FROM THE "ORIGINAL AFFLUENT SOCIETY" TO THE "UNJUST SOCIETY" A Review Essay on Native Economic History in Canada

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> On the face of it, the vicious poverty that grips our people presents one of the most complex human problems that any society might face. But the very fact that the problem was man made argues that the solution does not lie beyond man.[1]
>
> Harold Cardinal, 1969

Introduction: Defining the Problem

Sometime between the period in which Marshall Sahlins' hunters and gathers subsisted in an "original affluent society," and Harold Cardinal's account of the Indian struggles in an "Unjust Society" the economic security of Indian societies had deteriorated. Despite the potential for greater material production made available by European markets and technology, Indian economies became impoverished. What actually happened during those years has not been looked at too closely. Native American economist Ronald L. Trosper concluded that "The economic history of American Indian communities remains largely untouched by scholars, in spite of the fact that so much of the motivation behind European expansion was economic."[2] Moreover, mainstream economic history pays scant attention to the roles that Native people played in the economic history of Canada.[3] Consequently, the field of Native Studies has had little to draw upon.

Sahlins' *Stone Age Economics*, a seminal piece in economic anthropology, has strongly influenced ethnohistory.[4] He made the case for a substantivitist analysis of hunters and gathers, arguing that the ready made models of orthodox business economics (formalism) were inappropriate. His construction of a model of the domestic mode of production, in which labour power was under used, technology was not fully engaged, natural resources remained untapped, and pro-

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This writing project began as a contribution to a multi-authored book project on Writing Native History that was never realized, but in many respects it ensued from a dialogue during graduate-level Native Studies courses on economic history at the University of Saskatchewan. In particular, I would like to thank Rodolfo Pino and John Thornton for their views during those seminars, and I also would like to thank John Thornton for his commentary on an initial draft of this article. Assistance from Nancy Morin and Katherin McArdle, along with scanning tasks completed by Raylene Whitford and Rhys Lillo, also helped move this project along. Skip Ray's comments on an earlier draft also contributed to refining the analysis. The faults of this article are entirely my own, as are the interpretations. And finally, I would like to sincerely thank David Newhouse for encouraging the completion of this analysis.

duction was for use, not profit, became the basic substantivist approach to "hunters and gathers." He also showed that these societies were affluent, a material plenty existed, and that mobility was required to maintain production. Affluence existed because the amount of labour required to secure a livelihood was minimal. Further to his analysis, exchange (reciprocity) was a component of culture and not behaviour. If we take as a given that Indian economies at the time of contact were affluent, in which material needs were readily available and that the domestic mode of production was based on egalitarian relations, then we really must wonder what processes occurred to modify these economies.[5] However, these are not issues that typically interest ethnologists and ethnohistorians, and in fact, often amount to a not uncommon denial of economic problems.

Sahlins' economic anthropology has helped us appreciate the economy of hunters/gathers, but he did not provide a means to use a substantivist perspective to fully comprehend the integration of the labour and land of hunters with the expanding European economy. Where did this vicious poverty come from? Or were Indians merely left behind? Or is contemporary poverty culturally relative, as one anthropologist suggested to me? (In part due to different, culturally-determined consumptions priorities.) To date, there is no clear and comprehensive explanation of the economic foundations of the Unjust Society. In many respects, the more recent historical writing has tended to eschew economic concepts. This new history has focused on misguided government policies, usually in cultural or political/legal terms, to provide a description of Indian/White relations. Most sit comfortably with the cliché, that Indians were not passive victims of exploitation during the fur trade. Once the conclusion has been reached that exploitation did not exist, a leap in faith is not required to postulate that the fur trade was a mutually beneficial arrangement. (After all, neither side sought to destroy the other; presumably this is why the trade endured.) Similarly, the necessary corrective emphasis on "human agency" by many historians, can easily over compensate, such that, a kind of exculpating of colonialism results. This is particularly problematic and noticeable when economic concepts are dismissed.[6]

In "That Other Discipline: Economics and American Indian History" Trosper offered a cautious defence of the use of economics in Indian history, suggesting that objections to formalist economics have misled historians. Trosper argued that a number of problems should be considered which would help to explain why Europeans came to dominate the continent.[7] His suggestion to use the concept of price ratios to look at the changing balance of power would seem to make good sense.[8] He also stated that the situation of open access resources, an economic problem, should be examined with respect to Indian history. He pondered: "Quite possibly the vulnerability of the hunt to open-access destruction was much more important than the nature of Indian culture."[9] Trosper suggested that efforts should be directed towards answering "a major question of Indian economic history: the causes of dependence."[10] Yet he was critical of some of the proponents of dependency arguing for distinctions between "the market" and commercial capitalism, colonial commodity markets or mercantilism. Regarding the fur trade, he asked "Why did the trade between Indians and Europeans lead to economic growth for Europeans and dependency for Indians?"[11] (The expedient way to answer this question is to plead that dependency did not ensue from the fur trade.) Thus, Trosper identified a number of problems in Indian economic history that have a broad relevance to the desire to create historical understandings of contemporary situations. The other problem that is evident in the Canadian literature is a general unwillingness to employ a social science mode of thought.

For most of the span of Indian/White relations, the commercial capitalist market has been the most enduring institution. The market was ahead of any legal/administrative "frontier" which came with agricultural settlement. In fact, market impulses, like infectious diseases, visited Indian bands in advance of the traders, missionaries or treaty commissioners; and long before the police, Indian agents, teachers, farm instructors, or social workers appeared. The extent to which economic forces facilitated these agents of European expansion has not been a focus of the revisions to the old Indian history. Instead, the economic history of Native people has been a piecemeal enterprise. Apparently, we are supposed to believe that adverse changes to Indian society came as a result of the spread of White agents of assimilation, not economic havoc of a long-standing unequal integration with mercantil-

ism. This review will employ the problem of "commercialization" as a unified approach to the literature related to Native economic history. Commercialization refers to the process in which aspects of daily life increasingly fall under the influence of exchange value. More and more, needs or wants become satisfied by market-related activities. Increasingly, with the production of goods for the market, life is subjected to "commodification." In a rather provocative manner, David Newhouse has confronted directly more contemporary aspects and consequences of commercialization in "Resistance is Futile, Aboriginal Peoples Meet The Borg of Capitalism."[12] He asserted that "the idea that we can somehow participate in capitalism without being changed by it is in my own view wrongheaded" and this review will provide some of the historical contours of the relationship between capitalism and Native people.[13] (After all, historians and anthropologists continue to insinuate that historical participation in the mercantile fur trade was without significant consequence for Aboriginal peoples.) By conceptualizing the changing relationships between Aboriginal peoples and Europeans in terms of four stages (separate worlds, contact and cooperation, displacement and assimilation, and negotiation and renewal) Kelly Lendsay and Wanda Wuttunee have also indicated the relevance of economic history to development.[14]

The relevance of economic history is not so obvious to those focussed on the immediacy of community economic development. While the writing of academic economic history may not serve the short-term needs of Aboriginal communities, some of the results are relevant to today's Aboriginal and treaty rights litigation. With respect to recognition of economic rights, courts require historical evidence of subsistence and commercial practices in Aboriginal times or at the time of treaty negotiations. Beyond the interesting legal questions concerning 18th century treaties, the dispute with the *Marshall* decision concerns Indian commercial imperatives.[15] It is not always possible to predict when academic research will in fact have applied outcomes. For example, Arthur Ray's pioneering work on HBC accounting books was not initiated by some need to find evidence for a treaty rights argument, but in fact, these historical records and his analysis are valuable evidence for understanding Aboriginal and Treaty rights.[16] Both empirical and conceptual work in the area of economic history can have a relevance to contemporary concerns. This review provides a basic introduction to Canadian Native economic history.

This essay will initiate an assessment of the literature that actually seeks to explain the economic relationships between Natives and Whites. This review is not a detailed empirical study of a particular aspect of Native economic history or a demonstration of the immediate relevance of economic history. Instead, the present-day need for an accessible account, summary and analysis of the existing economic history literature and a critical evaluation of this disparate body of work will be addressed by this essay. By summarizing and reviewing this disparate literature, a rough chronology of Native economic history can trace major changes. Innovative studies using interesting data sources and methods will be highlighted. The examination of economic history before 1870 will focus on the fur trade to consider exchange relations, racial stratification, credit, and resource management problems. The period following 1870 will consider how the social overhead of the fur trade became a government responsibility. A number of empirical studies of Native participation in frontier labour markets and reserve agriculture will be summarized.[17] Out of necessity it will not be possible to review all studies that might touch on considerations of economic life.[18] Similarly, the state sponsored socio-economic studies of Aboriginal communities of the 1950s and 1960s, followed by the studies of the mixed economy in the 1970s, which have now become historical in nature, cannot be considered here.[19] Land is seen as a factor of production by economists, however, the economic dimensions of claims or use and occupancy studies are well beyond the scope of this essay.[20] This review also reflects the current literature's geographical emphasis on the fur country of Rupertsland.[21] The focus will be on studies that consider economic life as a subject of history. Finally, the aversion to using numerical data will be examined, in light of some potentially underutilized primary data and methodological confusion.

The Fur Trade — A Racial Partnership?

In Canada, trade was the rationale for much of the Indian/White contact over several centuries. The nature and consequence of exchange

Haida women at crab canning factory at Masset, Queen Charlotte Islands LAC, PA-123909

relationships are a matter of some disagreement. For some, the fur trade merely sustained a slightly altered Aboriginal economy; those holding this viewpoint contend that until 1945 Natives remained in a contact phase.[22] A few others recognize that the early passive trade which began as a trade of European manufactures for old clothes (*castro gras*) led to a steady commodification and commercialization of Native life. In 1974, Ray's *Indians In The Fur Trade* and Bishop's *The Northern Ojibwa And The Fur Trade* encouraged a new look at the fur trade — in particular a consideration of the Indian involvement in the fur trade.[23] Ray's study reconstructed exchange relations, patterns of consumption, ecological adaptations and resource problems. Most significantly, he connected the reserve adjustments of the treaty era to the preceding two centuries of trade: "the resource bases upon which these specialized economies developed were destroyed due to over-exploitation" and thus "out of economic necessity, rather than intensive political and military pressure, the Indians agreed to settle on reserves ..."[24] Ray's early work demonstrated the shrewdness of Indian trade captains, explained the trade ceremony as a mixture of Indian reciprocity and European commercial exchange, substantiated sensible and rational Indian consumer behaviour, and documented European modifications to their manufactures in order to suit Indian needs in a northern environment.[25]

Debate on the nature of the exchange relations between traders and Indians is one of the more "hotly" contested issues in the early academic literature on the trade. E.E. Rich, who wrote the classic history of the Hudson's Bay Company, in his major statement on Indians, focused on differences between Indian and European economic behaviour. He stated that "there was no escaping the conclusion that in trade with Indians the price mechanism did not work."[26] Indians would not respond to an increase in prices by supplying more furs, rather, they would only bring down to the Hudson Bay coastal posts what they needed in order to purchase a year's supply of necessary goods along with tobacco and spirits. He noted some price variation, but argued that neither side adjusted prices "in accordance with the laws of supply and demand."[27] Rich employed market-oriented, neo-classical terminology, such as the equation of profit pursuit with economic motivation, and thus, found that there was "a persistent reluctance to accept European notions or the basic values of the European approach."[28] For Rich, a distinction needed to be a made between the European and the Indian; he judged Indian behaviour as improvident because "it meant that the Indian did not react to the ordinary European notions of property nor to the normal European economic motives."[29] Basically, the Indian did not operate as a rational economic (i.e., profit maximizing) man; simply put, Indians did not make the appropriate responses to the forces of supply and demand in what should have been a market economy. It is fashionable to dismiss the wording of Rich's argument as Eurocenteric, but in fact, his use of economics greatly oversimplified what was going on in the trade.[30]

The view that Indian integration with the fur trade cannot be explained by mainstream economics suggests that other motivations had to be found to account for the nature of Indian participation. Rotstein used an institutional analysis of trade and politics based on selected published primary sources to argue a rather peculiar theory of Indian involvement in the industry. His argument presupposed a severe pre-contact hostility between tribes, the notion that Indians were extremely territorial and that tribal alliances constituted political institutions; all of which recast European market trade into a non-market trade. To show the dominance of politics over trade, that is gift exchange over market

exchange, Rotstein provided assorted descriptions of the calumet (pipe ceremony), gift giving and trade ceremonies extracted from published primary sources which were then taken quite literally. Rotstein agreed with Rich, Europeans and Indians were very different when it came to trade; Europeans were concerned about profits, fluctuating prices, markets, and had the tendency to carry out economic transactions impersonally. As far as Indian-European relations were concerned, Rotstein claimed that the market system, lacking the political framework and stability associated with the markets in Europe, did not arrive in the Indian New World with European contact.[31] Taken together, Rich and Rotstein asserted that trade relations could be understood largely in political and cultural terms. However, given that mercantile companies thrived when they monopolized long distance trade, Indians were not really participating in idealized markets in which supply and demand provide guidance.

The notion that Indian involvement in the fur trade was essentially non-economic fits very well with the argument that very little change occurred to Indian society as a result of several hundred years of the fur trade. On the empirical level, the Rich/Rotstein thesis simply lacks support. The Hudson's Bay Company account books, along with standard historical sources combined to form evidence for Ray and Freeman's argument which refuted some of the well established academic views about the trade. Their study considered the Official Standard, Factor's Standard, Comparative Standard and Overplus (a form of profit) and uncovered the essential features of this mercantile barter form of exchange.[32] Rich had argued that the inflexible English traders used fixed standards. He had also believed that Overplus was simply derived by short measuring certain trade goods when trading with Indians.[33] *Give Us Good Measure* demonstrated convincingly that this simply was not the case. Indian economic strategies made use of competition between trading concerns. Ray and Freeman reconstructed the long-term profitability of the HBC. Accounting and trade data were presented as simple line graphs — trends over time were displayed clearly. Competition clearly reduced Company profit margins. The spatial features of the fur trader's exchange network were critical; price variability was linked to the spread of competition. Ray and Freeman were able to present a comprehensive interpretation of the fur trade by using both numerical and narrative sources and by organizing the relevant historical data in a precise spatial and temporal matrix. This study encouraged the use of HBC accounting records by a few other scholars.[34] Their interpretation demonstrated how a European mercantile company adapted to a barter situation, how Indians adjusted to a market system and how an Indian middleman system spatially extended mercantile spheres of influence.

Indian placer miners on their way to the mines near Gladwin, British Columbia, ca 1899, LAC C-066761

Although this study by Ray and Freeman is cited, it is Ray's least appreciated argument about the fur trade.[35] The inductive quality of *Give Us Good Measure* created a detailed and accurate reconstruction of exchange procedures as developed up to 1763. Clearly, the terms of reference employed by Rich do not provide adequate theoretical concepts to explore the shifting power relations in the industry, nor was Rich concerned about such matters.[36] Ray and Freeman's recognition that Indian participation in the mercantile fur trade was mediated by behaviour has important implications. Ray and Freeman's empirical results reveal the limitation of using the substantivist approach when trying to understand the interdependence of hunters and merchants. The incremental evolution of the market in the subarctic, the significance of Indian commodity production to Canadian economic history and Indian participation in the emerging world economy can only be pursued once it has been made clear that trade relations were essentially economic, or at the very least politics and culture did not consistently override economic trajectories. However, evidence of the economizing behaviour of shrewd Indians can be misleading, or can limit an economic analysis. Mainstream economics (formalism) does not capture the deeper effects of an

Blackfoot Indian coal miners report for duty after their midday meal. Gleichen, Alberta, (Detail) LAC PA-017335

unfolding commercialization. An understanding of Indian economic behaviour in terms of responses to competitive prices does not require the total acceptance of mainstream economic thinking that focuses solely on the actions of individuals attempting to maximize gain in an idealized, anonymous market.

Native economic history could gain a fuller understanding of the production of fur as a monocrop export commodity from Polanyi's insights about the general development of the market system. Polanyi made a distinction between a market economy and a market pattern. "Market economy implies a self regulating system of markets; ... it is an economy directed by market prices and nothing but market prices" and can be contrasted to "the market pattern" which "being related to a peculiar motive of its own, the motive of truck or barter, is capable of creating a specific institution, namely, the market."[37] The motive to truck or barter is indicated by the extension of the middleman trade system in the fur trade. The same Indian participation in competitive markets, in which reciprocity, political alliances, or the Company's tradition of paternalism, failed to act as a barrier to the development of market, can best be explained as a market pattern, but not as a full-fledged market economy. Markets for labour, land and money needed to exist to create the self-regulating, full-fledged market economy. In the fur trade, a pure capitalist labour market did not exist; the direct buying and selling of wage labour was muted by paternalism (in which an interdependence develops because a shortage of labour along with a monopoly of employers necessitates a more personal relationship and the employer bears the direct costs of maintaining labour.) A market for land did not exist before Indian treaties.[38] During the fur trade, both monopolistic and competitive exchange practices fit the concept of a market pattern. The mercantile fur trade should not be conceived exclusively, in either substantivist or formalist terms, but instead as a "mercantile market pattern." The political and cultural aspects of the trade, along with the incomplete nature of the price system, can be accommodated by Polanyi's concept of a market pattern.[39]

When market relations dominated Indian/White relations, commercialization fostered economic specialization. A division of labour — suited to the needs of the fur companies — was one result. The concept of class has been readily used in social history, but in Native history, even the mere existence of classes is scarcely acknowledged. In order to export fur, the transport and post system created a rather complicated economy with specialized roles, in contrast to Watkins' pronouncements. Wage employment was an important aspect of this economy, and over time, an increasing proportion of the workers were Native. Carol Judd's research, too often overlooked, gave original consideration of ethnic, racial and class dynamics of the economic history of Rupertsland. She demonstrated that the HBC used ethnic competition to control the labour force and explained how economic circumstances affected the recruitment of labour for the fur trade.[40] In "Native labor and social stratification in the Hudson's Bay Company's Northern Department 1770–1870," Judd related the conditions of Native labour to the structure of the industry. With the restructuring that took place after the monopoly in 1821, Natives, "Halfbreeds" in particular, were trapped in the lower ranks of the Company's hierarchy. Judd concluded: "For the first time in the history of the fur trade ethnic derivations, 'class,' and status were intertwined."[41] Her archival research generated a number of interesting observations; for example, Natives tended to settle near larger posts to work at seasonal wage labour, especially boat work, rather than trap. Judd also demonstrated that "Racial stereotyping that eventually doomed most natives to the lowest rungs of fur-trade society became fully developed only after 1821."[42] The Native sons of HBC officers were blocked by rigid racial stratification. The peculiarities of the fur trade labour meant that Judd found it difficult to apply the usual socio-economic definitions; the dominant character of the HBC hierarchy meant that class "would con-

form more closely to social stratification by employment."[43] We should know that economic roles corresponded to race: generally Indians produced fur in the bush and did some seasonal wage labour; the Metis were commercial hunters, petty traders and wage labourers; and Whites held contracts for general and skilled labour, were managers, and of course, stockholders.[44] Judd's research concerning racial stratification identified the HBC as an institution that initiated racism across vast areas of the country. From the beginning until the mid-20th century, the Company's policy tried to keep a cheap labour force largely confined to the bush. The existence of racial stratification is counterfactual evidence for the theory that the fur trade was a mutually beneficial partnership between merchants and Natives. Ron Bougeault used a deterministic structuralist argument to state that: "Native peoples' modern history has as its basis class exploitation and oppression."[45] And not unexpectedly, labour struggles occurred in the fur trade. Glen Makahonuk discussed forms of labour protest in the fur trade, however, he did not specify the role of Native labour in this resistance.[46] Given the level of detail in the archival records, good prospects exist for developing Native economic history by considering a Native labour history.[47]

In terms of understanding economic history, the system of credit used by fur companies has to be seen as a key feature of the commercial interface between hunting and exchange. Very few studies have specifically examined this topic, yet it was a common practice in the trade. Morantz looked at credit in the James Bay region and found that the Cree were not "a coerced or controlled labour force, with debt being the agent of this control."[48] Indeed, the Company often wished that it could do away with the credit system; Morantz thus assumed that Indian trappers exerted enough muscle to maintain the credit system, and therefore it must have been to their real advantage. The problem with this conclusion is evident when the entire system of exchange relations is examined. Ray found that "The standards [prices] of trade that it [HBC] used to value goods and furs allowed for a very considerable gross profit margin. Indeed, it could be argued that the standards not only served to underwrite the credit/gratuity system, but that they increasingly made it necessary."[49] Significantly, Morantz indicated a similarity between European ideas of debt and

Interior of a salmon cannery, Skeena River, British Columbia, ca. 1890, LAC PA-118162.

Indian customs of reciprocity: "As a system of obligation it also conformed perfectly with the Cree expectations of sharing and looking out for one another."[50] Morantz concluded: "On the whole, the company was never able to establish a true relationship of indebtedness: the Cree could and did take their furs to other posts."[51] Be that as it may, Ray showed that: "Under normal conditions there were several advantages that native peoples and the Hudson's Bay Company derived from this arrangement. Indians counted on receiving the equipment and tools that they needed to hunt and trap regardless of their current economic or health circumstances. In this sense credit provided an economic safety net for native and trader alike since both of them depended on regular returns. In addition, company traders used the debt to establish a claim on some or all of an Indian's future returns."[52] As with other primary industries based on small producers, credit served to maintain production. The use of credit in the fur trade, is not unlike the means by which pre-capitalist, paternalistic economies extracted, on a sustained basis, a surplus. In fact, when the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation government attempted to establish a fur marketing board in northern Saskatchewan, its plans failed to provide credit to trappers, thereby generating opposition from Native producers.[53]

A more sophisticated approach to the fur trade developed when Ray made use of Pentland's concept of "personal labour relations" (a

scarcity of both labourers and employers) or paternalism as a means for understanding economic changes in the subarctic. The incomplete nature of the price system, the seasonal nature of work and the personalized relations are elements of a paternalistic economy. The debt system was part of the social overhead of the fur trade, and with the emergence of competitive fur prices and treaty money, the personal labour relations began to break down. Thus Ray's examination of the economics of the credit/debt system identified the situation that created the seemingly drastic upheavals of the early 20th century. He concluded: "As Pentland had noted in his analyses of other areas of Canada, the personal labour relations system born of the pre-industrial age did not work once competitive labour markets developed. In the north, however, the situation was very complex. Until the government provided the economic aid that native people sorely needed, the Hudson's Bay Company had to continue to carry some of the social costs of the trade."[54] Nonetheless, a general reluctance to consider Native integration with commercial markets means that economic concepts required to re-interpret Native history are very undeveloped. The need for seasonal credit in order to produce did not cease with the end of the HBC monopoly. In *The Unjust Society*, Harold Cardinal recounted a typical story of an Indian trapper waiting all day to meet with the Indian Agent because "Now the time for trapping has come again, and he would be working and off relief for a few months if his traps were favoured and the fur prices were good. But he needs a loan, some money for traps. All the Indians know that the agent is empowered to disburse funds for traps, but all the Indians also know that this is a discretionary power."[55] Finally, the trapper was told he will get a voucher: "He knows that the agent kept him waiting just to show him who was boss, but he knows there was no other way he could get the traps he needed to go to work again."[56] The assumption of the social overhead of the fur industry (i.e., outfitting producers) by the state was not without political consequences for Native producers. Clearly Morantz and Cardinal are interpreting the consequences of credit relationships very differently.

Many of the particular problems of fur trade economics have been worked out conceptually in Ray's "Periodic Shortages, Native Welfare and the Hudson's Bay Company 1670–1930."[57] He argued that the flexibility, mobility and reciprocity of pre-fur trade aboriginal economies that allowed Indians to deal with periodic shortages, were undermined. Moreover, the trade increased the risk of food shortages and resource problems which European traders responded to by storing food surpluses at posts. The spatial mobility of Native people was reduced as trade was fixed at a post; credit also necessitated reduced mobility. Trapping favoured specialization, and the flexibility of the Aboriginal economy was eroded. Credit and commercialization affected reciprocity. Resource management problems were created by commercialization associated with the market. When scarcity directed more effort towards hunting and fishing and away from trapping, the HBC provided flour to producers at well below cost.[58] Ray noted that the Company's conservation schemes after 1821 emphasized a more individual approach to land tenure.[59] The appeal of this argument is not simply because attention was drawn to some of the economic problems that Native people faced in the fur trade, but because Ray outlined a historical process — the modern welfare society of the north is not entirely a recent development — paternalism was rooted in the fur trade. Paternalism was required because "one of the most far-reaching aspects of European expansion into the north involved overturning basic aboriginal ecological strategies."[60] The conditions that were required for sustaining fur production necessitated the creation of a paternalistic economy — cancelling bad debts, gratuities, food assistance, aid to the sick and destitute were a means to deal with scarcity. Ray concluded that paternalism or the

Frontier Resource capitalism at Black River, Lake Winnipeg, Manitoba. Note ice houses for fish, wooden fish boxes, and gill net racks, sailboats and cord wood for steamboats, ca. 1929, Archives of Manitoba

Company's welfare system "was a necessary by-product of several processes: economic specialization by native peoples, a concomitant decreasing spatial mobility, European control of food surpluses and the depletion of resources. Reinforcing these were the labour policies, wage schedules, and standards of trade that assured the Hudson's Bay Company large gross profit margins in good years under near monopoly conditions."[61] Consequently, the use of the term "independent production" to describe Indian involvement in fur trade confuses the nature of the relationship between Native trappers and merchant traders.[62] These producers were not, even at the local level, independent of mercantile credit arrangements and their production was one contribution to numerous commodity flows that made up a world system which was dominated by European interests. Similarly, the pronouncement that the fur trade was simply a weak capitalist penetration obscures or denies the manifestation of the resource and income problems identified by Ray. The use of Pentland's concept of paternalism demonstrates that historical studies of the fur trade can insightfully employ theory.[63] Future research should consider the concept of a paternalistic economy as a means to examine the empirical data in the archives.

With respect to the importance of the fur trade, Patricia McCormack posited a conceptual approach that considered the fundamental issues related to commercialization (the articulation of use-oriented and exchange-oriented economies) in a study of the fur trade at Fort Chipewyan.[64] McCormack employed the concept of domestic mode of production (DMP) to show that changes in lifestyles transformed the mode of production. The Cree and Chipewyan "abandoned their aboriginal total economies and became parts of the new, complex, social configuration that was the fur trade society of the Fort Chipewyan region."[65] She sensed a central problem which has alluded other social scientists: the original domestic mode of production was structurally opposite to the fur trade, but merchant capitalism did not require direct control over the labour process in order to appropriate the surplus.[66] Serious investigation into changes of productive relations is not possible with an adherence to the Rich/Rotstein/Watkins perspective that simply defines the fur industry as a politically motivated trade. The concept of articulation was used to explain the intermeshing of these two systems: "The points of articulation between DMP and merchant capitalism in the boreal forest at contact were the willingness of Indians to produce furs and provisions for their exchange value as well as to work for the traders more directly on an occasional basis, and the willingness of Europeans to enter into a range of social relations or transactions with the Indians including marital alliances, which transcended the purely economic aspect of exchange."[67] McCormack pointed to the passing of the control of production from traditional leaders to traders, the need for Indians to reorganize material reproduction in order to supply furs and provisions, and the tendency of wage labour and credit to individualize production, especially when production was for exchange purposes rather than communal needs. Individualized relations were part of the fur trade mode of production and this was reflected in resource exploitation patterns and juridical changes in access and control over certain resources. McCormack successfully conceptualized changes in the fur trade by employing a domestic mode of production perspective and by considering the articulation, through exchange, with mercantilism. In many respects, Ray and McCormack reached similar conclusions about the historical processes, although the conceptual terminology and data differ. This is considerably more sophisticated than simply postulating that commercial credit can be classified as reciprocity or that mercantile capital was essentially benign.

While considerable primary research on Indians and the fur trade has occurred in the last thirty years, very little re-thinking of specific research problems in Native economic history has resulted. Empirical reconstructions of post economies, transport systems, and inter-regional resources flows reveal that the fur trade was a rather complicated economy and not "primitive." Certainly by 1821, the fur trade was an industry, and the narrow use of the term "trade" is misleading.[68] Patterns existed just the same: exchange relations fostered a commercialization of resources and resource management problems necessitated closer integration. A paternalistic economy evolved — the domestic mode of production articulated with European markets, subsistence activities and commercial pursuits combined to create what is now referred to as a traditional livelihood. Clearly, identifying the commercial impulses in the fur trade is not a matter of esoteric, academic debate. The inter-

connections and concomitant changes to other social, political and economic spheres of Native life that came with progressively greater commitments to commodity production cannot be understood unless this relationship is recognized. If the effects of producing and trading commodities are ignored, then it will be difficult to discern Indian perceptions of their economic circumstances with the onset of treaties. Claims about the perseverance of culture deflect from vital issues of income distribution, racial stratification and exploitation. Because of racial identity and legal status, there is a marked tendency by academic historians to see all aspects of Native life as unique. However, many of the basic economic problems that Native people had to contend with are similar to the situations of other primary producers in Canada's staple industries (e.g., restructuring, substituting labour with capital). It may be readily apparent that the intrusive assimilationist policies of the state and mission dramatically affected Aboriginal communities, but it does not follow that the preceding fur trade was unobtrusive.

Economic Change Following Confederation: An Era of Irrelevance?

In general, the post-1870 era marks a shift in Indian/White relations, from economic (trade) relations, to a more political relationship that was inherent in the treaties and the *Indian Act*. In this sense, the external interest shifted from labour derived through exchange, to the future value of the land and resources. Nonetheless, not all Native people became economically irrelevant following the era of fur trade dominance, and many participated in markets created by frontier resource capitalism. In 1870, the surrender of the Hudson's Bay Company's Royal Charter of 1670 paved the way for major political and economic changes throughout the west and north.[69] With the surrender of its Charter and the Transfer of Rupertsland, the Company argued that it was no longer responsible for the Native population. The economic problem of the social overhead of the fur trade, which existed because of the commercialization of the domestic mode of production, became a political concern following the transfer of Rupertsland. More recent research on the post-1870 economy concerns the transfer of the social overhead of the fur trade from the HBC to the Dominion government. I have argued that: "Land surrender treaties were the main mechanism for shifting the social costs of the fur trade from the HBC to the Canadian government."[70] In fact, the value of annuities was equivalent to the cost of outfitting an Indian trapper for the winter. According to Ray, the HBC wanted to get "the state to underwrite the social costs of the trade without losing any of its influence over the native peoples."[71] One of the most important economic histories of the post-1870 era is Arthur Ray's *The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age*. He provided: an analysis of the changing structure of the industry, argued for an economic context for treaties, outlined the problem that the state faced with spiralling relief costs, and noted the hardship that came with the imposition of game laws. For the period after 1920, Ray documented that Native incomes declined, purchasing power of annuities decreased and the cost of trapping increased. Moreover, the expenses associated with the social overhead of trapping were exacerbated by reckless over-exploitation carried on by White trappers. In the non-treaty areas, Ray documented an unemployed "surplus" population at Moose Factory in the 1890s.[72] This need for economic assistance aggravated tension between government and the HBC. In this study, Ray reconstructed the negotiations between the HBC and the Canadian government over the manner of paying the social overhead and the proportions shared between the state and trading interests. Ray concluded "... the older paternalistic fur trade, a hybrid of European mercantilism and native reciprocal exchange traditions, was crumbling by 1945, and the groundwork for the modern welfare system so prevalent in the north today was laid."[73] Clearly a political economy approach is called for if we are to understand more fully government policies towards Indians, which is in my view preferable to efforts to explain Indian policy simply from biographic data and an analysis of the individual shortcomings of key civil servants.[74]

The focus on the "Spirit and Intent" of the treaties has meant that the compensation Indians received for their title has not been considered in economic terms. Research has more recently recognized that Chiefs approached treaty talks with an economic agenda.[75] Despite Indian desires for a new economy, treaty rights were also a means for sustaining a population in the bush which was producing fur for the Hudson's Bay Company. Evidently, the compensation

was not based on any sort of market valuation of Indian lands or ongoing compensation for displacement of their mode of life (livelihood). This is in sharp contrast to the arrangement made with the HBC for its claim to Rupertsland; the Company received very significant financial benefits. With fur prices remaining low until 1900, the social overhead of the fur trade was a problem, for the Company and treaty supplies, annuities and relief acted as a subsidy to the fur industry. Moreover, the HBC benefited from Indian treaties because the annuities were used to make purchases in the Company's stores. Treaty money also introduced cash into the north, which required the HBC to adjust credit/debt and barter trade practices.[76] On the prairies, the rations provided to Indians served to expand the internal markets at a time when the general lack of cash income was limited.[77] Even the nature of the treaty relationship between Indian nations and the Crown can be better appreciated by examining the relationship between the HBC and Indians in the fur trade era.[78] In this sense, an empirical and conceptual reconstruction of the nature of the economic relations between traders and Natives is a vital context for understanding the meaning of Treaty and Aboriginal rights.

Native economic history after 1870 is not confined to the problem of the social overhead of the fur industry. Throughout Indian contact history, problems of resource management occurred because of the commercialization of resources, the migration of Indians to new areas or the immigration of non-Indians to tribal lands. Trosper noted that: "The spread of Europeans across the North American continent produced a succession of open-access problems for Indians and for Europeans, for several reasons. First, the frontier was an area where no government had effective control. Management of an open-access resource is much easier when governmental authority can be used. Second, the mercantile and industrial revolution in Europe provided increasingly effective weapons for hunting. Third, international trade provided the large market needed to amplify hunting intensity to levels which threatened resources."[79] However, even with the establishment of government control, the economic circumstances of Native people in western and northern Canada was very much affected by changing property relations. Little was done to use government policies to protect the Native economy from open-access exploitation.

The problem of the transition from common property to open-access to private property was described by Irene Spry in "The Tragedy of the Loss of the Commons in Western Canada."[80] She looked at the near extinction of the buffalo and encroachment upon land, hay, fish, water and wood resources. Spry outlined the breakdown of the traditional system of resource management with the opening-up of the west: "The old balance between a limited human use of the gifts of nature held as common property by each tribe and natural the regeneration of those gifts was finally destroyed when they were thrown open to all comers, including those intent on commercial exploitation. The disappearance of the buffalo was a classic instance of the "tragedy of the commons," when a common-property resource was transferred into an open-access resource."[81] Another "cataclysmic change" occurred with "the establishment of exclusive private property instead of the traditional common property of the native peoples."[82] Private property was a means to transform the west, but also "it contributed to the economic degradation of the original peoples of the plains and to a new inequality in the economic and social system."[83] The extent to which the move to the labour market by Indians was a push, due to the problem of diminished resources and restricted access to resources, and not simply the pull of cash incomes, needs to be investigated.

The early years of the freshwater commercial fishing industry clearly illustrates many of the general problems that Spry had raised, but also an interplay between government policy, markets, capital and property relations. With the development of a foreign market for sturgeon and whitefish, an externally-orientated commercialization of lake fisheries occurred, which had a differential impact on Native communities. The early fishing industry was unregulated, and so the prospects of depletion threatened Native subsistence fisheries. Some Natives participated in the commercial industry by selling fish or as wage labourers. Tension between the Fisheries Department and the Department of Indian Affairs led to an effort to create policies which would allow the commercial and domestic fisheries to co-exist, yet with the increasing capitalization of the industry, Native near-shore fisheries and spawning grounds were encroached upon. In terms of changing property relations, the right to

fish which was understood as a treaty right by Indians was not protected; an unregulated fishery was thrown open. And the increasing use of capital and the dominance of market relations had the effect, in my view, of privatizing the fisheries. The "privatization" was not so much the result of a legal system of exclusive property rights, but the economic power that came with increasing levels of capital investment and consolidation of ownership. In other words, the capacity to appropriate resources. These changes were sanctioned by the government.[84] While Indians obtained some economic benefits, as with the fur trade, the return to labour was much smaller than the return to capital.[85] Following the treaties, the natural wealth of whitefish fisheries was converted into significant commercial gains, but Natives could not obtain a sustainable share of this wealth. Legally they could not collect a rent nor could they engage in the same level of harvesting as the American financed companies. A buoyant market and weak Native property rights created a situation in which the economic future of Native communities was undermined. With the onset of export-oriented commercial fishing, Natives were not easily displaced, in fact, their protests resulted in a licensing system that provided for Native participation in the sturgeon fishery. Significantly, the value of sturgeon was very high, and consequently, the resource was over-exploited. However, as with the demise of the beaver in the competitive fur trade, over-fishing cannot be attributed exclusively to the direct actions of outsiders.[86]

The apparent absence of Indian involvement in the grain economy that emerged following the treaties has been one of the least understood problems in Indian economic history. Sarah Carter's *Lost Harvests* addressed this problem, thereby providing one of the most important studies of Indian life in the early reserve transition period.[87] The lack of a commercialization of reserve life is an issue for economic history. She critiqued the existing historiography concerning Indian reserve agriculture, and found that: "from the beginning it was the Indians that showed the greater willingness and inclination to farm and the government that displayed little serious intent to see agriculture established on the reserves."[88] In several respects, this is a model for examining Indian policy; Carter provided an analysis of the treaty negotiations, reserve selection, Indian opposition to government policies, and shifts in government assistance for agriculture. Relevant topics such as: climate and technical problems, the general situation of prairie agriculture, relations and comparisons between reserve and homestead farmers, the role of farm instructors, the plan to subdivide reserves and land surrenders are discussed with great care. With respect to the permit and pass system, Carter concluded: "Control of Indian transactions through the permit system, as well as control of their movements, placed restraints above and beyond those they shared with other farmers in the West."[89] Such restrictions had a negative impact on commercial agriculture. Carter is particularly skilful at connecting policy and ideology — illustrated by Hayter Reed's impractical aim of creating self-sufficient peasant farmers that were forbidden to use modern farm machinery.[90] The basic process that Carter identified can be summarized: Indians acquired skills and technology, the Department of Indian Affairs provided assistance, and reserve agriculture took hold, but since reserves were competing with white farmers, the Department of Indian Affairs advanced policies to divide Indian and white farmers into non-competing groups, which meant that between 1889–1897 reserves suffered from "unprecedented administrative involvement" and officials pushed allotment and peasant farming policy "both of which set extreme limits on Indian agricultural productivity" and ultimately "as the policies functioned to curtail the expansion of Indian farming, Indians did not appear to non-natives to be "productively" using their reserve land to full capacity. This perception paved the way for the alienation of much reserve land in the years after 1896."[91] Of note was her comparison of the Canadian government's practices of favouring White farmers at the expense of Indian reserve agriculture to African agriculture under colonial administration. Thus Indian farmers were excluded from the expanding commercial agriculture of the 1890s, did not regain ground, fell further behind and became isolated. While this study indicates an important means to correct the past, more numerical data should have been used and the role of off-reserve Indian farm labour is unclear. Carter did not seem to consider the prospective that the Indian Affairs' system of reserve agriculture was not entirely irrational because it provided seasonal labour for the settler (White) system of agriculture. Nonetheless, an influential explanation has been

established for "the role of Canadian government policy in restricting and undermining reserve agriculture."[92]

In the post-1870 era, Native life continued to feel the growing influence of the market. However, with the expansion of frontier resource industries, a number of new economic roles for Native people were created. In this era, and quite contrary to the field observations of the ethnologists of the time, Native labour was integrated with wage economies.[93] In the Interlake of Manitoba, Natives found work at commercial fishing (summer and winter, as well as cutting ice for freezers and cordwood for lake steamers); at sawmills and in bush camps cutting cordwood, railway ties, lumber and pulpwood; on steamboats and docks; with surveyors, and at railway construction. They also earned money by selling senaca root, berries, potatoes and handicrafts. New commercial enterprises created new markets. Some Indians left reserves and migrated to family farms to work at harvest time. These new staple industries and markets for Native products, along with reserve gardening diversified Native economies considerably. Incomes increased relative to the stagnant fur trade. In fact, a very noticeable movement out of the traditional fur trade and into new staple industries occurred. Seasonal wage income was more secure and lured Native energy away from the fur trade. The descriptions of Native participation in new industries are often supported by numerical data collected by the Department of Indian Affairs. In this era, reserves functioned as pools of more or less settled labour and Natives were very mobile and actively sought work. Many sawmills, fish stations and steamboat landings were located on or near reserves.[94] For a number of decades gainful incomes were made in the Interlake Manitoba, in contrast to the destitution on the plains.

During this era, the Indians of British Columbia (BC) had a particularly interesting economic history. Rolf Knight's research demonstrated that Indians played vital economic roles in British Columbia.[95] His pioneering work showed that Indian history in the frontier era is not simply a matter of dispossession and marginalization, and certainly not irrelevance. Our images of a dependent and passive population were challenged; Knight found that "Indian people in some regions have been more intimately and longer involved in industrial wage work than many Euro-Canadians from rural areas."[96] Through descriptive accounts, he looked at Indian economic history by highlighting their roles as loggers, farmers and farm labourers, cowboys, teamsters, commercial fishermen, cannery workers, longshoremen, freighters, construction workers for infrastructure (railroads and telegraph lines) mine labourers and coal trimmers. Indians were involved in unions and went on strike. Knight also considers the economic activity of Indian cottage industries, reserve agriculture, mission-sponsored activities and Indian entrepreneurs. Ultimately, he contended that "But the pride of most Indian people might better be served by appreciating their real history and contributions. One might remind people that Indian workers also dug the mines, worked the canneries and mills, laid miles of railway and did a hundred other jobs. They helped lay the bases of many regional economies."[97] This study described the roles that Indians played in BC primary industries (logging, fishing, sealing, farming, mining and transport). Significantly, and in contrast to what was generally accepted, Knight challenged the accepted view that Native people were historically irrelevant after the fur trade. Knight's *Indians at Work* has often been seen as inspirational in an intellectual sense, but much is attributed to it beyond any substantive, theoretical or methodological contribution; and the second edition was disappointing.[98]

Nonetheless, Knight's work is often shunned because he challenged the all too convenient cultural myth that Indians do not make good workers, and he accomplished this by writing a labour history. Like many historical studies, Knight's evidence was descriptive and anecdotal, however, numerical data seems to support his interpretation of a Native labour history. James Burrows made use of interesting numerical data in "'A Much-Needed Class of Labour': The Economy and Income of the Southern Interior Plateau Indians, 1897–1910."[99] Burrows used band-level income data from the Department of Indian Affairs to compare the amount and sources of incomes for various bands. He found that agricultural wage levels for Indians were the same as Whites and that the sources and values of income demonstrate participation in wage labour. Burrows concluded that: "The fact that they [Indians] had nonetheless been able to function at least for a period within the framework of an economy based on wage labour suggests, however, that their capacity to adapt

to new social and economic realities was not as limited as is frequently supposed."[100] Indian involvement in fishing has been seen as a mere extension of an Aboriginal activity, but Gladstone has provided a very detailed analysis of the Indian situation in the British Columbia fishing industry. He noted: "Relationships, defined increasingly by the market rather than by custom, have become more impersonal" which suggested a key difference between the Aboriginal fishery and the complex commercial fishery.[101] Much of the current research on British Columbia concerns the Indian land struggle, but a study of the interaction between the loss of land and labour markets would also be useful.[102]

Further evidence of a dynamic Native economic history was provided by John Lutz in "After the fur trade: the aboriginal labouring class of British Columbia 1849–1890."[103] Lutz's results are similar to Rolf Knight, further indicating that "... aboriginal people were not made irrelevant by the coming of settlement. In fact, they were the main labour force of the early settlement era, essential to the capitalist development of British Columbia."[104] Well after the advent of the gold rush, Aboriginal people "remained at the centre of the transformed, capitalist, economic activity."[105] Of note is his information on large seasonal Indian migrations to Victoria and the recognition of the spatial unevenness of Native participation in wage labour. And in a manner similar to Knight, Lutz described Indian involvement in gardening, coal and gold mining, sawmilling, fishing and canneries, steamboating, hop picking, and sealing and significantly, based his narrative on a diverse set of sources. His historical evidence established that Indians did not spend their wages in the same way that Whites did. Lutz also entertained the question of why Aboriginal people participated in wage labour: "It appears that the same cultural forces that drew aboriginal people into the fur trade continued to operate and draw them into the wage and industrial labour force."[106] Wages permitted the acquisition of goods, and thus more Indians, not just the chiefs, could sponsor potlatches. (And if so, implies a type of cultural shift.) Increasing incomes permitted potlatches with more participants and an increased volume of goods distributed. The ceremonial winter season did not conflict with the demands for labour. In other words, Indians on the west coast worked largely so that they could potlatch. Nonetheless, the potlatch was a ceremony that redistributed *material* goods.

If Aboriginal employment was robust with the onset of capitalism, occurring in an era of relevance, why is it evident that Aboriginal communities subsequently became economically marginal? Knight suggested that the downturn in 1929 explained the relative decline of the economic position of Aboriginal communities.[107] And Lutz noted that: "Increasingly, however, the sawmills, the railways, the steamboats and other large employers were anxious to have a year-round and stable labour force so that seasonal labour, the choice of large numbers of aboriginal people, was becoming less compatible with the demands of capitalism"[108] which implies that other sources of labour were found. Following enforcement of restrictions, the number of blankets distributed at potlatches diminished somewhat; however, indications of a continuation of the ceremony make Lutz's conclusion that: "Ironically, the very cultural imperative that had brought aboriginal people into the workforce was outlawed because, due to changing circumstances, it was no longer sufficiently compatible with the requirements of capitalism" wanting.[109] A serious research issue for post-fur trade Native economic history is to determine why is it, if Native people actively participated in new industries in various regions, that in later years they found their communities economically isolated?

One of the few efforts to provide a comprehensive and historical analysis of contemporary economic situations of a nation is Wien's *Rebuilding the Economic Base Of Indian Communities: The Micmac In Nova Scotia*. Wien contrasted the economic security of life in the Aboriginal period with the changes brought about by the fur trade, settlement, industrialization, government welfare and centralization. He argued that "... the fur trade economy was less difficult for the Indians to cope with than the settler economy that succeeded it."[110] The Micmac (Mi'kmaq) were marginalized in the settler economy. However, Wien showed that in the industrial economy (1868 to 1940), Micmac labour was important. Reserve agricultural activity increased between 1900 and 1920, as well, Micmac laboured on non-Indian farms at harvesting time, migrated to western Canada for farm work, travelled to Maine and New England to harvest blueberries and potatoes, were employed in the new manufacturing and process-

ing industries, public construction projects (canals and railroads), travelled for factory work in New England, and were self-employed. Data showed that wage labour was the most important source of income from 1905 to 1945. Wien stated: "The general impression that emerges from accounts of the period is that the Micmac struggled to earn a foothold in the prevailing economy of the time."[111] But the Micmac seemed to participate on the margin: more as general labour than skilled labour or management; mainly at short-term work and seasonal harvesting requiring migration from place to place; and their own businesses were small, self-employed crafts. He stated that "... in comparison to the settler economy, there is considerable movement away from the conditions of absolute destitution that prevailed after the collapse of the fur trade" and "... Indian people worked very hard to maintain a fair livelihood for themselves and their families."[112] Apparently, in a pattern similar to other regions, the Micmac foothold in the economy did not endure. Relief increased with the depression of the 1930s. Wien also identified a process which probably existed throughout Canada: "Beginning in the 1940s, the hallmarks of the new period are the extensive intervention of the federal government and the unparalleled use of welfare payments as the main public policy response to the difficulty the Micmac were increasingly experiencing in the labour market."[113] The research on Indians and regional labour markets demonstrates that economic change was not a unidirectional decline. Wien suggested a broader explanation for the marginalization of Aboriginal communities and his study is also relevant for those looking to interpret present circumstances with the help of theory and economic history.

More work is needed on the extent of Native participation in wage labour after 1870. Nonetheless, as this review has summarized, in Nova Scotia, Manitoba and British Columbia, Native participation in regional economies is more extensive than had generally been recognized. Despite a body of work on the important contributions that Indians made in relation to settlement and the industrial frontiers of British Columbia, old views are resilient. Robin Fisher gruffly dismissed Knight's work stating, by way of self-defence of his second edition of *Contact and Conflict*: "In fact, Knight modifies nothing because he has proven nothing."[114] And Fisher argued that Burrows' study was too "thin a slice of time and space" to provide any real support for Knight's thesis, and he compelled that: "We need the cumulative results of more local studies such as Burrows, before we can reach broad conclusions about the importance of Native people in the labour force and the significance of wage labour to the Native economy."[115] Such a cautious inductive approach is quite appealing to conventional historians. By diminishing the work of others, Fisher holds to his original thesis that Natives were economically irrelevant after the fur trade. Apparently, the cumulative results of local studies were not required to support his original generalizations in *Contact and Conflict*. He skeptically insisted upon a standard of proof for others that his own work did not meet. Justifiably, Dianna Newell in *Tangled Webs of History* pointed out that Fisher continued "... to defend his conclusion and declares that no others have successfully challenged it are to me signs of an ungenerous scholar who is out of touch with his rapidly evolving field."[116]

The Resistance to Numeracy in Native History

Generally, Native history, and in step with its mentor, mainstream history, shuns numerical data, and many studies that concern some aspect of economics of Native life choose not to collect or examine such data. As a consequence, the ability to apply and test fundamental economic concepts are being fettered. In the absence of precise concepts, we are left with indignation about the policies of the state and claims about Native agency devoid of any recognition or criticism of structural limitations. In practice, some academics purport that the colonizer's "numbers" are inherently more ethnocentric than the colonizers "words," which turns out to be a very convenient exemption for sidestepping the tedious work required by numerical analysis. Seemingly, Sarah Carter in *Lost Harvests* casually and reluctantly appends a few bits of agricultural data. Two little line graphs plot acres under cultivation, but for some reason only about half the available data for the period 1889 and 1897 are employed.[117] With respect to reserve agriculture, the Department of Indian Affairs published data yearly on: crop production, livestock, and farm implements. If the claim that the potential of reserve agriculture was perpetually thwarted by government policies, then numerical evidence should provide some insights about this process.

In the case of Treaty Four and Treaty Six Saskatchewan bands, numerical data demonstrates that between 1897 to 1915 the amount of land under cultivation, the number of farm animals, crop production and farm implements tended to increase.[118] These trends challenge the widely accepted view that senior officials succeeded at undermining reserve agriculture.[119] The harvest was not entirely lost, nonetheless, numerical data exists that would enhance her argument.

With respect to the annual income data from the Department of Indian Affairs, Stephen High recommended: "Caution should be used in analyzing these statistics as they represent a European concept of revenue ..."[120] Later he declared: "The statistics are consequently no more than a general estimate at best, and at worst wishful thinking. Wishful thinking *may very well* have been involved because the department's self-interest acted to minimize traditional activities and to exaggerate the importance of subsistence agriculture. These methodological concerns may have, therefore, led many historians to ignore the Department of Indian Affairs statistical data."[121] In fact, High provides no support that traditional historians have ever bothered to work with these data in order to carefully determine whether or not the data provides a useful estimate of sources and values of incomes, or whether the data is merely the dubious delusions of Indian Agents intending to exaggerate the importance of subsistence agriculture. He simply rejects the data, largely because of its source. Any systematic biases in these data would be worthy subject of inquiry and would provide insights about the Department of Indian Affairs' view of things. In contrast to disclaimers about the acceptability of this source, Arthur Ray graphed this income data for the period 1922–1935 and found "the most striking picture to emerge is that the aggregate incomes ... declined over the period;" an exercise from which we gained a new understanding of the dire economic circumstances for Indians of northern Canada.[122] Moreover, studies by Beal and Burrows made good use of the Indian Affairs data, so in fact, the data has not been universally ignored, and with proper use, it has provided some regional insights which might not otherwise be possible.[123] Why Indian agents would be so prone to exaggerate "subsistence agriculture" in particular or how exaggerating this particular source of income served the interests of the department is not made clear by High, nor is it evident that the numerical data provided by agents actually has this special bias. Generally, the department's interest was to demonstrate the over-riding objective that Indians were "self-supporting" and that relief costs were not escalating unnecessarily. Becoming self-supporting could be achieved by means other than subsistence agriculture.

It is worth parsing out his argument in detail because Stephen High expressed an unquestioned sentiment among many historians and because his argument, as conventional and as acceptable as it might be to some, is seriously flawed. Moreover, such an approach will impact on the development of theory in Native Studies. In particular, High claimed that my study of Indian incomes in Manitoba suffered from "substantive methodological problems," which specifically means the use of the data was inappropriate.[124] For High, the use of Indian Affairs data is objectionable because: (1) the data was collected by non-Natives committed to the assimilation of Natives; (2) of an inability of the data to account for the monetary value for subsistence activities; and (3) Indian agents could not accurately determine the sources of incomes for thousands of "Amerindians" living on far flung reserves.[125] In essence, he claimed that Indian agents attempted to establish Eurocenteric data they did not really acquire (the unknown value of subsistence from far flung reserves). If one infers, as High implied, that "European concepts of revenue" (data tainted by Eurocenteric biases) shed no light on Native relations with the forces of capitalism or their economic life, then how subsistence was valued or the spatial unevenness of the knowledge of agents are really beside the point.

The allegation that Indian agents exaggerated or positively skewed the value of subsistence agriculture means that the values of other sources of incomes (hunting, fishing and wages) were diminished for reporting purposes. How High learned this is unknown; he provided no specific evidence or calculations for this assertion. Similarly, alternative sources of economic data were not offered in place of the Indian Affairs data. And given that agents themselves could not come to terms with the economies of far flung reserves, how High knows with certainty that the hunting and fishing incomes were miscalculated becomes a problem. While the department promoted reserve agriculture, more specifically on the prairies, officials were capable

of describing regional economies and could account for differences between desired policies and how people actually made a living. For example, Indian Agent J.O. Lewis noted that for the agriculturally well-endowed St. Peters reserve in 1907: "They do not make good farmers, but are much sought after as labourers."[126] At Berens River, Indian Agent S. Swinford was told by one Indian "that it did not pay him to stay home and bother with a garden, as he could make so much more money in other ways, and he could buy his potatoes in the fall."[127] Even for the Manitowapah Agency, a region somewhat endowed with better agricultural resources than the fur country, agriculture was not characterized as the dominant source of income until 1914.[128] Since agents reported on the *various* ways that Indians made a living, High's insinuation that they cooked the books in favour of subsistence agriculture is only a suspicion.

Nonetheless, consideration must be given to the limitations of a source. Did Indian agents and other officials have the capacity to provide reasonable estimates of Indian income? Could the average Indian agent discern the sources of incomes obtained by Indians? High's assertion about the difficulty of data collection should not be taken at face value. A number of reserves were grouped into regions known as agencies. Indian agencies did not have insurmountably huge populations as alleged by High; for example, a number of agencies existed in the Treaty Four territory: one of the larger agencies, Touchwood Hills had a population of 868 in 1900.[129] This would amount to a much fewer number of families. Estimates of individual family incomes could provide a basis for knowing the incomes of each reserve, and agency totals could be calculated from reserve totals. In treaty areas, at the minimum, an annual visit to each reserve was required to pay each Indian an annuity, and thus, agents were in contact with the Indian population. Not only did agents provide reports on each band, but Inspectors of Indian agencies, to whom individual agents reported to, also visited Indian reserves. Indian agents also kept records relating to reserve economies. Figures 1 and 2 reproduce pages from the Saddle Lake Agency Daily Journal.[130] It is evident that the operations of a gristmill, the production of a sawmill and acres of crops sown were recorded in a working document.

FIGURE 1 Sample Economic Data (1899) in Saddle Lake Agency Journal



FIGURE 2 Sample Economic Data (1898) in Saddle Lake Agency Journal



SOURCE: NAC, RG 10, vol. 9083, Book 7.

With respect to the Saddle Lake Band, the published annual report noted: "The chief occupations followed by these Indians are farming and stock-raising, but a number of them add considerably to their incomes by working for settlers and freighting for the department."[131] In the spring of 1899, the Saddle Lake Agency Daily Journal recorded: "Went with Inspector to see Thos Hunter and Thos Mokookis and to count their cattle returned to agency. Inspection of books rest of the day."[132] And for the next few days: "Inspection all day. I balanced ledgers ..." and "Inspection of books all day."[133] These daily journals noted that in the spring, cattle and beef returns were regularly produced. Similarly a decade later, between 21 and 23 April 1909 the Saddle Lake Indian Agent recorded the he had been "... working at Statistical Returns."[134] And by the fourth day, he could report that he had finished the Statistical Returns. These sources indicate that attention was paid to the economic circumstances of Indians and that record keeping was routine.

Along with the capacity to keep records and to make and report observations inconsistent with the "subsistence agriculture" obsession of the department, Indian agents had access to other sources of information. Indian agents were also in contact with HBC post managers and frontier capitalists. For example in 1899, Inspector McColl reported that "Captain Robinson pays annually upwards of $40,000 to the Indians in my inspectorate for lumbering, cutting cordwood, making ties, working on steamboats and at the fisheries."[135] Indian agents were also responsible for reporting an individual enumeration of Indians for the Dominion censuses. In some parts of the country, Indian reserves were far flung, and the standards to value subsistence income cannot be known today, however, the desire to establish "social control" of band populations could not be achieved by willful ignorance of the economic circumstances of Indians. Given that the need to blindly uphold the subsistence agriculture policy and the incapacity of Indian agents to know something of the economic life of Indians is easily disputed, High is left with the mere argument that data from the Department of Indian Affairs is hopelessly tainted by Eurocentricism. Such *a priori* approach to a data source is difficult to reason with.

If the source of the data (i.e., Indian agents) negates any potential value in that data, then to be logically consistent with such methodological musings, historians should stop using all published and unpublished sources from the Department of Indian Affairs, and other non-Native sources that also sought to assimilate Natives. Since High was also unable to show the extent of error, his central objection is nothing more than an *ad hominen* denunciation of numerical data. But oddly enough, Steven High used snippets of the very same Eurocenteric quantitative data from the Department of Indian Affairs in his "Robinson-Superior Ojibwa and the Capitalist Labour Economy" to show an increase in wage income between 1899 and 1912, and also, to indicate an increase in ownership of sailboats, row boats and nets and a decline in canoes.[136] A more probable methodological concern should be the cursory or *ad hoc* use of these data, such as the treatment by High and Carter. The insurmountable data collection problems (too many Indians on far flung reserves) that High alluded to would also make many non-numerical sources somewhat suspect.

These ruminations by High, and the conventional apprehension and reluctance about numbers, do not conclusively demonstrate that the Indian Affairs data is worthless government propaganda or that it is unable to provide empirical insights not found elsewhere. Significantly, Indian agents provided estimates of the value of subsistence fishing and hunting, which were crude estimates no doubt, and may have underestimated or overestimated the equivalent values.[137] It is of course a form of acceptable arrogance that today's academics can dismiss observations, or those observations that do not accord with their views, of those that may have lived for years within Indian communities (e.g., fur traders, missionaries and Indian agents), year round and often for years or decades on end. And thus, dismissing the capacity of an Indian agent to know something of what is going on appeals easily to contemporary dispositions.

The sorts of objections offered by High are really predicated on an elemental cynicism towards numerical data. More or less identical objections could be raised with most numerical data used by economic historians (i.e., how can a nation state, like Canada, count a far-flung population?). Loose speculation about insidious institutional motives to mislead the naïve can be used to reject almost any kind of numerical data; i.e., perhaps wheat yields in western Canada in the late 19th century were extremely exaggerated because the Department of the Interior wanted to promote settlement by luring unsuspecting European peasants to the prairies and that all this agricultural data is merely wishful thinking. Therefore, government numbers cannot be trusted to assist with a description of the agriculture settlement of the west. High's objections are not novel or insightful, and are often offered up by those who prefer to use more conventional and readily accessible sources, which when considered, are not free from anecdotal and impressionistic weaknesses.[138] The same sort of demurring about numerical data applies also to the descriptive sources (correspondence, memorandum, reports, etc.). In effect, these so-called methodological objections are not brilliant, but simply a form of special pleading. The standards that are used to reject a certain type of data, such as Eurocenteric notions of revenue linked with assimilation motives, are not applied so as to reject other sources of historical information. E.H. Carr reminded us about the general limitations of historical sources: "No document can tell us more than what the author of the document thought — what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even only what he himself thought he thought."[139] Descriptive records generated by correspondence, reports and memorandums, are also really just "general estimates" of what happened and are also laden with "wishful thinking."

Of course, academic historians are not about to stop using written sources from the Department of Indian Affairs and other agencies, which would be the effect of adopting the "High Test" (reject data unless it was collected by Natives). Special pleading with respect to data sources does not negate the systematic error inherent in such an approach. Moreover, High does consider how Eurocenteric notions might have some conceptual utility for understanding capitalism, which in and of itself has something of an Eurocenteric origin. If "revenue" is too Eurocenteric a view, then we should also never foist such culturally objectionable terms like constant capital, surplus value, mercantile accumulation, or relations of production on the economic interactions between Indians and Europeans. In other words say goodbye

to political economy! In reality, unsophisticated ramblings on Eurocenterism can serve to buttress the status quo; an exoneration of economic oppression can be achieved by ignoring empirical evidence and at the same time ignoring the contributions that Native labour made during the fur trade and frontier capitalism eras.[140]

Unsubstantiated musings about "methodological" concerns cannot really justify the suppression of certain categories of data and the selective preference for other types. For example, in the published annual report, Indian Agent S. Swinford provided a lengthy description of the resources and occupations of the Indians of the Manitowapah Agency (Manitoba Interlake region) in 1900:

> The principal resource for the future will, in my opinion, be cattle-raising, but this is only in its infancy as yet ...
>
> A lot of money is earned by the Indians of all the reserves at fishing during the winter, there is also a good deal earned at hunting, trapping, digging senega-root, picking berries and working as boatmen on the lakes. Many of them work for settlers during haying, harvest and threshing time; others work at the saw-mill at Winnipegosis, and in the lumber woods, and this year a number have been working at the big government canal at Fairford River. A few are still skilled at building boats and birch bark canoes, and make money at it; others are good at making snow-shoes, light sleighs (jumpers), flat sleights and such like; but there is one thing they can do the year round, so never in want for food, and that is to catch fish.[141]

Accordingly, this is a fairly diverse economy, and notwithstanding the Indian agent's hope for agriculture, he itemized a long list of "non-subsistence agriculture" income and resource opportunities. The statistical data for the same report indicated that the sources and values of the Manitowapah Agency Indians incomes totalled $25,452, which were composed of: value of farm produce including hay $6,952 (27.3%); wages earned $3,555 (13.9%); earned by fishing $4,775 (18.7%); earned by hunting $8,370 (32.8%); and earned by other industries $1,800 (7.0%).[142] These data tend to support Swinford's description of a variety of incomes, however, the contribution of hunting is more evident in the numerical data than in the agent's written description. Given that hunting and fishing combined to make-up half the income, in this case the Indian agent's dollar estimates of the value of hunting and fishing incomes were not unduly low. In fact, the effort to estimate a dollar value of subsistence hunting and fishing suggests an acknowledgement of the importance of these sources of incomes, which in subsequent decades was seldom appreciated by other observers. Both of these main types of written historical information provide insights about the economy and the combination of quantitative and qualitative data is methodologically desirable.

A rigorous understanding of what happened is achieved by working intensively with all primary sources in order to discern discrepancies. An awareness of the limitations of the descriptive/narrative sources does not mean that numerical sources as a category of data are inherently superior. In fact, the use of numerical economic data without an appreciation of the context of these economies, which is gained by qualitative sources, will surely result in distorted interpretations. High's disapproval of Indian Affairs data ignored certain aspects of the soundness of these data. Table 1 lists the data categories that were published in the annual reports of the Department of Indian Affairs under the heading "Agricultural and Industrial Statistics." Information on agricultural implements, livestock, ownership of general effects, crop production, new land brought into production, new buildings constructed, and sources of value of incomes were captured by 77 categories. For a more complete view, a sample of the data for agencies in Saskatchewan and Alberta (Treaties Four, Six and Seven) for 1906–07 is reproduced in Appendix 1. These figures display a few of the potential variables that can be derived from the published data.

In general, whether these data represent factious "wishful thinking" or "hard fact" can be further considered by checking for internal consistency and by using external sources. Indian Affairs expenditures on relief supplies should be less for those agencies with diverse and secure sources of incomes than those agencies on the economic margins. Trends in Indian fishing income should co-relate with changes in Indian ownership of fishing equipment. The data concerning the value of Indian property (accumulation) should be within the income means to accumulate or purchase such property and personal effects.[143] Similarly, external sources, such as Department of Fisheries data can be used to

TABLE 1 Agricultural and Industrial Statistics Collected by the Department of Indian Affairs, CA. 1897–1935

Personality of Indians

Agricultural Implements, Vehicles &c.	*Live Stock and Poultry*	*General Effects*
Ploughs	Horses	Sail Boats
Harrows	Stallions	Row Boats
Seed Drills	Gelding and Mares	Canoes
Cultivators	Foals	Rifles
Land Rollers	Cattle	Shot Guns
Mowers	Bulls	Nets
Reapers and Binders	Oxen, Work	Steel Traps
Horse Rakes	Steers	Tents
Fanning Mills	Cows, Milch	Value of General Effects
Threshing Machines	Young Stock	Value of Household Effects
Tool Chests	Other Stock	Value of Real and Personal Property
Other Implements	Lambs	
Wagons	Sheep	
Carts	Boars	
Sleighs Draught	Sows	
Sleighs Driving	Other Pigs	
Democrat Wagon	Poultry	
Buggies and Road Carts	Turkeys	
Value of Implements and Vehicles	Geese	
	Ducks	
	Cocks and Hens	
	Value of Live Stock and Poultry	

Agriculture Season 1906

Grain, Roots and Fodder	*New Land Improvement*
Wheat: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested	Land Cleared Acres
Oats: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested	Land Broken Acres
Barley: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested	Land Cropped for first time Acres
Corn: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested	Land fenced Acres
Pease: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested	
Rye: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested	
Buckwheat: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested	
Beans: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested	
Potatoes: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested	
Carrots: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested	
Turnips: Acres Sown and Bushels Harvested	
Other Roosters: Sown and Bushels Harvested	
Hay: Tons Cultivated and Wild	
Other Fodder: Tons	

Progress During The Year 1906–7

Buildings Erected
Dwellings, Stone
Dwellings, Brick
Dwellings, Frame
Dwellings, Log
Shanties
Barns
Horse Stables
Driving Sheds
Pig Sties
Store Houses

TABLE 1 (continued)

Source and Values of Income	
Value of Farm Products including Hay	
Value of Beef Sold, also of that Used for Food	
Wages Earned	
Received from Land Rentals	
Earned by Fishing:	The Estimated Value of Fish and Meat Used for Food Is Included in these Columns
Earned by Hunting and Trapping:	
Earned by other Industries	
Total Incomes of Indians	

SOURCE: Canada, Sessional Papers, 1908, Paper No. 27, Annual Report for the Department of Indian Affairs, 1906–07, pp. 146–156.

verify trends in income (changes in fishing incomes, as claimed by Indian Affairs should correspond to changes in fishing yields or the value of fish yields as reported by the fisheries department). For northern regions, HBC post balance sheets (1891–1931) are another source that can serve to externally interrogate Indian Affairs numbers.[144] Absolute incredulity about Indian Affairs numerical data overlooks the fact that these data were published yearly from the period of 1897 to 1935, and that the categories of data collected were consistent from year to year. Consistency and regularity means that these data have some temporal durability, and because these data are organized by agency across the country, a spatial/temporal framework for Native economic history is possible. A certain level of error does not negate the possibility to reconstruct basic trends over several decades. (If an error is systematic over time, the trend, but not the absolute value, has some utility.)

Nonetheless, as with all sources, there are bound to be errors and mistakes. As with published data from this era, misprints occur in the *Sessional Papers*. Occasionally, data for a particular agency was not published. Since on occasion individual reserves were shifted from agency to agency in the period 1897–1935, what the data described may change geographically (in effect the boundaries of the agencies changed). Converting the raw data to per capita indices is one means to control for changes in the territorial size of agencies. Hyper-inflation existed during the First World War era and thus it would be wrong to assume that the real incomes of Indians were growing rapidly in this period. Rather than reject a source *a priori*, E.P. Thompson advised us that all sources need to be "interrogated by minds trained in a discipline of attentive disbelief."[145]

Fundamentally, "serious methodological problems" will generate unreliable substantive results, and yet, Stephen High does not really seem to quarrel too much with my findings. So merely imagining what *may very well* be wrong with data does not constitute a fully developed analysis or a justification not to expend effort on these data. In effect, High merely visualized a haphazard list of potential problems, concocted a scheme about subsistence agriculture, invoked an unsophisticated counter-Eurocenteric prerogative, made no effort to determine the extent of error, admitted no possible benefits from these data, but then used the very same series of data when it suited his interpretation. In a manner consistent with Steve High's excising of Eurocenterism, Eleanor Blaine characterized HBC records: "Account books themselves are neutral, apolitical documents; they are part of a whole belief system. Their figures represent the values assigned by the accountant's culture to goods, services and time. How can these figures pretend to assign values and motives to people who do not share that culture and belief system?"[146] By claiming that the use of these records leads to a confusion of the culture and beliefs of Indians with

those of the European account-keepers, an essentialist difference purports to negate the idea that numerical data might tell us something about the nature of the economic relationships between Natives and Europeans. In other words, a record of what was traded to Indians tells nothing about their consumption priorities. However, one does not need to assign values in order to reconstruct basic consumption and production patterns. For those that perpetuate a romanticized partnership between Indians and Europeans, looking at accounting books to determine rates of exploitation or terms of trade would only be a counter-productive endeavour. The argument that numerical data is very unreliable should also bring comfort to those prosecutors litigating against the claims that historical evidence can document the practice of Aboriginal or pre-treaty commercial rights. Finally, creating a fine-textured analysis from economic history without the use of numerical data, is rather like expecting historical demographers to determine depopulation rates without any population figures. Unconvinced by Stephen High's denouncement, I contend that this is a promising source of data for what has been labelled the reserve transition era, just as Hudson's Bay Company account books provide insights about the Native economy in an earlier era.

If economic security is fundamental to the well-being of a society, then historical trends cannot be approached without recourse to an analysis of available numerical data. Additionally, if incorporation into the capitalist market is an issue, then "European concepts of revenue" are a necessary means to establish empirical base lines. When numerical data is summarily dismissed as dubious, then it is unlikely that meaningful concepts such as, comparative wage rates, price ratios, or rate of profit will be employed, and consequently, no effort can be made to understand economic trends and change. In this case, Native history will remain stuck on analyzing policy pronouncements of virtually de-contextualized political institutions and influential individuals. And thus, the special pleading that relies on qualitative sources and disparages numerical data can be reassured by the view that Native wage labour was merely a means to strengthen Native cultural ways and not a significant interface with capitalism. Central to the theory of a world system is the notion of unequal exchange, which somewhat similarly, Trosper referred to as price ratios between what Indians and Europeans sold to each other. In fact, the use of HBC accounting data by Ray and Freeman supports a discussion of terms of trade between Indian and European entities. An examination of the terms of trade will raise troubling questions about the partnership myth. However, if data is disregarded as "wishful thinking" then the concept of exploitation need not be empirically investigated. In reality, it is the exculpating of capitalism that is the wishful project. The removal of economics from the relationship between Indigenous/settler societies can only lead to a distorted history. Following High's logic, then, economic forces become irrelevant to an explanation of why the society that took shape in Canada was so different for Indians than "settlers."

If Andre Gunder Frank along with other social scientists who are re-examining the assumptions about the origins of a world system during the early modern era can draw conclusions from old data about metal (copper and silver) price ratios in China, and the consequent dynamics for the making of global economy prior to 1500, then why is it so hard for Canadian historians to derive some sense from 20th century Indian Affairs statistical data?[147] In Native history, the prevalent resistance to numeracy is problematic on a number of levels, but in the end, as Paul Strather noted: "Without statistics, economics would be little more than guesswork."[148]

Summary and Prospect

This essay began by considering the economic problem raised by Harold Cardinal — the vicious poverty of Native communities. And while self-government and economic development are cojoined, Newhouse noted: "As Aboriginal peoples living in Canada, we inhabit a society dominated by the ideas of capitalism and the market."[149] Yet there is little in this essay which can be snapped up by economic development officers and used to transform communities. There are no formulas here to resolve the day-to-day frustrations. Moreover, the academic literature in the field of economic history is a long way off from explaining the complex problem of vicious poverty that concerned Harold Cardinal in 1969.

Some academic efforts to explain participation in a wage-based economy require that Natives behave entirely differently from other

people (who are motivated by material needs) and instead a cultural motivation takes precedence. Oddly, academics deem economic formalism irrelevant to the historic interactions between capitalism and Aboriginal societies, however today, Aboriginal communities are expected to conform to the laws of neoclassical economics in a global context. But clearly, the foundations for economic life of Native people have changed in the last few hundred years. Most contemporary historians do not see the fur trade as a system and means for creating wealth, or that the amassing of wealth by Europeans had any relevance for Native producers. For them, European objectives or purposes had very little effect on Native communities. The dominant paradigm asserts that most Indians were essentially free to make choices, the HBC could not get them to do what they did not want to do, and that Indians merely trapped to acquire a few tools in order to carry out traditional subsistence activities more efficiently. Apparently, the fur trade did not modify the "core" of Indian culture;[150] if anything, the new technology of the fur trade positively enriched "traditional" Indian life.

There is a marked tendency towards description and particularism in the fur trade literature, although some excellent empirical studies have been written in the last few decades.[151] Resistance to the use of numerical data, quantitative methods, and social science approaches makes the prospect for a new economic history of the fur trade unlikely.[152] Reluctance to use precise terminology is evident with the effort to construct an argument that the fur trade is best understood as an enduring partnership between Indians and Europeans. The terms dependency and exploitation are used derisively on occasion, but are never defined properly, and the conclusion that Indians were not exploited was never tested against the available evidence on prices, wages and profits. Fur trade studies attempt to make use of the term dependence, but do so in the same way that pro-empire historian E.E. Rich did forty-five years ago. Thus "dependence" is regarded as a situation in which the very physical existence of Indians would irrevocably be tied to trade with the company, an absolute proposition that would be hard not to disprove. Despite a denial of dependence by many historians, Trosper's desire for an understanding of dependence based on an historical interpretation informed by economics has some appreciation. The economic experience of Indians is not examined from concepts deriving from political economy; the outcome is that this research is isolated from the economic history of other non-European peoples who were incorporated with a world system through mercantilism.[153] The effects that engaging in production of fur for an external market based upon "hunters and gathers" is not readily grasped by the existing literature, in part, because economic concepts are not employed. In this respect, Sahlins' substantivist approach cannot provide an adequate theoretical foundation for understanding Aboriginal economic history following the development of the fur trade. Rather peculiar circumstances prevail: the fur trade history neither employs a radical political economy, which would seek to try and inform the present-day conditions, or mainstream formalistic economics which would provide some rigour for describing economic aspects of the fur trade. Although fur trade society was a consequence of trade, serious economics does little to inform these ethnohistorical studies.

In some respects, the debate concerning the effect of fur production for external markets on Indian society is a problem of spatial and temporal scale. From the local point of view of post journals, the evidence can be selected and interpreted to indicate either dependence or partnership. At the micro-economic level, the Indians pretty much handled the division of labour for the harvesting of fur, could insist on certain customs and rituals associated with exchange, decide upon which technology to employ, and express consumption preferences. One might easily accept that under certain conditions, leading Indians had an indirect influence on decision-making and practices associated with the post, and in the short-run, may have achieved certain objectives. The argument could possibly be made that the strikes of the HBC boatmen in the 1860s, which drove up the wage rate, were indicative of their autonomy and agency. However, such events really imply an antagonistic relationship with the managers of mercantile interests.

Even at the micro-economic scale, it is not clear that the apparent autonomy of Indian trappers really amounted to too much overt long-run economic power. Although commercial indebtedness, which has a marked affect on income distribution, may resemble reciprocity, and might even be exactly the same thing in the minds of Cree trappers, reciprocity in a communal society

and commercial indebtedness in a system of mercantile exchange have very different historical consequences. In an economy where a racial division of labour is a key means for structuring the industry, the relative proportion of income to each of the racial groups will influence their long-run social futures. The mixed economy could not absorb commercial value in a manner that would fund future growth. On this topic, research is needed on the changing pattern of income distribution in the fur trade. The inability of Native trappers to obtain more than a subsistence share of the fur industry's wealth has implications for trends in economic history. Political consequences followed.

At the larger macro-economic scale, there was no partnership; Native trappers and middlemen had no real equity in the system. Vital decisions about the accumulation of savings, investment allocations, mergers and business reorganization, long range capital strategies and control over world markets were entirely in the hands of the Europeans. Because Indians never tried to return to the original affluent society (a local economy based entirely on local resources and labour) larger economic processes affected their history. In some respects, Indian trappers were the first Canadians to feel the outcome of the staple trap.[154] Stagnant and declining fur prices on the London fur market probably did more to extend Canada's sovereignty than the trickiest treaty commissioner or meddling missionary. When the new owners of the HBC sought to divest in the fur trade operations, the political and economic future of Rupertsland was changed. Despite the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the legal rights of Aboriginal peoples, the HBC ended up with more land and money than Native people as a result of its successful claim to posses Rupertsland.[155] But pointing out these sorts of outcomes leaves one open to the accusation of prompting stereotyping and denying Native agency.

With respect to understanding the 19th century fur trade from the longer view of Native history, a number of new research questions need to be asked. From the perspective of economic history, what are long-term consequences created by the production of fur and other commodities for mercantile companies? If the fur trade was a mutually beneficial economic arrangement, did the consumption of trade goods by Indians reflect a reasonable equity stake in the industry relative to the commercial returns to the owners of the fur trading companies? And did a price/value system preclude reinvestment in activities that could keep pace with the surrounding economies? Similarly, the aversion to serious consideration of "economics" is a disconnect from efforts to seek redress through the courts for the historic "maladjustment" of resources following treaties and settlement.[156]

Apparently, we should believe that exploitation did not occur because Indians were active historical agents, not passive victims. The premise seems to be that only the inactive become passive, exploited victims. And thus because they were not passive, they were not exploited. A reassuring, and easily grasped academically sound assertion, but when examined closely, it is only a simple dichotomy. Being mindful and active about one's interests are not sufficient conditions to prevent exploitation. This new orthodoxy holds that the "Happy days" of Native history occurred during the historic fur trade and it cannot agree to investigate the proposition that political oppression was preceded by economic exploitation.[157] In other words, wealth and power are unrelated. In Canada, the problems that Trosper posed in 1988 have not been pursued actively. Exploitation, British historian E.P. Thompson explained: "... is, in fact, as I have said, a structural argument and a polemic against orthodox economic history," an orthodoxy that "... also attempts to present exploitation as a category in the mind of a biased historian and not as something that actually occurred."[158] To illustrate in the North American context, leading ethnohistorian Jennifer Brown objected to Harold Hickerson's fur trade colonialism thesis, noting his "simple stereotype of the trader as exploiter and debaucher of defenceless natives, a view that did credit to neither trader nor native nor historical complexity."[159] Exploitation is not a matter of stereotyping. While many early critical studies lacked nuance and flouted historical complexity, to reduce exploitation to a matter of a simple stereotype is a worthy illustration of what concerned Noam Chomsky: "the job of mainstream intellectuals is to serve as a kind of secular priesthood, to ensure that the doctrinal faith is maintained ... to be guardians of the sacred political truths."[160] But by denying that the fur trade put Whites and Natives on different historical trajectories, one of our nation state's

political truths have been preserved by mainstream academics.

Indian economic history after the transfer of Rupertsland certainly makes the partnership thesis suspect. When new frontier resource industries created labour markets, Natives quickly abandoned their obligations to the HBC. In a number of regions, it is clear, that Native labour was convenient for the establishment of frontier capitalism. Factors affecting Native security with their initial integration in capitalist-like labour markets are unclear. When competitive markets re-emerged, Native trappers responded to the price system and without hesitation they traded with opponents of the HBC. Revitalization of the fur trade after 1900 enabled trappers to have some very good years. However, when new markets yielded huge price increases, Natives could not appropriate the full value of this economic rent. Middlemen markups remained high. Moreover, high prices drew White trappers into the north, Native trapping areas were unprotected, and reckless exploitation by even a few itinerant White trappers meant that most benefits went to outsiders. Northern treaties did not deal with the problem of open-access and as a result Natives lost potential sources of income. The risks or costs associated with this form of resource development were incurred by Natives. After the trapping boom in the 1920s, more government relief was needed. The problem of the social overhead needs to be further investigated. Conceptual refinement is required, but this topic can generate some insights about the traditional Native economy and Native relations with the state in the 20th century. It might be found that many of the state policies of urbanization, assimilation and community development are essentially efforts to deal with a costly social overhead. Clearly, there was a "surplus" population that could no longer live adequately in the bush producing fur. An income gap between the general post-war prosperity and the Native economy was politically embarrassing.

With respect to more current interests, the final report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recognized that "... strategies for change must be rooted in an understanding of the forces that created economic marginalization in the first place."[161] This sketch of Native economic history attempts to provide some conceptual clarity as a first step to understanding the forces of marginalization. The commissioners also appreciated that economic history could address fundamental understandings: "There is some evidence, therefore, that Aboriginal people were successfully making the transition from a traditional to a 'modern' economy. These documented examples tend to be overlooked by those who conclude that Aboriginal people were unable to make the transition, that they were prevented from gaining positions in the wider economy because of racism, or that they were unwilling to venture beyond the safe haven provided by reserves."[162] However, as suggested by this essay, the exact nature of the transition is not clear. While much of Native economic history is connected to natural resource extraction, the fascinating story of Mohawk Steel Workers, beginning with working for the Dominion Bridge Company in 1886, seems to be an almost forgotten example of an integration with capitalism that is rich in both cultural and economic details.[163]

A small body of literature focusing on Native wage labour now exists, or perhaps what might be known as a labour history of Native peoples, however, the literature is essentially descriptive and has avoided engaging economic concepts or theories. Historians ponder why Indians were integrated with capitalism, but pursue answers that would not be deemed especially relevant to other peoples. Steven High, for example, boldly asserted that "a consensus has emerged among those who study native labour history" that participation in the capitalist economy was "selective" and done so "in order to strengthen their traditional way of life."[164] When Micmac farm labour is reduced because of the introduction of mechanical potato harvesters or Native boatmen employed on HBC Yorkboats are replaced by the adoption of steam power, then culture and identity have not shielded Aboriginal peoples from the tendency in capitalism to replace labour with capital. The contemporary implications of similar historical challenges have been raised by David Newhouse: "... with the emergence of a market where I can buy what I need and sell what I produce and the emergence of money as a system of exchange, requires me to think much differently about my life, what is proper behaviour in that life and the ends of that life. The emergence of the market as the dominant economic institution, replacing tradition and command as the method of provisioning means that I must begin to think about things in terms of the market, which is concerned with exchange value and

APPENDIX 1 Sample Annual Economic Data from the Department of Indian Affairs

Appendix1: Statistical Data from the Department of Indian Affairs 1906-1907

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PERSONALTY OF INDIANS.

Agency.	Agricultural Implements, Vehicles, &c.										
	Ploughs.	Harrows.	Seed Drills.	Cultivators.	Land Rollers.	Mowers.	Reapers and Binders.	Horse Rakes.	Fanning Mills.	Threshing Machines.	Tool Chests.
Saskatchewan.											
Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4	51	34	2	.....	.....	32	2	34	1	3	5
Assiniboine " " 4	31	12	3	1	.....	16	1	7	1	1	.....
Moose Mountain " " 4	23	5	3	.....	.....	16	3	10	.....	.....	.....
Qu'Appelle " " 4	126	71	24	2	.....	76	30	74	7	.....	4
Crooked Lakes " " 4	60	37	15	9	.....	43	14	45	6	.....	.....
Touchwood Hills " " 4	53	23	7	8	.....	47	9	39	3	1	3
Battleford " " 6	120	58	.....	.....	.....	82	14	66	.....	.....	.....
Carlton " " 6	81	52	4	.....	.....	52	11	46	4	.....	5
Duck Lake " " 6	90	62	13	11	3	48	14	50	2	.....	14
Onion Lake " " 6	27	15	.....	.....	.....	43	.....	38	.....	.....	1
Total	662	369	71	31	3	455	98	409	24	5	32
Alberta.											
Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6	47	27	7	.....	.....	35	9	31	2	.....	2
Hobbema " " 6	98	45	3	2	2	44	4	33	.....	.....	3
Saddle Lake " " 6	34	28	.....	.....	.....	32	4	28	.....	.....	.....
Stony " " 7	22	6	.....	.....	.....	27	.....	26	.....	.....	.....
Sarcee " " 7	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	14	.....	6	.....	.....	1
Blackfoot " " 7	55	19	1	3	2	73	1	64	1	1	1
Blood " " 7	15	2	.....	.....	.....	91	.....	89	.....	.....	7
Peigan " " 7	23	8	1	.....	.....	45	1	48	1	.....	.....
Total	296	135	12	5	4	361	19	325	4	1	14

Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PERSONALTY OF INDIANS—*Continued.*

27—ii—10½

Agency.	Agricultural Implements, Vehicles, &c.							Value of Implements and Vehicles.
	Other Implements.	Wagons.	Carts.	Sleighs, Draught.	Sleighs, Driving.	Democrat Wagons.	Buggies and Road Carts.	
Saskatchewan.								$ cts.
Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4	627	57	33	53	26	8	31	9,025 00
Assiniboine " " 4	48	30	7	22	14	3	12	8,350 00
Moose Mountain " " 4	200	34	2	25	10	6	14	4,370 00
Qu'Appelle " " 4	1,303	160	41	126	74	23	61	27,156 00
Crooked Lakes " " 4	450	86	7	72	65	11	29	19,391 00
Touchwood Hills " " 4	592	80	22	58	56	4	18	10,677 50
Battleford " " 6	1,414	148	42	125	135	25	29	24,008 00
Carlton " " 6	1,374	86	14	87	71	14	27	15,237 00
Duck Lake " " 6	1,780	76	55	72	62	12	44	26,960 00
Onion Lake " " 6	650	69	10	81	.....	.....	29	8,234 00
Total	8,438	826	233	721	513	106	294	152,408 50
Alberta.								
Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6	314	52	.....	51	20	2	8	9,165 00
Hobbema " " 6	505	105	38	91	54	1	13	12,245 00
Saddle Lake " " 6	794	65	7	44	41	5	7	19,125 00
Stony " " 7	45	67	.....	55	.....	2	.....	8,000 00
Sarcee " " 7	250	30	.....	17	.....	1	6	4,500 00
Blackfoot " " 7	240	161	.....	26	55	17	45	20,320 00
Blood " " 7	2,000	292	.....	.....	.....	49	50	47,525 00
Peigan " " 7	315	100	.....	.....	.....	20	20	6,600 00
Total	4,463	872	45	284	170	97	149	127,480 00

APPENDIX 1 (continued)

Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PERSONALTY OF INDIANS—*Continued.*

Agency.	Live Stock and Poultry.										
	Horses.			Cattle.					Other Stock.		
	Stallions.	Geldings and Mares.	Foals.	Bulls.	Oxen, Work.	Steers.	Cows, Milch.	Young Stock.	Lambs.	Sheep.	Boars.
Saskatchewan.											
Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4		165		17	53	2	264	456		27	
Assiniboine " " 4		107	60		24	5	45	85			
Moose Mountain " " 4		100		1	23	13	90	147			
Qu'Appelle " " 4	20	668		14	34	166	384	839			
Crooked Lakes " " 4	3	312	41	6	49	41	225	342		8	
Touchwood Hills " " 4	12	264	44	13	32	129	453	533			
Battleford " " 6	16	555		24	112	32	290	995		103	
Carlton " " 6	2	334	3	12	112	227	427	477			
Duck Lake " " 6	1	273	67	3	27	96	250	633		23	
Onion Lake " " 6	9	313	30	4	147	99	318	631			
Total	63	3,091	245	94	613	810	2,746	5,138		161	
Alberta.											
Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6	1	352	19		4	30	198	323		5	1
Hobbema " " 6		423			11	97	294	363			
Saddle Lake " " 6	3	244	34	1	58	113	217	491		43	
Stony " " 7		950				73	484	365			
Sarcee " " 7		300				5	166	186			
Blackfoot " " 7	44	2,500	125	38		588	944	1,179			
Blood " " 6	20	3,034		140		831	3,687	2,963			
Peigan " " 7		750	250			151	1,020	1,409			
Total	68	8,553	428	179	73	1,888	7,010	7,279		48	1

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Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PERSONALTY OF INDIANS—*Continued.*

Agency.	Live Stock and Poultry.						Value of Live Stock and Poultry.	General Effects.		
	Other Stock—*Con.*		Poultry.							
	Sows.	Other Pigs.	Turkeys.	Geese.	Ducks.	Cocks and Hens.		Sail Boats	Row Boats.	Canoes.
Saskatchewan.							$ cts.			
Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4						91	29,712 00		1	
Assiniboine Agency, Treaty No. 4						140	12,435 00			
Moose Mountain Agency, Treaty No. 4						5	12,260 00			
Qu'Appelle " " 4						180	92,440 00		7	
Crooked Lakes " " 4		41				80	38,576 00			
Touchwood Hills " " 4						60	63,500 00			
Battleford " " 6		90				390	68,128 00		8	9
Carlton " " 6		1	3	1		216	57,473 40		8	229
Duck Lake " " 6	10		60		15	500	48,216 25		19	28
Onion Lake " " 6							50,500 00		2	58
Total	10	132	63	1	15	1,662	473,240 25		45	324
Alberta.										
Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6		12	8			125	29,400 00			24
Hobbema " " 6							39,650 00			
Saddle Lake " " 6	12	40	5	8		250	32,903 00		24	69
Stony " " 7							36,180 00			
Sarcee " " 7							15,375 00			
Blackfoot " " 7			3		6	40	118,838 00		11	
Blood " " 7							234,095 00		1	
Peigan " " 7						100	74,060 00		8	
Total	19	52	16	8	6	515	580,501 00		44	93

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APPENDIX 1 (continued)

Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PERSONALTY OF INDIANS—*Concluded.*

Agency.	General Effects.						Household Effects.	
	Rifles.	Shot Guns.	Nets.	Steel Traps.	Tents.	Value of.	Value of.	Value of Real and Personal Property.
						$ cts.	$ cts.	$ cts.
Saskatchewan.								
Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4	25	90	.....	775	83	2,025 00	5,750 00	641,935 00
Assiniboine Agency, Treaty No. 4	14	44	.....	168	40	1,116 00	800 00	290,547 00
Moose Mountain Agency, Treaty No. 4	10	33	4	110	52	1,132 00	750 00	230,022 00
Qu'Appelle " " 4	83	134	22	270	226	3,350 00	10,800 00	1,932,294 50
Crooked Lakes " " 4	16	42	12	97	98	1,612 00	2,960 00	686,670 00
Touchwood Hills " " 4	27	79	.....	1,549	106	2,369 00	4,200 00	933,748 50
Battleford " " 6	86	157	70	695	200	5,626 00	10,800 00	923,276 00
Carlton " " 6	158	237	273	3,195	239	8,801 50	5,042 00	615,586 90
Duck Lake " " 6	52	185	69	3,617	179	8,842 00	13,300 00	736,551 25
Onion Lake " " 6	50	98	104	1,385	188	5,255 00	3,625 00	731,011 00
Total	521	1,099	554	11,861	1,411	40,128 50	58,027 00	7,721,632 15
Alberta.								
Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6	66	106	68	2,300	123	3,570 00	2,600 00	538,111 00
Hobbema " " 6	20	95	110	300	127	1,465 00	1,825 00	790,509 00
Saddle Lake " " 6	28	123	118	1,082	104	4,196 00	3,880 00	278,957 00
Stony " " 7	130	20	2	210	136	3,000 00	9,000 00	245,910 00
Sarcee " " 7	5	8	.... ..	40	70	500 00	1,500 00	984,317 00
Blackfoot " " 7	47	41	.....	24	125	4,005 00	12,800 00	205,360 00
Blood " " 7	40	10	... ..	40	185	... ...	6,000 00	1,392,176 42
Peigan " " 7	20	35	... ..	.....	100	1,359 00	4,000 00	719,449 00
Total	356	438	298	3,996	970	18,095 00	41,605 00	5,154,789 42

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Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

AGRICULTURE.—SEASON 1906.

Agency.	Grain, Roots and Fodder.									
	Wheat.		Oats.		Barley.		Corn.		Pease.	
	Acres Sown.	Bushels Harvested.	Acres Sown.	Bushels Harvested.	Acres Sown.	Bushels Harvested.	Acres Sown.	Bushels Harvested.	Acres Sown.	Bushels Harvested.
Saskatchewan.										
Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4	291½	8,619	481	14,115	8	260	.....	.....	.....	.....
Assiniboine Agency, Treaty No. 4	442	4,930	173	3,940	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Moose Mountain Agency, Treaty No 4	255	4,372	68	1,554	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Qu'Appelle " " 4	2,484	60,461	1,102¾	32,186	6	248	.....	.....	.....	.....
Crooked Lakes " " 4	829	14,908	277	8,379	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Touchwood Hills " " 4	56	1,553	575	23,502	16¼	766	.....	.....	.....	.....
Battleford " " 6	579	5,838	559	11,329	7	115	.....	.....	.....	.....
Carlton " " 6	346	6,794	492	15,680	88	1,877	.....	.....	.....	.....
Duck Lake " " 6	295½	7,945	326¾	16,755	34	417	.....	.....	.....	.....
Onion Lake " " 6	15	249	144	2,790	10	281	.....	.....	.....	.....
Total	5,592¾	115,669	4,198½	130,230	169¼	3,964	.....	.....	.....	.....
Alberta.										
Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6	76	1,682	410	14,035	68	1,400	.....	.....	.....	.....
Hobbema " " 6	123	2,453	180	7,743	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Saddle Lake " " 6	67½	4,911	349	13,676	45½	896	.....	.....	.....	.....
Stony " " 7	.....	.....	146	*	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sarcee " " 7	10	240	168	3,360	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Blackfoot " " 7	4	35	50	1,476	14	685	.....	.....	.....	.....
Blood " " 7	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Peigan " " 7	30	595	70	1,567	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Total	310½	9,916	1,373	41,857	127½	2,981	.....	.....	.....	.....

* Used for fodder.

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APPENDIX 1 (continued)

Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

AGRICULTURE, SEASON 1906—*Continued.*

Agency.	Grain, Roots and Fodder—*Continued.*									
	Rye.		Buckwheat.		Beans.		Potatoes.		Carrots.	
	Acres Sown.	Bushels Harvested.	Acres Sown.	Bushels Harvested.	Acres Sown.	Bushels Harvested.	Acres Sown.	Bushels Harvested.	Acres Sown.	Bushels Harvested.
SASKATCHEWAN.										
Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4							8	1,575	1½	110
Assiniboine Agency, Treaty No. 4							8	1,600	1 3-5	108
Moose Mountain Agency, Treaty No. 4							2	225		160
Qu'Appelle " " 4							28	2,930	1	48
Crooked Lakes " " 4							10¾	1,484		
Touchwood Hills " " 4							10½	1,500	2¾	73
Battleford " " 6										
Carlton " " 6							16¾	1,370	1¾	127
Duck Lake " " 6							10½	1,277	2¾	215
Onion Lake " " 6							6½	707	4	34
Total							100¾	12,668	13½	815
ALBERTA.										
Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6							23½	2,300	10½	190
Hobbema " " 6							11	1,335	3	540
Saddle Lake " " 6							21½	1,400		147
Stony " " 7							3	75		
Sarcee " " 7							8	600	1	200
Blackfoot " " 7							17¼	920	3¼	115
Blood " " 7										
Peigan " " 7							10	1,200		
Total							94¼	7,830	17¾	1,192

Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

AGRICULTURE, SEASON 1906—*Continued.*

Agency.	Grain, Roots and Fodder—*Continued.*							New Land Improvements.			
	Turnips.		Other Roots.		Hay.		Other Fodder.				
	Acres Sown.	Bushels Harvested.	Acres Sown.	Bushels Harvested.	Cultivated.	Wild.		Land Cleared.	Land Broken.	Land Cropped for first time.	Land fenced.
SASKATCHEWAN.					Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Acres.	Acres.	Acres.	Acres.
Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4	1½	210	1½	110		2,805	2,450		53	214	
Assiniboine " " 4	2½	420				850	200		36	126	43
Moose Mountain " " 4						600	500		53	116½	
Qu'Appelle " " 4	9½	960	3¾	310		2,880	5,800				100
Crooked Lakes " " 4			2¼	307		2,095	1,360		84	144	
Touchwood Hills " " 4	4½	349	2	177		2,369	1,400		188¼		104
Battleford " " 6			39	*	53	4,544	1,177		80	80	33
Carlton " " 6	1½	163	1	51¼		1,991	495	132	205	134	112
Duck Lake " " 6	1½	410	1¼	322		3,916	769		198	170	370
Onion Lake " " 6		97		28		2,446	220		27	26	21
Total	21	2,609	50¾	1,305½	53	24,496	14,281	132	924¼	1,010½	783
ALBERTA.											
Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6	5½	275				2,048	530				
Hobbema " " 6	6	950				2,802	610		179		
Saddle Lake " " 6	27	1,420	7	88		3,542	175				
Stony " " 7	1½	50	½			1,166	366				
Sarcee " " 7	1	200	8	100	39	900	160				70
Blackfoot " " 7	4	250				2,000	90			12	350
Blood " " 7						3,682					
Peigan " " 7	4	375			60	600			73	73	470
Total	49	3,520	15½	188	99	16,140	1,931		252	85	890

* Not given.

APPENDIX 1 (continued)

Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PROGRESS DURING THE YEAR 1906-7.

Agency.	Buildings Erected.										
	Dwellings, Stone.	Dwellings, Brick.	Dwellings, Frame.	Dwellings, Log.	Shanties.	Barns.	Horse Stables.	Driving Sheds.	Cattle Stables.	Pig Sties.	Store Houses.
Saskatchewan.											
Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4			1	2							
Assiniboine " " 4				3							
Moose Mountain " " 4				3	9			4			
Qu'Appelle " " 4			1	18				1	8		
Crooked Lakes " " 4											
Touchwood Hills " " 4				10	2				3		11
Battleford " " 6				4					2	3	1
Carlton " " 6				13	19				2		1
Duck Lake " " 6				10					15		
Onion Lake " " 6				10					3		6
Total			2	73	30		38	5	48	3	19
Alberta.											
Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6				1	1		2				
Hobbema " " 6				6							
Saddle Lake " " 6				8			5		5		6
Stony " " 7											
Sarcee " " 7				3			4				
Blackfoot " " 7			2				4		3		
Blood " " 7			1								
Peigan " " 7				4							
Total			3	22	1		15		8		6

Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

PROGRESS DURING THE YEAR 1906-7.

Agency.	Buildings Erected.			Increase in Value.		
	Root Houses.	Milk Houses.	Corn Cribs.	Value of New Land Improvements.	Value of Buildings Erected.	Total Value of New Land Improvements and Buildings.
Saskatchewan.				$ cts.	$ cts.	$ cts.
Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4				750 00	1,100 00	1,850 00
Assiniboine " " 4				2,699 00	1,200 00	3,899 00
Moose Mountain " " 4				265 00	1,490 00	1,755 00
Qu'Appelle " " 4			11	100 00	3,780 00	3,880 00
Crooked Lakes " " 4				684 00	300 00	984 00
Touchwood Hills " " 4				1,150 00	2,000 00	3,150 00
Battleford " " 6	3			362 00	1,690 00	2,052 00
Carlton " " 6				888 50	1,875 00	2,763 50
Duck Lake " " 6				2,054 00	2,400 00	4,454 00
Onion Lake " " 6				217 00	840 00	1,057 00
Total	3		11	9,169 50	16,675 00	25,844 50
Alberta.						
Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6					375 00	375 00
Hobbema " " 6				2,148 00	600 00	2,748 00
Saddle Lake " " 6					807 00	807 00
Stony " " 7						
Sarcee " " 7				50 00	2,000 00	2,050 00
Blackfoot " " 7				7,000 00	2,700 00	9,700 00
Blood " " 7					905 42	905 42
Peigan " " 7				492 00	800 00	1,292 00
Total				9,690 00	8,187 42	17,877 42

APPENDIX 1 (continued)

Appendix 1 continued

AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS—*Continued.*

SOURCES AND VALUE OF INCOME.

Agency.	Value of Farm Products, including Hay.	Value of Beef Sold, also of that Used for Food.	Wages Earned.	Received from Land Rentals.	The Estimated Value of Fish and Meat Used for Food is included in these Columns.		Earned by other Industries.	Total Income of Indians.
					Earned by Fishing.	Earned by Hunting and Trapping.		
SASKATCHEWAN.	$ cts.	$ cts.	$ cts.	$ cts.	$ cts.	$ cts.	$ cts.	$ cts.
Pelly Agency, Treaty No. 4	19,453 00	3,840 78	3,400 00	.....	180 00	6,400 00	4,850 00	38,123 78
Assiniboine " " 4	7,133 50	1,014 40	1,465 25	.....	1,650 00	460 25	2,386 00	14,109 40
Moose Mountain " " 4	4,593 10	1,000 00	650 00	.....	600 00	700 00	3,500 00	11,043 10
Qu'Appelle " " 4	69,026 90	7,573 00	10,610 00	.....	2,300 00	3,850 00	9,102 40	102,462 30
Crooked Lakes " " 4	16,587 70	3,145 00	2,135 00	.....	380 00	2,900 00	6,362 00	31,509 70
Touchwood Hills " " 4	22,393 20	5,746 10	1,902 75	3,090 00	400 00	19,538 00	5,323 30	58,393 35
Battleford " " 6	23,602 00	14,764 00	4,110 00	155 00	1,352 00	5,330 00	8,390 00	57,703 00
Carlton " " 6	12,864 50	3,827 39	6,419 10	.....	13,893 90	26,289 55	8,333 50	71,558 04
Duck Lake " " 6	30,222 35	13,696 34	12,185 92	.....	8,100 00	50,117 00	6,781 15	120,502 76
Onion Lake " " 6	12,970 00	7,104 00	4,638 00	.....	2,314 00	13,914 00	2,188 00	43,128 00
Total	218,786 25	61,111 01	47,516 02	3,245 00	31,169 90	129,498 80	57,206 45	548,533 43
ALBERTA.								
Edmonton Agency, Treaty No. 6	14,500 00	1,415 00	5,280 00	.....	400 00	14,075 00	2,550 00	38,220 00
Hobbema " " 6	12,653 05	3,125 00	1,000 00	.....	2,440 00	2,000 00	2,135 00	23,353 05
Saddle Lake " " 6	21,894 90	2,050 00	2,534 31	.....	2,650 00	7,720 00	889 00	37,738 21
Stony " " 7	2,200 00	2,342 63	2,145 00	.....	.....	3,700 00	9,247 50	19,635 13
Sarcee " " 7	4,600 00	700 00	2,200 00	.....	75 00	90 00	350 00	8,015 00
Blackfoot " " 7	5,500 00	7,375 16	7,500 00	.....	200 00	550 00	11,000 00	32,125 16
Blood " " 7	10,517 00	9,289 62	12,268 36	.....	.....	.....	4,308 40	37,373 38
Peigan " " 7	2,360 00	.....	5,000 00	1,500 00	.....	.....	6,580 00	15,380 00
Total	74,164 95	26,297 41	38,917 67	1,500 00	5,765 00	28,135 00	37,059 90	211,839 93

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SOURCE: Canada, *Sessional Papers*,1908, No. 27, Department of Indian Affairs, 1907,pp. 146-156.

begin to value them in monetary terms. I can no longer think of them in social terms. And my behaviour begins to be labelled as productive or unproductive, according to its relation to the productive apparatus of society."[165] This is a compelling argument, which also might have some antecedent expressions in the fur trade, and thus, the notion that Natives participated in wage labour markets merely to fund cultural activity is possibly incomplete or misleading. The assertion that Canadians as a whole sell their labour power in the capitalist system to strengthen their traditional ways, would be hard to dispute, but it would be inane nonetheless.

NOTES

1. Harold Cardinal, *The Unjust Society: The Tragedy of Canada's Indians* (Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig, 1969) p. 65.
2. Ronald L. Trosper, "That Other Discipline: Economics and American Indian History," *New Directions in American Indian History*, Colin G. Calloway, ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988) p. 199.
3. For example, Ian M. Drummond, *et al., Progress without Planning: The Economic History of Ontario from Confederation to the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Ontario Historical Series for the Government of Ontario, 1987). This study made one reference to Indians. The classic study in Canadian economic history did not pay any special attention to Indians, see W.T. Easterbrook and H.G.J. Aitken, *Canadian Economic History* (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1956). A somewhat more recent history has included the fur trade and has made use of concepts relevant to natural resource industries, see William L. Marr and Donald G. Paterson, *Canada: An Economic History* (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1980). Considerable attention to the role of Natives in the fur trade is apparent in Kenneth Norrie, Douglas Owram and J.C. Herbert Emery, *A History Of The Canadian Economy* 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Nelson Thompson Learning, 2002). Here too, the Native disappears after 1870. See K.J. Rea, *A Guide to Canadian Economic History*

(Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1991) for a very readable and comprehensive account, however, his summary of the fur trade history seems little influenced by work carried out in the last three decades. Some attention is given to the fur trade and Native peoples in John Dwyer, *Business History: Canada in the Global Community* 2nd ed. (North York: Captus Press, 2000). Although not exhaustive, serious coverage of the fur trade is found in Graham D. Taylor and Peter A. Baskerville, *A Concise History of Business In Canada* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994).

4. Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1972).
5. For an important theoretical contribution, see Michael I. Asch, "The Ecological-Evolutionary Model And The Concept Of Mode Of Production," *Challenging Anthropology: A Critical Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology*, D. Turner and G. Smith, eds. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979) pp. 81–99.
6. For example see the debate initiated with Robin Brownlie and Mary-Ellen Kelm, "Desperately Seeking Absolution: Native Agency as Colonialist Alibi," *Canadian Historical Review* vol. 75, no. 4 (1994) pp. 543–556.
7. Trosper identified a number of research problems: Indian societies failed to accumulate capital; Indian comparative advantage was the hunt which was vulnerable to open access; Indians did not have immigrants, giving Europeans the military advantage to take Indian property; the industrial revolution took place in Europe introducing modern economic growth; and Europe gained a monopoly in the trade with Indians and gained a larger share of the gain. Trosper, Economics, p. 213.
8. Price ratios concern relative prices between two commodities or sets of commodities, for example, if the goods Indians produce declined relative to the goods produced by Europeans, then Indians would have to produce more in order to maintain the same level of trade.
9. Trosper, Economics, p. 213.
10. Trosper, Economics, pp. 212–213.
11. Trosper, Economics, p. 213.
12. David R. Newhouse, "Resistance is Futile: Aboriginal Peoples Meet the Borg of Capitalism," *Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development* vol. 2, no. 1 (2001) pp. 75–82.
13. Newhouse, Resistance is Futile, p. 81.
14. Kelly J. Lendsay and Wanda Wuttunee, "Historical Economic Perspectives of Aboriginal Peoples: Cycles of Balance and Partnership, *Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development* vol. 1, no. 1 (1999) pp. 87–101. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples suggested a slightly different periodization: The pre-contact period, the fur trade, the settler period, and the period of dependence. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* vol. 2, *Restructuring The Relationship*, part 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996) pp. 780–790.
15. *R. v. Marshall*, Supreme Court of Canada [1999] 3 Supreme Court Reporter at p. 456; online: http://www/lexum.umontreal.ca/.
16. Arthur J. Ray, "The Early Hudson's Bay Company Account Books as Sources for Historical Research: An Analysis and Assessment," *Archivaria* vol. 1, no. 1 (1975–1976) pp. 3–38.
17. An assortment of published and unpublished material has been reviewed by Steven High, "Native Wage Labour and Independent Production during the 'Era of Irrelevance,'" *Labour/Le Travail*, no. 37 (1996) pp. 243–264.
18. The ethnographic literature that provides an atemporal account of economic aspects of Indian life, the debate on the character of Aboriginal land tenure, the legal dispossession of Native resources and reserve lands cannot be considered here. A good multi-authored assessment of this problem is found in "Who Owns The Beaver? Northern Algonquian Land Tenure Reconsidered," a special issue of *Anthropologia* n.s. vol. 18, nos. 1–2 (1986). Similarly, general histories, such as those that incorporate economic reality, cannot be discussed here, for example Kerry Abel, *Drum Songs: Glimpses of Dene History* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993); Peter S. Schmaltz, *The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Bruce G. Trigger, *Natives and Newcomers: Canada's 'Heroic Age' Reconsidered* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985); and Arthur J. Ray, *I have Lived Here Since the World Began: An Illustrated History of Canada's Native People* (Toronto: Lester, 1996).
19. Some examples of policy-oriented studies include: Jean H. Lagasse, *A Study of the Population of Indian Ancestry Living in Manitoba* (Winnipeg: Department of Agriculture and Conservation, 1959); H.B. Hawthorn, C.S. Belshaw and S.M. Jamieson, *The Indians of British Columbia: A Study of Contemporary Social Adjustment* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958); and H.B. Hawthorn, ed., "A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada: A Report on Economic, Political, Educational Needs and Policies," 2 vols. (Ottawa: Indian Affairs Branch, 1966).
20. An important regional history that makes use of historical economic and demographic data, see Gerhard J. Ens, *Homeland to Homeland: The Changing Worlds of the Red River Metis in the Nineteenth Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). In particular, the chapter on migration argued that the Metis exodus out of Manitoba was motivated by economic forces.

21. See Alice Littlefield and Martha C. Knack, eds. *Native Americans and Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical Perspectives* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996). For some conceptual depth that is largely lacking in the Canadian literature, see in particular their introductory essay "Native American Labor: Retrieving History, Rethinking Theory," pp. 3–44.
22. This position is clearly articulated in June Helm, Edward S. Rogers, and James G.E. Smith, "Intercultural Relations and Cultural Change in the Shield and Mackenzie Borderlands, *Subarctic* vol. 6, June Helm, vol. ed., *Handbook of North American Indians* William C. Sturtevant, gen. ed. (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1981) pp. 146–157.
23. Arthur J. Ray, *Indians In The Fur Trade: their role as hunters, trappers and middlemen in the lands southwest of Hudson Bay: 1660–1870* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974); and Charles A. Bishop, *The Northern Ojibwa And The Fur Trade: An Historical And Ecological Study* (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974).
24. Ray, *Indians In The Fur Trade*, p. 228.
25. Arthur J. Ray, "Fur Trade History as an Aspect of Native History," *One Century Later: Western Canadian Reserve Indians Since Treaty 7*, Ian A. L. Getty and Donald B. Smith, eds. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978); and Arthur J. Ray, "Indians as Consumers in the Eighteenth Century," *Old Trails and New Directions: Papers of the Third North American Fur Trade Conference*, Carol M. Judd and Arthur J. Ray, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980) pp. 255–271.
26. E.E. Rich, "Trade habits and economic motivations among the Indians of North American," *Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science* vol. 26, no. 1 (1960) p. 49.
27. Rich, Trade habits, p. 44.
28. Rich, Trade habits, p. 45.
29. Rich, Trade habits, p. 46.
30. In essence Rich was describing a backward sloping supply curve (increased prices reduced the supply of beaver belts). Several rational explanations would seem to account for this response. Indian canoes could only carry a limited amount of trade goods on the return trip, so increasing the number of pelts brought down would be pointless. Also the backward sloping supply curve response is consistent with conservation ethics. Trosper has argued that the backward sloping supply curve can be explained by the value placed on leisure. Trosper, Economics, pp. 203–205.
31. Abraham Rotstein, "Trade and politics; an institutional approach," *Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology* vol. 3, no. 1 (1972) pp. 1–28. See also A. Rotstein, "Innis: The Alchemy of Fur and Wheat," *Journal of Canadian Studies* vol. 12, no. 5 (1977) pp. 6–31; and Abraham Rotstein, "Karl Polanyi's Concept of Non-Market Trade," *Journal of Economic History* vol. 30, no. 1 (1970) pp. 117–126.
32. Arthur J. Ray and Donald B. Freeman, *"Give Us Good Measure: an economic analysis of relations between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company before 1763* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978).
33. Rich, Trade habits, p. 43.
34. In particular, see Shepard Krech III, "The Trade of the Slavey and Dogrib at Fort Simpson in the Early Nineteenth Century;" and Robert Jarvenpa and Hetty Jo Brumbach, "The Microeconomics of Southern Chipewyan Fur-Trade History," *The Subarctic Fur Trade: Native Social And Economic Adaptations*, Shepard Krech III, ed., (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984) pp. 99–146 and 147–183. However, to my knowledge, no efforts have been made to examine the fur trade by exploring concepts of surplus extraction or rate of profit with these HBC data. For a demonstration of the potential to extract political economy findings from post-HBC accounting records, see Frank Tough, "'to make a profit without much consideration for the native': The Spatial Aspects of Hudson's Bay Company Profits in Northern Manitoba, 1891–1929," *Geography Discussion Paper Series* paper no. 44 (Toronto: York University, 1994).
35. For example, see Mel Watkins' grating defence of the Rich/Rotstein thesis and rejection of the Ray/Freeman argument in his book review of *Give Us Good Measure* in *Canadian Journal of Economics*, vol. 12, no. 2 (1979) pp. 775–777. Watkins was completely dismissive: "but in fact this book is deeply flawed and in my opinion the Rich-Rotstein thesis survives with only marginal adjustments;" "unfortunate that they do not understand that they have proved rather than disproved it;" "the authors' microscopic analysis of the account books apparently yields no firm data;" "... there is really no justification for this book-length study;" and that it should have been "read as a lengthy footnote to the major contributions of Innis, Rich and Rotstein." Not surprisingly, Watkins also claimed: "What is striking is the limited adaptation and the essential survival of the Indian way," and that "fur as a staple activity was a trade, not an industry." Any familiarity with the labour and resource demands of local post economies and transport systems does permit the classification of the fur trade as something lacking the complexity of "industry."
36. By shifting power relations in the fur trade, one only has to consider the creation of a monopoly in 1821 or the Transfer of Rupertsland in 1870.
37. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press 1957, original 1944) pp. 43, 57.
38. I am referring to number treaties of northern and western Canada. Prior to Treaty One (1871),

economic growth at the Red River Settlement led to the commodification of land, but in 1817, the Selkirk treaty was signed.

39. With the emergence of competitive fur markets ca. 1900, patterns of Indian behaviour corresponding to the findings of Ray and Freeman for the pre-1763 era re-emerged. See Frank Tough, "Indian economic behaviour, exchange and profits in northern Manitoba during the decline of monopoly, 1870–1930," *Journal of Historical Geography* vol. 16, no. 4 (1990) pp. 385–401. In this sense, the Ray/Freeman findings have an historical coherence that is lacking in the Rich/Rotstein/Watkins thesis.
40. Carol M. Judd, "'Mixt Bands of Many Nations': 1821–70," *Old Trails and New Directions*, Ray and Judd, eds., pp. 127–146.
41. Carol M. Judd, "Native labour and social stratification in the Hudson's Bay Company's Northern Department 1770–1870," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* vol. 17, no. 4 (1980) p. 314. For detailed analysis of one particular group's participation as labourers in the fur trade, see Jan Grabowski and Nicole St-Onge, "Montreal Iroquois engagés in the Western Fur Trade, 1800–1821," *From Rupert's Land to Canada*, Theodore Binnema, Gerhard J. Ens and R.C. McCleod, eds. (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2001) pp. 23–58.
42. Judd, Native labour, p. 313.
43. Judd, Native labour, p. 313.
44. For an interesting case study of a Métis merchant which provides insights into economic history, see Gerhard J. Ens, "Metis Ethnicity, Personal Identity and the Development of Capitalism in the Western Interior: The Case of Johnny Grant," *From Rupert's Land to Canada*, Binnema, Ens and McCleod, eds., pp. 161–177.
45. Ron G. Bourgeault, "The Indian, the Metis and the Fur Trade: Class, Sexism and Racism in the Transition from 'Communism' to Capitalism," *Studies in Political Economy* no. 12 (1983) p. 45. His identification of a Métis national petty bourgeoisie class provided some interesting insights about the political history of the Red River settlement.
46. Glen Makahonuk, "Wage-Labour In The Northwest Fur Trade Economy, 1760–1849," *Saskatchewan History* vol. 41, no. 1 (1988) pp. 1–17. For a general labour history of the fur trade, see Edith I. Burley, *Servants of the Honourable Company: Work, Discipline, and Conflict in the Hudson's Bay Company, 1770–1870* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997). For an analysis of this argument, see Frank Tough, review, *Servants of the Honourable Company* in *Manitoba History*, no. 37 (1999) pp. 46–51.
47. For example, records were found that showed that "... the creation of a capitalistic labour market in Red River introduced a rigid class system which confirmed the status of the Metis daughters of the merchant elite even as it reduced the mobility of the great majority of the population." Brian Gallagher, "A Re-Examination of Race, Class and Society in Red River," *Native Studies Review* vol. 4, nos. 1 and 2 (1988) p. 25.
48. Toby Morantz, "'So Evil a Practice': A Look at the Debt System in the James Bay Fur Trade," *Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective*, Rosemary E. Ommer, ed. (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1990) p. 221.
49. Arthur J. Ray, "Periodic Shortages, Native Welfare, and the Hudson's Bay Company 1670–1930," *Subarctic Fur Trade*, Krech, ed., p. 11.
50. Morantz, Debt System, p. 221.
51. Morantz, Debt System, p. 222. She also argued: "In sum, the Indians expected a system whereby their supplies were advanced by the company for the ensuing winter's hunt whether in time of competition or not. They desired such a system because it enabled them to develop their own hunting priorities, trapping for exchange when, and to the extent that, they wished." Morantz, Debt System, p. 221. Given this claim, one has to wonder why the HBC bothered keeping debt accounts.
52. Arthur J. Ray, "The Decline of Paternalism in the Hudson's Bay Company Fur Trade, 1870–1945," *Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective*, Ommer, ed., p. 189.
53. F. Laurie Barron, *Walking in Indian Moccasins: The Native Policies of Tommy Douglas and the CCF* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997) p. 145. See also, Ann Harper Fender, "Public versus Private Ownership: Saskatchewan Fur Trapping and Trading Legislation in the 1940s," *New faces in the fur trade: selected papers of the Seventh North American Fur Trade Conference, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1995* Jo-Anne Fiske, Susan Sleeper Smith and Bill Wicken, eds. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1998) pp. 223–243.
54. Ray, Decline of Paternalism, p. 201.
55. Cardinal, *Unjust Society*, p. 96.
56. Cardinal, *Unjust Society*, p. 97.
57. Ray, Periodic shortages, pp. 1–20.
58. Ray, Periodic shortages, p. 9.
59. And see, Arthur J. Ray, "Some conservation schemes of the Hudson's Bay Company, 1821–50: An examination of the problems of resource management in the fur trade," *Journal of Historical Geography* vol. 1, no. 1 (1975) pp. 49–68. On the question of depletion, see also Ann M. Carlos and Frank D. Lewis, "Indians, the Beaver, and the Bay: The Economics of Depletion in the Lands of the Hudson's Bay Company, 1700–1763," *Journal of Economic History* vol. 53, no. 3 (1993) pp. 465–494; and Ann M. Carlos and Frank D. Lewis, "Property rights, competition, and depletion in the eighteenth-century Canadian

fur trade: the role of the European market," *Canadian Journal of Economics* vol. 32, no. 3 (1999) pp. 705–728.

60. Ray, Periodic shortages, p. 9.
61. Ray, Periodic shortages, p. 16.
62. For an example of the ambiguity concerning the nature of "independent production" in a mercantile economy, see, High, Native Wage Labour, p. 256. The concept of independent production can be an important distinction from the situation of wage labour, however, it can be misleading in terms of describing the power associated with controlling production for a market.
63. Leanna Parker, "Paternalism and Identity: The Role of Personal Labour Organization in the Formation of Group Identity Among the Metis in the Rupertsland Fur Trade and the Aboriginal People in the Northern Australian Cattle Industry," (MA Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1999).
64. Patricia A. McCormack, "Becoming Trappers: The Transformation to a Fur Trade Mode of Production at Fort Chipewyan," *Rendezvous: Selected Papers of the Fourth North American Fur Trade Conference, 1981*, Thomas C. Buckley, ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: North American Fur Trade Conference, 1984) pp. 155–173.
65. McCormack, Becoming Trappers, p. 156.
66. McCormack, Becoming Trappers, p. 157.
67. McCormack, Becoming Trappers, p. 157.
68. The notion that the fur trade was merely a "trade" and not an industry ignores empirical evidence, but see Watkins, Review of *Give Us Good Measure*, p. 777. For a critical analysis of the fur trade see, Russell George Rothney, "Mercantile Capital and the Livelihood of the Residents of the Hudson Bay: A Marxist Interpretation," (MA Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1975).
69. See Frank Tough, "Aboriginal Rights Versus the Deed of Surrender: The Legal Rights of Native Peoples and Canada's Acquisition of the Hudson's Bay Company Territory," *Prairie Forum* vol. 17, no. 2 (1992) pp. 225–250.
70. Frank Tough, "Buying Out The Bay: Aboriginal Rights and the Economic Policies of the Department of Indian Affairs after 1870," *The First Ones: Readings in Indian/Native Studies*, David R. Miller, *et al.* eds. (Piapot Reserve: Saskatchewan Indian Federated College Press, 1992) p. 404.
71. Arthur J. Ray, *The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) p. 49. See also Arthur J. Ray, "Introductory essay," in Harold Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999, original 1930) pp. i–xix.
72. Ray, *The Canadian Fur Trade*, pp. 208–210.
73. Ray, *The Canadian Fur Trade*, p. 221.
74. For example: J.D. Leighton, "A Victorian Civil Servant at Work: Lawrence Vankoughnet and the Canadian Indian Department, 1874–1893," *As Long As the Sun Shines and Water Flows*, Ian A.L. Getty and Antoine S. Lussier, eds. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983) pp. 104–119; or Brian Titley, *A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983).
75. For example, see Jean Friesen, "Grant Me Wherewith to Make My Living," *Aboriginal Resource Use in Canada: Historical and Legal Aspects*, Kerry Abel and Jean Friesen, eds. (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1991) pp. 141–155. For an the initial identification of the treaty economic agenda, see Frank Tough, "Changes To The Native Economy Of Northern Manitoba In The Post-Treaty Period: 1870–1900," *Native Studies Review* vol. 1, no. 1 (1984) pp. 40–66; and Frank Tough, "Economic Aspects of Aboriginal Title in Northern Manitoba: Treaty 5 Adhesions and Metis Scrip," *Manitoba History* no. 15 (1988) pp. 3–16. For details on the economic negotiations during treaty talks, see Frank Tough *"As Their Natural Resources Fail": Native Peoples and the Economic History of Northern Manitoba, 1870–1930* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1996) pp. 75–98.
76. Ray, *The Canadian Fur Trade*, p. 40.
77. Ray, *The Canadian Fur Trade*, pp. 39, 42–43.
78. See Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller and Frank J. Tough, *Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan Treaties* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000) pp. 3–20.
79. Trosper, Economics, p. 209.
80. Irene M. Spry, "The Tragedy of the Loss of the Commons in Western Canada," *As Long As the Sun Shines and Water Flows*, Getty and Lussier, eds., pp. 203–228.
81. Spry, Tragedy, p. 212.
82. Spry, Tragedy, p. 218.
83. Spry, Tragedy, p. 224.
84. Some excellent studies of the history of Native freshwater fisheries have raised the problem of access, over-exploitation and treaty rights: Victor P. Lytwyn, "Ojibwa and Ottawa Fisheries around Manitoulin Island: Historical and Geographical Perspectives on Aboriginal and Treaty Fishing Rights," *Native Studies Review* vol. 6, no. 1 (1990) pp. 1–30; John J. Van West, "Ojibwa Fisheries, Commercial Fisheries Development and Fisheries Administration, 1873–1915: An examination of Conflicting Interest and the Collapse of the Sturgeon Fisheries of the Lake of Woods," *Native Studies Review* vol. 6, no. 1 (1990) pp. 31–65; Anthony G. Gulig, "Sizing Up The Catch: Native-Newcomer Resource Competition and the Early Years of Saskatchewan's Northern Commercial Fishery," *Saskatchewan History* vol. 47,

no. 2 (1995) pp. 3–11; and J. Michael Thoms, "An Ojibwa Community, American Sportsmen, and the Ontario Government in the Early Management of the Nipigon River Fishery," *Fishing Places, Fishing People: Traditions and Issues In Canadian Small-Scale Fisheries*, Dianne Newell and Rosemary E. Ommer, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), pp. 170–192.

85. Frank Tough, "The Establishment Of A Commercial Fishing Industry And The Demise Of Native Fisheries In Northern Manitoba," *Canadian Journal of Native Studies* vol. 4, no. 2 (1984) pp. 303–319; Frank Tough, "The Establishment and Consolidation of a Commercial Fishing Industry in Manitoba, 1880–1910," *The Politics of Work in the West: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* Harley D. Dickinson and Bob Russell, eds. (Saskatoon: Social Research Unit, Department of Sociology, University of Saskatchewan, 1985) pp. 70–97; and Frank Tough, "Fisheries Economics and the Tragedy of the Commons: The Case of Manitoba's Inland Commercial Fisheries," *Department of Geography Discussion Paper Series* (Toronto: Department of Geography, York University, 1987). The Indian experience with the commercialization of west coast salmon fisheries corresponds to the history of the freshwater fisheries; see, Daniel L. Boxberger, "In and Out of the Labor Force: The Lummi Indians and the Development of the Commercial Salmon Fishery of North Puget Sound, 1880–1900," *Ethnohistory* vol. 35, no. 2 (1988) pp. 161–190.
86. For an appreciation of the particular situation of sturgeon fisheries and evidence that cultural values do not necessarily constrain the wanton impulses of the market, see Frank J. Tough, "Depletion by the market: Commercialization and Resource Management of Manitoba's Lake Sturgeon (*Acipenser fulvescens*), 1885–1935," *Fishing Places, Fishing People*, Newell and Ommer, eds. pp. 97–120.
87. Sarah Carter, *Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990). See also, Sarah Carter, "Two Acres and a Cow: 'Peasant' Farming for the Indians of the Northwest, 1889–97," *Canadian Historical Review* vol. 70, no. 1 (1989) pp. 27–52; Sarah Carter, "Agriculture and Agitation on the Oak River Dakota Reserve, 1875–1895," *Manitoba History* no. 6 (1983) pp. 2–9; and Sarah Carter, "'We Must Farm To Enable Us To Live': The Plains Cree and Agriculture to 1900," *Native Peoples: The Canadian Experience* 2nd ed., R. Bruce Morrison and C. Roderick Wilson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995) pp. 444–470.
88. Carter, *Lost Harvest*s, p. 50.
89. Carter, *Lost Harvests*, p. 158.
90. However, the significance of Hayter Reed's ideas might be overstated, see Rob Innes, Brenda Macdougall and Frank Tough, "Band Economies, 1897–1915," *Atlas of Saskatchewan*, Ka-iu Fung, ed. (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 1999) pp. 59–60. With respect to the mixed economies of this era, see Peter Douglas Elias, *The Dakota of the Canadian Northwest: Lessons for Survival* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1988); and Carl Beal, "Money, Markets and Economic Development in Saskatchewan Indian Reserve Communities, 1870–1930," Unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1994).
91. Carter, *Lost Harvests*, p. 193.
92. Carter, *Lost Harvests*, p. 258.
93. A good example in which wage labour has been erased from ethnography and history is Hallowell's studies on the Lake Winnipeg Ojibwa carried out in the mid-1930s; however, even more contemporary versions of ethnography have not seen fit to acknowledge Ojibwa involvement in frontier capitalism. See A. Irving Hallowell, *The Ojibwa of Berens River, Manitoba: Ethnography Into History*, edited with Preface and Afterward by Jennifer S.H. Brown (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publisher, 1992). Knack and Littlefield explained the ignoring of Native American Indian participation in wage labour by ethnographers and ethnohistorians: "Anthropological fascinations with the 'traditional,' or compulsions to salvage the 'aboriginal' before it became hopelessly contaminated by the 'modern,' may account for part of the silence;" and "... the habit of studying the Indian community as separate from the non-Indian, have all too often led to constructions that treat Native life as an isolate." Knack and Littlefield, "Native American Labor: Retrieving History, Rethinking Theory," *Native Americans And Wage Labor*, Littlefield and Knack, eds., p. 3.
94. Tough, "Changes To The Native Economy", pp. 47–48; and Tough, *As Their Natural Resources Fail*. However, Steven High is skeptical about the existence of a more diversified economy and wage labour of the post-1870 fur trade era or that it offers any advantages over the "independent" production of what was in reality a stagnating fur trade. To classify Native participation in fur trade as independent production is clearly an inadequate concept in light of mercantile domination. High, Native Wage Labour, p. 256. Declining fur prices demonstrate that the fur trade was stagnating and that new resources industries held certain advantages. Consequently, many Natives from the York Factory and Oxford House areas migrated to Lake Winnipeg because of a buoyant fishing industry.

95. Rolf Knight, *Indians At Work: An Informal History Of Native Indian Labour In British Columbia 1858–1930* (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1978). For the revised edition see, Rolf Knight, *Indians At Work: An Informal History of Native Labour in British Columbia, 1848–1930* (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1996).
96. Knight, *Indians At Work*, p. 7.
97. Knight, *Indians At Work*, p. 23.
98. Douglas Harris has reviewed the second edition of *Indian At Work* in *Native Studies Review*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1996) pp. 147–151. Harris challenged Knight's "exclusive reliance on a class-based analysis," and among other issues, Harris takes exception with Knight's view of land claims.
99. James K. Burrows, "'A Much-Needed Class of Labour': The Economy and Income of the Interior Southern Plateau Indians, 1897–1910," *BC Studies* no. 71 (1986) pp. 27–46. In preference for descriptive sources, many historians have chosen to ignore the income and economic data from the tabular statements of the annual reports of the Department of Indian Affairs.
100. Burrows, Economy and Income, p. 46.
101. Percy Gladstone, "Native Indians and the Fishing Industry of British Columbia," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* vol. 19, no. 1 (1953) p. 20. This is an excellent and rare example of an early interest in Indian economic history that not only provided a description of the industry but also considered: contrasts between the modern industry and the traditional fishery, the affects of conservation regulations, and racial divisions within the industry.
102. A recent study on the Indian lands in British Columbia see Cole Harris, *Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002).
103. John Lutz, "After the fur trade: the aboriginal labouring class of British Columbia 1849–1890," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* vol. 3 (1992) pp. 69–93.
104. Lutz, After the fur trade, p. 70.
105. Lutz, After the fur trade, p. 81.
106. Lutz, After the fur trade, p. 87.
107. Knight, *Indians at Work*, p. 196.
108. Lutz, After the fur trade, p. 91.
109. Lutz, After the fur trade, p. 91.
110. Fred Wien, *Rebuilding the Economic Base of Indian Communities: The Micmac in Nova Scotia* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1986) p. 12. For details on Micmac labour history see Harald E.L. Prins, "Tribal Network and Migrant Labor: Mi'kmaq Indians as Seasonal Workers in Aroostook's Potato Fields, 1870–1980," *Native Americans And Wage Labor*, Littlefield and Knack, eds., pp. 45–65.
111. Wien, *Rebuilding the Economic Base*, p. 27.
112. Wien, *Rebuilding the Economic Base*, p. 28.
113. Wien, *Rebuilding the Economic Base*, p. 30.
114. Robin Fisher, *Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774–1890* 2nd ed. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992) p. xix.
115. Fisher, *Contact and Conflict*, p. xix. In this respect, the historical and contemporary involvement in forestry by the Tsimshian is outlined in Charles R. Menzies and Caroline Butler, "Working in the Woods: Tsimshian Resource Workers and the Forestry Industry of British Columbia," *American Indian Quarterly* vol. 25, no. 3 (2001) pp. 409–430.
116. Dianne Newell, *Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1993) p. 25.
117. Carter, *Lost Harvest*, pp. 234–235. Clearly, the inclusion of these data was an affectation and not an effort to test the main findings. Not only was a trend constructed by ignoring data for every second year, but also a line graph was used, which provides a misleading impression by suggesting continuous data over a compact time period. Such flawed treatment of simple numbers may be a good reason for traditional historians avoiding these sources of data.
118. Innes, Macdougall and Tough, Band Economies, pp. 59–60.
119. See also Helen Buckley, *From Wooden Ploughs to Welfare: Why Indian Policy Failed in the Prairie Provinces* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992).
120. Steven High, "Responding to White Encroachment: The Robinson-Superior Ojibwa and the Capitalist Labour Economy, 1880–1914," *Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society Papers and Records* vol. 22 (1994) p. 34.
121. High's use of "many" implies a quantity, when in fact no numbers are revealed. The names of historians that had rejected these data after investigation were not provided nor was any literature cited in support of this claim. High, Native Wage Labour, p. 262 [emphasis added].
122. Ray, *Canadian Fur Trade*, pp. 202–209.
123. Beal, "Money, Markets and Economic Development;" and Burrows, "Economy and Income."
124. High, Native Wage Labour, p. 262.
125. High, Native Wage Labour, p. 262.
126. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1908, Annual Report for the Department of Indian Affairs, 1907, Paper No. 27, p. 75 (hereafter CSP, 1908, Indian Affairs, 1907, No. 27).
127. CSP, 1905, Indian Affairs, 1904, No. 27, p. 118. Similarly, when asked by the Indian agent why he did not grow potatoes, a Hollow Water band member elucidated: "he and the family were nearly always away during the growing season and he could buy potatoes cheaper than he could raise them." CSP, 1905, Indian Affairs, 1904, No. 27, p. 114. It is evident that there were better ways to secure incomes than to adhere to the

priorities of the Department of Indian Affairs, and evidently some Indian agents did not allow policy, or what we claim to be policy today, to blind them from reality.

128. Frank Tough, "Regional Analysis of Indian Aggregate Income, Northern Manitoba: 1896–1935," *Canadian Journal of Native Studies* vol. 12, no. 1 (1992) p. 144.
129. CSP, 1901, Indian Affairs, 1900, No. 27, p. 159.
130. National Archives of Canada, public records of the Department of Indian Affairs, Record Group 10, vol. 9803, Saddle Lake Agency Daily Journal, 1899, no. 7 (hereafter NAC, RG 10). This journal has been incorrectly catalogued as belonging to the Meadow Lake Agency.
131. CSP, 1910, Indian Affairs, 1909, No. 27, p. 188.
132. NAC, RG 10, vol. 9083, Daily Journal 1909, no. 13.
133. NAC, RG 10, vol. 9083, Daily Journal 1909, no. 13.
134. NAC, RG 10, vol. 9083, Daily Journal 1909, no. 13.
135. CSP, 1900, Indian Affairs, 1899, No. 14, p. 106.
136. High, The Robinson-Superior Ojibwa and the Capitalist Labour Economy, pp. 34–35. In this instance, High was not troubled by the inability of Indian agents to count accurately the canoes belonging to the far-flung Amerindians. With respect to the sources and value of incomes, High did not standardize these data in terms of per capita income, and he selected only five years from a fifteen year period. Nonetheless, the data was adequate to provide a description of the Ojibwa participation in the capitalist labour economy.
137. Even in more recent times getting a handle on the subsistence activities is not without controversy, see Peter J. Usher and George Wenzel, "Native Harvest Surveys and Statistics: A Critique of Their Construction and Use," *Arctic* vol. 40, no. 2 (1987) pp. 145–160. A very thorough account of documenting the Native economy can be found in Terry N. Tobias and James J. Kay, "The Bush Harvest in Pinehouse, Saskatchewan, Canada," *Arctic* vol. 47, no. 3 (1993) pp. 207–221.
138. With respect to fur trade social history, a very tempered critique of anecdotal sources and a case for using employment and accounting records is found in Arthur J. Ray, "Reflections on Fur Trade Social History and Métis History in Canada," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* vol. 6, no. 2 (1982) pp. 91–107.
139. E.H. Carr, *What is History?* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961) p. 16.
140. For an insightful discussion of Eurocenterism and economic history, see Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998) pp. 1–51.
141. CSP, 1901, Indian Affairs, 1900, No. 27, p. 88.
142. CSP, 1901, Indian Affairs, 1900, No. 27, Part 2, Tabular Statements, pp. 240–241. With respect to fishing and hunting values it was noted: "The Estimated Value of Fish and Meat used for Food is included in these columns."
143. With respect to these Indian Affairs data, I discuss in some detail the logical relationship between income and accumulation of personal effects. For example, if certain Indian assets appreciated or were valued higher than the initial value, then accumulated wealth might have exceeded the income required to make such investments. See Tough, Regional Analysis of Indian Aggregate Income, p. 107.
144. Archives of Manitoba, Hudson's Bay Company Archives, A.74/1-46, District and Post Balances.
145. E.P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978) pp. 28–29.
146. Eleanor M. Blain, "Dependency: Charles Bishop and Northern Ojibwa," *Aboriginal Resource Use in Canada*, Abel and Friesen, eds., p. 103.
147. Frank, *ReOrient*, pp. 134–135.
148. Paul Strathern, *Dr. Strangelove's Game: A Brief History of Economic Genius* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2001) p. 33.
149. David Newhouse, "Aboriginal Economic Development in the Shadow of the Borg," *Journal of Aboriginal Economic Development* vol. 3, no. 1 (2002) p. 109.
150. For a discussion of an enduring stability in the core of Cree culture and the basic irrelevance of the fur trade to economic change, see Paul C. Thistle, *Indian-European Trade Relations in the Lower Saskatchewan River Region to 1840* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1986) p. 34.
151. See Jarvenpa and Brumback, Microeconomics of Southern Chipewyan Fur-Trade History, *The Subarctic Fur Trade* pp. 147–183.
152. A useful discussion of this problem is found in Melisa L. Meyer and Russell Thorton,"Indians and the Numbers Game: Quantitative Methods in Native American History," *New Directions In American Indian History*, Calloway, ed., pp. 5–29.
153. This argument about connections between peoples was made very forcibly by Eric R. Wolf, *Europe And The People Without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
154. See M.H. Watkins, "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth," *Approaches To Canadian Economic History*, W.T. Easterbrook and M.H. Watkins, eds. (Toronto: Macmillan Company, 1978, original 1967) pp. 49–73.
155. Tough, Aboriginal Rights, p. 245.
156. In the academic literature, economic arguments have been used to negate Aboriginal claims, for examples, see: Gerhard Ens, "Dispossession or Adaptation? Migration and Persistence of the Red River Metis, 1835–1890," *Canadian Historical*

Association Papers (1988) pp. 120–144; Thomas Flanagan, "The Market for Métis Lands in Manitoba: An Exploratory Study," *Prairie Forum* vol. 16, no. 1 (1991) pp. 1–20; and Thomas Flanagan and Gerhard Ens, "Metis Land Grants in Manitoba: A Statistical Study," *Histoire Sociale/Social History* vol. 27, no. 53 (1994) pp. 65–87.

157. Throughout *A History of the Canadian Economy*, Norrie, Owram and Emery asserted that the fur trade was not dominated by European merchant capitalists. One curious proof of their position (page 126) claimed that: "The failure of a European currency system to penetrate the country indicates the degree to which the indigenous population retained economic development in the region." This is an extremely problematic assertion, and somewhat ahistorical, in that it is not clear that any serious or sustained attempt was ever made to introduce European currency into the fur trade, and thus, no actual failure ever occurred. Furthermore, the Made Beaver system of exchange was convertible to English Sterling, thus commercialization of the economy occurred on terms that by and large suited mercantilism. There was, in fact, no need by Europeans or Indians to make use of European currency. Those familiar with the fur trade will know that European currency was not necessary for mercantilism to extract profits. In later years, the HBC did what it could to slow down the introduction of cash, in opposition to the desire of Native trappers. In fact, European currency would have tended to undermine monopoly power since it would have given producers the opportunity to disconnect production and consumption, however such a realization is not possible for those that conceive of monopolies as an economic aberration. Furthermore, their notion that indigenous economic development occurred during the fur trade is more of an ideological position than historical fact, and as an ideological assertion it requires ignoring the capital accumulation by European merchants over several centuries. Since no reason existed and no effort was made to introduce European currency into the fur country, Norrie, Owram and Emery have derived a conclusion about Native economic development out of thin air.
158. Henry Abelove, *et al*., eds, "Interview with E.P. Thompson," *Visions of History* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) p. 20.
159. Jennifer S.H. Brown, "Northern Algonquians from Lake Superior and Hudson Bay to Manitoba in the Historic Period," *Native Peoples: The Canadian Experience*, R. Bruce Morrison and C. Roderick Wilson, eds., (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986) p. 229. For the original stereotyping of exploitation, see Harold Hickerson, "Fur Trade Colonialism and the North American Indians," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* vol. 1, no. 2 (1973) pp. 15–44. Discussions of exploitation need not be one-dimensional, as E.P. Thompson noted "The making of the working class is a fact of political and cultural, as much as of economic, history," *The Making of the English Working Class* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986, original 1963) p. 213.
160. Peter R. Mitchell and John Schoeffel, eds., *Understanding Power: The Indispensable Chomsky* (New York: New Press, 2002) p. 207.
161. RCAP, *Report*, Vol. 2, *Restructuring The Relationship*, part 2, p. 776.
162. RCAP *Report*, Vol. 2, *Restructuring The Relationship*, part 2, p. 788.
163. The various dimensions to the involvement of Caughnawaga Mohawk in large construction projects was first brought to light by Joseph Mitchell, "The Mohawks in High Steel," published in Edmund Wilson, *Apologies to the Iroquois* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959) pp. 3–36. Mitchell's chapter on Mohawks in High Steel was first published in *The New Yorker* (1949). See also, Bruce Katzer, "The Caughnawaga Mohawks: The Other Side of Ironwork," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* vol. 15, no. 4 (1988) pp. 39–55. A somewhat vagarious account is given by Arthur Einhorn, "Warriors of the Sky: The Iroquois Iron Workers," *European Review of Native American Studies* vol. 13, no. 1 (1999) pp. 25–34.
164. High, Native Wage Labour, p. 263. It is difficult to appreciate High's finding on this point also. Apart from Lutz's explicit claim on the Potlatch motivation, there is no validity to High's pronouncement that such a consensus exists. Several of his characterizations of the literature indicate a lack of credibility. For example, the obvious contradictions between the underpinnings of Rolf Knight's *Indians at Work* and Hugh Brody's, *Maps and Dream: Indians and the British Columbia Frontier* (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1981) have eluded High. His views can also be fanciful, in his perfunctory review of the literature he stated that "... only Menno Boldt has systematically applied the dependency/world systems model to native history." High, Native Wage Labour, p. 249. For several reasons, this declaration by High is completely false: (1) Boldt is not a historian; (2) others have, in fact, employed world system or dependency theory to Canadian Native history; and (3) Boldt did not make any use of world system theory (let alone systematic application), at least not a version of it recognizable by the works of Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Ander Gunder Frank, or Immanuel Wallerstein. An examination of Menno Boldt's *Surviving as Indians: The Challenge of Self-Government* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) reveals no references to the literature on world system theory or dependency theory, to authors such as Wallerstein or Frank.

Boldt simply uses the term "dependence" to describe the need for government funding by band councils and for social assistance for individuals. This usage can hardly be equated to the political economy concepts of world systems theory. In fact, Menno Boldt's *Surviving as Indians* is a pretty mainstream, atheoretical approach, which is not a criticism of this important study, but illustrates High's confusion. There is no justification for claiming that world systems theory is part of Boldt's analysis.

165. Newhouse, Resistance is Futile, pp. 79–80.