). The promised "trickle-down effects" of mainstream deregulation and development, as Klein (2002), suggests, "have either been pitifully incremental or non-existent" (p. 65). In their Conference Board of Canada report, Loizides and Wuttunee (2005) likewise insist that the status quo "is not acceptable" and that "community capitalism" incorporating Aboriginal values is key (pp. i, 2).

The Brundtland Commission in 1987, the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, the 1998 Kyoto Conference, and other international initiatives may well have given currency to notions of sustainability that communities are currently trying to define or make meaningful in their own terms. Still, as Jacobs (2002) points out, "planning for the Seventh Generation, or the faces yet to come, was an integral part of Indigenous decision-making long before the Brundtland Report" and long before colonization "devastated the environment, as well as social, cultural, and economic structures of indigenous peoples throughout the world." Nevertheless, Indigenous peoples representing only four per cent of the world's population speak 60 percent of the world's languages and linguistic diversity correlates directly with biodiversity (Lertzman & Vredenburg, 2005). Despite the record of Indigenous stewardship of the world's biodiversity when 80 per cent depend for health and security and 50 per cent for food on Indigenous knowledge (Battiste & Henderson, 2000), Aboriginal communities in Canada now struggle "to regain the tools and resources needed to heed the words of the Peacemaker" not to think of ourselves but of "continuing generations of our families" (Jacobs, 2002, p. 4). Jacobs (2002) sees lip service to sustainable development among governments and multi-national corporations who are "throwing the term around and peppering their documents with it in order to appease the public." Instead, Jacobs promotes talk of "sustainable lifestyles" and "sustainable livelihoods" so that Indigenous peoples

are no longer sacrificed to support a "comfortable minority" (pp. 4–5).

Even some mainstream businesses are redefining business interests and responsibilities recognizing that commonsense calculations of self-interest and taken for granted distinctions between business and broader interests no longer hold good. Hines (1988) retells a fable to underline the porous boundaries between business organizations and their environments and to stress people's responsibility for deciding what counts and what not, what is included and what excluded, for making things real "by recognizing them as real" (p. 252). Just as history reinterprets and rewrites the past, so science claims to discover by naming things like black holes that are "an idea, a metaphor, a concept. Like atoms. Like electrons. Like organizations! These things help structure our lives." The Master in the fable teaches the Apprentice not to "confuse the boundary of the organization with the fence — that is just to keep people out. You must not think of the organization as ending at the fence — that is common sense.... As ordinary people, we arbitrarily combine, and define, and add, and subtract things from our picture of reality. As professional people, we arbitrarily combine, and define, and add, and subtract things, in a different way to the everyday way: this is what differentiates us." While people used not to see pollution as part of the organization, now "they are beginning to see it as being the responsibility of the organization.... Once the organization becomes accountable for something, we must account for it, sooner or later" (Hines, 1988, pp. 253–54).

In the light of such growing understandings of the organization's embeddedness in broader communities and environments, over the past 70 or more years, mainstream accounting models have changed. According to a 2002 KPMG report, "This is the time of profit with responsibility. The bottom line has changed" (p. 1; qtd. in Milne, Tregidga & Walton, 2003). If accounting has never been socially neutral and has indeed been part of the reproduction and legitimation of social systems (Buhr, 2002; Collison, 2003; Everett, Green & Neu, 2005), triple bottom line reporting within the broader domain of corporate social responsibility has emerged to underline and make visible "social variables" (Quarter, Mook & Richmond, 2003, p. 3) and take account of what used to be termed "externalities" — "the consequences of economic activity which are not reflected in the costs borne by the individual or organization enjoying the benefits of the activity" (Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996, p. 1).

Enterprises are increasingly interested in producing sustainability and environmental reports to assess performance not only because they face public demand and challenges of "reputation and legitimacy" (Raynard, 1998, p. 1471; Buhr, 2002), but also because they see in their CSR initiatives "business benefits" and a "competitive advantage" (CBSR, 2003, p. 4).

If in the 1970s social audits were "something which was done to an organization by generally critical non-governmental organizations" and in the 1980s stock market success meant little regard for social performance, in the 1990s, "the landscape changed. Led by a group of ethically-oriented companies, a new, very much more systematic approach to social accounting has emerged" (Henriques, 2000, p. 60).

Today more businesses are recognizing that clean water and air are "not strictly 'environmental' issues. They are business issues" (Manning, 2004, p. 9). In this context, taking care of the triple bottom line (Elkington, 1998) — economic, environmental, and social performance — is seen by many as "key to success, even survival, in today's competitive business climate" (Manning, 2004, p. 9). Still, Hawken (2002) warns about "fantasy" reporting and the danger that "the meaning of sustainability ... get lost in the trappings of corporate speak.... I am concerned that good housekeeping practices such as recycled hamburger shells will be confused with creating a just and sustainable world. (pp. 1–2). And smoke and mirrors reporting — a journey with an infinitely deferred destination (Milne, Kearins & Walton, 2003) — is as much an issue in New Zealand as in North America, while the business case for sustainable development barely conceals "a series of hidden tensions and inherent contradictions." As a result, critical commentators call for "strong sustainability" emphasizing "the resource base, ecosystem services, people and other species" and "not just an efficient allocation of resources over time, but also a fair distribution of resources and opportunities between the current generation and between present and future generations" (Milne, Tregidga & Walton, 2004, pp. 5–6).

Nevertheless, Boyce (2000) sees in social accounting an opportunity for a version of "silent accounting" or counter-narratives derived

from public information (Gray, 1997). These narratives tell stories beyond the economically quantifiable, "developing and applying appropriate metaphors and narratives" and "facilitating transparent democratic discourse and debate" (p. 30). For Henriques (2000) too, it is the social dimensions of the process — the social relationships — that matter. And social accounting in general and the triple bottom line in particular have importantly added to discursive space for debate opened by the cracks and contradictions in dominant institutions, making for new understandings of Aboriginal peoples' struggles and shared interests in ecological and other survival (Blaser, Feit & McRae, 2004).

## Mainstream Accounting and Aboriginal Economic Development

Accounting and other mainstream fields of inquiry and action are being challenged from many fronts, including Indigenous and postcolonial researchers who have exposed the historical privileges of mainstream measures benefiting First World capital and economic individualism. Following the advice of Smith (1999), they are "rewriting and rerighting [Indigenous peoples'] position in history.... It is not simply about giving an oral account or a genealogical naming of the land and the events which raged over it, but a very powerful need to give testimony to and restore a spirit, to bring back into existence a world fragmented and dying" (pp. 28–29). These researchers are beginning to evaluate how accounting tools and practices in the hands of government bureaucrats and corporate managers have historically devalued and continue to marginalize Indigenous peoples, knowledge, and initiatives, subjecting them to canons of value and standards of evidence and accountability that are alien to Indigenous cultures (Chew & Greer, 1997; Gallhofer & Chew, 2000a). These researchers challenge the naturalness of modernity's exclusionary story of *universal* reason, progress, and civilization that took upon itself the exclusive definition of accounts, accounting, and accountability and licensed its oversight of those needing to give accounts of themselves (Gallhofer & Chew, 2000a). It was this dominant/dominating story, they argue, that allowed settler nations to imagine and legitimate their claims to territory and resources (Gibson, 2000; Gallhofer, Gibson, Haslam, McNicholas & Takiari, 2000), while depending on the knowledge of Aboriginal people to survive and prosper and dismissing Aboriginal peoples as uncivilized. As a result of these challenges, the way in which we view the world is changing, as researchers and practitioners revisit and revise commonly held views of our natural, cultural, and social environments.

A powerful book — *Accounting for genocide: Canada's bureaucratic assault on Aboriginal people* by Neu and Therrien (2003) — considers accounting's "mediative role" in "defining power relationships" and supporting the colonization of Canada's First Nations. They argue that since the early 1800s, accounting — "defined as a system of numerical techniques, funding mechanisms and accountability relations — has been used by the state as a method of indirect governance in its containments, control and attempted assimilation of First Nations peoples" (p. 6). Long before "the so-called wiring of the planet," accounting information was power — the power to redefine who were productive and who were parasites on the public purse (pp. 28–37). To feed "the global economy's appetite for resources [that] knows no boundaries," or "the new colonialism of global trade," governments and their functionaries claim that the "welfare of the country as a whole" is "a higher moral good, for which traditional tribal customs must be sacrificed." To protest the bureaucratic rationalizing of exploitation and inequality is to be accused of wanting "special treatment" for Indigenous peoples instead of "fighting for their right to have a say in their own future" (pp. 1–6).

In tracing in the so-called Information Age — "in reality a continuation of the industrial age under a new moniker" — "an even deeper advance of economic imperialism into Indigenous territories" (p. 8), Neu and Therrien's book adds importantly to work focused largely on New Zealand and Australia in a special issue of *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, guest-edited by Gallhofer and Chew (2000b). These and other papers on Aboriginal peoples elaborate accounting's "production of a calculative knowledge of imperialism" (Davie, 2000, p. 331). Such work highlights the devastating impact colonial and imperial bureaucratic practices and quantitative methods have often had on Aboriginal communities, isolating them geographically in the interests of settlement and commerce, destroying communal and co-operative practices, and imposing mainstream institutions without relevant tools to participate effectively.

While mainstream accounting undervalues and renders invisible many achievements of Aboriginal economies, it also makes some things unusually visible by its highly selective demands for "increased accountability" and intense scrutiny directed at those represented as "problems" and dependent on the public purse (Quarter, Mook & Richmond, 2003, p. 10). Such has been the fate of Aboriginal organizations, whose social, cultural, and economic achievements are obscured, especially in the face of paternalistic bureaucracies and public scrutiny of accountability and transparency issues and demands for better governance (Gibson, 2000; Ivanitz, 2001). Part of asymmetrical systems of visibility and accountability that enhance "managerial accountability" and diminish "political accountability" (Jacobs, 2000, p. 361), such accountability systems, for instance, divert attention from the accountability of mainstream institutions for undermining Aboriginal economic development by reducing land and resources — even after reserves were established in Canada, reducing them to little more than one-third of the acreage by the 1990s (Wien, 1999).

In the context of mainstream accounting, Aboriginal organizations and communities are subjected to a double standard of unusual scrutiny and inappropriate economic indicators at the expense of all other considerations and at great cost to those organizations and communities. The effect is redoubled for those organizations whose mission is not only economic but also social, cultural, ecological, for instance, and who remain accountable not only to governments and the public purse but also to the members of their own communities — and to their "Dreaming Law" in the case of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (Greer and Patel, 2000; Ivanitz, 2001). In this way, accounting persists in undermining self-determination and oppressing Aboriginal peoples by assimilating them to mainstream standards and an inappropriately hierarchical principal-agent model that ignores grassroots decision-making (Chew & Greer, 1997). As Gibson (2000) argues, in the case of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, financial reports are incomplete and simplistic because they do not address "implicit costs and benefits" or expenditures that "could be offset against other government allowances." Such failures are "at best misleading, and at worst may represent a conspiracy to conceal the disadvantage to Aboriginal Australians that still continues" (Gibson, 2000, p. 302).

And restrictive accounting measures leave the public feeling Aboriginal groups are unusually advantaged as well as insufficiently accountable (Gibson, 2000), even though, as Ivanitz (2001) has shown in the Australian context, "Ninety-five per cent of these [Aboriginal organizations] were cleared for funding. In those instances where non-compliance was an issue, it mainly took the form of minor technical breaches such as the late submission of financial and management reports." In contrast, Ivanitz (2001) cites the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commission, 1997, whose survey "showed that roughly half the 490 Australian companies surveyed had experienced significant fraud in the last two years" (p. 15). Such figures will hardly surprise those who have been following the cases of Enron, Andersen, or Nortel. And an Assembly of First Nations (AFN, 2004) report tells a very different story from that told by mainstream accounting and media. The average Canadian gets services worth two-and-a-half times more than those received by First Nations, while only three percent of 557 financial management audits of First Nations, 2002–2003, required remedial action (AFN, 2004).

Meanwhile, mainstream systems reward profit-maximizing that adds to the "growing list of social, ethical, environmental and political problems" (Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996, p. 2). And, as Chew and Greer (1997) argue, "the imposition of systems of financial accountability on Aboriginal organizations not only signifies a lack of trust, it also acts to undermine trust" (p. 281), that trust so critical to traditional Aboriginal society — and to economic success in contemporary society (Putnam, 1993).

Accounting is a system, then, that not only reduces inputs and outputs to those exchanged in the market, but that encodes neo-classical economic assumptions about what counts for success and happiness. As Smith (2000) has argued, such thinking has been especially threatening to Indigenous ways of knowing because "It begins to switch our thinking from the circle to square boxes. It initiates a positivist worldview that is fundamental to the New Right economic thinking that puts emphasis on competition rather than on cooperation, on the individual rather than on the collective, on regulations rather than on responsibility" (p. 211).

And such positivist thinking ignores too Aboriginal understanding of land not as an exploitable commodity but rather as something "possessing man" — a notion closer to "the western notion of custodianship" or to "the present accounting notion of liabilities rather than of assets" (Gibson, 2000, pp. 294–95).

In this context, current efforts to expand and refine accounting models and practices need to address the historical impact of traditional accounting on Indigenous peoples and economies, to displace old paternalistic models that constructed Aboriginal "problems," and respect and learn from Aboriginal powers and achievement. They need to understand Aboriginal values and views on governance, markets, community development, and social, human, and other capital. And they need to understand the overriding importance of "All my relations," a respectful and responsible understanding of relations between humans and their environment — surely a powerful form of "*embodied ethics*" that Everett, Green and Neu (2005) commend as a better guide than the one-hundred-page Canadian accounting code of ethics (p. 22)!

Gallhofer et al. (2000) are among those who celebrate how much environmental accounting can learn from Indigenous cultural practices and perspectives, especially contextual and holistic understandings of complex realities. Meanwhile, those involved in Aboriginal economic development are looking to the opportunities afforded by the triple bottom line to help escape the "one size fits all" models imposed by the Indian Act (Wien, 1999, p. 112) and to acknowledge and value Indigenous knowledge and traditional views of, for example, the use of land, community involvement and capacity building, and education and training (Wuttunee, 2004). It provides, for those involved in Aboriginal political, community, economic, and business development, in assessing assets and negotiating partnership and other agreements, with practical and Indigenous alternatives to "business as usual."

## Traditional Bottom Line, Triple Bottom Line, and Genuine Progress Indicator Accounting

If sustainability is an elastic term that has been stretched to serve the interests of very different stakeholders, it is likewise the case that the triple bottom line is in need of greater precision and meaning if it is to live up to its promise to challenge reductive rational economism or singular determinants of worth and really value relationships. The triple bottom line — and its nuances — may be best illustrated by placing it in the context of the traditional bottom line practised by for-profit organizations, or corporations, on the one hand, and the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) and the Genuine Progress Index (GPI Atlantic) being developed in Alberta (Anielski & Winfield, 2002) and Nova Scotia (Colman, 2001), for example, on the other. The traditional bottom line (Figure 1 below), representing the difference between total revenues earned and the costs incurred by a corporation, draws attention to the corporation's almost complete focus on a small group of society's numerous stakeholders, namely investors and creditors.

This narrow focus was not always the case. As noted by Mintzberg et al (2002), for example, corporations were originally granted charters to serve society. That this has changed is self-evident. Corporations have become selfish. Mintzberg, Simons and Basu (2002) refer to a decade during which the US experienced "a glorification of self-interest perhaps unequalled since the 1930s. It is as if, in denying much of the social progress made since then, we were thrown back to an earlier and darker age. Greed was raised to some sort of high calling; corporations were urged to ignore broader social responsibilities in favour of narrow shareholder

**FIGURE 1** Traditional Corporate "Bottom Line" Accounting



value; chief executives were regarded as if they alone created economic performance" (p. 1). Mintzberg et al (2002) further recount how in 1997 the Business Roundtable in a report on Corporate Governance rejected the idea that corporations should have responsibility beyond that to investors and creditors: "The notion that the board must somehow balance the interests of the stockholders against the interests of other stakeholders fundamentally misconstrues the role of directors. It is, moreover, an unworkable notion because it would leave the board with no criterion for resolving conflicts between interests of the stockholders and of other stakeholders or among different groups of stakeholders" (p. 7).

In seeking to maximize the bottom line for shareholders, executives have implicitly drawn on the accounting concept known as "entity," which defines a corporation's boundary in primarily legal terms, to externalize costs associated with the production and consumption of their products. The Global Reporting Initiative refers to this as a "boundary issue" (Adams, 2001). Under pressure from such institutions as the European Commission (1995), representatives of the accounting profession have sought to provide guidance on the manner in which externalities might be incorporated through, for example, Full Cost Accounting (FCA) (Bebbington et al., 2001). FCA seeks to identify external costs and benefits in order that society may "be better informed as to which decisions would be more likely to make sustainable development achievable" (p. 1). Bebbington et al. (2001), note, however, serious challenges in developing FCA. If it is developed from a 'business as usual' position, business may be willing to adopt the technique, but actions to improve sustainability will be limited. If the FCA perspective reveals that current business activities are unsustainable, it may be necessary to "rethink Western style capitalism completely" (p. 1) and business will be unwilling to adopt the technique. The apparent willingness, therefore, of many corporations to adopt "triple bottom line" reporting, which is synonymous with "sustainability reporting", "social reporting", and "other terms that encompass the economic, environmental and social aspects of an organization's performance" (GRI, 2002, p.1), may be regarded with a degree of skepticism.

The triple bottom line extends the perspective of the corporation's stakeholders beyond investors and creditors and their narrow interest in bottom line financial performance by introducing the notion of economic, environmental and social performance (Figure 2). The business press is replete with accounts of the success of corporations who have adopted the triple bottom line. In a report headlined "The Results Are In! Triple Bottom Line Benefits Business," Barrett et al. (2004) refer to recent studies "pointing the way to significant benefits for businesses that adopt a triple bottom line." Willard's 2002 *The Sustainability Advantage: Seven Bottom Line Benefits of a Triple Bottom Line* is hailed in the book's foreword by Heel and Elkington as a book that will be invaluable to corporate leaders and those wishing to convince corporate leaders that "sustainability strategies reap tremendous rewards."

Tschopp (2003) states that companies issue triple bottom line or similar reports "to meet investor demand, and to gain recognition for actions performed," and, citing the case of such companies as Nike and Shell, "to rebuild their reputations" (p. 11). In the field of engineering an article by Smith (2004) focused on The Triple *Top* Line (emphasis added) with the word Bottom struck out. In the article Smith refers to sustainability designing "win/win/win solutions for both the short- and long-term effects of design on social responsibility, environmental performance and business results" (p. 24). Sustainability and its reporting through the triple bottom line is thus regarded by many in the cor-

**FIGURE 2** Sustainability Accounting — GRI "Triple Bottom Line"



porate world as just another weapon to be added to an arsenal for strategic deployment in the interests of the traditional bottom line. Of course there are many in business who do not support the triple bottom line or indeed who are unaware of it and of GRI sustainability. However, the point is that the term appears to have been expropriated and colonized by business.

In addition to concern about colonization of the term, Norman and MacDonald (2004) critically appraise the very concept and identify fundamental problems with aggregating or rather the impossibility of aggregating scores arising from the diverse indicators, comparability over time and across organizations, and credibility (or the lack thereof) in the absence of generally accepted sustainability auditing standards. They note that because of these factors the triple bottom line is exceedingly easy for firms to embrace. The authors conclude that the triple bottom line turns out to be "Good old fashioned Single Line plus Vague Commitments to Social and Environmental Concerns" (p. 13).

The picture painted so far may appear a little depressing. When we step away from the corporate into the municipal sector, however, an example of the possibilities of triple bottom line reporting appears: The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) and the Genuine Progress Index (GPI Atlantic). Each metric seeks to do some justice to a concept of Gross National Happiness, providing an alternative to the "practice of equating progress with economic growth alone" (GPI Atlantic, 2005). Alberta's approach which has an unabashed community focus is described by Anielski and Winfield (2002) in a study prepared for Environment Canada. Anielski and Winfield (2002) establish a strong case for pursuing a policy of sustainability by showing (Figure 3) the increasing divergence between Environmental Sustainability measured by 17 indicators and GDP in Alberta. The figure shows that while Alberta's GDP Growth Index climbed from 40 to 100 points during the period 1961 to 1999, the Environment Sustainability Index declined 20 points from just under 70 to under 50.

Alberta's GPI envisages three groups of stakeholders: social, environmental, and economic. As shown in the model (Figure 4), accounts are created for each of the three groups and an index, the GPI, is developed to integrate and provide a "kind of holistic balance sheet" (p. 55). A framework for community environmental quality reporting embraces numerous performance indicators including economic growth, economic diversity, poverty, income distribution, unemployment, free time, life expectancy, infant mortality, crime, educational attainment, oil sands reserve life, wetlands, air quality and hazardous waste.

**FIGURE 3** Alberta GPI Environmental Sustainability Index Compared with GDP Growth, 1961 to 1999




(Alberta GPI Accounts 1961–1999; Anielski & Winfield, 2002)

**FIGURE 4** The Alberta GPI Sustainable Well-Being Accounting System




(Anielski & Winfield, 2002)

**FIGURE 5** Developing a Sustainability Report (Maclaren, 1996)




Despite ten years of progress on sustainability measurement led by the municipal sector, Anielski and Winfield (2002) note that "the emergence of a commonly accepted national framework for community/municipal sustainability indicators and reporting systems is still a good distance from reality" (p. 3). Nevertheless, the authors conclude that Environment Canada can play a critical role by providing baseline data as well as national and community guidance on data collection and reporting protocols. It is perhaps to these initiatives rather than the corporate sector that Aboriginal organizations may turn and contribute to efforts to protect, conserve, and restore their environment and communities and to reassert independence.

## Putting Theory into Practice

Maclaren (1996) provides a useful and visual framework, consisting of a nine-step iterative process, for communities wishing to adopt sustainability as a goal (Figure 5).

The first and crucial step involves a consensus-based approach to identify how the community should appear or be envisaged at some specified future date in order to be regarded as sustainable. A parallel can be drawn between this first step — "defining sustainability goals" — and the practice of formulating strategic objectives and visions in a corporation. However, the strategic objectives described by Maclaren (1996) are markedly different from those adopted by corporations. For such organizations, where investors and creditors remain central, "sustainability" is more likely to be regarded as a vehicle for improving competitive performance than sustaining let alone restoring economies, environments, and communities.

The other steps including scoping and choosing indicator frameworks are briefly described in Figure 6. With a history of stewardship of the environment, Aboriginal peoples may need little guidance in identifying potential indicators (step 5) in the area, for example, of habitat, flora, and fauna. However, recent work by Jones (2003) describing an approach to accounting for wildlife assets including habitats, flora, and fauna may be of interest. The approach described by Jones (2003) was developed during

**FIGURE 6** Developing a Sustainability Report

| *Steps* | *Brief Descriptors* |
|---|---|
| 1. Define Sustainability Goals | Identify how the community should appear or be envisaged at some specified future date in order to be regarded as sustainable. |
| 2. Scoping | Define the scope of the report by identifying the target audience and the purpose of the indicators. |
| 3. Choose Indicator Framework | Maclaren identifies six general frameworks that can be used for developing sustainability indicators. One of these, a "goal-based framework" draws on identification of the sustainability goals for the community. |
| 4. Define Indicator Selection Criteria | Maclaren suggests among the criteria of good sustainability indicators are indicators that are scientifically valid, representative of a broad range of conditions, responsive to change, relevant to user needs, based on accurate and accessible data that is available over time, understandability and comparability. |
| 5. Identify Potential Indicators | Maclaren suggests the use of "brainstorming" and workshops, perhaps facilitated by experts. |
| 6. Evaluate and Select a Set of Indicators | Evaluate potential indicators against the selection criteria (step 4) in the context of the conceptual framework chosen (step 3). |
| 7. Analyze Indicator Results | Determine whether indicator results show that progress is being made towards achieving sustainability (a sustainability "bottom line" perhaps). |
| 8. Prepare and Present Report | Among many issues identified by Maclaren are providing a description of the meaning of each indicator, historical trends and anticipated trends. |
| 9. Assess Indicator Performance | Are indicators measuring what they are meant to measure? |

(Developed from Maclaren, 1996)

a study conducted on a 17,400 hectare estate in mid-Wales populated with over 3,000 species of flora and fauna. Jones (2003) identified, operationalized, and evaluated indicators to measure stewardship on the estate using a Natural Inventory model (p.769). Among the habitat, flora, and fauna measured and reported were grassland, moorland, and woodland; birds, butterflies, and mammals; grasses, trees, and rushes. Jones (2003) concludes that while the study was conducted on a small scale, the model has "demonstrated great promise" as a means of monitoring the stewardship of natural assets (p. 782).

When it comes to reporting sustainability, there are many possible formats. One that may provide a particularly appropriate summary or "bottom line" in the context of both Maclaren's bold characterization of sustainability and the sustainability objectives of Aboriginal communities and organizations is the Sustainability Circle (Figure 7). This particular chart (Anielski & Winfield, 2002) provides "the 'condition' statement of the well-being of a society." It provides for the simultaneous comparison of multiple indicators (in this case 51).

Indicators reflecting an optimal state of well-being score 100 points. The shaded area

**FIGURE 7** Alberta's GPI Sustainability Circle




(Anielski & Winfield, 2002)

thus shows the extent to which objectives — relative to either a community target, benchmark year, or other best performance benchmark — have been achieved at a particular point in time.

The Sustainability Circle clearly illustrates how the successful achievement of Economic Growth (100%), for example, may be simultaneously accompanied by apparently less success in other areas including Economic Diversity (40%), Oil and Gas Reserves Life (10%), Unemployment (45%) and Problem Gambling (10%) (all figures approximate). In the case of the US, the Sustainability Circle would reveal the hollowness of "success", for instance, which in a recent report by the United Nations was ranked "highest in both gross domestic product and poverty rates." At the height of the economic boom in 1999, "one in six American children was officially poor" and "poverty was more acute than in prior years, while income inequitably remained at record levels" (Mintzberg et al., 2002, p. 18).

## Conclusions

In addition to tracing accounting's historical role in relation to Aboriginal economies, this essay has unpacked accounting's persistently colonial role not only in determining the way in which governments and corporations interact with Aboriginal businesses and communities, but also the way in which they evaluate Aboriginal business, political, educational, and economic development. Neu and Therrien (2003) remain vigilant, asking whether modern deals and partnerships really do depart from the old "genocidal practices" of governments, corporations, and their bureaucracies and what are the implications for emerging sovereignty. They ask too: "How are economic globalization and the pressures of ecological brinkmanship and dwindling

resources relevant to these new agreements?" (p. 168). Similarly, Gibson (2000) sees no end to traditional accounting's part in the dispossession of Aboriginal peoples, imposing still "higher levels of accountability" that "act in many cases to deny them access to the social goods and services regarded as rights by non-Aboriginal Australians" — a role masked by a "value-free" discourse that values "economic power ... at the expense of social infrastructure and social interaction" (pp. 290–91). And Dodson (1994) warns of the dangers of past and present silencing, suppression, and injustice: "if the injustices of history are grievous, then of even greater gravity are the injustices which remain entrenched in the attitudes, practices and laws of contemporary states ... the dignity and perhaps even the survival of the human race hinge on the revival of the voices and cultures of the earth" (pp. 18–19; cit. in Gallhofer et al., 2000, p. 382).

Speaking about participatory development, Davis (2003) of the World Bank calls for more accurate measures of the impact of international development on Indigenous communities, especially when existing measures fail to take sufficient account of social and cultural displacements and spiritual and ecological balance. In the interests of broader, more holistic notions of accountability and sustainability, then, industrial society needs to listen to the lessons from Aboriginal ways of knowing, saying, and doing to legitimate and foster a truly sustainable development (Lertzman & Vredenburg, 2005). In changing an unsustainable status quo, RCAP (1996) suggests, "Aboriginal principles of sharing and coexistence offer us the chance for a fresh start" (p. 428). As Grand Chief Harold Turner of Swampy Cree Tribal Council put it, "Our responsibilities to Mother Earth are the foundation of our spirituality, culture and traditions.... Our ancestors did not sign a real estate deal, as you cannot give away something you do not own" (qtd. in RCAP, 1996, p. 436).

Whereas critiquing mainstream business and accounting practices is an important first stage in departing from "business as usual," the next stage must provide concrete alternative solutions. We also have to understand how new accounting tools can assist those involved in Aboriginal economic development adopt alternative economic strategies and make clearer "what counts" (Quarter, Mook & Richmond, 2002) in social, environmental, and cultural terms, elaborating costs, benefits, and responsibilities based on Indigenous and local knowledge.

Triple bottom line reporting as practised in municipal contexts and in the GPI Sustainability Circle allows community development 'change agents' a way to value and bring into the equation 'externalities' that would otherwise be left unaccounted for. Indigenous knowledge together with the aspirational goals of postcolonial thinking can expand the capacities of the triple bottom line by enabling Aboriginal communities to engage new ways of telling their stories and arguing for change and development of policy — based on time-tested, cultural and spiritual ways of seeing and knowing. Only then will Aboriginal communities be better able to assess the costs and benefits of the partnerships (with corporations or government) they are often encouraged to enter.

The triple bottom line, and especially the Sustainability Circle, when controlled by a community or co-operative, or Aboriginal community-based enterprises, can be enhanced by local and Indigenous knowledge to the benefit of all. Thus transformed, it can help people to think and act outside colonial conceptual boxes that have a habit of entrenching comfortable forms of dependency. Such transformed accounting measures could provide sites of renewal, stories of hope, and ideas for change that will benefit Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples alike — a postcolonial realm of possibility governed not by an exclusionary and hierarchical Western "either-or" logic, but an inclusive "both-and" perspective that learns from best practices in each culture.

Local and Indigenous knowledge can combine for an enhanced analysis of the value, role, and impact of an organization or business within a community and its larger social and environmental systems. This is particularly important to those interested in community vitality and safety and in "*an economics of happiness*" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 40) that promises a more inclusive and humane cost-benefit calculus than that offered by mainstream accounting. And the time is right with current efforts to Make Poverty History and the United Nations' Second International Decade of the World's Indigenous People (beginning 1 January 2005) together with UNESCO's proposed priorities, including promoting Indigenous visions of development and sustainability and developing relevant international normative instruments. With Indigenous

knowledge and values at the centre of accounting's authoritative practices, they can do justice to the specificities of Aboriginal experience in Canada, support and sustain Aboriginal aspirations and economies, help Canada live up to its treaty promises to Aboriginal peoples, and forge a truly postcolonial Canadian future with the sort of nurturing relationships and social cohesion connected to healthy people and vigorous economies.

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# DEVELOPMENT ON THE MARGIN
## Development Orthodoxy and the Success of Lax Kw'alaams, British Columbia

Ralph Matthews and Nathan Young

**ABSTRACT**

*The remote Aboriginal community of Lax Kw'alaams in northwestern British Columbia has recently experienced a remarkable turnaround in its local economy. This has been achieved through innovative land and resource management, as well as the entrepreneurial pursuit of new tenure rights and markets for product. In this paper, we relate the experiences of Lax Kw'alaams within the framework of predominant theories of rural development; specifically the traditional approach of staples and dependency theory, as well as newer perspectives grounded in theories of globalization. In doing so, we discuss several ways in which the Lax Kw'alaams case challenges accepted orthodoxies about rural development. We end by outlining potential research questions for better understanding the immediate and long-term implications of this case.*

### The Transformation of Lax Kw'alaams[1]

Lax Kw'alaams (formerly known as Port Simpson) is a First Nation community of some 1350 residents, part of the Tsimshiam Nation, located on the north coast of British Columbia a short distance from the Alaska panhandle (see Figure 1). Until about five years ago, Lax Kw'alaams demonstrated almost all of the social and economic difficulties that beset many isolated First Nation communities in Canada. Unemployment soared over 80 percent, school attendance was poor with a large dropout rate, and the economic affairs of the Band were in such disarray that it was severely in debt.[2]

Today, in stark contrast, the community is thriving. The Band is out of debt and has a hefty bank balance that it is using to expand services and infrastructure. Almost all roads in the community have recently been paved and the place has the appearance and feel of prosperity. This new image is supported by the construction in the town of a new 25 metre indoor swimming pool with water slide, adjoining Elders' Centre, and refurbished recreation centre

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**FIGURE 1** Lax Kw'alaams and British Columbia




and gymnasium. Moreover, the community has taken primary control of its own schooling, moving its school out of control of the regional school district authority by establishing it as the private Lax Kw'alaams Academy. Specialists in inner city education from the southern United States have been invited to run the school and they have provided a new remedial education program that has seen students, on average, advance in one year from being four years below grade level, to being on grade level with the provincial average.

Furthermore, though the community is still served by a lengthy car ferry from the City of Prince Rupert through a north Pacific route, it has obtained the financial resources to upgrade, to a high standard, a logging road across the peninsula to nearby Tuck Inlet. There, a commuter ferry regularly whisks passengers to and from the city along a sheltered inlet, in what appears (at least in comparison) to be a matter of minutes. As a result, from being an isolated coastal village on the open Pacific, Lax Kw'alaams has become transformed into an easily accessible adjunct of the larger and historically more prosperous City of Prince Rupert.

The most striking improvement in Lax Kw'alaams during this short period has been its economic revival. Whereas, previously over 80 percent of able bodied residents in the community were on social assistance and without work, this has been reduced to the point when it now averages well below five percent of the labour force. The community has managed to achieve these gains primarily by developing a unique approach for the development of its forestry reserves. First, the Lax Kw'alaams Band benefits from the provision of a relatively large reserve, at least by British Columbian standards. While most coastal bands have been allocated only miniscule reserve territories based on traditional fishing and encampment sites (cf. Harris 2002), the Lax Kw'alaams Band holds nearly 12,000 hectares in reserve lands. Second, the Lax Kw'alaams Band has developed a unique Land Use Plan (LUP). This, unlike the plans currently being negotiated for Crown lands across the province through the Land and Resource Man-

agement Planning (LRMP) process, places no area under complete protection from economic development. Conversely, every area within the traditional territory is subject to careful sustainable management. As part of this process, the community has eschewed the clear-cutting methods of large commercial forestry companies. Instead, it has developed a sustainable method of selectively cutting small segments of each hectare, using helicopters to move this timber to a wet log-sorting area. Though generally considered as too expensive a harvesting method for commercial operation, the Band has found specialty overseas markets that cover production costs. This process has been so successful that the Band currently generates a substantial annual profit in the millions of dollars.

This success has proven to be a foundation for further entrepreneurial pursuits. In 2004, the Lax Kw'alaams Band made a surprising, and successful, bid of $4.8 million dollars to the court appointed receiver for the timber assets of a defunct mill in the region. With these timber reserves added to its existing holdings, the Band now has a sustainable annual cut of approximately 700,000 cubic metres, which brings it into the range of the largest timber producers in British Columbia. Through involvement in this and other ventures, the Lax Kw'alaams Band has established a private firm to manage its operations. This corporation — the Coast Tsimshian Partnership Ltd. (CTP) — has a full Board of Directors, and every member of the Band has been accorded non-voting shares. CTP is committed to moving beyond forestry. The firm is presently developing the potential to become a significant producer of fish products. It has invested in refurbishing a long closed fish processing plant in the community, and is negotiating an agreement with Japanese interests as buyers for the product of this plant as well as the fishing resources from other nearby communities, including the Tsimshian people of Metlakatla, Alaska. These same Japanese interests are also negotiating with the Band to build a fish-meal production plant at Law Kw'alaams to produce meal from fish bi-products obtained throughout northern British Columbia and Alaska, and to ship these to markets in Japan, China, Taiwan and other parts of Asia where they are in high demand both by aquaculture and animal producers.

The implications of these developments is that Lax Kw'alaams has been transformed in five short years from a place that appeared to have little hope for a positive social and economic future, into an economic engine of Northwestern British Columbia. Band officials estimate that the annual production of these enterprises places the band gross revenues from its resource bases at approximately two hundred million dollars per year. With its recent forestry acquisitions, Lax Kw'alaams now is rivalling and indeed perhaps surpassing the economic prospects of the two large municipal centres in the region, Prince Rupert and Terrace. The contrast with the City of Prince Rupert in particular is striking. During the period in which Law Kw'alaams has developed and prospered, the City of Prince Rupert has endured significant hardship. Its primary fishing activities have been curtailed through government licence buy-backs, and the pulp and lumber mills in the city have closed. As a result, the population of Prince Rupert has declined from 17,400 residents in 1991 to 14,600 in 2001.

## Lax Kw'alaams and Development Orthodoxy

The transformation of Lax Kw'alaams runs counter to dominant understandings of the economic prospects of remote communities. This is true both of traditional frameworks such as staples and dependency theories, and of newly formulated theories of globalization and local-global (or 'glocal') networks and relations. In this section, we elaborate these inconsistencies and identify conceptual gaps in these literatures with respect to the case of Lax Kw'alaams.

Thinking about development in Canada has been dominated in the last century by the 'staples theory' of Harold Innis (1933; 1956). Innis' analysis was a reaction to primarily British economic theories of 'comparative advantage' that contended that colonies such as Canada are naturally suited by their small population, resource base, and distance from population centres, to being staples economies rather than industrial ones. Innis certainly recognized the importance of staples production in long-term development. By analyzing Canadian economic history from the fur trade through to modern forestry and fisheries, Innis concluded that Canada's enormous resource base enabled it to become a strong and modern economy by transferring from one staple resource to another as international demand dictated.

However, Innis also argued that such an economic strategy based almost solely on the extraction of raw material led, ultimately, to a "staples trap" in which local communities and regions remain always caught in a state of volatility and crisis, fuelled by fickle external demands for their particular resources and the potential exhaustion of these same resources on which local well-being depended (cf. Watkins 1963). Thus local prosperity has historically depended upon the ebbs and flows of global demand, leading to a state of deep instability characterized by dramatic boom-to-bust swings in rural economies.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Innis' staples perspective was supplemented with theories of hinterland dependency (Long 1977; Matthews 1983). The essence of the dependency perspective was that urban areas and rural (resource based) regions are held together by a symbiotic relationship of mutual dependency. In this process, urban (manufacturing) areas were 'dependent' on rural ones for the resources on which their society and economy were based. However, this relationship was seen by dependency theorists as exploitative. Thus, hinterland areas were exploited by central ones for their resources, their labour, and their capital — all of which were drawn into urban areas at the expense of hinterland economies. Dependency theory also contained an inherent social class perspective. Thus, it was argued, the capitalist classes of the centre and of the hinterland had interests in common — being essentially a series of patron-broker relationships engaged in the exploitation of workers (Matthews 1983). In contrast, the workers of the hinterland and those of the central area were in essentially a conflicting relationship. The limited gains to labour in the metropolis were made essentially through low wages and lack of other benefits to the workers of the hinterlands. Moreover, hinterland workers were also further exploited by being a pool of excess labour that could be drawn into the central areas when jobs were plentiful, but that could be laid off when times were poor. When that happened, many such workers returned to their hinterland communities to be drains on the local hinterland welfare system, rather than on the social service agencies of the centre regions.

In recent years, theories of staples and dependency relationships have been supplanted by theories of globalization. The primary concern of staples/dependency theories was to understand how economies are organized within and across regions and territories. In contrast, theories of globalization are attentive to networks of association and exchange across vast spaces (cf. Holton 2005: 209). To be sure, these earlier theories (most notably of dependency) emphasize relations and relationships. However, the focus remained the impact that these had on the economic and social arrangements between regions. Within staples and dependency theory, the unit of analysis was the vertical and hierarchical dynamics of highly ordered economies. In other words, local development in disadvantaged regions was understood as directly shaped by the capacity of senior governments to influence the geography of production, specifically by creating a series of incentives for corporations or firms to invest and/or locate in these regions (Savioe 1992).

The globalization perspective has advanced a different set of theses about development. The most sophisticated of these argue that the 'success' of a region in the world economy is less and less dependent on capacities to directly produce commodities or manufactured products en mass. Rather, successful regional development is thought to stem from the capacity of local ventures to participate in a fluid but network-based economy. This has been most thoroughly articulated by Castells (2000), who argues that the global economy is increasingly characterized by logic of 'flows'. The metaphor of flows refers to the liberalization of movements of capital, knowledge, and labour across spaces that have traditionally been dominated by rigid regulatory and/or institutional structures. The general thinking is that flows concentrate or move through 'hubs' that offer particular advantages in terms of skills, infrastructure, knowledge, and service capacities (cf. Scott et al. 2001). The classic example of this is the emergence of 'world cities' such as Tokyo, London, and New York that are now more oriented to one another's economies than to those of the nations in which they reside (Sassen 1991). Smaller hubs in the global space of flows include knowledge-based industrial districts such as Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1994) and Germany's Baden-Wurttemberg region (Herrigel 1993).

In other words, the ability of places to become hubs, moorings, or conduits in "the space of flows" is thought to be integral to local economic development (Brenner 2003). For places that stand outside major hubs, participa-

**TABLE 1** Summary and Comparison of Staples/Dependency and Globalization Perspectives on Development

| | *Staples/Dependency* | *Globalization* |
|---|---|---|
| Key units or metaphors | nation<br>region | flow<br>network |
| Key relationships (in creating wealth) | nation-global<br>centre-periphery | local-global<br>hub-hub |
| Source of inequality or uneven development | spatial division of labour;<br>local dominance by elites | participation in the space of flows;<br>status within global networks |

tion in flow-based economies is more difficult, and dependent on the ability of local actors to create direct 'horizontal' linkages to specific markets (cf. Sheppard 2002). Current thinking suggests that these capacities are enhanced when local firms operate in a 'learning environment' that fosters a semi-competitive, semi-cooperative sharing of knowledge, network connections, and business services (Storper 1995; Amin 1999). These arrangements are often called "clustering" or "agglomeration", and can, through specialization and careful local and extra-local networking, facilitate the participation of disadvantaged regions in flow-driven economies.

Table 1 summarizes and compares several key principles of traditional staples/ dependency and newer globalization-based theories of development. We see that these theories present very different arguments about the organization of economies, methods of wealth-generation, and sources of inequality or disadvantage. Staples/ dependency theory, for instance, suggests that development can be pursued by reforming the relationship between centre and periphery, urban and rural, industry and community (Matthews 1983: 116–17). In contrast, the globalization perspective emphasizes the need for local actors to strive for direct connections to a wider "space of flows" by establishing local systems of innovation and vigorously pursuing niche markets. Otherwise, rural places increasingly find themselves 'left out' of the global flow-driven economy.

It is important to note that rural development policy in British Columbia is currently oriented towards both the staples/dependency and globalization perspectives (Young and Matthews 2005). Specifically, since the 2001 election of the centre-right British Columbia Liberal Party, the province has sought to liberalize practices of resource development. This has included implementing a 'results-based' system of environmental regulation (where firms are free to determine methods and process of harvesting, and only the end-results are regulated), and the abolishment of regulations that forest commodities be processed in local regions. These acts are rooted in traditional staples perspectives, albeit with an even more explicit orientation to the needs of international corporations and markets. The government of British Columbia has promoted many of these reforms as part of a Forestry Revitalization Plan, which justifies these changes as necessary to safeguard corporate profitability in exports.

> Timber processing rules were introduced in an attempt to create local or regional economic benefits from the timber that was [locally] logged. But these regulations led to a series of unintended consequences that hinder the forest sector's ability to make sound, business-based decisions. ... Forcing licensees to process wood at mills with equipment that is outdated, or at mills that make products that are not in demand, prevents valuable public timber from flowing to other, better uses (British Columbia 2003: 17).

At the same time, the governments of British Columbia and of Canada have been implementing programs to develop local capacities for self-organization and local entrepreneurialism. These programs include BC's Northern Development Initiative and Coast Sustainability Trust that establish funding for local infrastructure

projects and economic planning, as well as the federal Community Futures network that directly supports new business ventures at the local level. Programs such as these envision rural development as an "endogenous" process, as an outcome of creating local conditions of inclusion and support that contribute to a climate for innovation and entrepreneurialism (Ray 1999; Shucksmith 2000).

The case of Lax Kw'alaams, however, seems to fit with neither orthodoxy. The present success of the Band stems directly from its usage of staples. But the Band's involvement in the resource economy contrasts strongly with the current liberalization of resource production across Crown lands in British Columbia. First, rather than implementing a looser 'results-based' approach to harvesting practices, the Band operates on very stringent environmental principles that are 'process-based' — in other words that insist on good practices (such as selective heli-logging) rather than outcomes alone. Second, while current provincial reforms are pointing to lesser local involvement in the resource economy, particularly through the abolishment of requirements for local processing, the Lax Kw'alaams Band is building prosperous ventures that are based on local labour and rights. In sum, the Lax Kw'alaams Band is developing a staples-based economy that is inconsistent with classic staples/dependency perspectives that emphasized rural subjection to urban and/or international interests. Moreover, it does not relate to current political efforts to revitalize the resource economy through the liberalization of corporate practices within and across rural spaces.

But at the same time, the Lax Kw'alaams case is equally at odds with prevailing thinking about globalization and development. First, very little is written in that literature about the continuing role of resource and commodity production in the global "space of flows" (Hayter et al. 2003). Too often, it is forgotten that the flow-driven economy is not the exclusive purview of information technology and high finance. Lax Kw'alaams is proving to be a powerful participant in the global space of flows, but not in the way that is usually assumed. Put simply, Lax Kw'alaams is not a 'hub' in the sense implied in globalization theory. The community is not a site for the concentration of investment capital or the relaying business and informational services. In equal measure, it is not an economy that is based on a dynamic local business climate. The economic resources that are currently lending great prosperity for the community do not stem from 'endogenous' or ground-up development. Rather, they have in a very real sense been imposed, in this case through the centralized powers of Band government, and the rigid hierarchy of Band administration. In other words, the new prosperity of the place has not been built on local processes — it has not been grown out of efforts to establish local entrepreneurial culture, networks or resources.

Instead, it is the product of the levering of traditional rights and its coupling with imported expertise. The Lax Kw'alaams Band has asserted exclusive rights over productive territories in two ways. First, it has done so externally, it has made a claim to authority over a legally recognized space (the reserve lands), and from that basis has made legal purchase of other rights and spaces. Second, it has asserted rights internally, in that the primary tool for these actions has been the political apparatus of the Band. Put simply, the Band has merged its political authority (its authority over Band finances, training programs, social welfare, etc.) with its legal authority (over reserve lands and acquired tenures) to pursue a development strategy aimed at 'globalizing' the economy of Lax Kw'alaams. This has meant claiming control over territories, hiring of outside experts, and channelling capital into private ventures. In this sense, the globalization of Lax Kw'alaams has been simultaneously a local and corporatist endeavour.

This strategy, unheralded in the standard literatures on rural development, has been very successful, to this point, in the rapid turnaround of the community of Lax Kw'alaams. However, its novelty raises particular questions about the potential 'side effects' or consequences of this approach, as well as its generalizability to other communities. Therefore, we conclude this paper by outlining potential research questions for better understanding the implications of this method of rural development.

## Understanding Lax Kw'alaams and Its Implications for Development: Questions for Research

In this final section, we discuss key research questions suggested by the exceptional case of Lax Kw'alaams. These are not intended to detract from the real successes achieved there, but to locate this experience within wider ques-

tions about social and economic development in isolated First Nation communities.

1. How has the economic transformation of Lax Kw'alaams been possible?

The fundamental research question concerning the economic renaissance of Lax Kw'alaams is, quite simply, how has it been made possible? The most evident response to this question is to point to the efforts of the Band Manager of Lax Kw'alaams. Since appointment in 1999, this individual has gained the support of the elected leadership of the Band and attracted experts in education and forestry to reside in the community (albeit only for the short to medium term). While this situation appears to lend itself to an individualistic explanation of the case, we suggest that a generalizable analysis emphasize the social processes and practices involved in these actions.

First, it is important to investigate the processes through which certain knowledges have been mobilized and applied to the particular problems and assets at Lax Kw'alaams. For instance, the unique methods of resource harvesting were achieved only with extensive and specialized expert involvement. Similarly, the reforms to the curriculum of Lax Kw'alaams Academy were conceptualized and implemented by well-travelled educational activists. Our preliminary research indicates that this expertise was marshalled through networks within the international and urban development communities. The expertise and skills required were sought directly via social networks within a truly global network of skilled persons. Second, we suggest that the establishment of Lax Kw'alaams as a powerful participant in the global economy stems from the ability of these experts to forge direct 'horizontal' links to specialized buyers in many regions of the globe. The establishment of these networks means that the Lax Kw'alaams Band and its newly established corporation (the Coast Tsimshian Partnership Ltd — CTP), deal directly with buyers, rather than feeding the general commodity stream. Thus, these links intentionally by-pass traditional 'hubs' of the resource economy (in this case, Vancouver and Seattle). These arrangements have allowed more wealth from production to remain in local hands. In sum, preliminary research suggests that much of Lax Kw'alaams' success is grounded in successful efforts to embed the local economy in international networks of knowledge and exchange. From a research perspective, we would begin our inquiry into this case by investigating how these network connections are made and maintained. In other words, while we may attribute the turnaround to the resourcefulness of one or more key leaders, we argue that explanations of these outcomes ought to emphasize the actions undertaken, and by extension how they might be pursued in other cases.

2. Is the Lax Kw'alaams approach economically sustainable?

A subsequent research question to be raised is whether the approach to development pursued in this case is sustainable. As social scientists, we defer to the assurances of the current experts involved in resource production in Lax Kw'alaams that these methods are environmentally sustainable. However, the question of economic sustainability is also pertinent. The history of resource-dependent communities in British Columbia points to deep instability and cyclical development. Therefore, we would suggest that the long-term sustainability of the strategy depends on the ability of the Band and its ventures to secure new sources of value. Band officials argue that the primary source for value, particularly with respect to forestry, stems from the combination of security and flexibility of access to the resource. Specifically, the clarity of access rights in the case of Lax Kw'alaams allows the CTP to cut selectively within the reserve lands to meet the specific needs of buyers and brokers that have supply agreements with the Band. Importantly, this access is secure, in that the lands are not contested (i.e., not under land claim or open for private development — they are reserve properties). We suggest that the stability of these arrangements (to cut quickly, flexibly, and securely according to specific demand) ought to be monitored long term to see if it is consistent across market fluctuations in world commodity prices. On a related note, it remains to be seen if CTP's acquisition of off-reserve tenures on Crown land will offer equal flexibility and security of supply to purchasers as is currently achievable with full control over reserve lands.

3. What is the relationship, both economically and socially, between Lax Kw'alaams as a community, and the recently established

corporation 'Coast Tsimshian Partnership Ltd'?

A third set of research questions involves the relationship that exists between the community and the firm that has been established in its name. As previously discussed, the Lax Kw'alaams Band has developed their economic interests into a free-standing corporate entity, The Coast Tsimshian Partnership Ltd. (CTP). According to both staples and globalization theories, much of the power of firms in both local and global contexts stems from their capacities for mobility and flexibility across space. But in this case, we see a firm that is an extension of a group and place, which suggests that its power stems from other sources. It is likely that this power is drawn from the authority of the Band (a political entity) over territories and rights. It would appear appropriate, therefore, to examine the ways in which the interests of the community (as a social and political group) might conflict and/or be furthered by the economic interests of a firm such as has been created. This new economic agent has the ability to engage in activities well beyond the limits of the Band and community, and now has only limited accountability to it — namely through a shareholder process in which every Band member has been accorded non-voting shares, and through the membership of four Lax Kw'alaams Band members on the firm's Board of Directors. In some sense, the Band has divested its economic interests to a separate entity, i.e., the firm, with a legal identity of its own. Given this, does the firm have rights off-reserve, for instance to land that is claimed as traditional territory but is under legal contestment? What are the implications of this for the BC Treaty Process? What are the ramifications of the firm seeking tenure on land contested by other First Nation groups?

4. What, in both the short and long term, is the relationship of these new economic endeavours to the culture and way of life of the people of Lax Kw'alaams'?

To this point in time, it would appear that most of these activities have been undertaken with relatively little involvement of the people of Lax Kw'alaams as a whole, though they have all been carried out in the name of the Band. As such, it is relevant to investigate questions regarding how Band members view these developments and the actions undertaken on their behalf. It is also important to consider how these activities will change the character of the Band and community itself. Will such activities generate wealth for local residents, as would be suggested by the shareholder procedure? Will this economic activity spur entrepreneurship in the community? Given that approximately half of the members of the Lax Kw'alaams Band now live outside the community (but retain voting rights and will receive share certificates), will these members return to the reserve? What, simply put, will be the immediate, long term, and day-to-day impact of these economic developments on the community of Lax Kw'alaams?

5. Is this creating a new cycle of dependency?

As previously discussed, the current successes at Lax Kw'alaams have been achieved through centralized control over resource operations. Moreover, they have also been heavily dependent on the marshalling of expert talents rather than local capacities. In this respect, is this strategy creating a new type of dependency? Are Band members acquiring the capacities to eventually take over the 'expert roles' in local development? On the one hand, the employment and educational gains achieved through expert investment are real. On the other, the recent establishment of CTP Ltd as an independent corporate entity suggests a further separation of Band operations from community involvement. How can the training and direct involvement of community members be integrated with the goals of a private firm?

These research questions seek to address the consequences (positive and negative, short and long-term) and generalizability of this approach to community development. The case of Lax Kw'alaams is indeed unique and exceptional. But an analysis of the social processes involved in this transformation would yield valuable insights into the following issues:

- The role of resource production in the increasingly flexible and varied global commodity marketplace.
- The manner in which local governments can become 'actors' in the free market.
- The building of a corporate structure out of structures for local governance.

- The mobilization of knowledge and networks in forging inter-community and global links.
- The consequences of the above for community development, as well as political and legal rights and claims.

## NOTES

1. We are deeply grateful to the Lax Kw'alaams Band for sharing their experiences regarding the recent transformations in their community. We also acknowledge their invaluable assistance in the development and writing of this paper.
2. These and other figures have been provided by officials with the Lax Kw'alaams Band. They are current to mid 2004.

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# THE PAST IS THE FUTURE
## The Cultural Backdrop for Economic Development Activities in the Western Hudson Bay Region

Brock Junkin

**ABSTRACT**

*The bulk of the inhabitants of the Hudson Bay basin are aboriginals and the culture characteristic of the aboriginal lifestyle does not always lend itself to traditional views on economic development. It is therefore important to develop a succinct understanding of the northern cultural context before embarking upon economic development initiatives. There is an ocean of bad experience over the past sixty years which bears testimony to the perils of not dovetailing culture with development policy. In the Western Hudson Bay region this cultural context flows from the subsistence harvest and this discussion paper seeks to set the backdrop for economic development initiatives.*

### INTRODUCTION TO THE HUNTER-GATHERER LIFESTYLE AND ECONOMY

The Aymara word for tomorrow is "qaruru" which is composed of two elements: "qaru" or right behind and "uru" day. Literally translated tomorrow is the day before or the past is the future. In order to know the future you must look to the past. A community without a past has no future. From a community economic development context this interesting vignette on language has two profound implications: the past can not be ignored as it shapes the future and our ability to communicate development objectives will be greatly imperiled in the absence of our understanding of the context and language of the people we seek to assist. Many a politician has harangued the Aymara by saying "let's look ahead and forget the past". This has led to 500 years of sterile development effort in the Altiplano of Bolivia and Peru as to "forget the past" is necessarily to forget the future because, according to the logic construct of the Aymara language and culture, the past is the future. Hence misunderstanding of this simple concept has and continues to stymie development effort. Further, "forgetting the past" ignores the strengths which are inherent in any culture and which have been built up as a consequence of millennia of trial and error in the environment to which the culture has adapted. To ignore these strengths is to weaken develop-

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ment efforts. Further it runs contrary to successful development experience (Brown; Government of Nunavut; Porter). It is therefore incumbent upon those who choose to aid in economic development to cultivate an intimate understanding of both the past and the culture of the focus of their effort so as to be able to (1) design appropriate programmes, (2) communicate effectively with the people involved and (3) ferret out the inherent strengths of the underlying social fabric. In this way relevant effort is expended, mutual understanding is reinforced and viable opportunities are recognized with economic progress resulting.

The societies of the circumpolar peoples and the Inuit of Nunavut and the First Nations of the Sub-Arctic are that of "hunter-gatherer" (Brody; Bone). That differs from most of the rest of the world which is essentially agrarian.[1] The difference between the two boils down to the level of manipulation of the environment. With the hunter-gatherer society there is reduced manipulation (Brody, p. 89). The society adapts to and lives with its surroundings. There is no need or want for the accumulation of the surpluses of the wealth maximizing model (Sahlins, p. 7). This contrasts sharply with an agrarian based society where there is strong intervention on the part of society in the ambient environment. The hunter-gatherer society is characterized by egalitarianism. "Pride in success is expressed through giving the results of the hunt to others" (Brody, pp. 118, 147; Sahlins, p. 7). It approaches Johnstone's "humanist" (p. 99) approach to profit. The agrarian society is characterized by wealth maximization. This "mechanistic" approach, as Johnstone would put it, stems from the risk of failure which faces an agrarian society. With the manipulation of the environment through agriculture comes vulnerability "to weather, rival plants, animals that could destroy crops, theft of the produce by other human beings" (Brody, p. 151). The farmer guards against this by accumulating wealth or building up inventory "for a rainy day". The altruistic nature of the predecessor hunter-gather society is stamped out or at least minimized when society diverges to agriculture and the institutions that it spawns (Taylor, 1982–1987).

An intimate appreciation of the hunter-gatherer lifestyle is therefore a prerequisite before we can successfully suggest economic modus operandi that will be viable in that context. Hunter-gatherers were essentially considered part of a primitive group of people lumped in with small scale agriculturalists and herders. The colonizers of these peoples thought them essentially inferior ... "an example of some earlier stage of evolution" (Brody, p. 126). The sophistication of their particular society and economy did not really receive significant attention until the 1968 Man the Hunter Conference which generated a great deal of subsequent interest and research. Among the seminal pieces spawned was the work by Marshall Sahlins "The Original Affluent Society" in his "Stone Age Economics". It was this essay that established the savoir-faire of this society and exposed the essential dichotomy between that of hunter-gatherer and agripastoralists. He and his peers found a surprisingly sophisticated society which eschewed material possessions in order to maintain their mobile lifestyle (Brody, p. 335) and provided a way of life characterized by virtues such as "kindness, generosity, consideration, affection, honesty, hospitality, compassion, charity," et al (Brody, p. 146) where people "ate well, lived longer and took better care of one another" (Brody, p. 144).

There is an important misconception on time spent in pursuing economic activity of which Sahlin's research disabuses us. To set the stage Sahlins quoted Herskovits who characterized the hunter gatherer society as being so mean and difficult and "precariously situated that only the most intense application makes survival possible" (Sahlins, p. 9). The conclusion one would be forgiven to reach was that barest survival was a full time occupation. In fact nothing could be further from the case. Sahlins discovered that in fact "the food quest is intermittent, leisure abundant..." (p. 9). After reviewing a host of literature and opinion he comes to the conclusion that a "mean of three to five hours per adult worker per day (is spent) in food production" (p. 15). Given the absence of other economic interests or desires the travails of the hunter-gatherer look pretty attractive compared to our own as we are caught up the maelstrom of consumerism.

Another misconception is the consideration that the hunter-gatherer existence is nomadic: no roots, always on the move. In fact, it is the southern existence that more closely resembles that of the nomad. True, hunter-gatherers move as the seasons change to take advantage of the bounty each geographic area furnishes. But they

move back with each cycle and the same routine of travel carries on over the centuries. They have a home and it is the land in the variety of its seasons. Those who have been spawned in the agripastoralist venue have no real home. They live for a period of time with their forebears and then strike out to points afield often changing venues of productive enterprise and geographic abode several times, to bear children who in turn leave to wander the globe. The hunter-gatherer, in contrast, remain largely confined to a small but productive geographic area, moving within the same according to the bounty of the seasons. Thus is the paradox and the inversion of the "settled hunters and the nomadic farmers" (Brody, p. 160).

Western society or civilization has another vain and self-congratulatory view of the hunter-gatherer society and that is that it is steeped in poverty. The essence of poverty, however, is not about the lack of material goods believe but rather it is about relative social status. Poverty is the "invention of civilization" (Sahlins, p. 16). Status in a hunter-gatherer society accrues from wisdom, skills and ability, i.e., elders and not through the accumulation of wealth which is seen for what it is, a burden.

The question of hunger is often associated with the hunter-gatherer existence. As mentioned earlier, there is the expectation that the votaries of this existence are in constant search of food to ameliorate quasi starvation. The question of the time involved to meet basic needs has already been adequately dispatched. Hunger as has been suggested in the review of time allocation is not often a factor in the society under examination. However, as the world has become increasingly civilized it is interesting to note that starvation becomes an increasing problem. As the evolution of culture increases, so does the level of hunger wrote Sahlins in 1972 (Sahlins, p. 16).

In concluding the hunter-gatherer backdrop it would be worthwhile to underscore once again the inversions in thinking which are necessary to appreciate the best application of economic development policies to pursue a hunter-gatherer activity. A summary of the hunter-gatherer societal frame as discussed follows:

- Movement: The life of the hunter gatherer is in fact less nomadic than those who come from the agrarian tradition. They move frequently but remain in a defined geographic area for their lives;
- Leisure: The hunter-gatherer does not live the subsistence life of toil as was thought up to the sixties. Indeed they have a life of relative leisure when compared to their agrarian cousins;
- Hunger: The spectre of hunger and starvation does not hang over the heads of hunter-gatherers. True it exists but it is isolated and is more common among their agrarian neighbours. Witness the Irish potato famine and so forth;
- Poverty: Poverty is a construct of "civilization" to define relative social status. The hunter-gatherer is an egalitarian society where status is earned through deed and wisdom. The hunter-gatherer seeks the necessaries of life and not the burden of possession;
- Assets: The agrarian based economy is driven by insatiable demand or want. This drives production, GDP, etc. up. The hunter-gatherer society modulates want to fit the environment and desires no more than the necessaries of life. As such the hunter-gatherer life style finds itself with an abundance of assets and no scarcity. Assets are a burden and are eschewed.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ROLE OF WILDLIFE TO ABORIGINALS

The role of wildlife in the aboriginal context is ubiquitous. It permeates their spirit, their health, their economy, their leisure, their culture and their very raison d'être. As will become evident, an aboriginal lifestyle in the absence of wildlife and its utilization is unimaginable. An understanding of the importance of this role is requisite before we can consider, comment upon and comprehend venues for its use.

### In Their Psyche

The extent to which wildlife is important to the aboriginal peoples was best summed up by F.G. Speck in 1935 when he noted of the Naskapi:

> "To the Montagnais-Naskapi ... the animals of the forest, the tundra and the waters of the interior and the coast exist in a specific relation. They have become the objects of engrossing magico-religious activity, for to them hunting is a holy occupation."

The "magico-religious" activity manifests itself in (Berkes, pp. 22–23):

- education of the young and transmission of knowledge;
- perpetuation of social values such as sharing and reciprocity. The practice of distribution of subsistence harvests is wide spread. Sharing with up to six families is not uncommon.
- reproduction of culture which is embodied in action.

Usher added that "it is the relations among people that hunting and fishing generate, not simply the relations between man and wildlife, which are important to native people. Despite the continued northward advance of industrial society, most native northerners continue to regard traditional activities as essential to the maintenance of their social structure and institutions, their culture, and the solidarity and cohesion of their community and family lives (Usher, p. 11)." "Finally, native northerners universally understand that their aboriginal right to hunt and fish is the legal and political symbol of their special status in Canadian society. In a history shadowed by lost lands, cultural destruction and broken promises, the assertion of hunting rights is a means of exercising what is left of one's status" (Usher, 1982, p. 35).

Be it for livelihood or leisure, the harvesting of natural resources is the keystone of what it is to be aboriginal. It is inextricably linked with a high quality of life. The capture and utilization of country foods cements the spiritual, cultural and social essence of the Inuit and the First Nations and ensures the transfer of that essence to future generations. The self esteem associated with this activity could never be found in southern venues for economic advancement (Berkes, p. 27; Dragon, p. 35; Conference Board, p. IV; Notzke, p. 112; MacPherson, p. 6).

## In Their Health

The consumption of country foods are the epitome of healthy living. They are free range, organic and do not suffer from injections of hormones or antibiotics, genetic modification or a month in the feed lot being fed nutrients of unknown origin. Further wasting diseases such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob are unknown to free ranging caribou populations. They are highly nutritious and safe to eat. Not only are levels of heart disease and diabetes reduced through their consumption but the very physical activity engendered in their harvest augments the health of the harvester. The harvest of wildlife is a matter of health as well as economics (Usher, pp. 10–11; Conference Board, p. IV).

With health comes enhanced ability to carry on the activities of life particularly including those in the economic sphere. A good supply of country foods improves the nutritional status of indigenous populations which in turn leads to increased labour productivity and hence increased wages or other wealth in the non-wage sector. Health and nutrition is an often neglected element of development economics and can be at the root of an aspect of the poverty trap as it can also be a way of breaking out of the poverty trap. Poor nutrition leads to poor health which dampens the ability to earn wages to buy the necessaries of life which in turn leads to poor nutrition and a further decline in health. So by ensuring that a vehicle exists to allow a society to feed themselves well, a strategy is invoked to lead that society out of the poverty trap just mentioned (United Nations 2000, p. 134).

## In Their Security

The presence of a viable population of wildlife which allows Aboriginal peoples to carry on traditional activities of hunting secures not only their culture and raison d'être but also provides for economic security as well. As Usher (p. 11) notes "Wildlife, in their perception (aboriginal peoples'), is also important for some less tangible reasons. One is security. Native people have seen many economic booms and busts, and know that even in the best of times they are the last hired, first fired and get the lowest paid jobs. Consequently, wage employment, even though people may want it, is not considered a permanent or secure source of livelihood. The land, on the other hand, provides exactly that anchor of security because, properly cared for, it will yield food forever". Even after decades of attempts to introduce and enhance the employment portion of a mixed economy, the land based economy continues to be the most reliable portion together with being the cultural stitching in the gusset that holds together the aboriginal society (Berkes). Given the remoteness of Hudson Bay settlements in general, conventional employment is not likely to supplant a land

based economy very quickly. Further the political leadership sees a strong role for the land-based economy.[2] Finally with a rapidly expanding population and a government that has largely levelled off in terms of its expansion, the prospects for a wage-based economy grow dimmer still. Hence, the importance of wildlife to the body as well as the soul.

The northern peoples realize that with wildlife comes security of body, soul and culture but in order for the security to prevail, wildlife needs to be nurtured and husbanded. Thus the sustainability of the resource is at the forefront of any initiative to develop it by either aboriginals or non-aboriginals. This propensity forms the basis for all northern land claims negotiations (Notzke, 1994, p. 111).

## In Their Economy

The traditional economy of hunter-gatherer society revolved around the basics of food and shelter. The balance of the time was spent with family and friends and in leisure activities (Sahlins). In the past century and particularly the past fifty years in the north there has been an evolution to a mixed economies (Usher and Weihs, 1990) as successive governments encouraged Inuit and First Nations peoples to centralize their activities in a variety of settlements. In this way the government could more easily provide support services such as medical and education (Berkes & Berkes, p. 21). However, the infrastructure in those communities was relatively modest and did not lend itself to large scale wage based development (ibid.). The predictions that the land-based economy would be supplanted by a wage economy did not materialize (George & Preston, 1987). Wildlife harvesting continues to represent a substantial portion of current economic endeavour, particularly in the smaller more remote communities (Conference Board, p. III). Domestic utilization of their wild resources continues to be "the most reliable sector of the mixed northern economy as well as the main source of cultural satisfaction and social prestige" (Notzke, 2000). It becomes incumbent upon society then to build on what strengths existed in the community. This is in accord with current general theory in economic development (Brown; Porter). A further advantage of building on strengths in the northern context as outlined in the foregoing is that this strategy either displaces expensive imported goods through the capture and consumption of the fruit of the land (Conference Board, p. IV) or it also imports dollars from the outside by selling product externally and attracting outside dollars to the region. So there is a minimal investment in human capital to produce immediate results. Berkes and Berkes (p. 27) put it succinctly as follows:

> "The continuing contribution of traditional wildlife harvesting activities to community income and employment is an objective for both community sustainability and community economic development. Alternative views of development articulated by aboriginal people favour a mixed economy, not as a transition to the ideal of a wage economy, but as an arrangement that can persist in a culturally and environmentally sustainable fashion."

The pursuit of the strategy outlined above has the further advantage of being conducive to small scale non-regimented enterprise which fits nicely within the context of small northern communities.

In the design of economic strategies in the northern context and the assessment of their viability it would be a mistake to overlook the following attributes of the existing economy as identified by the Conference Board of Canada (p. III):

(a) A strong commitment by aboriginal communities to the notion of sustainable development;
(b) A collective approach in the sharing of economic wealth. In the case of harvesting this means that it is expected that harvested food will be shared within the family and community;
(c) A collective approach to socio-economic development. Economic development projects that are seen as "community-owned" tend to be preferred over those that are individually owned;
(d) Respect for traditional knowledge. A considerable amount of knowledge has been handed down from generation to generation. Maintaining elders' knowledge is an important ingredient in the preservation of aboriginal land-based activities;
(e) Harvesting and a connection to the land as a form of leisure or livelihood are strongly associated with a high quality of life;

(f) Harvesting is to be foremost for subsistence purposes not for commercial purposes. Any commercial wild food activity can be pursued upon reassurance that the supply for subsistence purposes is not threatened;
(g) The production of furs should take place in the animals' natural environment. Ranching is not an acceptable alternative to trapping.

Observations "b" and "c" are particularly relevant as we search to draw a conclusion about the best venue to launch an economic initiative.

Further the Northern Eden (p. 34) project made the following observations to support those of the Conference Board of Canada:

(i) Commercial use of wildlife provides a venue for economic development while honouring the traditional aboriginal way of living;
(ii) The occupation of hunting and gathering already plays a major role in the lives of northern residents;
(iii) Renewable resources already form the economic base for both aboriginal and non-aboriginal northerners and this dependence determines the fate of many of their remote communities;
(iv) Commercial hunting is a strategy that is at one with northern culture, the existing economy and sustainability.

Finally the strategic role of the commercial hunting has been seen as bulwark against the collapse of sealing together with the decline in the fur industry (Notzke, p. 136) although that collapse and decline appears to have reversed recently.

In developing a strategy to augment the commercial utilization of the land and its bounty, care needs to be taken to ensure that a process of "overcapitalization" does not occur. It would be politically tempting to build a meat plant in every community. Such a foolhardy policy would result in untenable exploitation of the resource until it no longer became viable. The cry about jobs would weaken the political will to halt the commercial hunts before it was too late. Witness the collapse of the East coast fishery in the face of compelling scientific evidence that it should have been dampened much earlier. Capital investment should only be made where it makes sense and with low enough capacity which would not threaten the resource (Dragon, pp. 37–38).

A final word about the northern economy and the potential for the commercial endeavour. An investment in the commercial arena might well also act in a secondary role of moving to break the classic poverty trap, i.e., the people are poor so there is no reason to invest. There is no investment, therefore people are poor. An investment in, say, a commercial harvest is likely in some humble way to stimulate other sorts of investment which in and of themselves will spin off future employment and further future investment. For example with an extra 50 people in a community of 800 working, even for only four to six weeks a year it might provide the critical mass for, say, a coffee shop or a small engine repair shop and so forth. Humble as this may be its impact would not be insignificant in a small isolated northern community.

## In The Ecology

The aboriginal view on the role of caribou and by extension wildlife and their environment in general can best be summed up with the words of Peter Green:

> "Conservation is ensuring that if we take caribou, there will be caribou the next year and the year after that. The same for anything else. This applies to all uses of the land: if it is used and enjoyed now, it must be left and preserved so that it will be there for the next year and for future years."

This is not just rhetoric but transcends the psyche of aboriginal peoples as has been alluded to previously. The concern expressed here is further clarified through the work of Claudia Notzke when she noted that "the sustainability of wildlife and its habitat is one of the most important determinants of the manner in which aboriginal people would like to see other renewable and non-renewable resources developed, by both native and non-native interests. This concern is also at the core of all northern land claims negotiations (p. 111)."

It needs to be understood that the actual translation into action of these sentiments in terms of the actual resource management tends to cause discomfort among aboriginals, particularly the elders. Resource management implies superiority over the resource which is at odds of the tradition of partnership with the environment which is at the heart of aboriginal culture (Notzke, p. 2). This discomfort is further com-

plicated by early experience on Southampton Island as alluded to in the following passage by Fikret Berkes:

> ...the commercialization of a subsistence hunt is probably one of the better documented mechanisms by which resources come to be over harvested. Incentive to create surplus breaks down the self-limiting principle of a subsistence operations, and together with it, the customary laws that regulate hunter-prey relations.... Commercialization of caribou hunting to serve the needs of over-wintering whalers at the turn of the (last) century and commercialization of musk-ox hunting have been linked to the near-disappearance of various populations (Berkes, 1981, p. 171).

## In Tourism

The connection between wildlife and tourism is underlined to a reasonable degree by several "exit survey" studies which have been performed in the last decade. They universally conclude that wildlife viewing ranks tops among tourists to North America (Notzke, 2000, p. 42). This interest coupled with the special knowledge and rapport which the Inuit and First Nations peoples have developed with the wildlife over the past 10,000 years would suggest significant economical potential in developing the tourism potential of wildlife. Of course, there are two rather contradictory venues in this regard and these include viewing and sports hunts. Some operators claim that there is as much money to be made with simply viewing wildlife as there is in harvesting the same for sport and it is unintrusive and sustainable. This assertion is questionable, however, as one caribou hunt will generate $5,000 plus the attendant expenses, accommodation, et al and a polar bear hunt $25,000 plus similar attendant expenses. And so on for other species. With wildlife viewing, there is only the attendant expenses which are left behind not the big ticket fees. Further sports hunts tend to target males whose removal have little impact on population.

The interest in the sports hunt is also driven by the decline in available hunts in other parts of the world. The money spent directly on the hunt tends to stay in the communities while expenditures on more passive forms of tourism tend to gravitate to southern based concerns and so the money doesn't stick to the north to the same extent.

Finally, tourism can be a double edged sword. The complaint is often made that tourism encourages spectacle, fly-in entrepreneurs, and low paid servitude by the employees of the tourism industry with no opportunity for real personal advancement. On the other hand, with minimal training, most First Nations and Inuit in the north can adapt to this industry which is so close to their lifestyle in terms of demand on time and knowledge of the product.

Sports hunts are generally contracted out through local hunters' and trappers' organizations (HTO). They are the ones that control the resource which they issue in the form of tags. Wildlife viewing, on the other hand, tends to be run by non-natives and the income generated often moves southward.

## In Subsistence Harvesting

As has already been underlined, the act of the pursuit of game provides more to the hunter and his/her family than nourishment for the body. It also nourishes the soul and the use of the word subsistence harvesting is meant in the broader sense of an act the ministers to the whole person and not just his or her bodily requirements. It should also be noted that a subsistence lifestyle implies no negative connotations. It in fact suggests a high quality of life if we consider an abundance of time spent with family, friends and leisure activities to be relevant to social good (Shalins).

Subsistence harvesting remains important if not central to most northern communities and particularly to those ones which are smaller and more isolated (Treseder, p. 60). Further, given the mixed nature of our economy, subsistence has come to include harvesting activities surplus to an individual's needs which are then used to barter for needed commodities. It is perhaps useful in this context to look at an aboriginal definition of subsistence:

> Subsistence in our interpretation means we eat and we take for our own purposes. At the same time, subsistence could be interpreted as that which you take but you then exchange to survive. Does that conflict with harvesting for commercial purposes? I don't think so, though your interpretation is different from ours. (Charlie Watt, Senate of Canada, address-

> ing a panel of the National Symposium on the North, quoted in Keith and Saunders 1989, p. 78)

The subsistence harvest raises the question as to its long-term viability given a significantly expanding population in Aboriginal communities in general and in Nunavut, second only to Alberta. It would be profitable in this instance to examine the study of Berkes and Fast who concluded that it is possible to have a stable resource base in communities with high population growth. This stability is occasioned by a stable or declining number of direct participants in the harvest (Berkes & Fast, 1996).

The subsistence harvest then is more than eking out an existence. It represents a holistic activity which contributes socially to the esprit de corps of the individual and his/her family unit. Further it can include generating a surplus to immediate requirements so as to allow the consumption of other economic goods made necessary by modern society.

## In Commercial Harvesting

When the activity of harvesting wildlife transcends the broader definition of the subsistence harvest as discussed above a certain amount of cautious discussion emerges. As has already been alluded to, many in the aboriginal community, particularly the elders, are uncomfortable with the notion of resource management which must necessarily accompany any harvest but particularly a commercial harvest. The range of views on harvesting begins to diverge at this juncture.

Those in favour of the commercial harvest of wildlife harvest point to several features of these activities which lend themselves to northern environs as follows:

- The commercial harvest is really just an evolution of the subsistence harvest and therefore, fits within the four corners of the traditional activities of aboriginal peoples and enhances all of the intangible features which augment lifestyles such as self-esteem, cultural promotion, role modelling within families, maintenance of traditional land skills and so forth. Commercial activity also subtly introduces certain western disciplines such as "good" business practices which encourage some respect for the bottom line. It may be argued that "respect for the bottom line" may be a bad thing in that it might encourage over-capitalization, undue pressure on the resource, short term thinking and so on. Certainly the current dose of Enronitis in the world capital market is testimony to this criticism along with a host of other examples. On the other hand it could be argued that the ancestral ties of the Inuit and First Nations to the land and its bounty mitigates against the short-term thinking of capitalism and introduces at least a medium term view of resource exploitation. Perhaps there is a reciprocal exchange of values. Both aboriginal practice and western practice might both be enhanced through this synergy.
- A second factor invoked in favour of the commercial harvest is its provision of cash income to support a lifestyle that has come to rely on imported goods, be they only fuel for heat and transport, shelter, electricity capital equipment and supplies to pursue the subsistence hunt.
- The commercial harvest fits within the seasonal cycle of the aboriginal lifestyle. It is an extension of what has been going on for time immemorial and thus does not invoke a wrenching break with the past.
- Wildlife management is another mantra cited in support of this activity and has particular relevance to the people of Coral Harbour, as an example. One of the dangers faced by this very successful population of caribou is that it will over-populate and "crash". The residents of Coral Harbour are very sensitive to this possibility as they are to the possibility of over-harvest as expressed by their continuing interest in population survey. So there is found a certain schizophrenic divide in the attitude of the Salimmiut[3] who both are reluctant to over-harvest and yet recognize the need to harvest at a commercial scale to maintain the herd so that it is available for the subsistence harvest.
- Finally the prosecution of the commercial harvest results in the bringing into traditional aboriginal areas export dollars. In a land suffering a substantial "trade deficit" this is an important factor to be borne in mind.

As can be expected in any activity of human endeavour, there is always opposing opinion. An appreciation of both sides of any question allows movement forward in a productive fashion while at the same time allowing education to take place on both sides of the argument. Following

are the more salient features of the argument which casts some shadow over any commercial harvest of wildlife.

- From a traditional perspective among aboriginal peoples it is simply wrong to take more of a resource than is needed to provide for one's own well being together with that of the immediate family and community.
- Pressure is increased on a resource which is needed for subsistence hunting. To a certain extent this is obviated through good monitoring but all the same it is an important element in opposing thinking.
- Commercialization of any renewable resource can lead to over capitalization which in turn leads to greater pressure on the resource with obvious negative impact. One needs to look no further than the east coast fishery in Canada to determine the negative effects of (government led) over-capitalization.
- The resource is not reliable and natural cycles may intervene to shut the harvest down. This would disrupt established markets which would be difficult to rebuild as consumers, especially high end consumers, want stability of supply. The question is raised, then, should there be any investment in an industry with known cyclical deficiencies.
- The animal rights lobby can never be discounted from any discussion on matters of concerning wildlife utilization in any venue. Almost forty years of a collapsed sealing industry pursuant to the actions of the lobby should be a sobering reminder that public relations and humane, respectful treatment of the resource need to be high on any agenda in pursuing a commercial harvest of this ilk.

A review of both sides of the question allows the proponents in the harvest and those that support the same via indirect means to modulate their activities so as to steer a middle course. In this manner it is hoped that the resource will be best utilized. The foregoing underlines the comments of Sadie Popovitch-Penny who noted that "the most vital ingredient of the commercial enterprise is that it is both based in and controlled by the community ... local control over the commercial hunt is an important principle which must be maintained if the hunt is to succeed" (quoted in Keith and Saunders, 1989, p. 61). Such a participatory approach allows a broader range of views to reach the stage of discussion and thus a more viable pursuit of a commercial hunt is likely.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, an economic development effort in the Western Hudson Bay drainage basin needs to first consider the needs of the indigenous peoples of this vast area. This means a clear and deep understanding of the cultural morass of both Inuit and First Nations people. Through this understanding and with the full participation of all effected parties, economic development policies can be developed that will truly develop the region in a holistic sense.

### NOTES

1. Agrarian which progressed to industrial, technological and so forth.
2. Supported by opening remarks of Paul Kaludjak at the June 2002 Economic Conference in Gjoa Haven, Nunavut.
3. Residents of Coral Harbour.

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# THE APPLIED THEORY OF FIRST NATIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
## A *Critique*

Christina Dowling

### Introduction

Founded by Professors Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt at Harvard University in 1987, The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development (The Harvard Project) aims to understand and foster the conditions under which sustained, self-determined, social and economic development may be achieved among American Indian nations. The project has become something of a benchmark for current discussion of First Nations economic development. However, as a result of my research and fieldwork with the Nuxalk Nation in Bella Coola, British Columbia, Canada during 2003–5, I have strong reservations about its terms of reference and underlying ideology. The Harvard model embraces western style economics, underpinned by an individualistic orientation and acceptance of authority based on self-interest. Cornell and Kalt tend to use uncritically concepts such as markets, enterprises, and Westernized notions of economic development (their writings are littered with words such as 'progress' and 'productivity' [Cornell & Kalt, 30]); they lament the lack of economic success of those tribes whose cultures do not easily welcome the business model. Instead of such exclusion, we should be examining the cultural specificity of our own assumptions, together with the motivations for our engagement with, and expectations of, aboriginal peoples.

### The Theory

The causes of indigenous problems, Cornell and Kalt remind us, are extensive and well-known. (See Figure 1.) While Cornell and Kalt have found these problems to be forces which undermine economic development in "Indian Country" (Cornell & Kalt, 6), they remind us that each tribe has its own set of factors particular to their situation: "These explanations are not necessarily wrong. Most of them are right somewhere or other in Indian Country. But some are far more important than others, and some are either insignificant, misleading, or mistaken" (Cornell & Kalt, 6). Therefore, as a guide to federal policy-making the list is ineffectual, since it offers no clear departure point that would facilitate a focused effort at improving the situation. Instead of a building block approach grounded in First Nations traditional economies, Cornell and Kalt propose working 'backwards' from the requirements of capitalistic economic activity: "[a] more useful approach is to identify the key ingredients of successful economic development, determine

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**FIGURE 1** Causes of Indigenous Problems

- Tribes and individuals lack access to financial capital.
- Tribes and individuals lack human capital (education, skills, and technical expertise) and the means to develop it.
- Reservations lack effective planning.
- Reservations are subject to too much planning and not enough action.
- Reservations are poor in natural resources.
- Reservations have natural resources, but lack sufficient control over them.
- Reservations are disadvantaged by their distance from markets and the high costs of transportation.
- Tribes cannot persuade investors to locate on reservations because of intense competition from non-Indian communities.
- Federal and state policies are counterproductive and/or discriminatory.
- The Bureau of Indian Affairs is inept, corrupt, and/or uninterested in reservation development.
- Non-Indian outsiders control or confound tribal decision-making.
- Tribes have unworkable and/or externally imposed systems of government.
- Tribal politicians and bureaucrats are inept or corrupt.
- On-reservation factionalism destroys stability in tribal decisions.
- The instability of tribal government keeps outsiders from investing.
- Reservation savings rates are low.
- Entrepreneurial skills and experience are scarce.
- Non-Indian management techniques won't work on the reservation.
- Non-Indian management techniques will work, but are absent.
- Tribal cultures get in the way.
- The long-term effects of racism have undermined tribal self-confidence.
- Alcoholism and other social problems are destroying tribes' human capital (Harvard Project).

which of these ingredients are most important, and identify which ones tribes actually can do something about" (ibid.). This approach, they say, lets the tribes focus their energies in an area where they can have the greatest impact, showing them "how, in effect, they can 'reload the dice' so as to increase the chances of success in the development gamble" (ibid.).

Cornell and Kalt are surprised that the 'commonsensical' (i.e., universal — an ethnocentric presumption) elements of economic development are not the crucial factors when it comes to First Nations: "Just having resources is not the key — nor even necessarily a key — to getting a reservation economy off the ground" (Cornell & Kalt 2, 4). They conclude that the following three 'key ingredients' to are crucial to First Nations' economic success: sovereignty, effective institutions, and cultural match. I will address each of these in turn, and argue that Cornell and Kalt's analysis both presumes the supremacy of the western capitalistic ideology, and glosses over the complexities of actual situations.

## 'Sovereignty Matters'

> When tribes make their own decisions about what approaches to take and what resources to develop, they consistently outperform non-tribal decision-makers. The effective exercise of sovereignty is manifested in many ways, from tribal control over resource management and tribally designed economic development strategies to tribal administration of health care and other social services (Harvard Project).

"Sovereignty and self-rule" is Kalt's prescription in his 2001 article (Kalt, 5), and he finds in successful social and economic Indian programs a commonality of "the 'just do it' approach, capable institutions of self-government, and the implicit and explicit incorporation of tribe-specific cultural values and techniques" (Kalt, 6). He advocates some practical steps, such as that the federal government make block grants so that tribal leaders are responsible to their own people for how they spend the money, rather than to federal authorities who rule from

a distance and are impressed by check-lists and preconceived ideas (Kalt, 8). He also stresses the importance of institutional infrastructure (Kalt, 8), which includes the separation of political powers and a sound, uncorrupted judicial system (Kalt, 8–9).

However, for Professor Menno Boldt of the University of Lethbridge, 'sovereignty' is a concept which requires a more radical critique. Indian 'sovereignty' is a notion which has been developed only out of defence and reaction: "From an Indian perspective 'sovereignty' is an inappropriate concept. It did not emerge as a 'thesis' from Indian culture; rather, it emerged as an 'antithesis' to Canadian claims of sovereignty over Indians" (Boldt, 134). This mimetic creation is an example of what Professor Francesca Merlan, of the Australian National University, calls 'social technology'. She argues that the concept of sovereignty has been taken up by Indigenous peoples in reaction to colonizers' claims on their territory, "as if it were only working to reveal something found and rescued, something old, without necessarily introducing transformation as part of its process" (Merlan, 237).

Working against even this constructed sense of sovereignty has been the artificial environment of the reserve system, which has removed even this artificial notion of self-determination from the economic arena: "The lengthy experience of individual and collective economic dependence has profoundly influenced the Indians' cultural adaptation to their world. Instead of adapting their traditional cultures to an industrializing world, Indian communities have been forced to adapt their cultures to a dependent form of surviving and living" (Boldt, 173). This 'welfare dependency' is a familiar theme in the literature of Aboriginal Economic Development, as it is in Bella Coola among the Nuxalk. It is at the forefront of the minds of Nuxalk who are determined to change the status quo and gain independence from the system of 'hand-outs'. However, they also acknowledge that many people are now acculturated to this dependency. Because of this, entrepreneurship is not an easily accepted or well understood concept. A recurring theme among many Nuxalk is that they do not think their people have 'what it takes' or the right 'emotional make-up' to be an entrepreneur. In the first instance, people do not have the skills or the experience with business systems to run them efficiently. In the second, 'traditionalists' are anti-development and have a cultural bias against many forms of economic entrepreneurship.

As well as working against the development of economic entrepreneurship, the reserve system has brought with it the familiar package of social problems: "Economic dependence has caused social malfunction in Indian societies. Privation is part of the cause, but the main problem is that lack of productive employment has undermined traditional role and status relationships, especially for male members, most of whom have lost their important role of food provider for the family or kin group" (Boldt, 223). Boldt concludes that the reserve system is fundamentally inimical to Indian economic development, both in terms of employment — "if job creation is premised on on-reserve economic development, the majority of reserves will never be more than ghettos of unemployment" (Boldt, 232) — and in terms of competing with non-Indian economic enterprise — "the reserve system was created to clear Indians out of the way of Canadian economic development" (Boldt, 231).

## 'Institutions Matter'

> Harvard Project research consistently finds that assertions of sovereignty must be backed by capable institutions of governance for development to take hold. Stable political institutions and policies, fair and independent mechanisms for dispute resolution, a separation of politics from day-to-day business management, a capable bureaucracy and a strategic orientation are institutional attributes that help tribes create an environment conducive to economic development (Harvard Project).

There are competing political structures within the Nuxalk, as in other First Nations societies, set up and maintained by the federal government as a major barrier to community action. As Boldt says, "Indians are confronted with a political, economic, and social environment beyond their powers to change or escape" (Boldt, 196). Historically, government control was certainly the objective; as Boldt reminds us, "the reserve system was created to clear Indians out of the way of Canadian economic development" (Boldt, 231). It is still the objective today, although the means are more covert: beneath all the economic plans and feasibility studies there lurks the spectre that First Nations independ-

ence would mean a loss of governmental control. Control is maintained by the governance structures which are decreed by federal government. As Boldt says of the amendment to the Indian Act (1951) that created the 'Chief and Council' system of governance, "This amendment was not motivated by any ideal of democracy, but rather a desire to gain greater control over Indians by removing all remnants of their traditional system of leadership" (Boldt, 120). Boldt goes on to say that in contrast to the democratic basis of Canadian governmental structure, "the political and bureaucratic structures on Indian reserves have evolved according to the DIAND's (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) rigid, oppressive, authoritarian colonial design for controlling Indians" (Boldt, 128). In Bella Coola, this situation was well described by a Nuxalk informant in 1997: "The Councils are only elected to look after the program of the government or the DIA. They're only there because the government wanted them there. They were scared of the Hereditary Chiefs.… Like the old days, no matter where you go you always depended on the Chiefs. But the elected Council is always changing every two years" (Hipwell, 214).

Despite the pretence of control that is offered to Band Councils, the only roles allowed for First Nations people in these imposed governmental and economic institutions are imitative, artificial or trivial. As York observes of the Shamattawa Cree of Northern Manitoba, "economic development, education, housing, programs to fight alcohol abuse — all depend on budget approvals from the department's offices in Ottawa or the regions.... Like the elected councils at most other Indian reserves across Canada, [they] are left without much effective power. Their main job is the administration of monthly welfare cheques" (York, 6). This fact is echoed in Bella Coola by Peter Siwallace, the Nuxalk Band Manager, who admits, "We don't really have any control over any of the services we offer. We simply are given a list of services from the government to manage along with the money" (personal communication).

In addition, this governance structure has fostered the growth of an elite class on reserve and the stratification of a once-egalitarian society, perpetuated by the larger families who have the greater constituency. 'You only need to look in the phone book to know who is in the Band Office,' was something I heard on more than one occasion. As a result, they are able to maintain their position as a 'ruling class' at each election. As Boldt shows, the repercussions of this artificially fostered stratification on the social fabric of First Nations communities have been extremely deleterious (Boldt, 117–66).

Again, Merlan's notion of 'mimesis' is relevant here. Merlan argues that contemporary relationships between Aborigines and the Australian state are 'mimetic' rather than 'coercive' in character (Merlan, viii), meaning that instead of the state maintaining its authority by force (as it had done in the earlier days of colonization), that authority is now maintained by a requirement and an agreement that Aborigines reflect back to the State what the State wants the indigenous person to be and act like. Aborigines are caught up in an elaborate ritual of imitation. Consequently, Merlan says, "in the imitative relationship, questions of representation are important" (Merlan, ibid.). Either explicitly or more often implicitly, Aborigines are encouraged to behave according to a concept of Aboriginality or 'Otherness' imposed on them by the authority which uses as 'bait' land, money, prestige, etc. Merlan says:

> ...the mimetic character of the intercultural relationship between Aborigines and the nation state needs to be seen as part of a social technology of imitation, continuous with other forms of Western invention in its tending toward reproducing the world as knowable, boundable, and manageable (Merlan, xi).

This mimetic process is not unique to Aboriginal Australia; in Bella Coola, these representations are well established in terms of governance and economic management. Nuxalk informants talk on the one hand about environmental responsibility and guardianship, spirituality and communality, and on the other hand about entrepreneurial activity and economic sustainability. The Nuxalk Nation Council is an obvious example of a contemporary mimetic representation in First Nations governance — mimetic, rather than organic and arising out of the culture. Even the Hereditary Chief system has been modified to accord with federal government demands (e.g., in the appointment of a 'Head' Hereditary Chief). The resulting behaviour reflects what Merlan calls the "intercultural" condition of the modern world, where indigenous and non-indigenous interact,

reflect, borrow from, imitate, parody or subvert each other (Merlan, 229–40). In fact, an anthropologist who studied with the Nuxalk in 1922 and 1924, T. F. McIlwraith, notes that a form of mimesis was then already well established in the Nuxalk people, when he writes to his supervisor that "the only blot on the landscape" are the squalid conditions of the reserve where the Nuxalk are "trying to copy in a blind way the habits of the 'superior' race" (Barker & Cole, 2003: 52). These values are taken up within Nuxalk culture through a complex, subtle process of 'mimesis'.

Thus, First Nations people play out the fantasies and needs of the ruling hegemony. The only thing offered to them is a contradictory set of imitative demands; the result, in Bella Coola for example, is that different groups imitate a different western concept as their social technology. On the one hand, the traditionalists follow what it means to be an indigenous person; on the other hand, the Band Council members are more geared towards discussing the possibility of economic enterprise. Furthermore, each group speaks its appropriate discourse: the traditionalists lobby in the international arena for their rights to nationhood, sovereignty, and to be guardians of their own lands, while the 'modernists' lobby nationally in Ottawa for funding opportunities.

Nuxalk society is thus divided, both vertically and horizontally, into a complex matrix of competing views. Because of this 'multivocality' of the Nuxalk community, I wonder if it is it possible to find the 'cultural match' insisted upon by Cornell and Kalt, between the institutions of self-government and those of economic development.

## 'Culture Matters'

> Successful tribal economies stand on the shoulders of culturally appropriate institutions of self-government that enjoy legitimacy among tribal citizens. Given a diversity of Native cultures and circumstances, tribes are challenged to equip themselves with institutions (e.g., constitutions, economic systems, etc.) that fit their unique societies (Harvard Project).

Culture emerges from the writings of Cornell and Kalt as the most important factor for economic development, and the most difficult to satisfy. They acknowledge that culture and its role in development is not easily quantified, nor can it be universally applied to aboriginal communities; it is very complex and situation-dependant. They note the difficulties which any culture has in adaptation, so they ask for "capable government and nongovernmental social institutions" (Cornell & Kalt, 43) which can resolve all conflict, and supply "adequate" and "appropriate" (Cornell & Kalt, 45) development. In their view, the fundamental challenge in matching economic models with First Nations communities lies in reconciling two differing systems of social organization, and engineering a "cultural match" (Cornell & Kalt 2, 12) between each First Nations institution of governance and economic development. Cornell and Kalt insist that "unless there is a fit between the culture of the community and the structure and powers of its governing institutions, those institutions may be seen as illegitimate, their ability to regulate and organize the development process will be undermined, and development will be blocked" (Cornell & Kalt, 8).

However, Cornell and Kalt overlook (or choose to ignore) this crucial aspect of First Nations' culture: the 'individual' does not have the centrality for many First Nations that it does for Westerners, or for capitalist theory. For example, in the Nuxalk culture of Bella Coola, British Columbia, where I am both working in the community and continuing my field research on economic development of First Nations peoples, the family unit is the basic social unit, and individuality exists only in the context of kinship obligations. As Professor Tuhiwai Smith, a Maori educationalist, puts it:

> The individual, as the basic social unit from which other social organizations and social relations form, is another system of ideas which needs to be understood as part of the West's cultural archive. Western philosophies and religions place the individual as the basic building block of society. The transition from feudal to capitalist modes of production simply emphasized the role of the individual (Smith, 49).

Cornell and Kalt also insist that recognition of authority is required if strong leadership — another identified ingredient in economic success — is to be achieved. Focusing on leadership, Cornell and Kalt argue that sovereignty alone is not a key to economic success; tribes need good managers. The ideal, they say, is a "strong chief

executive" (Cornell & Kalt, 32) whose decisions are accepted by the community. However, in some contexts — the Nuxalk being no exception — this leadership model simply does not have relevance, whether it is stable or not. As Boldt says, "Traditional Indian leadership grew out of social systems that were organized around extended kinship groups, whose relationships and duties were defined by custom and whose cultures were essentially communal.... Thus the dichotomy of 'rulers' and 'ruled' did not exist between leaders and members" (Boldt, 118–19).

Where the idea of ruler does not exist, Cornell and Kalt find (predictably) that the business model has not functioned well: for example, in tribes like the San Carlos Apache, or the Pine Ridge Sioux, who have a tradition of independence "rooted in kinship units" (Cornell & Kalt, 33). Similarly, Nuxalk culture, being traditional hunter-gatherers (including fishing), is historically egalitarian with a tradition of hereditary chieftainship, and so lacks a tradition of hierarchical or western-style leadership and obedience. The idea of a "strong chief executive" is not culturally appropriate for the Nuxalk Nation — nor, I suspect, for many other First Nations Canadians with similar historical ways of life and consequent social organization. Local Bella Coola historian Cliff Kopas puts it this way:

> A chief was shown great respect, had extensive privileges within the tribe but had no great authority. If he decided to go to war, his subjects were not obliged to follow him and, if they did, no penalty was meted out if they decided at any time, even in the heat of battle, to leave him and go home. This resulted in lack of leadership in war and lack of anything but the most primary of planning in their expeditions (Kopas, 172).

Traditional First Nations societies (particularly hunter-gatherers) are essentially opposed to the very conditions of industrial development: the accumulation of wealth, growth and Westernized notions of 'progress'. Acceptability of these ideals, intrinsic to westernized economic success, does not dovetail with First Nations ways of life. Furthermore, the myopic view of the world that a society must take in order that these conditions take hold (acceptance of the use of natural resources for economic gain, the resulting environmental degradation and stratification of society, to name a few), is not congruent with their cultures.

Cornell and Kalt's 'cultural match' sounds easy to achieve, yet the forces against a valid match, as I have described, are complex and pervasive. The creation and implementation of governmental legislation, which re-creates and circumscribes the very terms of 'culture' itself, is what Cornell and Kalt therefore prescribe. However, this prescription is an example of what Merlan calls a 'mimetic creation'. While Merlan describes the mimetic demands of the Australian government on Aborigines in the process of their land claims, she may well be describing what Cornell and Kalt are calling for in aboriginal economic development, that it:

> ...[be] given a fresh form of existence, and indeed considerable material realization, through the invention of the legislation and an associated, complex bureaucratic-administrative machinery. It is also widely assumed that this machinery should be indigenized, run insofar as possible by Aboriginal people, and on organizational bases that some hope may also be seen as indigenous, or at least contrasting distinctively with the way other, non-indigenous institutions are run. It is an important and widely shared assumption that this process be seen as one of reclaiming, giving land-tenure legitimacy in a new context, finding and rescuing from devaluation something already there (Merlan, 235).

Merlan refers to the theoretical work of Bourdieu, and his notion of the objectivizing moment of cultural maintenance, "in which some aspects of present and past life are crystallized as 'cultural'" (Merlan, 226). She explains how this objectivization results in a complex feedback loop of representations, often mimetic, which "come to play a material role in the shaping of Aborigines' lives. Aboriginal people, of course, participate in these processes in various ways" (Merlan, 226). The same is true among North America's First Nations. The very terms of cultural identity — the land, the law — are offered to them as part of the "trick" of cultural match. Lamenting the economical failure of certain Sioux reserves, Cornell and Kalt draw the lesson: "The trick is to invent governments that are capable of operating effectively in the contemporary world, but that also match people's ideas — traditional or not — about what is appropriate and fair" (Cornell & Kalt 2, 24).

## Multivocality Matters

First Nations people are enmeshed in forces which create cultural mis-matches, and which actually work to encourage 'ineffective' business institutional development. Many of these forces are cultural, arising out of their egalitarian society which allows for, and possibly even encourages, 'multivocality' — a concept alien to the Harvard Project. For example, from the beginning of my fieldwork, through my preliminary email contact with two Nuxalk men — one a traditionalist and the other not — I was made aware of at least two differing views on economic development of the Nuxalk. Once I began my fieldwork in the Bella Coola Valley, this knowledge rapidly expanded, encompassing the 'vocalities' of the people. I now realize there are many differing views in the community with regard to how economic development should proceed, and this has led to my use of the term 'multivocality'.

Some of this multi-vocality is an unwelcome, recent imposition. Many voices speak *at* First Nations, as well as from within their communities. For example, the Canadian federal government speaks to First Nations in at least two voices: one voice is for the traditional hereditary government and deals with land claims, while another voice is for their own Band Council government system (largely an administration for distributing money). In addition, historically the government has used different voices (or rhetorics), speaking now of assimilation, now of equality and tolerance, now of fiscal stringency (Boldt, 115). Of course, the hidden agenda remains the same: "the 'national interest' imperative" (ibid.). It is therefore not surprising that on the reserve there are many examples of conflicting values. Even without focusing on efforts at economic development, it is clear that the intervention of the federal government has created an ongoing clash of value systems and continues to support this division through various mechanisms. A result of this intervention in Nuxalk society is that community relations between the modernists and the traditionalists are often divisive and destructive.

The practical result of all these conflictual ideological demands and role models is paralysis, both psychic and social — what Elsass, a Danish Professor of Health Psychology, calls a "schizophrenic situation" (Elsass, 230). How can anyone reconcile environmental guardianship with a resource-based, profit-driven, westernized notion of economic development that does little more than pay lip service to the idea of 'sustainable economic development'? How can anyone create a cultural match between a hegemonic society which reveres individual success, and one which values community and equality? First Nations people are being repeatedly told to be dichotomous (economically profit-driven but in an 'egalitarian, environmentally conscious' way), until they come to reflect what they are being told, in all its contradictoriness. Furthermore, because their numbers are small and resources are few, many First Nations peoples have neither the time nor the energy to ponder the images they are being encouraged to adopt, in order to sort or rank them in a pro-active way. The exception is the international arena, where the Nuxalk, for example, have been outspoken and active in campaigning to save their forests, stop fish farming, etc. However, even this international success is seen in a different light back in Nuxalk territory; some Nuxalk as well as non-Nuxalk see these 'successes' as barriers to their economic development. This is a practical example of the multivocality of their culture. It is also a practical example of the result of the 'schizophrenic demands' placed upon the Nation by various outside interests.

## Conclusion

I have not been able to find in Cornell and Kalt's writings any allowance or response to tribal 'multivocality' in their advocacy of 'cultural match'. On the contrary, the tribes which they regard as economically successful are ones that have "a centralized government operating under a single chief executive and a one-house legislature without an independent judiciary" (Cornell & Kalt, 18). These tribes, they say, have a better 'fit' for economic success; the cultural match is easier to accomplish because this hierarchy is similar to the dominant hegemony — that is, 'uni-vocal' and hierarchical. Indeed, Cornell and Kalt identify less economically successful tribes as those which "may include decentralized authority or identity, regional or clan-based government, or political power founded on religious belief" (ibid.). They conclude that these tribes which have "greater difficulty" in governance need "constitutional reform" as the "appropriate first step toward sustainable economic development" (ibid.).

Why do Cornell and Kalt resist the fact that some cultures are egalitarian and 'multivocal'? Why do they, along with the dominant hegemony, presume that univocality is a reasonable request, even when their own culture fails to achieve it? As Elsass observes, "To demand unity of other peoples is unwarranted when our own society and institutions are split into multiple factions" (Elsass, 231). Cornell and Kalt's Harvard Project is one more univocal formula, imposed from without and encouraging yet more mimesis and fracturing First Nations society. What Cornell and Kalt are participating in is further promulgation of the social mimesis that Merlan finds so deplorable. Their version of 'cultural match' amounts to a demand that First Nations develop "machinery [that is] indigenized, run insofar as possible by Aboriginal people, and on organizational bases that some hope may also be seen as indigenous, or at least contrasting distinctively with the way other, non-indigenous institutions are run" (Merlan, 235). The 'culture' in Cornell and Kalt's 'cultural match' is nothing more than politically correct rhetoric glossing over very real, perhaps intractable, issues.

Even Boldt admits "the bottom line ... that Canada will not redesign its industrial society to make room for the traditional ways of Indian life." (Boldt, 196). Like Cornell and Kalt, he acknowledges that "the challenge of living and surviving as Indians is to reformulate the ancient customs and traditions without compromising the enduring truths" (Boldt, 198). But, unlike Cornell and Kalt (and their "trick"), he argues that any solution must involve a system of economic development based on community rather than on the western individualistic model: "The first step in [First Nations'] quest for self-government should not be to take over the existing colonial political and bureaucratic institutional structures, but to engage their people in planning and developing political and administrative structures and norms consistent with traditional philosophies and principles, i.e., structures that will empower the people..." (Boldt, 141).

Rupert Ross presents the challenge:

> How does the general unwillingness of white society to acknowledge that North American Indians have different values and institutions that have not lost their relevance and application despite five hundred years of cultural and technological advances, bear upon the affairs with the First Nations peoples? The answer is clear: as long as the governments and the agencies of this country fail to recognize that many original peoples of this country still cling to their different values and institutions, and so long as they insist that the original peoples abandon their ancestral heritage and embrace European culture, so long will penalties be unconsciously imposed upon the Natives and injustices and injuries be committed. And so long as the government and the officials of this country continue to act as if the original peoples are the only ones in need of instruction and improvement, so long will suspicion and distrust persist (Ross, ix).

Until institutions are able to disengage, genuinely ask the simple question, "How can we help?" and be willing to accept and act on the answer in the spirit of a partnership of equals, they will never be more than meddlers in the affairs of First Nations, driven by an unspoken, unacknowledged agenda of continued control. As I see it, that crucial step back will be our only step forward.

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# ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS IF CULTURE MATTERS
## Inuvialuit Wild Game Harvesting, Community-Based Economic Development, and Cultural Maintenance in the Western Arctic

Martin Whittles

Recent ecological and economic change has exerted profound pressures upon circumpolar Native peoples. For the Inuvialuit Inuit in the Western Arctic, the impact has been especially severe. Specifically, the Inuvialuit of Banks Island, Northwest Territories have witnessed an inversely-functional ecological relationship between *Umingmuk* (Arctic Muskoxen) and *Tuktu* (Peary Caribou): the intense population growth of the former has been linked to critically declining populations of the latter — the traditional staple of the Inuvialuit. Acutely dwindling caribou herd populations have required a virtual cessation of caribou hunting, with concomitant negative economic and nutritive effect. Moreover, following the European Parliament ban on the importation of wild fur in the 1980s and the declining export market for Inuvialuit *Tiriganniaq* (white fox) fur stocks, family cash incomes continued to decline, further eroding the self-sufficiency of Inuvialuit hunters and fur trappers.

In response to tandem crises, current Inuvialuit subsistence on Banks Island is being drawn from muskox hunting, and for almost a quarter century a successful community-based project to harvest and market muskox meat, horns, hides, and *quiviut* (textile-grade soft body hair) for international export has afforded community-wide wage employment. Unique among development schemes in the Arctic, however, is the value that local and regional Inuvialuit political and economic agencies place upon not only the creation of much-needed local jobs and community cash-flow, but on specific strategies to successfully embed renewable resource development within traditional Inuvialuit culture. To date, muskox harvesting on Banks Island has supported the continuation of traditional patterns of community resource sharing, maintained the seasonality of renewable resource harvesting, and actively promoted the practice and preservation of traditional Inuit land-based skills and knowledge to a new generation of Inuvialuit.

### Introduction

Twice yearly over the last two decades small groups of up to a dozen Inuvialuit men have

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ventured by snowmobile from Sachs Harbour, the only community on Banks Island, in the near total darkness of the polar night witnessed 400 miles (650 kilometres) north of the Arctic Circle. They have spent up to ten days on the tundra in temperatures often dipping to below –30°, and returned to the community slowly driving ahead of them herds of several hundred *Umingmuk* (tundra muskox, *Ovibos muschatus*). Directed toward a set of temporary corrals located three kilometres from the community, an equal number of Inuvialuit men (and recently women) wait in a set of heated canvas tents that have been designed and erected as a portable Arctic abattoir. There they slaughter up to 100 muskox per day and butcher, inspect, package, and freeze the wild game meat in preparation for air transport to Inuvik, south of the Arctic coastline. From there the quartered muskox carcasses travel by truck to custom meat jobbers in southern Canada, for further packaging and export to the U.S., Europe, and the Far East. Originally marketed under the product name of *Niqqi — good food* or *nourishing food* — and advertised abroad as *haute cuisine* with names such as 'Estouffade of Arctic Muskox' and 'Arctic Muskox Brochette,' muskox has become the new Banks Island cash crop. In recent years Hills Foods Ltd. of Coquitlam, has promoted the product in southern Canada and beyond with considerable market success and in 1996, Culinary Team Canada brought international notoriety to Arctic wild game by winning a gold medal at the Berlin World Culinary Olympics for their hot entrée using wild muskox meat (Hills Foods, Ltd., 1997).

The most westerly island in the Canadian north located in the Beaufort Sea in the Arctic Ocean, north-east of the Mackenzie River Delta, and with a landmass in excess of 70,000 square kilometres, Banks Island is the third largest landmass in the Canadian Arctic archipelago. It enjoys a particularly diverse arctic environment, including an abundance of marine wildlife and the largest single herd of muskox in the world, encompassing perhaps as much as one-third of the planetary population. It hosts the largest nesting population of *Kanguq* (Lesser Snow Geese, *Chen hyperborea*) in the Western Arctic and the most fertile *Tiriganniaq* (white fox, *Alopex lagopus*) population in the hemisphere. The Inuvialuit whose name means *the real people* in their language, Inuvialuktun, have long made the Beaufort Sea and Mackenzie River Delta region of the Western Arctic their homeland, nurturing a unique Inuit identity (Alunik, Kolausok, and Morrison, 2003). Yet, for much of the past 3,500 years, Banks Island remained uninhabited, most recently remaining isolated from the mainland for nine of the last ten centuries. It was only in 1917 that the Alaskan-born Inuvialuit hunter Natkusiak, whose anglicised name was Billy Banksland after the island he later colonised, in his motor schooner *North Star*, undertook an exploratory expedition to Banks Island. When he returned to the Canadian mainland four years later with news of bountiful hunting and trapping there, he inspired a handful of coastal Inuvialuit trappers to attempt the return journey across the Beaufort Sea to Banks Island in search of new opportunities. In so doing, Natkusiak's successes in opening an Arctic sea bridge heralded the dramatic Native (re)settlement of Banks Island. By 1920, a nascent Native community obtained a toehold on the island, with Inuvialuit hunters and their families trapping in winter, and returning by private schooner to the mainland trading houses at Aklavik and Tuktoyaktuk in the summer to market their fox furs and replenish over-wintering supply stores. Since then, Sachs Harbour (*Ikaahuk*, or literally *the place where people cross over to*), has been the only settled community on the island. With a 2004 population of about 120, the most northerly and remote community in the Northwest Territories is the home community to both the descendants of the original Inuvialuit trappers and Inuit newcomers who began arriving from Alaska and Victoria Island until the 1960s.

From the late 1920s and the formation of the permanent community of Sachs Harbour (named after the schooner *Mary Sachs* used by Vilhjalmur Stefansson, leading one of the parties of the 1913–1918 Canadian Arctic Expedition) through the arrival of the RCMP and the striking of a permanent detachment there in 1953, the Banks Island Inuvialuit were among some of the most prosperous Inuit in the Canadian Arctic. As late as the 1960s they lived not unlike their forebears: they harvested plentiful but specific resources for local consumption and for trade and sale. During this time, most Inuvialuit families spent lengthy portions of the year hunting, fishing, and trapping travelling considerable distances between a series of family-operated seasonal camps and supply caches dispersed across the island, following annual harvesting cycles. The annual cycle commonly included

polar bear hunting with the return of sunlight in February and March, fishing at freshwater inland lakes in March and April, harvesting snow geese in April and May, hunting seals and whales as coastal sea retreated in July and August, and fishing and hunting caribou as fall and winter approached. The principle cash crop was derived from trapping white fox, a season that usually began after Christmas and continued until spring. Through the Inuvialuit participation in the white fox industry, Sachs Harbour became "the most outstanding example of a successful trapping community in northern North America, and perhaps the world" (Usher, 1971a: 1). Until 20 years ago, trapping furs provided Inuvialuit families with access to the resources they required to remain economically self-sufficient, yet afforded them the opportunity to do so within a traditional cultural framework of living from the bounty of the land while remaining largely free of dependency on wage labour employment or government social assistance schemes.

However, in the 1980s, following the rise of the animal-rights movement and the activities of anti-fur organisations, the livelihood of the Inuvialuit was directly and externally threatened. A series of outright prohibitions on the importation of wild, trapped fur enacted by the European Parliament from the late 1970s, and the associated dramatic collapse of the European and southern fur markets, left many Inuvialuit families suffering financial hardship from the loss of what was often their only significant source of cash income. For the first time in many people's recollection, the Banks Island Inuvialuit lost much of their independence, with the very real prospect of financial ruin. Families who had commonly realised cash incomes of $CDN40,000 to $CDN70,000 from trapping white fox, faced the prospect of cash incomes of near nil. The loss of cash flow further imperilled the Inuvialuit by undercutting access to resources they required for subsistence hunting and fishing. Many Inuvialuit left Sachs Harbour in search of wage-labour employment on the mainland, and the population plummeted almost 40%. Those who remained faced the dim possibility of surviving on meagre monthly government assistance allotments, with seemingly little hope of ever regaining any sustainable level of self-sufficiency and independence. This situation was as rapid and dramatic as it was personally distressing and marginalizing for members of a community deeply rooted in cultural notions of autonomy and self-sufficiency. Further, as government transfer payments were calculated and disbursed at levels of minimal provision, most Inuvialuit lost control over the resources necessary to maintain existing equipment or to obtain the equipment essential to a hunting and fishing lifestyle. Broken and worn-out equipment could no longer be replaced and many Inuvialuit were in effect removed from seasonal subsistence harvesting, essentially finding themselves marooned in the community, relying on processed food imported at great expense from the South. In short, many Inuvialuit who lost the cash income from trapping that had been used to purchase snowmobiles, fuel, rifles, boats and motors, fishing nets and other such provisions, simply could no longer afford to pursue traditional subsistence activities. To this day, many Inuvialuit recount with sadness and bitterness the difficulties they faced responding to rapid and dramatic changes in their lives, directed by political and philosophical events from afar.

Until the mid-1980s, the staple of the Inuvialuit had been *Tuktu* (Peary Caribou, *Rangifer arcticus pearyi, Rangerfer tarandus pearyi*). Once plentiful throughout the Canadian Arctic, caribou was a fountain of material for the Inuvialuit: the species provided meat for human and canine consumption; bones and offal were used for the manufacture of tools and equipment; and hides were sewn into clothing and tents. More recently meat continued to be consumed and hides were sold for cash to fur-trading houses. Since the 1980s, caribou — like other species of Banks Island big game, including polar bear and muskox — have became an indirect source of cash income for the Inuvialuit who have taken to offering their services as professional big-game guides for American and European recreational hunters in pursuit of game trophies. However, from about 1980 caribou populations began to decline dramatically — slowly at first, later more swiftly. One estimate suggested that numbers of caribou outrightly crashed from 12,000 in 1972 to 8,000 in 1980 (Urquhart, 1993: 4). Other studies identify that numbers fell from 9,000 in 1971 to less than 1,000 two decades later (Hrynyshyn, 1991: 7; Community of Sachs Harbour, 1992: 59). During the mid-1990s, numbers hovered between 300 and 500, and since 1998 an estimated herd of 436 has rebounded to 1,196 in 2001, probably due to relaxed Inuvialuit hunting (Parks Canada, 2002; Environment Canada, 2004). The ecologi-

cal, economic, and cultural results of such a population crash were alarming in the extreme. In response to this potential ecological disaster, the Banks Island Inuvialuit agency responsible for monitoring and managing game stocks, the Sachs Harbour Hunters' and Trappers' Council (HTC) established restrictions on caribou hunting. By 1990, and the continued downward slide in caribou numbers, the HTC imposed a virtual caribou moratorium. The results were nothing short of staggering: where 306 caribou had been taken annually a generation earlier (Usher, 1971b: 71), only 20 caribou kills were licensed in 1992: less than one caribou was taken for every seven Inuvialuit on the island, a figure *twenty times less* than that for other comparable Inuit communities in the region (Inuvialuit Game Council, 1993). At the household level, the new restriction amounted to a near abatement: two decades earlier, families entirely reliant upon caribou meat would take upwards of 50 animals per year (Usher, 1971b: 73), whereas by 1992 they were effectively rationed to one caribou, per household, per annum. The situation became so critical that the Sachs Harbour HTC was also regularly compelled to import caribou carcasses taken by Inuvialuit hunters from near the coastal community of Tuktoyaktuk, on the Arctic mainland. Flown into the community at considerable expense by HTC-chartered aircraft — and distributed free to all community members, with preference shown to locals Elders — the imported caribou meat has become seen as the only alternative for many Inuvialuit who have a strong taste and cultural preference for caribou meat. Additionally, the collapse in caribou numbers also crushed the Banks Island sport hunt industry for the several Inuvialuit men who drew considerable cash income from organizing and delivering guided trophy hunts for non-Native sport hunters. Yet, where previously trophy hunters had often ventured to Sachs Harbour to undertake big game sport hunts in the autumn and spring seasons, often specifically to hunt caribou, or perhaps undertake a combined caribou-polar bear hunt, the HTC moratorium restricted sport hunting considerably and dissuaded many potential trophy hunters.

A number of explanations have been cited for the caribou population collapse, yet the issue of causality remains moot (see: Urquhart, 1973, 1993; Wilkinson, Shank, and Penner, 1976; Vincent and Gunn, 1981; Gunn, Shank, and McLean, 1991; Hrynyshyn, 1991; Biddlecomb and Klein, 1992; Gunn, 1992; Staaland and Olesen, 1992; Muskox Management Workshop, 2001). One explanation offered by Inuvialuit Elders posits that caribou herds collapsed in response to the eruption of the Bank Island muskox population that had increased from near nil to 34,000 in the two decades prior to 1984. However, this ebullition was not regarded as any sort of windfall by native hunters: for many Inuvialuit the meat of the muskox remains undesirable and tasteless to local palates and many community Elders continue to avoid the personal use of muskox meat, often commenting that they find it to be "tasteless — it just doesn't taste like *good* meat," "has no good fat on it" and that it is "only good for dog feed."

By 1990 the outlook for the Inuvialuit seemed grave. First, the community of Sachs Harbour found itself surrounded by bountiful numbers of white fox, for which local hunters and trappers had been led to believe for more than a half-century there was a near insatiable world-wide demand, yet for which fickle fashion and the fleeting philosophy of international animal rights activists had ensured no substantial market remained. Secondly, the only valued local staple, Peary Caribou, had suffered a seemingly irretrievable population crash, and hunting was all but prohibited. Thirdly, muskox populations had exploded, but far from a staple windfall for the Inuvialuit, the increase offered only a marginal utility. Cruelly it seemed, aside from the artificial collapse of fox trapping, the very species for which there was neither marked traditional use, nor a viable cash-market demand, were available in considerable, indeed frightening, abundance, while the one species culturally and nutritionally fundamental to the way of life of the Inuvialuit was in critically short supply.

Meanwhile, the cash costs of living in Sachs Harbour continued to climb: Canadian cost of living differentials, baselined at 100.00 reached 165 locally in 2004, while the fixed price index, baselined in Yellowknife at 100.00, rose from 126 in 1992 to a new high of 188 in 2004 (Whittles, 1995: 114; GNWT Statistical Profiles, 2004). Employment offered only diminishing buffers. Where Sachs Harbour showed a community employment rate of 47.6% in 1986, by 2004, the rate had dropped slightly to 46.6%, and the Aboriginal-only employment rate registered at 42.3% (GNWT Statistical Profiles,

2004). Thus a series of ecological and economic transformations had, in a period of less than a decade, inextricably altered the way of life of the Banks Island Inuvialuit and compromised their independence as a people. Sachs Harbour was becoming a 'have not' northern Native community (Bone, 2003:98).

## Three Millennia of Muskox Harvesting on Banks Island

There is evidence that aboriginal peoples have hunted muskox on Banks Island for over 3,400 years. Pre-Dorset sites have been found to contain muskox bones indicating small-scale harvesting by palaeo-Eskimo populations from 1,400 BC (Hickey, 1979; Arnold, 1980; Will, 1984; Gunn et al., 1991). While later Inuit occupation of Banks Island appears to have been episodic, evidence indicates that successive populations also used muskox as a foodstuff and a source of domestic raw material (Will, 1984). While current populations are estimated to be nearly 70,000, scarcely less than 50 years ago muskox were a demographic rarity on the island. Prior to that, early European expeditions to the region curiously noted that there were few, if any, muskox to be found on Banks Island (Whittles, 1992, 1994). Later still, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, leading one of the parties of the 1913–1918 Canadian Arctic Expedition that crisscrossed Banks Island commented: "We soon came to the conclusion that .... polar oxen were now either rare or extinct in our immediate vicinity" (in Barr, 1991: 58). Later expeditions recorded a similar scarcity of muskox. In fact, studies conducted well into the 1950s noted occurrences in only single digits. Yet from the mid-1960s, numbers appeared to increase at such a dramatic rate as to be virtually inexplicable: from 60 in 1963 to 800 in 1967, 1,800 by 1974, 20,000 by 1980, 25,000 by 1985, in excess of 34,000 by 1989, to over 60,000 recorded by census in the spring of 1992 (Barr, 1991: 61–62; Gunn, Shank, and McLean, 1991: 188–89; Rondeau, 1992: 4.). As late as 2001, an island-wide survey revealed a muskox population of 68,788 (Annual Report of Research and Monitoring in National Parks of the Western Arctic, 2002). When combined with the dramatic crash in caribou populations, the net result was twofold: first, at the very least, the Inuvialuit would be required to re-focus their domestic hunting activities away from caribou in favour of muskox as a default staple. Secondly, it led many Inuvialuit to consider the possibility of commercially harvesting muskox.

The Banks Island muskox harvest formally commenced in the spring of 1981 (Latour, 1987: 265). Initially a semi-commercial effort to provide muskox meat for the Inuvialuit and others living in the Western Arctic, it later expanded to supply rapidly developing international markets. The Beaufort Sea-Mackenzie River Delta communities of Inuvik, Aklavik, Holman Island, and Tuktoyaktuk all received muskox meat distributed under the aegis of the business division the Committee for Original Peoples' Entitlement (COPE) — the vanguard of the later Inuvialuit Final Agreement and precursor for the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation (IRC). Meat was distributed and marketed by Ulu Foods Limited, an aboriginal country food outlet in Inuvik, and shipped from there to the communities of Aklavik and Tuktoyaktuk for retail sale (Urquhart, 1982:19). Quotas of approximately 150 animals were easily met in eight to ten days of hunting. Muskox were harvested during the last week of April and the first week of May, from separate sites — all within 100 kilometres of Sachs Harbour (Latour, 1987: 265). Between 1981 and 1983, muskox was similarly harvested in numbers of 260, 96 and 83 respectively (Tessaro et al, 1984: 177; Rondeau, 1992: 6). From 1987 onwards, harvesting has proceeded sporadically in autumn and late winter (Fraser, McLean, and Nagy, 1991; GNWT, Wildlife and Fisheries, Economics, Muskox, Sachs Harbour, 2002; GNWT, Wildlife and Fisheries, Harvest Levels, Muskox, Sachs Harbour, 2002).

The harvests were successful on a number of levels. Local employment provided cash income of upwards of $2,500.00 per hunter for the approximately 10 Inuvialuit hunters who each tracked, culled, and butchered the product *in situ* on the tundra, finally transporting the dressed carcasses from the habitat to Sachs Harbour for later air transport to Inuvik (Eli Nasogaluak, personal communication). Additionally, the economic value to Sachs Harbour HTC of the 470 muskox harvested between 1985 and 1987 totalled $117,600 — clearly a significant resource for a community of 130 (Gunn et al., 1991: 191). Responsible for almost every aspect of the harvests, the HTC, an Inuvialuit political body locally elected and represented, held and continues to hold the ongoing mandate to manage and conserve the wildlife habitat of Banks Island. Matters pertaining to the har-

vesting of muskox were for the most part locally controlled: harvesting areas and seasons were defined, quotas determined, techniques and skills shared, and local hunters were invited to participate. In this way, Inuvialuit community-based decision-making directed the development and management of a local renewable resource-base activity, and the traditional knowledge and expertise of the community was combined with local consensus to generate a policy for the harvest in order better to serve the needs of the community and its members, and to ensure the preservation of the habitat for future generations of Inuvialuit (Whittles, 2004). Finally, the benefits of commercial harvesting that were realised at individual and family levels should not be overlooked. Muskox harvesting was not a discrete economic or cultural activity: while actively scouting or herding muskox, many herders used their time on the tundra and their knowledge of the habitat to track the movements and activities of other possible prey species, thus satisfying their own hunting requirements simultaneous with earning cash wages. The connections to traditional subsistence hunting did not end with the harvest itself, as following work on the harvest many Inuvialuit returned to these areas in order to satisfy their own dietary requirements, or serve the country food needs of family and relatives. Thus the early harvests enabled local hunters to augment their subsistence activities with a desperately needed cash income, all the while promoting and directly supporting independent hunting and fishing activities. Additionally, the harvests provided other Inuvialuit communities with a culturally valued meat supply, while also giving residents of Sachs Harbour access to the by-products of harvesting required to make hide sleeping skins, clothing, sled dog food, in addition to other raw materials necessary for handicraft production.

## The Banks Island Commercial Muskox Harvest

Since 1990, and in response to a burgeoning international demand, the products of the Banks Island muskox harvest have been made available outside the Western Arctic. Yet, control of the harvest demonstrably remains within Inuvialuit hands. The harvest itself is directed by a number of Inuvialuit governing bodies including the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, the Inuvialuit Development Corporation, the Inuvialuit Game Council, and a number of joint Inuvialuit-Government of the Northwest Territories committees. During the early 1990s, meat was marketed by *Umayot, An Inuvialuit Company*, a branch of the Inuvialuit Renewable Resource Development Corporation, however, for over a decade marketing has been a joint venture of the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation and the Sachs Harbour Hunters' and Trappers' Committee.

In the early 1990s, the commercial harvest began to expand in order to meet market requirements (Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, Annual Report, 1992: 12). The autumn harvest of 1991 took approximately 1100 animals, producing almost 180,000 pounds of high-grade meat — much of it for international export. The spring harvest of 1992 processed about 1,792 animals (Wildlife Management Advisory Council, NWT, 1992/93) for a total annual harvest in 1991–1992 of 2031 muskox. Almost 1,800 animals were taken in the autumn harvest of 1993 (GNWT, Wildlife and Fisheries, Harvest Levels, Muskox, Sachs Harbour). Since then, harvests for export have occurred in 1997–1998, 1999–2000, 2001–2001, and 2002–2003. Typically in October and February, a group of about ten men using all-terrain vehicles or snowmobiles herd the muskox from the habitat into corrals and finally to a modern portable abattoir located near Sachs Harbour for processing. Before the harvest begins, Inuvialuit hunters often spend considerable time travelling on the tundra in order to locate herds, track movements, and determine the herd sizes of harvestable muskox, but also using the opportunity to hunt or track other animals for their own subsistence needs. This initial phase requires them to travel widely across the vast expanse of island, a trip that can often last a fortnight or longer; however, many informally explore areas of the island known to contain muskox for a month or more previously. Once the critical number of animals has been located, the drive to Sachs Harbour follows. As the journey to the abattoir can take upwards of two to five days, some hunters travel to predetermined locations where overnight corrals are located and undertake maintenance work there in preparation for the arrival of the driven herd. Later, harvesting parties return to drive herds to the abattoir where they are maintained prior to processing. In an assembly-line system contained within two large Quonset-style tents — each about four metres wide by about 15 metres in length — animals are processed ready for

inspection by a certified Agriculture Canada veterinarian, and ultimately for shipment to southern markets. At the abattoir, crews consisting of 15 to 35 Inuvialuit are employed for almost a month to kill the muskox, skin, clean, and dress the carcasses, trim excess and those portions unfit for export, then proceed to section, package, weigh, and store the frozen meat in preparation for shipment through a series of processes that are both technically sophisticated and labour- and energy-intensive. In the early 1990s additional community-based value-added activities were developed so that following successful harvests, additional wage-labour opportunities exist for three or four Inuvialuit workers processing the raw hides in Sachs Harbour and preparing them for transport to facilities in southern Canada and the United States.

During the harvest, and in keeping with traditional Inuvialuit practices, as much as possible of each animal and associated by-products are used. As the primary cash-crop products of the harvest, meat, guard hair, and hides are exported, and raw horns have been independently marketed by a Sachs Harbour Elder. Excess, trimmed, and lower-grade carcass sections are stored in middens outside of the processing tents. During the harvest, many Inuvialuit arrive at the abattoir with snowmobiles and *komatiks* (ladder-like freighter sleds) to transport the surplus meat to the community, where it is shared throughout. Additionally, what little meat is not approved by a federal meat inspector and any other residuum is also fed to local sled dogs, thus providing another resource to the community: a directly and easily available source of dog food in considerable quantities that seasonally frees Sachs Harbour hunters from the considerable burden of hunting in order to feed their dog teams.

## Harvesting and the Maintenance of An Inuvialuit Way of Life

For the Inuvialuit of Sachs Harbour, the economic consequences of muskox harvesting have been considerable and varied. In a remote region which has historically experienced extremely limited economic diversification, and which is currently heavily dependent upon the burgeoning Western Arctic hydro-carbon economy, economic benefits include:

1. At any given harvest, approximately 25 local Inuvialuit secure short-term wage labour: employment is generated for about ten herders and 15 harvesters. For instance, during the autumn 1992 harvest, each of the two herding parties comprised five men, and the abattoir was staffed by twelve men and three women. The impact of 25 seasonal employment positions on the local economy is little short of profound. Statistically, in 1992 a total of 56 of the Inuvialuit adults of working age living in Sachs Harbour were available for work in full- and part-time wage-labour employment, of which 28, or precisely 50%, were so engaged (18 full-time and 10 part-time positions). Thus, in offering seasonal work to 25 of the 28 Inuvialuit adults in Sachs Harbour who were otherwise unemployed, the harvest provided short-term employment for 90% of those in the community who did not otherwise have full- or part-time wage labour employment (Whittles, 1994, 1996).

2. At the October harvest in 1991, individual herders earned approximately $4,800 and abattoir harvesters over $5,400 for between three and four weeks work, where wages totalling more than $120,000 were paid by the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation through the now discontinued business *Umayot, An Inuvialuit Company.* Yet, by the early-winter harvest of 1999 and following a cessation in harvesting of two years, Banks Island operations had expanded to employ 35 workers from Sachs Harbour, and the Inuvialuit communities of Holman, Tuktoyaktuk, Paulatuk, and Inuvik for two months during that harvest. Fully 1450 animals were processed and exported in that enterprise, generating about 126,000 kilograms of meat with a commercial value of CDN$450,000.

3. A successful harvest based in Sachs Harbour requires the skills of a number of non-Inuvialuit workers — including government wildlife biologists and an Agriculture Canada qualified veterinarian, abattoir maintenance workers, and other specialised personnel. Their economic impact on the local economy cannot be overlooked, as all are boarded in facilities in the community of Sachs Harbour. The services necessary

to accommodate up to a dozen non-Inuvialuit for periods of up to eight weeks, twice a year, were and remain substantial to the economy of Sachs Harbour — a community that due to the sheer remoteness of location does not see considerable economic benefit from tourism or other visitor traffic. Additionally, those Inuvialuit not directly involved with the harvest are often offered paid-service and wage-labour opportunities as innkeepers, cooks, housekeepers, cleaners, and general support staff during the course of the harvest. The direct injection of cash into the local economy by way of provisioning hostel and private residential boarding facilities, service sector wages, and cash realised through the locally owned and operated Ikaahuk Co-op community store (groceries for workers' meals, fuel for abattoir equipment and heating, etc.), and other local concerns, remains considerable. The harvest also provides direct and indirect employment for a number of Inuvialuit in regional communities throughout the Beaufort Sea — Mackenzie River Delta region as much of the infrastructure necessary for the harvest is provided by the Inuvialuit Development Corporation (IDC), based in Inuvik. A division of the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, IDC is responsible for arranging the transportation of both muskox meat and hides from Sachs Harbour to Inuvik, further product processing, and for world-wide product marketing. The ground services that were provided at Inuvik airport for the approximately 30 round trip air-freight flights from Inuvik to Sachs Harbour during the 1999 harvest are but one example of the regional economic spin-off of the Banks Island harvest project.

4. The harvest indirectly injects considerable revenue into the local economy and provides opportunities for those Inuvialuit not personally affiliated with the harvest, and often too aged or infirm to participate directly. The raw horns of processed muskox have been marketed to southern art and handicraft houses by a Sachs Harbour Elder for between $200 and $250 per set. In the 1990s, a number of Banks Islanders, including two male Elders, derived a cash income from carving unsold horns, which they marketed directly to southern and international Native craft galleries for between $500 and $1,200 per carving. From hide remnants Inuvialuit women have made mukluk leggings, slippers, animal dolls, hats and mittens for domestic and local use as well as handicrafts for sale, also marketed through southern galleries. These products remain a valuable source of cash income for a number of families, and generate significant income for several elderly Inuvialuit households: one Elder grossed approximately $10,000 in 1992 alone from the sale of her handicrafts and clothing.

5. Perhaps one of the most valuable cash products from muskox is *qiviuq* or *quivuit*, the soft, down-quality body hair of the animal. As a textile, *qiviuq* offers warmth many times that of sheep's wool, and is considerably softer than cashmere. As approximately three pounds of qiviuq is obtained from each adult muskox, several tonnes of the so-called 'muskox down' and outer guard hair are produced from each of the larger harvests. Processed *qiviuq* has been marketed through an Inuvialuit Development Corporation subsidiary in Whitehorse, Yukon that developed markets in Japan, Europe, and North America (Down North: The Qiviuq Company Product Catalogue). A number of local women have generated income from washing, carding, and spinning the wool in order to knit mittens, hats, scarves, neckties, and sweaters, all of which command a premium price in southern markets. In the autumn of 1992, two local women completed a technical education course in custom-garment knitting for export, and soon began garment production. *Qiviuq*, which sold for $135 per raw pound in 1989, often fetched prices upwards of $40 per 100 grams ($182 per pound) carded, washed, and spun into fibre in the 1990s. Although Banks Island raw *qiviuq* is currently being exported to Peru where it is manufactured into exotic clothing and handicraft items, finished yarn currently sells for $26 per 25 gram skein (US$468.00 per pound); retail outlets in Alaska currently offer *quiviut* yarn for US$28.00 per ounce (US$448.00 per pound). It bears noting that when I lived

> in Sachs Harbour and worked on the abattoir line, a number of Inuvialuit jokingly commented that it seemed quite ironic to them, and an echo of the fur trade of days long gone, that — to non-Inuvialuit consumers, at least — the exterior covering of the muskox had become more valuable than the meat itself.

## Muskox Harvesting and Inuvialuit Cultural Maintenance

The muskox harvest not only provides opportunities for a diversified Inuvialuit economy, but it promotes the importance of traditional patterns of community resource sharing, maintains the seasonality of renewable resource harvesting, and actively fosters (and rewards) the practice and preservation of traditional Inuit land-based skills and knowledge for a new generation of Inuvialuit in the following ways:

1. Muskox harvesting provides economic opportunities for Sachs Harbour Inuvialuit who generally have not had access to full-time wage-labour employment and who wish to remain full-time hunters. Cash realised is used to cover day-to-day living expenses and to clear outstanding debts at the Ikaahuk Co-operative shop. In direct support of traditional subsistence activities, it provides much of the cash necessary for Inuvialuit to acquire snowmobiles, sleds, tents, rifles, boats and motors, and to purchase fuel, ammunition, and food. The purchase of equipment and provisions not only contributes to (indeed, ensures) the continued independence of Inuvialuit hunters, but it also prepares many men with the financial liquidity to offer their services as trophy-hunt guides and to operate sport hunt outfitting enterprises from Sachs Harbour, an activity that is becoming increasingly important to the local economy:

   > In 2002–2003, 93 guided sport hunts were conducted for muskoxen in the Northwest Territories. Of these, 44 were on Banks Island, 7 on northwest Victoria Island, and 42 on the mainland (Inuvik and Sahtu regions). Guided muskox hunt[s] cost approximately $3000 US. Thus 93 guided sport hunts generate approximately $279,000 US ($372,000 CDN) in outfitting fees in the NWT in 2002–2003. This value excludes dollars spent on airline tickets, hotel accommodations, meals, and local purchases of arts and crafts (GNWT, Wildlife and Fisheries, Economics, Muskox, Sachs Harbour).

2. Harvesting allows Inuvialuit hunters to work when they require employment income most, yet remain available for 'on-call' subsistence-based hunting and fishing. In short, a successful subsistence career requires that the hunter have the opportunity to track animals as the weather, seasons, and herd movements dictate. Conditions in the Arctic vary greatly from season to season, even from day to day. Windows of opportunity are often unpredictable and successful hunters must respond rapidly and competently to local seasonal, climatic, environmental, and faunal conditions. As seasonal employment lasting less four to eight weeks, perhaps twice per year, and unlike full-time wage labour employment, muskox harvesting does not exert profound or continued limitations onto the lives and livelihood of Inuvialuit hunters. Rather than constraining Inuvialuit life ways, the harvest serves as a vehicle to support many Inuvialuit to obtain the equipment and resources necessary to pursue a traditional lifestyle, and to maintain a high level of economic independence. As such, the harvest provides greater economic flexibility and independence for many Inuvialuit than they might otherwise realise from the often uncompromising cultural interference of full-time wage labour employment, all the while ensuring their freedom to remain full-time and successful hunters.

   Moreover, muskox herding and meat processing in late autumn and late winter takes place at times when other Inuvialuit activities associated with the economy of the land are at low ebb: average daily temperatures are statistically nearest the yearly low at the beginning and end of the winter dark period (November and February). Traditionally, men would be travelling on the tundra and engaged in fox trapping activities during these periods; currently, however, in the absence of opportunities for profitable fur trapping, some of the coldest temperatures of the year combine with seasonally low photoperiod values to keep many Inuvialuit from their land-based subsistence pursuits.

As a result, most locals prefer instead to hunt or fish closer to the community during the mid-winter period. Yet it is precisely during this time that both seasonal muskox harvests take place. Preceding or following traditionally intense periods of hunting and fishing, muskox harvesting consequently neither coincides with nor contradicts peak subsistence production periods, so Inuvialuit hunters participating in the harvest do not forgo culturally valuable and economically vital hunting opportunities whilst employed. They do, rather, engage in employment at either or both harvests in order to secure access to the necessary cash income to clear debts from the preceding season of hunting, or to sponsor approaching expeditions, or both.

3. Wild game harvesting — unlike most wage-labour jobs held by Inuit in the Canadian Arctic that exist within the category of oil, gas, mining, construction, and government service — demands a level of specialised traditional skill and indigenous technical knowledge only to be found in within the Inuvialuit population. Moreover, without the Inuvialuit, the harvest would be destined to failure: Inuvialuit employed posses a set of near priceless traditional and non-traditional skills indispensable in locating and herding the muskox, as well as processing them in the abattoir. Inuvialuit locate and herd the animals (in the darkness of the polar night) on the tundra, navigating and surviving on the land at two of the most severe climatic periods of the Arctic year. They successfully drive the animals towards the community abattoir relying upon their traditional knowledge of the habits and behaviour of muskox — knowledge that is also deployed by Inuvialuit cullers and butchers during processing. In this way then, the harvest not only utilises Inuit skills as such, it recognises and validates these skills as valuable and therefore essential to a successful harvest.

4. The harvest has offered seasonal employment opportunities to upwards 90% of the Inuvialuit who do not enjoy access to full- or part-time wage labour employment. Through the muskox harvest, the people of Sachs Harbour are able to provide a commodity for which there is a considerable market, from a resource which is communally held and eminently renewable. In return they invest in their traditional subsistence-based way of life while injecting cash into the community, enabling it to retain its independence. Thus a highly specialised cash-crop product is harvested in a culturally conducive and socially sustainable fashion and is converted it into a valuable source of income in a region which itself has cash-intensive requirements.

5. The Banks Island harvest generates a product for which there is no current significant competition anywhere. Additionally, it is product realised from a richly renewable resource. In terms of the sustainability of the harvest, the current Banks Island muskox population is in excess of 68,000; thus a yearly harvest of 2,000 to 5,000 animals represents the removal of between three and seven per cent of the herd — minimal when consideration is made for the fact that the herd has consistently reproduced itself every five years (Whittles, 2004). Renewable resource management on Banks Island requires the rigorous and careful direction of the Sachs Harbour HTC, in an ongoing process that continues to employ and validate the formidable body of Inuvialuit traditional knowledge through a traditional consensus-based decision-making process.

6. Through wild game harvesting the Inuvialuit of Sachs Harbour have realised what Lyck (1990) describes as the fifth, and final, phase of political and economic evolution in the Arctic. Preceded by phases of international (non-Inuvialuit) exploitation of marine mammals, of military discovery and use of the Arctic, by the 'public concern' phase, and finally, the national exploitation of oil, gas, and other minerals, the Inuvialuit have finally achieved for themselves a more integrated and diversified economy — yet one "in which indigenous people are seeking their own rights, influence and autonomy" (ibid.: 310).

7. On the surface, it might appear that the Inuvialuit have become involved in a wholly new type of economic endeavour: muskox harvesting uses thoroughly modern technology, those who participate receive

hourly wages for their labour and, on a larger scale, harvesting produces a cash commodity for foreign markets. However, rather than an example of a transformed economy, muskox harvesting is better understood as a new aspect of the what I have termed the *economy of the land* (Whittles, 1995) that illustrates the plurality and flexibility of economic activities available to the Inuvialuit, focusing upon the dominance of subsistence pursuits and the Inuvialuit harvest of the rich resources of Banks Island so as to ensure their maximum personal, family, and community independence. More importantly, like traditional hunting, fishing, and trapping, muskox harvesting remains an enterprise that does not depart from the scope of traditional Inuvialuit economic activity; nor is it a new, and therefore synthetic, category of endeavour. Rather, it is a venture that is clearly integrated within Inuvialuit notions of the economy of the land, and one that ensures some degree of the continuity of a traditional Arctic community.

## Conclusion and Discussion

Circumpolar peoples comprise a distinct category of economically challenged indigenous populations, often inhabiting a specific niche that often includes restricted settlement on lands of marginal utility, ethnic encapsulation, political impotence, and cultural stigmatisation. Comprising the "Fourth World," (Manuel and Poslums, 1974), they often encompass minute populations of reindeer herders, subsistence hunters and fishers, fur trappers, and wage labourers in the non-renewable economies of gas, oil, and mineral extraction. Circumpolar peoples are often located (or re-located) upon economically marginal land. Primary and secondary industry has generally not been historically viable in these regions. Requisite conventional economic infrastructure rarely exists in many locations and raw materials and energy sources are often scarce or available only at a premium, while the distance to potential markets often makes transportation costs prohibitive. Levels of education and marketable skills are frequently not available in required numbers or standards and most circumpolar communities, while often suffering marked levels of over-crowding given the number of available residential units, are often small-scale settlements physically remote from larger, urban markets. Additionally, techniques of production and the cultural impact of the establishment and maintenance of new industry is often disruptive to small-scale, subsistence-based rural populations.

Numerous Northern economic development schemes attempted in the past have involved the promotion of non-renewable resource extraction industries, often including ventures which are generally bound to mercurial world market prices. In the case of renewable-resource industries, they too are bound by supply-demand fluctuations in external markets, which themselves are coupled to fickle trends in fashion and dietary éclat. In addition, many projects are defined, implemented, and managed by centralised governments and tend to be inefficient, under-capitalised, and rarely prove to be either sustainable or profitable. In this light, the uniqueness of the Banks Island muskox harvest is clear. In the final analysis, perhaps Mark Hills of Hills Foods Ltd. best captures the opportunities arising from the Banks Island harvest, "Their community has new employment, the muskox herd is receiving the culling wildlife experts deem healthy, and gourmets, chefs, restaurateurs, and those who desire natural, organic, flavourful protein are being satisfied" (Hills Foods, 1997).

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# BOOK REVIEW

*Water and Fishing: Aboriginal Rights in Australia and Canada*
Paul Kauffman (editor)
Canberra: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, 2004

ISBN 0-9750275-4-9, Cloth and Paper, 233 pp.

Yale D. Belanger

The Supreme Court of Canada in 2000 upheld Aboriginal fishing rights flowing from historic Treaties signed between the Míkmaq and the British in 1760–61, a decision that was immediately condemned by non-Aboriginal fishers. Minor altercations followed cultivating more violent confrontations that resulted in Aboriginal fishers being shot at. In an insightful article by Paul Fitzgerald, a senior level Public Affairs Officer for Saint Mary's University in Halifax, the author expressed his concern with the "manner in which the complexity of the Marshall Decision was dramatically simplified in a one-sided way for popular consumption," and how Aboriginal people were, despite Supreme Court vindication, depicted by the Canadian media as criminals for fishing out of season. This event effectively introduced to the Canadian public the idea of Aboriginal water and fishing rights and the difficulty involved in reconciling these rights with contemporary government policies.

Aboriginal water and fishing rights is an area of study that has been recently embraced by indigenous scholars internationally and is one of significant importance. In the introduction of *Water and Fishing: Aboriginal Rights in Australia and Canada*, the editor Paul Kauffman posits, "Does granting rights for Indigenous people necessitate limiting the rights of others? Can protecting or re-instating Indigenous people's rights to waters or to fishing lead to a more harmonious society and better protection of the environment? What do Indigenous people want? What is the law? And what is the practical situation in Australia and Canada where the situation of Indigenous people has much in common?" These and other salient questions provide the foundation for an extended discussion about Aboriginal water and fishing rights in Australia and Canada, an all too often ignored aspect of traditional Aboriginal economies, and one that requires further academic investigation and legal clarification.

Kauffman, who has managed Indigenous land, heritage, and cultural programs in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission and who has held

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senior government and academic positions, assembled a collection of 15 essays developed by 14 academics, lawyers, and community leaders. The final edited compilation is an important and varied collection that reveals the varied dynamics Aboriginal leaders in Australia and, to a lesser extent, Canada must contend with in what has become an age of contested water and fishing rights. The prescribed intent of the book is to act as "a resource to Indigenous people, the general public and others who will work on these issues in the future," a lofty goal that I believe Kauffman reached.

In what is at times a highly technical read, the level of detail is impressive and the analyses offered telling. The contributions are for the most part legal critiques of existing legislation and government policies in both countries. What is unique in most of the chapters is the sense of relevancy and urgency engendered vis-à-vis the authors' discussion of issues that will soon become both public and politically-charged debates. Most authors included discussions about the difficulties facing Aboriginal people in their drive to see historic water and fishing rights entrenched, and the positive and negative outcomes of various political strategies are also discussed by highlighting policy and legislative outcomes and how these ideas continue to fuel debate. Unfortunately, for a book that purports to offer a comparative study of Canadian and Australian Aboriginal fishing and water rights issues, Canadian issues take a definite back seat to Australian concerns. Included is one brief comparative essay examining Aboriginal fishing rights in Canada and Australia and two essays discussing the Aboriginal fisheries experience in Canada, generally, and specifically how the Inuit navigate political currents in their quest for improved access to fish stocks of the Arctic seas.

As is often the case with compilations, *Water and Fishing* is at times uneven. The quality of the fourteen essays is undeniable as the contributors endeavour to capture for the reader the Aboriginal experience in both Canada and Australia. The compilation is laden with theoretical analyses that at times makes for a difficult read for those unfamiliar with Australian and/or Canadian legislation in relation to Aboriginal fishing and water rights. For specialists in the field, however, this compilation is a must.

This volume's intended audience is primarily academic and in particular it would be of interest to graduate students or specialists in the field and from other related disciplines. Due to its precise legal nature this book is not recommended for those seeking a quick and painless overview of the issues. The calibre of scholarship is significant and its appeal would quickly be lost to lower division students and the general public.

**NOTE**

1. Paul Fitzgerald, "Fishing for Stories at Burnt Church: The Media, The Marshall Decision and Aboriginal Representation," *Canadian Dimension* 36, no. 4 (July/Aug 2002), 29–32.

# CONCLUSION
# *Land. Labour. Capital.*

David Newhouse

We have land. We have plenty of labour. We have capital, both financial and intellectual and we know how to get more. We have a strong desire to create better lives for ourselves. We have a developing institutional infrastructure and capacity. capable of encouraging and supporting the development of our communities in many areas: economy, health, education, social welfare, culture. The decade since the release of the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples has seen an explosion in the number of small businesses started by Aboriginal peoples. The organizations we created are starting to effect change within our communities: employment rates are up slightly in some areas, household incomes are slowly moving away from being primarily government transfer payments; high school retention and graduation rates have improved. Progress is slow and many still live in poverty and on the margins of society. Many live in substandard houses; Many don't have good access to clean drinking water or reliable sources of energy to heat and light their homes. The relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples is still problematic on many fronts. There is still much work to be done to improve the material quality of life in this country for many of us.

It is easy to focus on the problems. They are real. They affect the lives of many every day. They can be overwhelming. It is the work of each and every one of us to work to solve them; to create the partnerships that are necessary and to effect social change that allow for greater life choices. The recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal people form a solid basis for moving forward. In moving forward, we must not ignore some of the very real changes that have occurred over the last three decade, some stimulated by the work of the Royal Commission.

We, in conjunction with the courts, have shifted the self government debate from being about the right to govern to being about how to govern. The philosophical debate about the right to self government was over with the adoption of the Penner Report in 1985. After its adoption, it was not a question of whether or not we as Aboriginal people had a right to govern themselves but in what form and with what powers. We are now debating details, a debate that will last forever if Canadian experience is any indication. We have been engaged in a debate about powers and jurisdictions, lands and resources over the last 25 years,

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David Newhouse, Associate Professor, Chair, Department of Native Studies *and* Principal, Gzowski College, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario

a debate that is about regaining control over our lives and lands. And for the most part, we are winning the debate for greater control.

The legacy of the last 25 years is this: We have regained confidence in ourselves. We again believe that we can do things for ourselves and that we can affect our future. In the economic development arena, we argued for a comprehensive approach to development, we argued for self-determination, we argued for Aboriginal capital corporations, increased loan funds, equity contributions and loan funds, among other things. And in part the government listened and started to respond. Our voices were heard and listened to. We have effected change of a fundamental kind. We are creating the foundation for a modern aboriginal society. One that is confident, aggressive, assertive, insistent, and desirous of creating a new society out of Aboriginal and western ideas.

The next twenty years is a critical time for Aboriginal individuals and communities. During this period, much of basic structures and processes of Aboriginal life will be modified and placed under aboriginal influence: Aboriginal governance will become a social and political reality. A confident, aggressive, savvy, educated experienced leadership has emerged over the past two decades who know how to push hard and get what they want. Behind them are thousands of young students who are in post-secondary education institutions across the country and who over the next decade will move into positions of leadership in many communities. These people are determined, well-educated, courageous and want the world to different for them and their children.

These youth see increased Aboriginal self-government as within their grasp: they will have experienced aspects of it: in education, in health care, in economic development, in social work, in housing, in cultural programs, in language training and education. It is this desire to experience more that is the fundamental change. It leads to a new aboriginality.

This aboriginality is defined by what I call: post-colonial Indian consciousness. Post-colonial Indian consciousness is a fundamental condition of modern aboriginal society. It is a society that is aware that it has been colonized in many ways; a society that is aware of the implications of its colonization and which is choosing deliberately, consciously and systematically to deal with that colonization. It is a society that is coming to terms with what has happened to it. Post colonial Indian consciousness will the defining force within aboriginal society over the next generation. No where is this more evident than in the economic sphere.

One of the most difficult challenges we face will be fostering the development of positive public attitudes towards us, our institutions and our governments. RCAP recommended that there be major public education effort aimed at helping Canadian citizens to understand aboriginal aspirations, cultures, communities and ways of living. This is an area that is still sadly neglected.

Now that we have land, labour and capital, perhaps some will listen more closely. I hope that the next issue devoted to the state of the aboriginal economy will have a very different set of results of report.

# Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development

# Submission Guidelines

*The Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development* is a peer-reviewed journal for practitioners and scholars working and researching in areas relevant to Aboriginal economic development. Its intent is to explore ideas and build knowledge in the field of Aboriginal economic development theory and practice. The journal prefers a broad interpretation of research and knowledge and encourages a wide variety of forms of contributions in this area.

**JAED** features four sections: **Learning from Experience**, **Lessons from Research**, **Reviews of Current Books and Literature**, and **Toolkits** — each with its own editor(s). Please send five copies of your manuscript. Contributions may vary in length, depending upon the section they are written for. We are looking for submissions in the range of 20–25 pages, or about 5,000 words for research papers, book reviews of about 1,000 words, and experience sections of about 2,000–3,000 words. Manuscripts submitted should be single spaced with 1.5 inch margins all around and page numbers at the bottom middle. The title page should indicate the section for which you are submitting. All identifying information should be restricted to this one page. Review for publication will take approximately 6–8 weeks from time of receipt.

*Manuscripts should be sent to:* JAED (CANDO@edo.ca), CANDO, 9635 — 45 Ave., Edmonton, Alberta, T6E 5Z8. A copy of the final revised manuscript, in Microsoft Word® format, saved on an IBM-compatible disk should be included with the final revised paper copy. Research submissions should conform, where practical, to the *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association* (4th edition), however the journal is flexible in its format and encourages creativity and innovation.

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**Reviews of Current Books and Literature** features recent literature exploring aspects of economic development relevant to Aboriginal peoples.

**Toolkits** showcases practical articles that contain information and tools useful to practitioners in their day-to-day activities.

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